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
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The LONG ARM of LEE



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THE LONG ARM OF LEE

VOLUME II



VIRGINIA, 1864

By William L. Sheppard,
Private Second Company,
Richmond Howitzer Battalion, 1861-65.
Pinxit.

THE LONG ARM OF LEE

OR

THE HISTORY OF THE ARTILLERY OF THE
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

With a Brief Account of the Confederate Bureau
of Ordnance

BY

JENNINGS CROPPER WISE

ILLUSTRATED

TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

1915

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CHAPTER XXVI

CHANCELLORSVILLE—SUNDAY, MAY 3D

WHEN Stuart arrived and took command, he was entirely ignorant of the situation except as to its general features. Rodes' plan to wait for the morning was approved by him and all activity was postponed until dawn. Stuart then set about making a personal and general reconnaissance and directed Col. Alexander, in his capacity as Chief of Artillery, to examine the ground for artillery positions.

A careful reconnaissance extending throughout the night convinced Alexander that a frontal attack through the dense woods against the enemy's works and artillery position would prove most costly to the Confederates, even if successful. The Federal infantry in the far edge of the forest not only lay behind exceptionally strong breastworks, with the approaches well protected by abattis, but a powerful artillery was massed behind individual epaulments on the crest of the hill behind and within easy canister range of the woods, through which an attack would have to be made. He soon found that there were but two possible outlets by means of which the Confederate artillery could be brought to the front. The first was the direct route of the Plank Road debouching from the forest beyond the schoolhouse and the junction of that road with the Bullock Road at a point not over 400 yards from the position of the hostile guns, part of which enfiladed the roadway for a long distance towards the woods. In advance of their main artillery position, the enemy had placed three pieces of Dimick's Battery behind an earthwork across the road and abreast of the infantry line. Even a casual examination of this route was sufficient to convince Alexander of its impracticability for the advance of artillery, which could only move up the narrow road in column of pieces and would, therefore, be destroyed piecemeal be-

fore it could be thrown into action. The utmost dash and gallantry of the gunners would simply be sacrificed in such circumstances.

The second outlet was a vista, some 200 yards long, a lane cleared on both sides to a width of 25 yards, which ran parallel to the Plank Road about 400 yards to the south. This vista terminated at its eastern end in the narrow dirt road leading from Hazel Grove to the Plank Road and it was in this clearing that Col. Winn's men had abandoned the two guns and three caissons, which they had captured from the train of the 3d Corps about 6 p. m., subsequently recovered by Sickles. It was reached from the Plank Road not only by the dirt road running to Hazel Grove 1,000 yards to the south, over which route Pleasonton had dispatched the regiment of cavalry to Howard's assistance, but by a second road half a mile to the rear of the Confederate infantry line. Pegram had from the first appreciated the value of the opening, and, as we have seen, had posted Chamberlayne with a section in it the evening of the 2d in support of McGowan's right, from which position Chamberlayne had been able to deliver a more or less random fire through the woods when Sickles' left collided with McGowan's right, about midnight.

At dawn, Alexander posted 17 guns as follows: Capt. E. A. Marye, of Walker's Battalion, with two Napoleons and two rifles in the clearing about the school-house, at which point Pender's line crossed the Plank Road, and a short distance in rear, and also on the road, Capt. Brunson with his battery of four rifles, of the same battalion. It was necessary for the latter to fire over Marye's head, for in no other way could the guns be placed. Capt. R. C. M. Page, of Carter's Battalion, was placed with three Napoleons in the thin woods some 300 yards south of the Plank Road and on the dirt road leading to Hazel Grove, to fire upon the enemy's infantry lines until ordered elsewhere. Lieut. Chamberlayne of Walker's Battalion, with two Napoleons, was masked in the pines at the eastern end of the vista to assist the

infantry in its advance and then accompany it, while Maj. Pegram, with Davidson's and McGraw's batteries of Walker's Battalion, took position at the western end of the vista. Placing four Napoleons on a small cleared knoll 400 yards to his rear to fire over the trees at the enemy's smoke, he held his entire command well in hand to advance down the vista and the dirt road towards Hazel Grove, when circumstances should permit the occupation of that position. Alexander's, Brown's, Carter's, Jones', and McIntosh's battalions were held in the rear in column along the Plank Road.

Col. Alexander convinced Stuart that the Hazel Grove position, which commanded Fairview Heights, was the key to the Federal line, and Archer's Brigade which had come up during the night and formed on McGowan's right, thus occupying the extreme right of the Confederate line, was ordered at daylight to seize the hill, which Sickles had all but abandoned. Archer at once advanced through the woods, driving the handful of Federal skirmishers before him, and charged about 400 yards across the open fields in front of the Hazel Grove position. Pressing up the slope, his men seized the hill and captured the four pieces of artillery. Within 90 minutes after the attack commenced, Hazel Grove was in possession of the Confederates, its wanton desertion by Sickles having destroyed all chance of a successful resistance by Hooker, in the lines then occupied by his troops.

Stuart was now to reap the benefit of Alexander's judicious disposition of the artillery, for at 5 A. M. the latter ordered Maj. Pegram to move forward and occupy Hazel Grove, and Col. Carter to move as many of his pieces as possible up to the schoolhouse. Pegram, all in readiness, responded, and before 6 A. M. had placed Chamberlayne's Battery of his own battalion and Page's of Carter's Battalion in position on the forward crest of Hazel Grove. The sight that met his eyes was one to fill the soul of an artilleryman with joy. Less than 1,500 yards to the northeast the enemy's position

lay before him, and his own guns almost completely enfiladed those of the enemy in the road and were able to deliver an oblique fire upon the others on Fairview ridge. Meantime, Col. Carter had moved up to Marye's position at the schoolhouse, with six pieces of his own battalion. Without hesitating a moment, Pegram opened with his eight pieces upon the enemy, joined by Carter's group of ten on the road, thus at the outset subjecting the enemy's guns to a cross fire.

But until the Artillery opened fire, Stuart had not recognized the vast importance of Archer's capture, and while Pegram and Carter were getting into position, a useless sacrifice of Lane's and Ramseur's men had been made by furiously hurling them against Berry's and Williams' intrenchments in the woods, from which the Federals were, however, driven back upon their main line just in front of Fairview. After an hour of desperate fighting, Stuart's whole line was in turn driven out of the works, and Archer himself was forced to fall back to Hazel Grove, where he took up a position in support of Pegram's guns. It was clear now that extreme efforts would be required to drive the Federals from their strong position, for Hooker had established the 1st, 2d, and 5th corps on his line, threatening to turn the Confederate left where a desperate conflict was raging.

Meanwhile Stuart had seen the value of Pegram's position, to which Alexander had, meantime, ordered Moody's and Woolfolk's batteries and Parker's section of his own battalion, with ten guns under Maj. Huger, and Brooke's, Smith's, and Watson's batteries of Brown's Battalion under Capt. Watson, Lusk's, and Wooding's batteries of McIntosh's Battalion under Maj. Poague, and Tanner's and Carrington's batteries of Jones' Battalion, all of which immediately went into action. McIntosh with a rifled section of Thompson's Louisiana Battery of Jones' Battalion moved down the road to Brunson's position, while Maj. Jones with portions of W. P. Carter's, Reese's, and Fry's batteries

of Carter's Battalion, Tanner's Battery of his own, and a section of Taylor's Battery of Alexander's Battalion, twelve pieces in all, moved further to the front and to the left of the schoolhouse group of ten pieces, now under Maj. Braxton. Col. Carter about this time assumed control of his own, Huger's, and Poague's batteries at Hazel Grove and Col. Walker of Brown's, Pegram's, and Jones' batteries at that same point.

Alexander states that perhaps 50 guns were engaged at Hazel Grove, though not over 40 at any one time, as the batteries had to be relieved from time to time to replenish their ammunition. The fire which Pegram, then Walker and Carter, conducted from this point was perhaps for an hour the most continuous and rapid ever delivered by the Confederate Artillery. Every caisson had to be well filled during the night, yet many of them were emptied within the hour, some of the better-served pieces, those under Pegram, firing as rapidly as three rounds a minute, which was an exceptionally rapid rate for the time.

As an artillery position, Hazel Grove was ideal and Alexander's battalion commanders made the best of it. Somewhat greater in elevation than Fairview, its bushy crest all but obscured the Confederate guns, well drawn back from the view of the enemy, whose shells bursting beyond the narrow ridge, or in the depression in front, were quite harmless. Few reached their difficult target, while the Federal position presented an extensive and easy target to the Confederate guns. It is remarkable how the Federal cannoneers managed to maintain their fire against such odds, yet they did so and although severely punished by Alexander's artillery, their guns formed the rallying point for Hooker's troops below them in the woods, and they inflicted terrible losses upon Hill's attacking infantry. Had the Confederates been provided with good ammunition for their guns, it is doubtful if the Federal Artillery could have made the stand it did. An extraordinarily large percentage of the Confederate shells failed to burst, and

many were even more ineffective by reason of premature explosions. With the very best ammunition the error of the fuse, and consequently the area of dispersion, is large, but the mean burst is easily ascertained and ranging becomes fairly simple and accurate. On the other hand, ranging with the Confederate ammunition was extremely difficult. The writer has heard this point discussed by numerous Confederate artillery officers, who declared that ranging with them was ordinarily mere guess work, and that frequently a dozen bursts gave them no knowledge whatever of the true range. Indeed it was most discouraging to the Confederate gunners to fire and fire upon a perfectly visible target under the easiest conditions, and see not a sign of effect from their shells, and this is a fact which must be considered by the artillery student of the war.

Soon Anderson united with Stuart's right, the former moving his left up to Mine Creek from the furnace, while Hardaway followed with three rifles of Jordan's Battery. Before moving off, Hardaway left Capt. Dance with one rifle of Jordan's Battery, one Napoleon, and one howitzer of Hupp's and two howitzers of Hurt's, with instructions to follow Mahone's advance along the Plank Road to the east. Dance at once occupied a fine position on a knoll to the right of the road, and about 900 yards from the enemy's breastworks.

Proceeding along the ravine, Hardaway encountered Gen. Lee, who had selected a position on a wooded hill, which the Major was directed to prepare for his three guns, and from which he opened an active fire upon the Fairview guns, after the axmen with great labor had cut a roadway thereto.

By 9 A. M. the Federal artillery fire had appreciably slackened, many of the guns having exhausted their ammunition since no provision was made to resupply them in spite of the urgent requests of the officers. Besides, the Federal Artillery had suffered severely from the terrible cross fire, which Carter, Pegram, and McIntosh, now reënforced by Hardaway's guns, had been directing for nearly two hours upon Fairview.

It was at this juncture that the veteran commander of the Richmond Letcher Battery, Capt. Greenlee Davidson, received his mortal wound at the very moment of victory. In the words of Maj. Pegram, he was "one of the most gallant, meritorious, and efficient officers in the service."

About this time Col. Walker assumed the active direction of his battalion, of which Pegram had sent Davidson's and Chamberlayne's, together with Page's of Carter's Battalion, to the rear to replenish their ammunition. Col. Brown also assumed active control of the artillery of the 2d Corps.

Concerning the Federal artillery position and the effect of the Confederate fire, Capt. Clermont L. Best, 4th United States Artillery, Chief of Artillery, 12th Corps, after explaining how his guns had been intrenched during the night of May 3d, had the following to say: "Our position would not have been forced had the flanks of our line of guns been successfully maintained. An important point, an open field about a mile to our left and front, guarded by a brigade of our troops (not of the 12th Corps) and a battery—was seemingly taken by a small force of the enemy and the battery captured and turned on us with fearful effect, blowing up one of our caissons, killing Capt. Hampton, and enfilading Gen. Geary's line. It was most unfortunate. My line of guns, however, kept to its work manfully until 9 A. M., when, finding our infantry in front withdrawn, our right and left turned, and the enemy's musketry so advanced as to pick off our men and horses, I was compelled to withdraw my guns to save them. We were also nearly exhausted of ammunition."

The remarks of Capt. Best are much more conclusive of the service rendered by Alexander and his batteries than anything the Confederate gunners themselves might have said. The effect of Alexander's fire Gen. Hunt also characterized as fearful.

The Federal line of battle was now along the heights below and a short distance west of Fairview. Sickles' Corps connecting with Slocum's on the left, occupied this line to the Plank Road and across it. On his right was a portion of the 2d Corps and beyond behind breastworks thrown up during the night along the Ely's Ford Road, and separated by a small interval from Couch, lay the 1st Corps under Reynolds. On Slocum's left and facing towards Fredericksburg the 5th Corps opposed McLaws, while the remnants of Howard's Corps was massing beyond Meade. Thus Hooker still had 60,000 infantry in line while the combined strength of Stuart, Anderson, and McLaws, after the losses of the 1st and 2d, was not over 40,000. But the *élan* of Stuart's men had not waned in spite of the unsuccessful attempts of the morning to drive the enemy from their strengthened line, and each minute the efforts of the Confederate Artillery became more telling. There was nothing for Stuart to do but to organize a fresh attack. The spirit of the brave leader as he rode the lines encouraging his men was contagious. Entirely relieved of anxiety for his right flank by the union with Anderson's line in that quarter, he now massed his infantry on the left to drive the enemy out of the position from which they were threatening his flank, to the support of which Ramseur's Brigade had been sent. Finally, about 9:30 A. M., a third assault was made and the Federal line was broken by the sheer valour of Jackson's infantry. The Artillery had meantime crushed the Fairview batteries, the very keystone of the whole structure of resistance.

As the Confederate infantry surged forward through the woods, Carter, Jones, and McIntosh dashed down the road and up the slopes of Fairview to the crest, while the batteries at Hazel Grove crossed the valley in their front, and, joining with the others in action, poured a whirlwind of fire upon the retiring Federals and their batteries, the latter withdrawing to their ammunition trains.



MAJOR JOHN PELHAM
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY
Killed at Kellysville, 1863

The Federals now endeavored to make a stand near the Chancellorsville house, but without success. Enfiladed from the west by Carter's group, fired upon from their right front by Pegram's batteries and from their front by Jordan's guns, which Hardaway had meantime brought upon the southern edge of the plateau, and entirely without breastworks, their resistance was gallant but brief. At this juncture, Hooker, while standing on the porch of the Chancellor house, was put *hors de combat* by a fragment of brick torn from a pillar by one of Jordan's shells, and did not recover for several hours. For a time his defeated army was without a leader.

About 1 A. M., Lee joined Stuart near the Chancellor house and directed that both infantry and artillery replenish ammunition and renew the assault. The enemy having stubbornly fallen back to a line of works prepared by Warren, running along the Ely's Ford and United States Ford roads, with its apex at the White House, thus covered their avenues of retreat.

When the Federals fell back to their works after being shelled for about an hour, the Confederate batteries at once advanced to the turnpike and threw up hasty intrenchments from which a desultory fire was maintained upon that portion of the line near the White House. About 3 P. M. Colston's Division, which had been temporarily withdrawn, reformed, and, resupplied with ammunition, was ordered by Gen. Lee to move forward towards the United States Ford for the purpose of developing the enemy's position. Page's Morris Battery of Napoleons accompanied Colston. Hardly had Colston's men been set in motion when the enemy opened upon them with twelve pieces of artillery from a barbette battery on an eminence, and although Page replied to this fire for half an hour or more, nothing serious was attempted and Colston was directed to draw off and intrench. Meanwhile Maj. Hardaway with thirteen rifled pieces, including two of Fry's, two of Marye's, and two of W. P. Carter's, Jordan's four rifles

and three of Hurt's, was ordered to accompany Gen. Anderson to the river for the purpose of shelling the enemy's wagon trains on the north bank near Scott's Dam, about 11½ miles below the United States Ford.

The Confederates had before noon practically come to a standstill on the Chancellor plateau, for disquieting news had reached Gen. Lee from the rear. Sedgwick had finally forced Early's flimsy line and compelled the Confederates opposite Fredericksburg to fall back. Operations about Chancellorsville were perforce suspended while Gen. Lee's attention was directed to the new danger.

CHAPTER XXVII

CHANCELLORSVILLE, CONTINUED—FREDERICKSBURG AND
SALEM CHURCH—MAY 3D

WE left Early and Pendleton on the morning of the 2d disposing their men and guns to oppose as best they could Sedgwick's advance, the Federals pretty much in the same position and attitude they had assumed the evening before. Before 10 A. M. Gen. Early, however, directed Maj. Andrews to feel the enemy with his guns, and accordingly Maj. Latimer opened with two rifles on that portion of the hostile line near Deep Run, while Graham's and Brown's Parrotts on Lee's Hill directed their fire upon the infantry and batteries massed near the Pratt house, driving them to cover. Latimer drew no fire, but two batteries on the north bank and several on the south side of the river responded with energy to that of Graham's and Brown's guns. Soon after this affair, Early rode to the left to confer with Pendleton, who was directing the disposition of Walton's guns along the Stansbury Hill, with a view to firing upon the enemy's masses about Falmouth. While he was with Pendleton, Col. Chilton, Gen. Lee's Adjutant-General, arrived with verbal orders for him, directing that he move at once to Chancellorsville with all his infantry but one brigade, and that Gen. Pendleton should withdraw all the artillery along the Telegraph Road, especially all the heavier pieces, to Chesterfield, except eight or ten guns which were to follow the rest when forced by the enemy to do so. Early and Pendleton both advanced many objections to the withdrawal of their forces at such a time, which in their opinion would only invite the advance of the enemy, but were informed that the commanding general was convinced of the wisdom of crushing Hooker's force and that, having done so, he could then return to Fredericksburg and drive Sedgwick off if necessary. To do this, all his

infantry was needed, but more artillery about Chancellorsville would be superfluous, and the small detaining force was only expected to delay Sedgwick long enough for the Artillery and trains to withdraw. Such was the substance of Chilton's remarks. The orders as delivered to Gen. Early left him no discretion and, much against their will, he and Pendleton, about noon, set about executing them. Hays' Brigade was directed to relieve Barksdale's Regiment in the town and to remain with Pendleton's artillery force. It was late in the afternoon, however, before the infantry column moved off from Early's line along the military road from Hamilton's Crossing to the Telegraph Road, and then along a cross road leading into the Plank Road, followed by Maj. Andrews with his own battalion and Graham's Battery.

Pendleton had, before noon, ordered Nelson's Battalion to withdraw first since it was least exposed to the view of the enemy. The three 20-pounder Parrotts of Rhett's Battery were replaced by the lighter and less valued pieces of Patterson's and Fraser's batteries. Lieut. Tunis with the Whitworth moved over from the extreme right and with Rhett's Battery and Nelson's Battalion retired along the Telegraph Road while Richardson's Battery which Walton had detached to Early's line rejoined its battalion. Col. Cabell also withdrew Carlton's Battery from Lee's Hill and moved to the rear in command of the entire column of 22 pieces. Pendleton, therefore, retained in position after noon but 15 guns. Of these six guns of the Washington Artillery and Parker's two 10-pounder Parrotts were held in position on Marye's Hill and the ridge to the left, Fraser's three and one of Patterson's guns on Lee's Hill, and three of Patterson's on the ridge back of the Howison house. During the withdrawal of his batteries, Pendleton resorted to every subterfuge to make it appear to the enemy as if additional guns were being brought into position. After remaining idle the greater part of the afternoon, the Federals at last began to send

forward their skirmishers and to mass on the north bank as if to cross. Pendleton now ordered Col. Cabell to return with Carlton's Battery.

Upon arriving with the head of his column at the Plank Road leading to Chancellorsville just before dark, Early received a note from Gen. Lee saying that he was not expected to withdraw his division from Fredericksburg, if by remaining Sedgwick could be checked, as by neutralizing the 80,000 Federals with his 10,000 men Early could render far greater service than he could at Chancellorsville. Thus had Chilton misunderstood the commanding general's directions, and led to an all but disastrous movement in Lee's rear by denying Early and Pendleton all discretion in the execution of the orders he transmitted to them. The incident well illustrates the danger of verbal orders and from orders in any form emanating from one not actually conversant with the conditions in remote quarters of the field of operations. What Gen. Lee had intended for instructions were transmitted as positive orders.

Early had hardly received the message from Gen. Lee when he was informed by Gen. Barksdale through a courier, at the rear of his column, that the enemy had advanced in force against Hays' weak line, and that both Hays and Pendleton had sent word that all the artillery would be captured, unless they received immediate relief. Meantime Barksdale, with rare good judgment, and in the exercise of that initiative on the part of a subordinate so valuable on such occasions, had retraced his steps with his own regiments, followed by Gordon's Brigade. Early at once gave the order for his main column to do the same.

Sedgwick, upon discovering the Confederate withdrawal, had crossed the remainder of his corps about dark, and moved towards the River Road, or Bowling Green Road, below the town, driving Col. Penn's Regiment of Hays' Brigade back to the line of the railroad, and then formed line with his main body along the river. Fortunately, he had not seriously attempted to

take the town. The heavy masses of the enemy seen at Falmouth, earlier in the day, were the troops of the 1st Corps under Reynolds moving to the left to reënforce Hooker.

Between 10 and 11 p. m. Early's Division reoccupied its old line and skirmishers were thrown out towards the River Road, Barksdale again occupying the town and Hays moving to Early's right. Before notice of Early's decision to return reached Pendleton he had, after deliberate consultation with Hays, withdrawn the Artillery, Walton's batteries moving off first, followed by those on Lee's Hill. But Pendleton had scarcely reached the Telegraph Road with the rear batteries, when he met Barksdale returning to the field and was told by him that the orders were to hold Fredericksburg at all hazards. Pendleton, as well as Hays, who was at Marye's Hill supervising the final preparation for the retirement of his brigade, was naturally much puzzled by the incomprehensible conflict of orders they had received during the day, but was finally assured by Early himself that the confusion had resulted from Chilton's mistake, and that since Barksdale and Gordon had both returned of their own accord he had thought best to reoccupy his lines so long as it was possible to do so. Pendleton, in complete coöperation with Early, though much perplexed, and weakened by having sent so many of his guns to the rear, promptly directed Walton and Cabell to reoccupy their positions, the former being assigned to the command of the artillery on Marye's Hill and the latter to that on Lee's and the Howison Hill. It was 1 p. m. when the 19 guns, including those of Carlton's Battery, remaining for the defense of so important a position, were reëstablished in position.

At 11 p. m. Sedgwick received a much belated order from Hooker to march upon Chancellorsville with all haste. Leaving one division to cover his rear and skirmish with the Confederates in its front, he moved his other two divisions up the river towards Fredericks-

burg. Had Hooker's orders been duly received, his advance would have been all but unopposed. Even now delays occurred, and although Gen. Warren arrived at 2 A. M. to hasten forward his movement, the head of Sedgwick's column did not enter the town, but 3 miles from the bridge at Franklin's Crossing, until daylight. Having detected the movement of the enemy, and believing that Sedgwick's main effort would be made on the left, Pendleton at once advised Early, who dispatched Hays' Brigade from his right, to reënforce Barksdale near the town.

Meanwhile, Gibbon had thrown a bridge at the town and crossed over with his division of the 2d Corps. With the Federal advance were several batteries, to engage which Pendleton directed Walton to send a section of artillery to the most advanced works on the left. Meantime Barksdale had directed Maj. Eshleman to move a piece of Miller's Battery, which commanded the Plank Road leading from the town, to the left front, thus unknown to Pendleton uncovering the most important approach to Marye's Hill.

To meet the enemy, Early now had 7 companies of Barksdale's Brigade between the Marye house and the Plank Road, 3 companies on the Telegraph Road at the foot of Marye's Hill, and 2 regiments on the ridges of Lee's and Howison's hills, while one of Hays' regiments covered Barksdale's right and 2 occupied the Stansbury ridge. The extreme right was held by Hoke's and Smith's brigades with Andrews' Battalion of artillery and Richardson's and Graham's batteries in their old works.

Very shortly after daylight Sedgwick commenced demonstrations at Deep Run as if to turn Hoke's line, throwing forward his skirmishers up the ravine formed by the stream. In spite of Latimer's fire, a large body succeeded in reaching the railroad behind which it remained while several Federal batteries played upon Latimer's guns. Andrews now brought Graham's and Brown's batteries from the right to the support of Lati-

mer's two Napoleons, and also Carpenter's rifled section, which engaged in a duel with the enemy's artillery as well as firing upon their infantry. Finally Hoke moved out and drove the enemy from behind the railroad embankment, while Andrews' batteries played upon the retiring troops.

As soon as the advance division (Newton's) of Sedgwick's Corps had entered the town, four regiments were sent forward to attack the Confederate line in rear of it, advancing over the ground made famous in December by the desperate charges of Burnside's divisions. Once more the brave Federal infantry pressed up to within a few paces of the stone wall and rifle pits at the base of the hills, while Pendleton's batteries poured shell and canister into their ranks with dreadful effect, and Barksdale's men, reserving their fire until the last moment, hurled the attacking columns back in a blizzard of musketry fire. Once more the enemy withdrew to cover behind the accidents of the ground, while their batteries in the town poured their fire with unrelenting vigor upon Marye's Hill. At all points Sedgwick's men were repulsed, but it was apparent to the defenders that the ever-increasing force in the town was only temporarily balked. The glorious news of Jackson's victory at Chancellorsville, which had just been received, inspired the gray line to redouble its efforts.

Sedgwick now determined to turn the Confederate position and directed Howe with his rear division, on the left of Hazel Run, against the opposing line, while Gibbon was ordered to move up the river from the town and turn the Confederate left. But Howe found the works in his front and those which extended beyond his left occupied, while the stream on his right deterred him from assaulting Marye's Hill in flank, and Gibbon's advance was barred by the canal behind which on the Stansbury Hill were the men of Hays' Brigade, and the pickets of Wilcox's Brigade on Taylor House Hill. Information of Gibbon's movement was at once sent Wilcox, who, leaving one section of Lewis' Battery and

50 men at Banks' Ford, had hastened down in person with the other section of the battery under Lieut. Nathan Penick, and threw his guns in action first on the Taylor House Hill, then on the Stansbury ridge. Soon he also brought up Moore's (Huger's) Battery, two rifles of which on the Taylor House Hill engaged the enemy's guns in Falmouth and on the plain below, for about two hours, while the latter sought to prepare for Sedgwick's final efforts.

When Gibbon and Howe, whose men unable to advance also sought the cover of the ground, reported the impracticability of turning the Confederate position, the resolute Sedgwick determined to storm the opposing works. For this purpose, Newton's Division in front of the town was to be organized into two columns for the assault of Marye's Hill, while Howe was to move up Hazel Run and attack Lee's Hill. Newton's two columns, of two regiments each, with two regiments in support, moved forward on the right of the Plank Road while Col. Burnham with four regiments in line of battle, to the left of the road, charged directly upon the rifle pits at the base of Marye's Hill. The works against which these troops charged were now held by but two regiments supported by six guns on the hill above under Walton, who directed a withering fire of canister upon the enemy. As before, the Federals reeled and broke, only to be rallied and led back with the same result. But under a flag of truce for the purpose of allowing the enemy to recover their dead, the fire in this quarter was now suspended. This action by the Confederates was entirely unauthorized by proper authority and was due to the strange good nature of a gallant officer, Col. Griffin of the 18th Mississippi, who received the flag and honored the request in spite of the fact that Howe was actively engaged in attacking Hays' line only a few hundred yards to his right. Not only did Griffin suspend the fire on his portion of the line, but he allowed his men to show themselves, and when Newton was apprised by his returning officers how weak the line was which had

repulsed him, the three columns were ordered forward again upon the termination of the local truce. It was now that the full effect of Chilton's dreadful blunder, as well as Barksdale's unwarranted interference with Pendleton's dispositions, were to be felt. Instead of 37 guns in position to repel the enemy, there remained less than half that number, and the direct approach up the Plank Road instead of being completely dominated by Miller's guns was exposed only to the fire of the six pieces on the hill, above and behind the stone wall, the few defenders of which finding themselves assailed from every side by superior numbers were unable to check the onset. The Federals dashed on up to and over the works, completely overpowering the Mississippians, most of whom were either killed, wounded or captured in the desperate hand-to-hand conflict which ensued. Thus did Griffin reap the whirlwind which he had sown. It was now 11 A. M., and so rapid had been Newton's final assault that Hays and Wilcox, the latter having by this time assembled a portion of his brigade on Taylor's Hill, had not had time to come to Barksdale's aid. The enemy, after securing the works at its base, swarmed up Marye's Hill and seized five of Walton's guns and Parker's two to their left, before they could be withdrawn, but the gunners kept to their work to the last. Seeing Newton's success, Pendleton at once caused the guns on Lee's Hill to be directed on the enemy on Marye's Hill, and brought up two pieces of Patterson's Battery from near the Howison house, which opened fire from the brow near the Telegraph Road. Just at this moment Richardson's Battery arrived at the Howison Hill from the right, from whence it had been dispatched by Early, and was sent by Pendleton to join Walton, who assumed direction of the guns firing upon Marye's Hill, while Barksdale formed a regiment in line to the left of the Telegraph Road in their support.

The enemy now advanced his batteries on the plain in support of Howe's column, which vigorously assailed Lee's Hill. Upon these Carlton's and Fraser's bat-

teries under direction of Col. Cabell poured a rapid fire of canister, but they, too, were forced to withdraw as the infantry supports in their front fell back along the Telegraph Road, contesting every foot of ground. In withdrawing, Richardson was compelled to abandon a piece, the horses of which were all shot down. Fraser, in the meantime, had been directing the fire of his left piece upon Marye's Hill, while his other piece and Carlton's Battery continued to hurl canister upon Howe's men. Not until the enemy all but reached their guns did Fraser and Carlton withdraw them, the former saving both his guns by substituting a caisson limber for a gun limber which had been blown up. While directing this difficult task under a galling fire, Lieut. F. A. Habersham, of Fraser's Battery, was struck in the head and killed by a large fragment of shell, but his body was borne from the field on the shoulders of his cannoneers. Cabell now led his two batteries to the rear along the Telegraph Road and formed Carlton's for action near the pump at the Leach house, while Early hurried up with his troops from near Hamilton's Crossing and formed them on the line which the remnants of Barksdale's Brigade was holding in front of the Cox house, about two miles in rear of Lee's Hill. Walton had been ordered to the rear along the Telegraph Road, and directed to occupy the first favorable position with his remaining guns. Soon the enemy brought a battery into action near the brick house in rear of the Howison house and engaged Carlton, who replied until his ammunition was expended, when Walton was ordered to bring up his ten pieces and relieve Carlton and Fraser, the former having lost one man killed and eight wounded in the duel.

One incident in connection with Carlton's Battery should here be mentioned, as it illustrates the coolness and heroism of the Confederate gunner. An unexploded shell fell among Carlton's guns with the fuse still burning. Its explosion would have certainly caused the death of several men. Without pausing an

instant in his work, Lieut. Thomas A. Murray, who was busily engaged in sighting his piece, called private Richard W. Saye's attention to the dangerous projectile which lay at their feet and Saye, picking it up, hurled it over the parapet of the work. The shell burst as it fell to the ground in the ditch beyond.

Pendleton in his report mentions the mortification he experienced in seeing Walton's and Patterson's guns captured by the enemy. Fortunately the day has come when it is considered an honor and not a disgrace for the artillerymen to lose guns in such circumstances. In this affair it does not appear that any criticism can be made to the discredit of the gunners, for they remained at their posts until the last, and by the nature of the ground were cut off from saving their guns. The artilleryman who feels that he must save his pieces, or be disgraced before his comrades in arms, finds a strong incentive to "pull out" before actually necessary, and where such a spirit prevails the subaltern who cannot view the whole field in its general aspect is too apt to anticipate the crisis and retire his guns when by remaining in action a few minutes longer he might materially influence the issue. Then, too, the guns give the bravest infantry additional assurance. Nothing is more inspiring to a sorely pressed infantry than the nearby crash of supporting guns and nothing more disheartening to the foot soldiers than the sight of their artillery supports drawing off from the post of danger. Upon such facts the more modern and sounder rule has been based that artillery when practicable must seek positions in close proximity to the advanced infantry, and remain with it until to do so longer becomes but a useless sacrifice of men and guns. The mere personal knowledge that their batteries are still in the fight is of great moral support to the infantrymen who must after all bear the ultimate shock of an assault driven home. If by losing a single piece or many, the force of the enemy's blow can be reduced by the artillery to within the limits of the defending infantry's power of resistance, then by all

means the guns should be gladly lost and much honor accorded the gunners who are resolute enough to lose them, for it must be remembered that if the infantry is overborne and swept from the field, the artillery as a rule must fall with it. Let us all be thankful that the old idea that under no circumstances must a gun be lost, a rule which continued to be accepted from the time of the War of Liberation to the Franco-German War, has at last been abandoned, and that Bernadotte's proud boast that in all his battles he had never lost a piece no longer does him any credit in the eyes of the world.

This point is well covered by Hohenlohe, who discusses at length the evils which flowed in 1866 from the Prussian batteries withdrawing from the front line to refit, or when their ammunition ran short. Of course, there were exceptions even then, such as in the case of Von der Goltz's Battery at Königgrätz. Ordinarily, however, they were too prone to fall back when custom and the regulations warranted it. But before 1870, the German artillerymen had learned that to lose guns was not dishonorable and at Chateaudun instead of a battery withdrawing when its ammunition had been exhausted and its material greatly injured, the battery commander made his cannoneers mount the limbers and sing the "Wacht am Rhine" until the commanding general should see fit to order them to retire or until a fresh supply of ammunition might arrive.

That Pendleton's batteries remained long enough at their posts at Fredericksburg is amply attested by their losses. In Walton's Battalion of Washington Artillery, there were four men killed, and four wounded, including Lieut. De Russy, besides the losses in material etc., which was two 8-inch rifles of Squire's, one 12-pounder howitzer of Richardson's, one 12-pounder Napoleon of Miller's, and a 12-pounder howitzer and a 12-pounder Napoleon of Eshleman's Battery, four limbers, one caisson, and 29 horses. In Lieut. Brown's section of Parker's Battery, the loss including the section commander was 28 officers and men captured, two 10-

pounder Parrotts, 2 limbers, 2 caissons, and 28 horses. Patterson of Cutt's Battalion lost 3 men wounded, one Napoleon, one 13-pounder howitzer, 2 limbers disabled, and 4 horses killed, while Fraser lost one officer killed and one caisson and limber by explosion. Carlton's loss was one man killed, 10 wounded and 8 horses. Later Patterson's two pieces were recaptured, so the total loss of the artillery under Pendleton was 6 officers, 64 men, total 70; 8 guns and limbers, 4 caissons and 64 horses.

Sedgwick, as we have seen, did not press along the Telegraph Road, but followed the direct route to Chancellorsville along the Plank Road. Wilcox, cut off by the Federal advance from Early, instead of trying to establish connection with him, determined to delay Sedgwick's progress as much as possible. He, therefore, and with a keen perception of the best part he was able to play, drew up his brigade in line on a ridge running from Stansbury Hill to a point on the Plank Road some 500 yards in front of the Guest house, and placing two rifled pieces of Moore's and Lieut. Barksdale's section of Penick's (Lewis') batteries in his front, shelled the Federal troops on Marye's Hill and the adjacent height at a range of about 800 yards. For a time this checked the enemy, but soon their skirmishers advanced to within 400 yards of the guns with dense lines following. A force that was sent below the Plank Road threatened to turn Wilcox's right, whereupon he ordered Moore and Penick to retire and withdrew his men along the River Road to a point half a mile in rear of Dr. Taylor's house. In this affair, Lieut. Barksdale, of Lewis' Battery, was severely wounded. So active were Moore and Penick that Sedgwick mistook them for a horse battery.

The slowness and caution with which the Federals advanced encouraged Wilcox to move back to the Plank Road and again seek to delay their progress towards Chancellorsville. Deploying a troop of cavalry which he happened to have with him, in some pines in rear of Downman's house, he moved his brigade and five

batteries to Salem Church, about five miles from Fredericksburg, where Cobb's rifled section of Penick's Battery went into position near the toll gate, while Moore's Battery sought a position 1,000 yards to the rear near the church itself. In the meantime one of Early's aides had informed Gen. Lee of the loss of the position in his rear, whereupon, as we have seen, he postponed his assault on Hooker's new lines, and dispatched McLaws with Mahone's, Wofford's, Semmes', and Kershaw's brigades to the support of Wilcox.

Upon forming line in front of Salem Church, Wilcox calmly awaited the arrival of the head of Sedgwick's column, which soon came up pushing Maj. Collins' small cavalry detachment down the road. Lieut. Cobb now opened fire with his two pieces, but was almost immediately driven from his position by a battery with the Federal advance guard, and fell back upon Moore's position, soon followed by Wilcox's Brigade, which reformed on the line already occupied by McLaws' troops at Salem Church.

Leaving Wofford at the junction of the turnpike and Plank Road, McLaws formed his line of battle perpendicular to the latter in front of the church, with Mahone on the left, Semmes next, then Wilcox across the road, and Kershaw on the right. Wofford took position on Kershaw's right when ordered up, while the two batteries remained in the road. Wilcox placed a number of his men in the church and also some in a schoolhouse about 60 yards in advance of his line. These dispositions had hardly been made when Brooks' Division moving forward rapidly in line of battle, and athwart the road, with Newton's Division in close support, rushed into the open space between the toll gate and the church, while Sedgwick's batteries drove Moore and Penick from the road after the latter had fired a single shot. Thus McLaws was left entirely without artillery in the engagement which followed. The Confederate line, however, lay well retired, in a thick growth of woods which afforded much shelter from the hostile guns.

After shelling the woods for about 20 minutes, the Federals advanced, Bartlett's Brigade, which boasted it had never been repulsed, on the left of the first line. On came the charging troops, cheering as they entered the woods, but when they had pressed to within 80 yards of the Confederate line they were received by a tremendous volley of musketry which momentarily checked the advance. In spite of the Confederate fire, Bartlett's brave men soon recovered their formation and swept on, taking the schoolhouse and its small garrison as it passed. But Wilcox, having held a regiment in reserve, now hurled it upon Bartlett's disordered line, and after a desperate encounter at close quarters, the Federals were broken and pressed back past the schoolhouse. Brooks' right had also been checked and broken. Sedgwick hurried forward his second line to save the day, but all in vain, for Semmes and Wilcox advanced their entire brigades and drove the enemy from the field clear back to the toll gate in a dangerously prolonged pursuit. At that point Sedgwick's massed reserves, together with the closing in of night, forbade further progress on the part of the Confederates. Meanwhile, Col. Alexander with his battalion and Maj. Hamilton with Manly's and McCarthy's batteries of Cabell's Battalion, had been ordered from the Chancellorsville plateau down the Plank Road to the support of McLaws, but arrived too late to take part in the engagement. The necessity of withdrawing these guns from so critical a point was due simply to the fact that Gen. Lee was entirely without an artillery reserve. Every piece, except those of Nelson's Battalion, which had been ordered to the rear as a result of the disastrous verbal order erroneously transmitted by Chilton, was engaged. Salem Church was in effect a rear guard action, and for use in such a contingency reserve artillery was created. One cannot fail to see how crippled the commander-in-chief had been by the loss of two of his battalions. Had they been present, Pendleton's two battalions would no doubt have been available as a reserve,

instead of being committed at the outset. As a reserve, these battalions would have been held at Gen. Lee's immediate disposal, and would have, therefore, been among the first troops to arrive at Salem Church in support of Wilcox. McLaws would then have had Nelson's and Cutts' six fresh batteries, with which to repulse Sedgwick instead of parts of two much-damaged ones, without ammunition enough to remain in action at the critical moment. Since Gen. Lee was able to withdraw Alexander's four and Hamilton's two batteries from Chancellorsville, it is apparent that he would have been free to dispense with Pendleton's six batteries had they been present, and without weakening his front by taking so many guns from his advanced lines.

The sturdy Wilcox had, however, almost without artillery fought a superb rear guard action. Few better examples of the kind are to be found. In the nick of time, he had interposed his small force between the enemy and Lee's rear, after Early and Pendleton had been forced from the path. But much credit is also due Early and Pendleton, for they with 10,000 men and a few guns had for the better part of two days neutralized Sedgwick's whole corps of 30,000 men. Wilcox's Brigade had lost 500 officers and men, but Bartlett's Brigade alone of some 1,500 men had experienced casualties aggregating 580.

Sedgwick's line now extended from the river above Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg, and during the night a bridge was thrown at the ford.

CHAPTER XXVIII

CHANCELLORSVILLE—MAY 4

AN hour before sunset on the 3d, Early was informed that McLaws was moving down the Plank Road to meet Sedgwick, and that he, Early, was expected, if possible, to coöperate with McLaws in overwhelming the enemy's column. Early was then three miles from Salem Church and, satisfied that he could render no assistance to McLaws at so late an hour, advised him that he would concentrate his force during the night, and endeavor to drive the enemy from Lee's and Marye's hills at dawn, throwing forward his left to connect with Wofford on the right of Salem Church. Both Lee and McLaws approved this plan.

It was late in the evening when Early succeeded in concentrating his division, one battery only with a regiment of infantry in support being left on the right of the Cox house ridge, so as to guard the flank beyond the Telegraph Road against any movement of the enemy up the Deep Creek Valley. Early's plan was to advance along the Telegraph Road with Gordon's Brigade in the front line, followed by Andrews' Battalion of artillery and Graham's Battery, with Smith's and Barksdale's brigades in rear forming a second line, and to throw Hays' and Hoke's brigades across Hazel Run opposite his position so as to move down the left bank while he attacked the heights held by the enemy along the road. Upon recovering Marye's and Lee's hills, he proposed to occupy them with Pendleton's batteries and Barksdale's men while Hays and Hoke, crossing Hazel Run at the ford on his left, connected with McLaws, and Gordon and Smith moved along the Plank Road up river.

At dawn, Gordon moved off along the Telegraph Road and found Lee's Hill unoccupied, but a body of hostile infantry moving westward along the Plank

Road halted and took position behind an embankment of the road between Marye's Hill and the ridge above. In the valley between Guest's and Downman's houses, there was also a large body of the enemy's infantry and a battery at the latter house. Andrews, who had accompanied Gordon, now placed Graham's Battery in position on the Telegraph Road along the western face of Lee's Hill, and opened on the enemy's troops in the valley, while Gordon's skirmishers descended the hill and advanced upon them. At this juncture, two large bodies of hostile infantry, probably brigades, crossed the ridge just beyond the Alum Spring Mill and threatened Gordon's left, as his line advanced, but Graham shifted his fire upon them and drove them to cover. Gordon then made a dash across the run and after a sharp encounter drove off the enemy behind the road embankment, captured some prisoners, several commissary wagons, and a battery wagon and a forge with their teams. This gave Early possession of Marye's and Cemetery hills again, and while Smith moved up to the support of Gordon, Barksdale reoccupied the sunken road behind the wall at the base of Marye's Hill, under a heavy fire from the batteries on Stafford Heights, and was ordered to seize the town itself, the bridge head, and a large wagon camp seen there. But Barksdale was unable to occupy the town, which was still held by Gibbon's Division of the 2d Corps, and the wagon train decamped.

Having disposed of the enemy's infantry, Graham turned his two 20-pounder Parrotts upon the battery at Downman's which had been free to fire upon him, and drove it off to the Guest house out of reach.

The enemy now held a line of shallow trenches extending from Taylor's Hill to the brow of the hill beyond Alum Spring Mill, while Gordon and Smith had occupied the trenches along the crests from the Plank Road towards Taylor's Hill, with their backs towards Fredericksburg. Smith was now ordered to advance towards Taylor's Hill, and in pressing forward up the

slope was opened upon by the Federal batteries at the Taylor house with such effect that his movement was checked. The enemy appeared in such strength and inflicted such losses upon him that his brigade was withdrawn to its former position.

Hays' and Hoke's brigades had, meanwhile, moved down the left bank of Hazel Run, and had taken up a position from which they could connect with McLaws' right, by moving across the ridge on which Downman's house stood, and of this fact Early now notified McLaws. McLaws did not attack, however, but informed Early that Anderson was coming up to his support. When these troops began to arrive at Salem Church, Early drew Hays and Hoke further back to his right, placing the former in line at the base of the Alum Springs Hill, from which concealed position the brigade might move up the wooded slope on to the plain above, which was occupied by the enemy. Hoke was concealed in the woods on the lower end of the Downman house ridge. Gen. Lee now arrived and, personally examining Early's dispositions, approved his plan of attack, which was for Hays and Hoke to press forward to the Plank Road, while Gordon supported by Smith endeavored to sweep the crests in front of him, and to turn the Federal left resting on the river.

Sedgwick's main line covered the Plank Road for some distance on the south side, its center on the ridge along which the road runs and both flanks retired and resting on the river above and below. His main artillery position was within his line and at the Guest house, while other guns were on his left front facing Early. Skirmishers were thrown out upon the ridges in his front.

When dawn broke, no communication had yet been received from Hooker by Sedgwick, and he was still under orders to move to Chancellorsville. At an early hour, Early's movements in the latter's rear had caused him to deploy Howe's Division facing to the rear and perpendicular to the Plank Road. His scouts had reported

that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, had arrived from Richmond and occupied the heights at Fredericksburg. At once abandoning all idea of taking the aggressive, Sedgwick was bent only upon crossing the river, but this in spite of the bridge at Banks' Ford, now within his line, he did not dare attempt by daylight. And so, with a line much attenuated and facing in three directions, east, south, and west, he awaited events. At last a welcome dispatch from Hooker, which authorized him to cross at Banks' Ford, or fall back upon Fredericksburg, and directing him not to attack, was received; but a little later another message arrived urging Sedgwick to hold a position on the south bank, to which he replied that he was threatened on two fronts, that his line was a poor one for defense, and that his bridge was endangered, closing with a request for assistance. Receiving no reply to this message he decided to remain in position until nightfall. Howe's Division still extended from the river to a point a short distance south of the Plank Road. Brooks' Division was on the right of Howe, forming line at right angles with him, and parallel to the road, while Newton's Division formed the west front occupying its position of the evening before and extending to the river above the bridge.

Anderson had arrived at Salem Church by midday, and after some delay his three brigades were moved into line on Early's left. Between Anderson's left and McLaws' right, the latter confronting Newton's Division, a large gap existed which was to be closed as the whole line advanced upon the enemy. The Confederate line from Lee's Hill to McLaws' left was six miles or more in extent.

Pendleton after reestablishing Walton's guns on Marye's Hill and Fraser's Battery with a number of others on Lee's Hill, moved Carlton's Battery and Ross's which had rejoined him from Port Royal during the night, as far forward from the Telegraph Road towards the Guest house as possible, and also attempted

to find a good position for the Whitworth with which Lieut. Tunis had returned. Andrews with his battalion occupied positions along the Telegraph Road, while Alexander had sent Taylor's (Eubank's), Woolfolk's, and Moody's batteries of his own battalion under Maj. Huger to coöperate with Anderson's brigades. Moody's Battery moved far off to Anderson's right towards the Telegraph Road. Manly's Battery remained with Wilcox near the church.

It was not until 6 P. M. that McLaws gave the signal for attack, when Hoke moved at once across the plateau between Downman's house and Hazel Run, under cover of Ross's and Carlton's fire, then down the slope, across the valley, and up the steep ascent of the Plank Road ridge, driving the enemy's skirmishers before him, while the hostile guns at the Guest house played upon, but failed to break, his line. Hays also swept the enemy's advance line from his front. These two brigades with unsurpassed ardor pressed on without halting for a moment, and were lustily cheered by the gunners in their rear whose fire was masked by the advance. From the artillery positions along the Telegraph Road, the sight was indeed an inspiring one, and filled the hearts of the artillerymen with enthusiasm and admiration for the gallant infantry which they were powerless to assist.

Gordon had advanced along the Plank Road ravine, formed in line, and with the utmost *élan* swept on towards the Taylor house. Brushing the enemy's skirmishers from the forward crests, he forced the artillery on that flank to retire rapidly, only halting when the Federals had been driven pellmell from Taylor's Hill towards Banks' Ford. Even the guns at the Guest house had been compelled to fly in order to escape capture. Thus had the enemy been thrown into confusion on all sides when Hoke was wounded, and his brigade, colliding with Hays' men in the woods, lost its direction and was thrown into confusion beyond the Plank Road. Hays' Brigade pressed on with such men of Hoke's as had mingled with it, but having also be-

come disordered in the woods, was checked by a retiring force of the enemy, which had been rallied to meet the advance and which drove the Confederates back to the Plank Road. Here Hays succeeded in rallying the regiments of the two brigades to the support of which Early brought up a part of Smith's Brigade. But before the Confederates could be reformed, night had fallen, and with Smith's two regiments in front, Hays' and Hoke's brigades rested in position along the Plank Road. Gordon had also come to a standstill by reason of the approach of darkness, on the Taylor House Hill confronting the enemy's left. McLaws' Division had not advanced at all. Anderson's Division had pressed forward on Hoke's left, driving the enemy's skirmishers, which confronted his center, from the Downman house and the upper part of the ridge, but it did not cross the Plank Road until dark, and none of its batteries were engaged. When the attack came to an end, Posey extended Early's left, with Wright further down the road, towards Salem Church. Beyond Anderson was McLaws with two of Alexander's batteries and Hardaway's group on the river road on his left.

During the early morning Alexander had been directed to post some of his guns so as to prevent Sedgwick from advancing along the River Road to unite with Hooker at Chancellorsville, and for this purpose he had placed Jordan's Battery on a bluff commanding the road, where the guns were intrenched. These guns were now able to fire upon Banks' Ford, as were those of Andrews' Battalion, which had been moved up to the Taylor House Hill when the battle ended. Manly's Battery was also most effective in firing upon the retreating enemy, while Hardaway with a number of batteries was nearby.

We have seen that after the seizure of the Chancellorsville plateau on the 8d, Hardaway had been dispatched to Scott's Dam with 18 rifled pieces. Some time was required for the assembling of his force, the organization of his column, and the refilling of his caissons.

The roads were also very heavy and difficult and it was well after dark before Hardaway, moving northward along the River Road, came up to the position of the 8d Virginia Cavalry near the Hayden house, with 10 of his guns. Gen. Anderson had meantime halted Hurt's three pieces on the road some distance in rear, as the weight of the carriages was such that it was doubtful whether the teams could draw them through the mud.

Hooker's wagon trains, in park and with camp-fires burning, were plainly visible at the base of a hill about a mile from the bluffs on the south bank of the river, when Hardaway in company with an engineer officer reconnoitered the ground. About 3 A. M. he brought up his 10 guns to the bluff in front of the Hayden house, and after firing 15 rounds per gun, the pieces were limbered up and started back through the mud to Chancellorsville, while Hardaway remained to discover by daylight the effect of his fire. The horses of the train when fired upon had been picketed in a field on the slope of the hill on the river side of the wagon park. Many of them had been killed or injured, as well as some of the teamsters, and a number of wagons had been destroyed by shelling. But the results of such an enterprise are never very serious, and have practically no effect upon the main operations of the enemy. It is exceedingly doubtful if in this case the injury inflicted by Hardaway was worth the ammunition expended.

While the column was returning the enemy made a demonstration on the south side of the river below United States Ford as if to cut off Hardaway's command, whereupon the batteries were hurried to the rear, leaving Anderson's skirmishers to check the attack, which proved not to be serious.

Anderson was now ordered to proceed to Salem Church, and Hardaway's artillery detachment was directed to follow. Upon approaching the church, Alexander halted Hardaway's command, directing Parker with his remaining section to join it. Sending Jordan's Battery to the position on the River

Road before referred to he set out to determine what position was best for Hardaway to occupy. In a short while the latter was directed to move his guns from the Plank Road to Smith's Hill to the north and drive off a Federal battery on the north bank of the river, which had enfiladed McLaws' line whenever it attempted to advance towards Fredericksburg. It was now about 10 A. M., and meanwhile Anderson had commenced to move forward, directing Hardaway to follow him to the right of the church. Under this conflict of orders, Hardaway galloped forward to consult Anderson, who referred him to Gen. Lee. Since Alexander had sent Maj. Huger with the 10 guns of his own battalion to the right in support of Anderson, Hardaway was ordered to comply with the orders of the Chief of Artillery, which he proceeded to do.

Hardaway had been informed that he would find pits for his guns at Smith's Hill, but upon arriving at the designated position, found intrenchments for but four pieces. Many of his men and horses had been without rations for 24 hours, while they had been continually on the move since leaving Chancellorsville the evening before. So sultry and oppressive was the day that a number of his gunners fainted while engaged in the work of clearing away the timber and digging gun pits. But at last the axe details from the gun detachments completed their work, and most of the pieces were in position and fairly well protected before the attack was ready to be made.

To the left of Jordan's four pieces, which occupied a position across a ravine, and some 900 yards down the road, W. P. Carter's four guns were posted on the bluff, with Fry's two guns to the left of him. Parker's section and three pieces of Penick's (Lewis') Battery occupied pits on a knob to the left rear and some 40 feet higher than the bluff on which Carter and Fry were posted. Hurt with a Whitworth occupied a pit at the bend of the ridge 80 yards or more to the left of the knob, while 200 yards to the rear and 100 to the left McCarthy's

two guns and Marye's two held the ridge. Lieut. Ferrell's section of Hurt's Battery was kept in reserve.

The part played in the action of the day by Hardaway's command, while a secondary, was quite an important one. As soon as Early, Anderson, and McLaws became engaged, his guns opened upon the Federal Battery of eight pieces in earthworks about a house on the bluff of the north bank, and immediately opposite Smith's Hill. Other Federal guns soon came into action, two from a point 400 yards below, and two in a thicket 200 yards above the main battery. The fire of these 12 guns was principally directed at the four guns of McCarthy's and Marye's batteries and the Whitworth, all of which stood in the open. At one time the fire of Hardaway's right guns was all but silenced, which enabled the enemy to concentrate more successfully on those to the left. But going to the right of his position, Hardaway in person encouraged his gunners to redouble their efforts.

Never in the war was a duel with the Federal artillery conducted under more disadvantageous circumstances. Although the shells were provided with the fuse-igniter attachment, but one Confederate shell in fifteen burst while the Federal ammunition was most effective. Hardaway, an officer of much scientific knowledge, afterwards declared that the meal powder was knocked off the fuses while they were being driven home with the mallet, but in spite of the fact that he was in effect using solid shot almost entirely, six of the enemy's guns in the central work were disabled, and the other two were driven from their position, while the remaining four pieces were practically silenced, though they maintained a desultory fire until after dark. Meantime, McCarthy's section, which had expended its ammunition, had been relieved by Ferrell's section of Hurt's Battery, and sent to the rear. Hardaway's task had been well executed, for by the continuous action of his guns, the fire of the Federal artillery on McLaws' left, hitherto so destructive to the infantry, had been completely diverted.

As night closed in a thick fog had settled over the field which added greatly to the difficulties of the Confederates, who were thus again balked of the fruits of victory by darkness, and the delay in attacking. Under cover of the fog, Brooks' and Newton's divisions reformed about the ford, and upon them Howe's broken division fell back and also reformed under cover of 84 guns on the north bank, protecting the bridge at Banks' and the one at Scott's Ford, a short distance below.

Sedgwick had suffered too severely to think of another day's battle with his troops in their present position. In two days he had lost over 5,000 of his men. He, therefore, advised Hooker that his position was commanded by the enemy's guns on the Taylor House Hill, and asked if he should risk remaining on the south bank. At 1 A. M. he received orders from Hooker's Chief of Staff to "withdraw under cover," and by 5 A. M. the entire corps had crossed the river and taken up its bridges. But the crossing had not been accomplished without some loss, for Alexander had during the afternoon busied himself establishing points of direction for night firing upon the position about the ford in anticipation of Sedgwick's retreat, and during the night Jordan was able to fire upon the masses huddled about the crossing, causing the enemy much annoyance.

This was perhaps the first instance of the employment of indirect fire by the Confederate Artillery. Jordan's position along the bluff to the left of the River Road, facing towards Banks' Ford, was obscured from the latter point by intervening ridges and thickets over which by means of Alexander's deflection marks the fire could be directed upon the enemy. About 1 A. M. Hardaway had also withdrawn Carter's and Fraser's four pieces on his right and shifting his line so as to face the ford, opened fire down the ravine leading thereto, but was soon directed by Alexander to cease firing as McLaws was sending two brigades in that direction. Riding forward to the picket line of the infantry to secure the exact direction of the pontoon bridges, and hearing

the artillery of the enemy crossing, Hardaway returned and again shifted his guns so as to deliver an indirect fire upon the approaches to the ford on the north side of the river, and caused his guns to fire from right to left, at the rate of about one shot a minute. About 2 A. M. Hurt's Whitworth was directed upon a deep hollow leading towards Falmouth, in which many stragglers, wagons, etc., could be seen by the light of the numerous fires along the line of retreat. Later it was turned upon a large wagon train concentrated at the junction of the Aquia Creek and United States Ford roads. Although the range was about 8 miles, the fire of the Whitworth was soon adjusted and created consternation in the wagon park, causing the train to disperse in the utmost disorder. The ammunition for the large rifle being very scarce and expensive the fire soon ceased.

All day on the 4th, Brown's, Walker's, McIntosh's, and Jones' battalions had been held in position along the Chancellorsville plateau, the cannoneers requiring no encouragement to throw up hasty works for the guns. With the exception of Walker's batteries, which had been turned over the night before to Maj. Pegram, none of the Artillery was seriously engaged, though most of the batteries fired upon the enemy's works from time to time. Early in the morning, 18 or 20 Federal guns opened fire upon Pegram's position on the Plank Road, and, after a somewhat protracted duel, ceased to fire. In this affair, Pegram seems to have had the better of it, for his guns all remained in position until the morning of the 6th, when the enemy's withdrawal was discovered.

While Sedgwick's last brigade was crossing, he received an order from Hooker countermanding the authority previously given for the withdrawal to which, at 5 A. M. Sedgwick replied that it was too late, and that the bridges were already being taken up while his men were much exhausted.

In spite of the fact that the enemy had escaped, it was with great elation on the morning of the 5th that Huger's and Andrews' guns fired the last shots across the river at Sedgwick's retreating columns, and that the Confederates at sunrise found themselves in complete possession of the southern bank of the river from Fredericksburg to Hooker's contracted position above Chancellorsville. The movement against Sedgwick had been a complete success, and even Gibbon had been withdrawn across the river from the town during the night, while Hooker had not ventured from his works to assist the inferior force which he had ordered up to his own relief. The whole situation presents a tactical anomaly. Hemming a vastly superior enemy up in his works in front of United States Ford, Lee had withdrawn much of his artillery and the larger part of two divisions of infantry from his front to hurl upon an equal force, which had already pushed his rear guard aside, and, uniting them with that broken rear guard, had assailed an entire Federal corps of 30,000 men, rated among the best of his adversaries, overthrowing it and driving it across the river at Banks' Ford, in some disorder at least, in the very face of the main army of the enemy. But still the bold commander-in-chief was not satisfied with what he had done. He knew that Sedgwick's Corps had suffered so severely in men and *morale* that it was not available for immediate service, even had it been transferred to Chancellorsville, instead of being headed for Falmouth. During the afternoon of the 5th, therefore, leaving Early's Division, Barksdale's Brigade and Pendleton's artillery to guard the river from Banks' Ford to the crossings below Fredericksburg, he ordered Anderson and McLaws to return to Chancellorsville with a view to assailing Hooker's position. What was known of that position satisfied every man in the Confederate Army that the worst was yet to come. Ninety thousand men behind works covering a front of five miles, which they had had 48 hours to prepare, with all the advantages which un-

limited quantities of timber, broken ground, and difficult approaches through a dense forest gave them for defense, with three-fourths of their front covered by streams on their southwest and northwest, and both flanks resting on a wide river,—this was the proposition now before some 85,000 Confederates. Not only would the attack have to be directed squarely on the Federal front, but little assistance could be expected from the Artillery. Impenetrable abattis covered the entire line, and the crest of the works was everywhere surmounted by head logs with loopholes, while in rear separate structures were provided for officers and supports from which the former could see and exercise control over the defenders, and from which the latter could be moved up to the advanced works under cover.

It is doubtful if in the whole military career of Gen. Lee, a bolder resolve on his part can be discovered than this one to hurl his troops upon Hooker's final position at Chancellorsville. But again, it must be conceded that in arriving at a decision, seemingly so rash, if not desperate, he had considered the moral attitude of his adversary. Again he did not count the number of noses and muskets as the supreme factor of his problem. The moral power of the enemy he regarded inversely as the strength of his breastworks and preparations for defense. It was the same unflinching determination which led him to order Longstreet and Jackson back to their lines at Sharpsburg the preceding September, that now enabled the great commander to approach the task before him in so resolute a manner. He saw too well in both cases the results which would flow from a more timid course, and he knew that Hooker, like McClellan, would fall a victim to imposition. Lee has been harshly criticised for even contemplating an assault on Hooker's lines, but the question may be asked his critics, what his position would have been had he lain supine upon the fields he had won? In a frank answer to this query is the vindication of his action, if any justification is needed. It was certainly

not for him to admit to the enemy by inactivity that his last bolt was spent, and invite the Federals to move out upon his army, weakened as it was by four days of tremendous effort and constant strain. Why, may we also ask, should Lee at this juncture, after once having assumed the aggressive, and with unparalleled audacity having divided his army in the face of a superior enemy, now resort to the defensive? Was the resolve to attack Hooker on the 5th more reckless than the actual attack which had been made on the 2d? Of the two decisions, the writer is inclined to consider Jackson's turning movement by far the more daring. But, whether so or not, Lee's willingness to take upon him the consequent risk of the maneuver, retaining under his immediate control but two small divisions, with a powerful enemy both in his front and rear, displayed a higher courage than was ever evinced by any other mortal man upon the field of battle. The maneuver of Jackson, the lieutenant, the lustre of which has all but obscured the other incidents of the campaign, was indeed brilliant, but the courage of Lee, the captain, who permitted it, was far more superb, for victory alone was not the stake—a nation hung in the balance.

No. On May 5, Lee did just what a general with exceptional power to divine the enemy's thoughts, and the boldness to act upon the latter's fears, should have done. He drew his sword once more to strike, knowing that the flash of the blade would itself strike terror to a heart already taking counsel of a timorous mind. And so, when his forces were again marshalled for attack, the blow became unnecessary; there was no adversary to meet him. Critics deal too much in numbers. They forget that moral force, in the words of Napoleon, is everything in war. Who shall say that the violent storm which caused Lee to postpone his attack on the afternoon of the 5th was not as welcome to Lee as to Hooker? We may surmise this with respect to the former. We have evidence from his hasty withdrawal across the river under its protection that it was welcome to the latter.

During the afternoon and before Anderson's troops had come up from Salem Church, the rain fell in torrents, converting the spongy soil into a vast quagmire. In spite of the almost impassable condition of the roads, Alexander who had reconnoitered the extreme Federal left during the morning, and had directed the scattered batteries to report to their respective corps, moved his own battalion by the River Road and set his men to work digging pits and preparing a position near the Childs house, from which to open upon the enemy behind Mine Run. The rain continued to fall, but all night the cannoneers kept at their work. Alexander's position, partly around the bend of the river and near the bank, was such as to enable his guns to deliver an oblique fire upon a hostile group of artillery on the enemy's extreme left.

As soon as Hooker learned from Sedgwick that the 6th Corps had abandoned the southern bank of the river, he too determined to withdraw to the north bank, but went through the idle form of calling his corps commanders together to hear their views. As it happened, the majority were of his own opinion, but judging from the frame of mind of the commander-in-chief, it is doubtful if he would have waived his own views had they all been opposed to them. During the 5th preparations were made for recrossing the Rappahannock and an interior line of works, running from Scott's Dam to the mouth of Hunting Run, was constructed to cover the withdrawal. At nightfall the retreat, greatly favored by the storm, began. First the Artillery crossed over the bridges, the ends of which were all but submerged by the rising current which threatened their destruction. By daylight the great mass of the Federal Army was on the north side, and by 8 A. M. the rear corps under Meade had crossed, leaving behind nothing but several field hospitals full of wounded soldiers. Meanwhile, at early dawn on the 6th, the storm unabated, while Lieut. Taylor of Eu-bank's Battery was placing his four Napoleons and



COLONEL ROBERT FRANKLIN BECKHAM
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY
Killed at Franklin, Tenn., 1864

Lieut. J. D. Smith, of Jordan's battery, his section in the six epaulments, which Alexander had constructed near the river during the night, they were suddenly fired upon by a group of guns across the river and squarely on their own flank. A number of men and horses were wounded and several dismounted limber chests exploded before the detachments succeeded in getting their pieces under cover. To this fire, Capt. Jordan, in command of the guns, was quite unable to reply. During the night the enemy had constructed works on the hill some 800 yards distant in which two batteries had been placed to prevent the occupation of Jordan's position, which commanded the lower bridge at Scott's Dam, and it was only now that it was discovered by the Confederate pickets that Hooker had abandoned his advanced lines, and that few Federal troops remained on the south side of the river.

The batteries on the north bank continued to hammer at Jordan until 9 A. M. when Alexander brought up Moody's Battery, a section of Parker's, and a 24-pounder howitzer of Woolfolk's Battery, seven pieces in all, which, aided by Jordan's guns, engaged the enemy. During the duel which ensued two fresh hostile batteries to the right of the others uncovered, and all being well protected Alexander commanded his guns to cease firing. Jordan's six pieces remained under cover in their pits, while the enemy continued to fire upon him until the other guns were withdrawn. This incident closed the operations of the Confederate Artillery in the battle of Chancellorsville, in which Alexander's Battalion alone had lost Brown's entire section of Parker's Battery by capture, 6 men killed, 25 wounded, 21 missing, and 46 horses killed, disabled, or captured, or a total loss in officers and men of 62, which was about twenty per cent of those engaged. The losses of Walton's and Cabell's battalions of the 1st Corps were 28 and 45, respectively, while Garnett's loss was probably not less than 25. In the 2d Corps, Brown, Walker, Carter, Jones, McIntosh, and Andrews together lost 150 men,

while the total loss in Cutts' and Nelson's reserve battalions and Beckham's horse batteries was about 30. The aggregate Artillery loss in personnel at Chancellorsville was, therefore, not less than 275, or in the neighborhood of seven per cent of the number actually engaged. For field artillery at this period the loss was enormous. But the loss inflicted upon the enemy's artillery had been still greater. In a report of casualties, which Gen. Hunt characterized as "imperfect," he states his losses as 5 officers and 50 men killed, 13 officers and 268 men wounded, 53 captured or missing, or an aggregate loss in personnel of 389, not including the horse batteries. In horses the loss was 389, and 14 pieces of superior ordnance were taken by the Confederates who themselves lost but 8. Although Hooker's entire loss aggregated 16,844 of all arms, that of his artillery was disproportionately large for the circumstances under which it was engaged.

Nor had the Federal Artillery by any means measured up to its former standard of efficiency. The reason is not difficult to discover. The command of the Artillery which had been committed to Hunt by both McClellan and Burnside was withdrawn from him by Hooker, and the splendid soldier whose services at Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg had won great fame for him as an artillerist, was relegated to a purely administrative duty. Not only was the superb organization which he had perfected much broken up by scattering the Artillery here and there, and giving the various corps and division commanders too high a degree of control over it, but many of the batteries, unknown to Hunt, were ordered to be left in camp on the north side of the river when Hooker's main force moved to Chancellorsville. The promotion and transfer of numbers of the old regular artillery officers to other branches of the service also deprived many of the divisional battalions of experienced commanders, and throughout the arm a great deficiency in the quality and number of field officers existed. For the command and administration of an arm with 412 guns, 980 carriages, 9,548 officers

and men, and 8,544 horses, besides the immense ammunition trains requisite for such a force of artillery, there were during the Chancellorsville campaign but five field officers of artillery present with the Army, and they were provided with miserably-inefficient staffs! Add to this the fact that there was no active head to the Federal Artillery until Col. Wainwright took command at Fairview on the morning of the 3d, and that Gen. Hunt was not given entire control until 10 P. M. that night, and the wonder is that Hooker's scattered batteries maintained themselves as well as they did. If Hooker were open to criticism as a general in no other respect the gross mismanagement of his artillery, the Federal arm *par excellence*, already famous the world over for the superiority of its organization and material and the high efficiency of its officers and men, would appear to be inexcusable.

Many writers speak of Hooker's movements up to the time his three corps reached Chancellorsville on the 30th, as exceptionally fine. If to dispatch one's entire cavalry force, with the exception of a small brigade, to another quarter of the universe on a wild-goose chase; if to leave a great part of one's artillery at the base and provide no chief for the rest, but commit it entirely to the control of corps and division commanders; if to pen one's infantry up in the heart of a forest without having even attempted a reconnaissance of the surrounding country, and leave every approach, except a single line of communication, open to be blocked by a nearby enemy known to be exceptionally bold and active; if such movements are correct, then Hooker's conduct of the campaign was indeed fine. But it seems to the writer that Hooker in disposing of his cavalry and demolishing his artillery in the way he did, committed acts which alone are enough to condemn any general guilty of such acts as inefficient and lacking in the fundamental conceptions of the tactics of the three arms combined. And such a view, it is believed, will universally obtain as time progresses and knowledge of events at Chancellorsville becomes more general.

But now as to the tactical employment and services of the Confederate Artillery, the actual operations of which have been so closely followed. From the standpoint of the effectiveness of its fire, we have but to consider the results it undoubtedly accomplished in the conflict with an artillery superior in numbers and material. Again the Federal reports teem with references to the severity and accuracy of the Confederate artillery fire; not one but mentions the Confederate guns in a way showing that the writer had in mind their fire as bearing a direct influence upon the issue of events at every point, and this in spite of the inferior grade of ammunition with which Lee's gunners were provided. We must at least concede, that with such a serious defect to overcome, an exceptional degree of energy and efficiency was required on the part of the personnel to accomplish even what might have been expected of ordinary artillery.

The mobility which the Confederate batteries displayed in this campaign is astounding when the deficiency in the number and quality of their draught animals is considered. In no battle of the war was artillery called upon for greater activity on the march after contact with the enemy had been gained. Beginning with April 29th, when Lee directed his Chief of Artillery to set the reserve battalions in motion, there was not a day when a great part of his artillery was not on the march. The transfer of the Artillery of the 2d Corps from below Hamilton's Crossing to the vicinity of Chancellorsville on the night of the 30th, was rapid and conducted in such a successful manner over a single road that there is an entire absence of complaint on the part of division and brigade commanders about blocked roads, etc., to which infantry commanders are so prone to attribute the causes of their own delays. With little rest, again the great column was set in motion and whirled over 15 miles or more of despicable roads, both narrow and difficult, and not only did it arrive at the designated point of rendezvous in good order and in

good time, but some of the battalions were forced impatiently to remain in the clearings near the head of Jackson's column, when the signal for the infantry attack was given. Indeed, the Artillery seems rather to have been too forward, as in Crutchfield's case and that of Carter on the night of the 2d, instead of being tardy in its arrival. In spite of darkness and the forbidding character of the terrain, when dawn of the 3d broke every gun of both corps was in the best position which those responsible for the posting of the Artillery could select, a fact which enabled Alexander, who accompanied Archer in his attack on Hazel Grove, to secure the position with Pegram's batteries the instant the Federals abandoned it, and instead of his lacking guns at the critical point, there was actually a surplus of them at hand in the foremost line. The coöperation of Alexander, with Stuart, was extraordinary and elicited from Stuart himself the statement that the action of the Artillery was superb, attributing the rapid movements of the batteries as he did to the improved battalion organization. But, if Alexander's coöperation with his corps commander was active and complete, no less so was that of Brown, Walker, Jones, McIntosh, Poague, and Huger with their respective chiefs. Everywhere we found them striving to be at the right point at the right time. The activity displayed by Hardaway was also noticeable. Stumbling through trackless thickets, cutting his way with pick and axe to the front, we find him moving a part of his guns, at least, forward with the infantry as it advanced from the south to the Chancellorsville plateau, soon to move to a distant point of the theater of operations, only to push on over bottomless roads to a more active conflict, after a distressing night of toil and hunger. On the 4th we find Alexander's Battalion whisked from Chancellorsville after five days of constant marching or fighting, many miles to the rear and then back again to the river, where the morning of the 6th it was as active as when "boots and saddles" was blown at Hanover Junction a week

before. In this week a number of the batteries of this battalion marched over 100 miles, in addition to being actually engaged three days and three nights. We have seen that the Horse Artillery under Beckham had lost nothing of its old dash so well known to the enemy. Yet, at least two of the light batteries, Moore's and Penick's, maneuvered with such rapidity in action as they dashed from hill to hill before Sedgwick's column on the 4th, always in the front and retarding the enemy, that they were mistaken by the Federal commander himself for horse artillery.

Another fact to be discerned from the records is the entire absence of friction in the Confederate Artillery, and between it and the Army as a whole at Chancellorsville, while so much discord and lack of cohesion existed in the same arm of the Federal Army in this campaign. In Hooker's army, after the battle, there was a widespread feeling that the Federal Artillery had failed, a sentiment so prevalent that Gen. Hunt himself saw fit to offer explanations of the cause in his report. While one is forced to absolve the Federal Artillery itself of all blame, yet the fact remains that, though not of its own doing, it was rendered collectively inefficient throughout the campaign in spite of the individual gallantry and prowess of Dilger, Weed, Best, Osborn and others. Its very losses, which included about 20 officers, are sufficient evidence of the courage and fighting capacity of the Federal gunners, and it seems a pity that so superb a fighting machine as that which under Hunt was inherited by Hooker, should have been wantonly sacrificed to the ignorance and stupidity of one whom the world at large has seen fit to credit with unusual skill as an organizer, palliating in a measure thereby his miserable failure as an army commander.

It has already been remarked that the Confederate Reserve Artillery was by necessity perverted from its true function in the campaign. Unless battalions which must be committed to the first line before a shot is fired can be classed as an artillery reserve, Lee had none at

Chancellorsville, and in this respect was sadly crippled. In the narrative of events we have noted numerous occasions when such a force might have been, and had it been available would have been, employed with controlling influence upon the issue. All that can be said of the nominal reserve artillery is that in the sphere of duty assigned it, the services it rendered fully measured up to the expectations of the commander-in-chief, who in the conclusion of his report paid high tribute to the Artillery of his army in the following words:

"Cols. Crutchfield, Alexander, Walker, and Lieut.-Cols. Brown, Carter, and Andrews, with the officers and men of their commands, are mentioned as deserving especial commendation. The batteries under Gen. Pendleton also acted with great gallantry." And later: "The Horse Artillery accompanied the infantry, and participated with credit to itself in the engagement."

In concluding this account of the great campaign of May, 1863, the direct influence of the Confederate Artillery upon the issue demands notice by reason of the fact that history has almost completely ignored the matter. Without calling further attention to the service rendered by Pendleton at Fredericksburg, which was jointly rendered with that of Early's infantry, at least two instances may be cited when the Artillery exercised a direct and determining influence upon the ultimate result attained by Lee. Had Sickles not been checked by Col. Brown at the furnace on May 2, he would most certainly have developed the line of least resistance in that direction, and thrown the main column of his corps towards the southwest instead of, by a more easterly movement, becoming involved with the left of Anderson's Division. Had he, while engaging Anderson with his own left, been free to follow up Jackson's column with the force which Brown's prompt action balked in its advance, the trend of that column would have been more accurately determined, and at an early hour in the day, that is before 1 P. M., Hooker would most certainly have been advised of its true direction, for already the head of the column had turned north-

ward at a point less than two miles from Brown's position, and nothing seems more probable than that this fact would have been discovered through flanking parties of Sickles' Corps drifting up against it during the advance of their main body. Already Berdan, with a division close behind, had almost reached the unfinished railroad; had he reached and freely possessed himself of it, this road would have formed the natural line of extension for the troops behind in their effort to turn the flank of any force which might seek to block their advance. Possessed of this railroad Sickles' men would have had a short route to the Brock Road, from which Jackson's movement to the north would have been plainly visible, and the very denseness of the country intervening between the furnace and the Brock Road would have led small parties of the Federals to search for points of vantage from which to observe the movements of the enemy. From the point where Berdan was actually checked by Brown to the point along the railroad from which a clear view of Jackson's column moving to the north across Poplar Run and the railroad itself, and ascending the Trigg House Hill might have been had, the distance was not over $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The information which Sickles would thus have secured would at once have corrected the false impression under which he labored, and which he created in Hooker's mind about the enemy's movement to the south, and, added to the reports coming in from Howard's front, would have altered the whole estimate of the situation at headquarters, giving Hooker and Howard some five hours to prepare to meet the attack. In half that time, the 11th Corps alone, with such reserve artillery as was available for use on the Federal right, could have been so disposed behind Hunting Run as to present an impregnable front. With Barlow and every available reserve hurrying to Howard's left, and Sickles already wedged into the immense gap below the furnace, it would not have required a tactician of the first order to cut Lee's Army in twain. In fact, Brown's single bat-

tery at one time stood between Hooker and the accomplishment of this task. But let us pass from what may appear too speculative, to that which is beyond the realm of conjecture, and which savors of reality.

When Stuart arrived at the scene of action along the Plank Road at midnight, May 2, he was totally ignorant of the situation, and none of Jackson's staff except Col. A. S. Pendleton reported to him. Fortunately, however, he found Col. Alexander, who had the situation in its broad aspects in hand. Rodes and Colston were of course willing and anxious to give Stuart the benefit of all the information in their possession, but their observations had been necessarily hasty and local in character. It seems certain that no one at the moment was so familiar with the situation as the Chief of Artillery, whose very duties had led him to make a thorough reconnaissance of the paths and roads leading to the front. That Stuart appreciated this fact, is evidenced by his immediately associating Alexander with him for the purpose of making a general examination of the ground. It is now important to note from the tenor of Stuart's report that Alexander, and not he, discovered the Hazel Grove position and at once grasped its importance. This fact is proved by the useless and costly effort which Stuart made with Lane's and Ramseur's brigades in the morning along the road, while Alexander was massing his batteries in readiness in the vista to seize Hazel Grove, at the first opportunity. From the moment he had first laid eyes on Hazel Grove, Alexander never lost its importance from view, and in the light of what transpired, it seems fortunate for the Confederates that its seizure was not seriously attempted on the night of the 2d, before Sickles and Pleasanton abandoned the position. Had this been done, the attention of the Federals might have been called to the point, and the head instead of the tail of Sickles' column of attack would have been directed towards the Confederates, thereby saving the key-point

of Hooker's line of defense, and many men who met their fate in the midnight fiasco.

Conceding then, that the occupation of Hazel Grove was primarily due to the ready perception of Stuart's Chief of Artillery, we must now go further and consider the controlling influence its occupation by the Artillery exerted upon the issue. In the first place, there is no reason to suppose that having twice failed on the morning of the 8d to carry the Federal works in front of Fairview, although aided by Pegram's artillery, Stuart's infantry could have succeeded in a third attempt without artillery. In fact, the Federals themselves unanimously ascribed the loss of their line of defense to the Confederate batteries at Hazel Grove, the oblique fire of which Best's and Osborn's guns were unable to withstand. The great mass of guns at Fairview Cemetery comprised the very bulwark of the Federal defense, and it was those guns in large measure which had swept back Stuart's gallant infantry from the works they had taken, while the Confederate left was subjected to an increasing pressure. To the threatened point, Stuart's attention was more and more directed, but meantime Alexander was moving the bulk of his artillery to the extreme right, and when finally his artillery preparations were well under way it must be observed that it was not the Federal right, but that portion of the line upon which the Confederate Artillery exerted its influence, that yielded, which of course relieved the intense pressure on Stuart's left. It is thus seen that the superiority of fire attained by Alexander over the Federal Artillery, alone made possible the success of Stuart's third infantry assault, for it was the withdrawal of their artillery that broke the backbone of the enemy's resistance.

There are few better examples to be found than this one of the power of artillery when once it has attained a superiority of fire. Then it is that the crisis of the battle has arrived, and whatever may be the timber of the defending infantry, unless there are close at hand

fresh guns, as in the case of the Confederate short-range batteries at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, to uncover when the hostile artillery becomes masked, the day is usually lost if the assaulting infantry is in earnest and numerically adequate to its task. Stuart was fortunate in possessing such an infantry, and it drove home with all the ardor of its old recklessness favored by the fact that almost until "cold steel" was the word, the supporting batteries were able to maintain over its head a heavy fire upon the somewhat elevated line of works held by the enemy.

The loss of Fairview was but the precursor of Hooker's withdrawal from the south side of the river, for by its fall the Federal left was compelled to retire before Anderson and McLaws. Even before it fell, Hooker's heart had become set upon a general retrograde movement. Otherwise, he would surely have allowed his batteries to be supplied with ammunition, however hopeless their struggle might have appeared.

CHAPTER XXIX

PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND MARYLAND INVASION— DEATH OF JACKSON—BRANDY STATION

WHEN it became certain that Hooker had withdrawn his immense army from the upper fords and had re-established his old camps about Fredericksburg and Falmouth, Gen. Lee ordered his troops back to the lines held by them during the winter.

Col. Walton immediately placed the bulk of the artillery of the 1st Corps in camp at Stanard's farm, a few miles below Massaponax Church, while Col. Brown moved his batteries to the old artillery camping grounds in rear of Hamilton's Crossing and about Guiney's Station. Alexander, however, moved his battalion to the immediate neighborhood of Bowling Green, a point which was thought by both Gens. Lee and Pendleton to be too far to the rear in case of emergency. Meanwhile, the horses of the various artillery commands, which were greatly worn down and depleted by the strain of the recent campaign, were turned out to pasture, although the orders were general that the Artillery should be kept well in hand and prepared to move at a moment's notice. Reports of the condition of the batteries, detailing the number of serviceable guns, horses, and the strength in personnel of each were directed to be made, in order that all deficiencies might be made up as far as possible.

The old idea that artillery battalions were an integral part of infantry divisions had by this time almost disappeared, an advance in the right direction which had taken long to accomplish. But still the old view continued to crop out on occasions, as in the case of Col. Cabell, who, instead of moving his battalion along the Telegraph Road, as directed, to join Walton and rest his horses, maintained his position on Lee's Hill in accordance with Longstreet's views until he was peremp-

torily ordered by Pendleton to repair to the rear. Cabell, it seems, had preferred to consider his command as permanently attached to one of Longstreet's divisions, and had been most remiss in rendering his reports through Col. Walton, Chief of Artillery 1st Corps.

Gen. Longstreet had arrived at Fredericksburg on the 6th of May and soon after Pickett's and Hood's divisions began to arrive with Dearing's and Henry's battalions of artillery. On the day Longstreet arrived A. P. Hill resumed command of the 2d Corps, Stuart returning to his own division. Gen. Lee had also urged the return of Ransom's Division, which the Secretary of War, on the 6th, directed D. H. Hill in North Carolina to set in motion for Fredericksburg, if it could be done with safety.

The great shock of the campaign now occurred, for on May 10, Gen. Jackson succumbed. The story of his last hours on this earth is one full of pathos, as well as of the most inspiring lessons for the soldier. In the hour of his death he was as great as when upon the various battlefields of his career, with exalted mien and superb composure, he led his men to victory. Concerning his wounding and death, Longstreet wrote: "The shock was a very severe one to men and officers, but the full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains of the beloved general had been sent home. The dark clouds of the future then began to lower above the Confederates." Gen. Lee in a note to the wounded general on the 8d, in the midst of battle had already declared that, could he have directed events, he should have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been disabled in Jackson's stead. In closing his message, he congratulated Jackson upon the victory his "skill and energy" had won, but the latter, expressing appreciation of his superior's remarks, declared that Gen. Lee should give the praise to God and not to him.

Soon after his wounding, he had been removed by order of Gen. Lee to the Chandler house near Guiney's Station, where Dr. McGuire did all in his power to save

him, but on Thursday the 7th he developed pneumonia of the right lung, doubtless attributable to the fall from the litter the night he was wounded. Fortunately for the peace of his mind, Mrs. Jackson arrived this day with their infant child, and took the place of his chaplain who had remained almost constantly with him. By Saturday, Drs. Hoge, Breckenridge, and Tucker had joined McGuire in an effort to save him, and noting their presence he said to Dr. McGuire: "I see from the number of physicians that you think my condition dangerous, but I thank God, if it is His will, that I am ready to go." When informed by Mrs. Jackson at daylight the next morning that he should prepare for the worst, he was silent for a moment and then said, "It will be infinite gain to be translated to heaven." And so we see that although this wonderful man still clung to a hope of recovery, his confidence in the future was as supreme as his self-confidence had been on earth. Never once did he express a doubt of his ability to rise paramount to present difficulties or to meet the future. His sole request was to be buried in Lexington, in the Valley of Virginia, where as a simple and unassuming professor of the Science of War he had kept the smothered fire of his genius aglow while preparing himself and a host of his pupils for the inevitable struggle which he had foreseen. When told by his wife that before sundown he would be in Heaven, he called for Dr. McGuire and asked him if he must die. To the affirmative answer he received, his reply was, "Very good, very good, it is all right." His efforts then were to comfort his heart-broken wife, and when Col. Pendleton, whom he had trained as a soldier and loved very dearly, entered his room about 1 p. m., he asked who was preaching at headquarters on this his last Sabbath. Being informed that the whole Army was praying for him, he said, "Thank God, they are very kind. It is the Lord's day; my wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday."

His mind now began to weaken while his lips frequently muttered commands as if he were on the field

of battle, then words of comfort for his wife. When tendered a drink of brandy and water, he declined it, saying, "It will only delay my departure and do no good. I want to preserve my mind, if possible, to the last." Again he was told that but few hours remained for him, and again he replied, feebly but firmly, "Very good, it is all right." In the delirium which preceded his death he cried out, "Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action, pass the infantry to the front rapidly,—tell Maj. Hawks—" and then, pausing, a smile of ineffable sweetness spread over his pallid face and with an expression as if of relief, he said, "No, no. Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees."* Then without sign of pain, or the least struggle, his spirit passed onward and upward to God.

Such were the final moments of the great soldier. With body all but cold in death, so long as his pulse continued the dictates of his heart were pure. Almost to the instant that heart ceased to beat, his mind gave evidence of the quality of the man in the flash of the will, though now subconscious, which possessed his spirit. Still his mind dwelt upon rapid action and the rush of infantry, which ever filled his soul with joy, but then, even in the last flicker of his intellect, he realized that the flag of truce had been raised by his enemies and interposing the stay of his final words "No, no—," he died in the happiness of the earthly victory he had won. Let us be thankful that he saw his men preparing to rest upon their arms—not engaged in the heated turmoil of the charge when he bade them farewell. Let us be thankful that this dispensation was granted him by the Maker who gently led him to the shade of the river side where rested all those gallant associates who had preceded him. No longer were they his pupils and his subordinates in war, but his equals in the eternity of peace. But yet an earthly rite remained to those whom he had left behind, for far off from the scene of conflict, that youthful band, bound together then as it is now,

*This remark was as given above, according to Capt. James Power Smith of Jackson's staff, and not merely as usually quoted without the two first words.

by the traditions of his fame, bore his body to the grave. How fitting that a caisson of the cadet battery with which he had for so many years drilled his pupils and the Confederate Artillery should form his hearse, and that his body should lie in state in the old tower classroom, wherein he had set so noble an example to youth. It was in that very room that he had declared, "If war must come, then I will welcome war," and that the South in such event should "throw away the scabbard."

In the shadow of the majestic Blue Ridge, with the great North Mountain as his head stone, which like a huge sentinel stands guard beside the parade ground of his life, tenderly was his body laid to rest by the youthful soldiers he loved so well, but still, wielding the uncovered blade of immortality,

"His spirit wraps yon dusky mountain;
His memory sparkles o'er each fountain;
The meanest rill, the mightiest river,
Rolls, mingling with his fame forever."

For one part of the Army, at least, it was Jackson, the artilleryman, that had gone, for he in a higher degree than any of Lee's lieutenants had endeared himself to the gunners to whose welfare he was ever attentive and of whose success he was ever proud. The old love of the arm which he could not overcome in spite of the more general command he had been clothed with, coupled with the knowledge of the gunners that their leader had once commanded a battery, created and maintained a bond of sympathy between Jackson and his artillery evidenced by innumerable little incidents in his career as a general. One thing is certain, he was the first of Lee's lieutenants to grasp the idea of artillery as an entity and to employ it accordingly, and in this he was ably assisted by Col. Crutchfield, between whom and his chief the most thorough confidence existed. No such relations as theirs existed between Longstreet and Walton, neither of whom proceeded upon the principle that the Chief of Artillery should be able to read the

very soul of his commander, and by that constant and close association which alone can breed the highest confidence between men, especially between soldiers, be able to frame his every action in conformity with his superior's views. Mutual confidence between a commanding general and his chief of artillery is certainly essential to the success of the artillery, if not to the army as a whole, for occasions will arise when the supreme commander must needs direct the movements of his batteries and there is always danger that the limitations and necessities of the special arm may be lost sight of by one who views the situation in its general aspect. Now, if the chief of artillery has by his obedience, by his readiness to act, and by his sympathy with the wider problems of the general, won a personal place in addition to his official position on the staff of his commander, he is prepared to suggest, without danger of giving offense to his superior, a change here and there which will at once inure to the benefit of his arm, and enable it to accomplish the best results. If, however, there is a want of sympathy between the two, or if the subordinate holds himself aloof, or stands upon his dignity and receives his orders in a perfunctory way, rather suggesting by his conduct a superior specialized knowledge, lack of harmony is sure to result with its many evil consequences. We must concede, in view of these facts, that Jackson was most fortunate in possessing Crutchfield, from whose relations with the commanding general the artillery of his corps in turn directly benefited.

The loss of Jackson was accepted by Lee in the same spirit of Christian fortitude for which he was ever conspicuous, and the day following his death the highest tribute ever paid a soldier was published in the following words:

"With deep grief, the commanding general announces to the Army the death of Lieut.-Col. T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th inst., at 8:15 p. m. The daring, skill, and energy of this great and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise Providence, are now lost to us. But while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit

still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defense of our beloved country.

"R. E. LEE,
"General."

And to Stuart, the bereft Commander-in-Chief wrote, "May his spirit pervade our whole army; our country will then be secure."*

These words of Lee are referred to as the greatest tribute ever paid a soldier, for never before or since has so great a commander-in-chief as Lee appealed to the love and memory of a lieutenant as the spirit which diffused should prove the motive power of his army.

On May 11th, the Chief of Artillery, 2d Corps, reported that immediate steps had been undertaken to reorganize and refit his batteries. As it shows the condition of the Artillery in general, the substance of his report is given.

Many guns were rendered unserviceable through lack of horses. The available ones were as follows.

Walker's Battalion of 5 batteries, 14 guns in camp and 4 on picket near Hamilton's Crossing.

Jones' Battalion of 4 batteries, 8 guns in camp and 4 on picket on the left.

Carter's Battalion of 4 batteries, 18 guns in camp and 8 at the repair train in rear.

Andrews' Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp.

Hardaway's (Brown's) Battalion of 6 batteries, 12 guns in camp, and 4 on picket in the center.

McIntosh's Battalion of 4 batteries, 14 guns in camp.

Thus it is seen that but three batteries had been left along the front while there were 87 guns available for service in the 2d Corps.

Meantime, Col. Brown had sent out two officers from each of his battalions amply provided with money to

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, pp. 792-3.

buy fresh horses and authorized to sell the condemned battery horses to farmers who might be willing to purchase them for future use.

The condition of Cabell's Battalion on the 15th is indicative of that of the others of the 1st Corps. McCarthy's Battery with two 3-inch rifles, two 6-pounders, one 4-horse battery wagon and two quartermaster wagons, had 54 horses of which 12 were unserviceable. Manly's Battery had one 3-inch rifle, two 20-pounder howitzers, two 4-horse battery wagons, two quartermaster wagons, and 90 horses, of which 20 were unserviceable. With Carlton's Battery, there were two 10-pounder Parrotts, one 12-pounder howitzer, three battery wagons with 12 mules and 73 horses, seven mules and twelve horses being unserviceable, while Fraser's Battery had one 10-pounder Parrot, one 3-inch rifle, one 12-pounder howitzer, one forge, three wagons, and 62 horses, of which six were unserviceable. Including mounts for the battalion sergeant-major, forge master, wagon master, quartermaster-sergeant, and mounted courier, 88 horses were required to complete the complement of this battalion alone, while two Napoleons for McCarthy, three for Manly, two for Carlton, and a 12-pounder Blakely for Fraser were soon expected to arrive from Richmond.

Gen. Pendleton made every effort to secure the horses needed for the Artillery, but before the end of the month was able to secure but 396. The condition with respect to horses of the various battalions after the preceding campaign is shown by the distribution of this supply, which was as follows:

Hardaway's Battalion	112
Jones' Battalion	17
Walker's Battalion	56
Carter's Battalion	14
McIntosh's Battalion	84
Andrews' Battalion	40
Eshleman's Battalion	82
Garnett's Battalion	26
Cabell's Battalion	10
Alexander's Battalion	55

This issue by no means supplied all the wants, which fact gives a pretty good idea of the suffering and service which the field artillery horses had undergone during the short space of a single week, for it will be recalled that the batteries were fairly well mounted when they left their winter quarters the 29th of April.

Extraordinary efforts were now being made by the Bureau of Ordnance to provide the necessary material, and Col. Gorgas himself was present to examine into the exact needs of all, and found that in general a marked improvement in the ammunition was reported. The shells for the 20-pounder Parrotts, due to defects in the castings, were still unsatisfactory, for many of them were reported to have burst near the muzzle. The new projectile for the Whitworths, which had been fabricated in Richmond, however, proved a great success. In the main, the field ordnance operations had been well conducted during the campaign and satisfaction in that respect was general. Capt. William Allan, Chief of Ordnance, 2d Corps, had displayed unusual ability, and his promotion was again urged by Col. Gorgas.

Nothing is so indicative of the growing appreciation of the importance of the Artillery as the increased interest now displayed in the theoretical features of gunnery. By a special order of June 8, a board to consist of not less than three nor more than six artillery officers, to be designated by the Chief of Artillery, was created and directed to meet the first day of each month, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to report such facts in regard to material, ammunition, and any other matters concerning the Artillery, and to make recommendations for its improvement. The board was also directed to compile range tables for the various types of guns in use. On the 15th, Gen. Pendleton appointed Col. Alexander, Majs. Dearing and Henry, Capts. Reilly, Blount, and Fraser to the board, and immediately they set to work, extending their investigations over a wide

field and contributing in innumerable ways to the betterment of the arm.*

It was at once found that a number of vacancies existed among the superior officers of the Field Artillery, which hampered the effective administration and leadership of the battalions. The number of guns with the Army entitled the arm, under the law, to 8 brigadier-generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17 majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but 1 brigadier-general, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, there being, however, 19 majors, or two more than for which authority of law existed. Already several promotions of importance had been made, among which was that of Capt. Benj. T. Eshleman, of the Washington Artillery Battalion, as its major with rank as of March 26, 1863. This battalion had not only furnished the Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, but three majors besides, namely, Garnett, Dearing, and Eshleman, while one of its original captains, Thomas L. Rosser, had already become a colonel of cavalry. Both he and Dearing later became major-generals of cavalry.†

It was but a few days before the artillery board of which Col. Alexander was president, and in the deliberations of which he played a leading rôle, drafted a plan for the reorganization of the Artillery and submitted it to the commander-in-chief, with what result we shall see.

By special order dated May 30, the Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized into three corps with Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill as corps commanders. The 1st Corps now consisted of McLaws', Hood's, and Pickett's divisions, the 2d Corps of Early's, Edward Johnson's, and Rodes' divisions, and the 3d Corps of R. H. Anderson's, Heth's, and Pender's divisions. Rodes' and Anderson's divisions each contained five,

**Rebellion Records*, Series 1, Vol. XXVII, pp. 873, 895.

†Rosser, Garnett, and Dearing were members of the graduating class at West Point when they resigned in April, 1861. When the Washington Artillery Battalion reported in Richmond in May they were assigned to duty with it, the first as a captain and the others as lieutenants.

Pickett's three, and all the others four brigades. The Chief of Artillery was directed to designate the artillery for the various corps and the General Reserve Artillery was abolished.* This order marks a great crisis in the development, not only of the Confederate, but of the artillery organization of the world. For the first time practical effect was to be given the growing recognition of the fact that a general reserve artillery was no longer necessary, and that the better tactical employment of the arm required the distribution of all the guns among the corps, if the danger of part of them being left inactive in the rear was to be overcome. The advantages of corps artillery have been previously discussed at length. Suffice it to repeat that together with the change of name came also a change of position in the order of march, and that every leader of troops and every staff officer were at once compelled to recognize that no part of the artillery was to remain in idleness, but that all was to take a place in the line of battle since improved material with its increased range enabled the withdrawal of battalions for special missions, even after they had once become engaged. It should here be noted that Lee in the employment of his artillery had anticipated the actual change in organization, which was, therefore, in large measure, but the logical result of a gradual process of development in his tactics. Whatever may be claimed as to the theoretical development of artillery organization and tactics, the Confederates certainly gave practical form to the conception of corps artillery in its highest sense, and the innovation was soon accepted and adopted by the armies of the continent.

On June 2 and 4, Pendleton gave form to the new artillery organization by first designating three divisional and two reserve battalions for each of the three corps of the Army, and then assigning a chief of artillery to each. The completed organization was as follows:

* *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 850, Special Order No. 146.

1ST CORPS (Longstreet)

Col. James B. Walton, Chief of Artillery

DIVISIONAL BATTALIONS

CABELL'S BATTALION

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. "A" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg., | Capt. Basil C. Manly. |
| 2. Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, | Capt. John C. Fraser. |
| 3. 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, | Capt. Edward S. McCarthy. |
| 4. Troup (Ga.) Battery, | Capt. Henry H. Carlton. |

DEARING'S BATTALION

Maj. James Dearing

- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Fauquier Battery, | Capt. Robert M. Stribling. |
| 2. Richmond Hampden Battery, | Capt. William H. Caskie. |
| 3. Richmond Fayette Battery, | Capt. Miles C. Macon. |
| 4. Lynchburg Battery, | Capt. Jos. G. Blount. |

HENRY'S BATTALION

Maj. M. W. Henry

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Branch (N. C.) Battery, | Capt. Alexander C. Latham. |
| 2. Charleston German Battery, | Capt. Wm. K. Bachman. |
| 3. Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, | Capt. Hugh R. Garden. |
| 4. Rowan (N. C.) Battery, | Capt. James Reilly. |

ALEXANDER'S BATTALION

Col. E. Porter Alexander

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Ashland Battery, | Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr. |
| 2. Bedford Battery, | Capt. Tyler C. Jordan. |
| 3. Brooks (S. C.) Battery, | Lieut. S. C. Gilbert. |
| 4. Madison (La.) Battery, | Capt. Geo. V. Moody. |
| 5. Richmond Battery, | Capt. William W. Parker. |
| 6. Bath Battery, | Capt. Esmond B. Taylor. |

ESHLEMAN'S BATTALION

Maj. Benj. F. Eshleman

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. 1st Co. Washington Artillery, | Capt. C. W. Squires. |
| 2. 2d Co. Washington Artillery, | Capt. J. B. Richardson. |
| 3. 3d Co. Washington Artillery, | Capt. M. B. Miller. |
| 4. 4th Co. Washington Artillery, | Capt. Joe Norcom. |

THE LONG ARM OF LEE

2D CORPS (Ewell)

Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of Artillery

DIVISIONAL BATTALIONS

CARTER'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Thos. H. Carter

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Jeff Davis Alabama Battery, | Capt. William J. Reese. |
| 2. King William Battery, | Capt. William P. Carter. |
| 3. Louisa Morris Battery, | Capt. R. C. M. Page. |
| 4. Richmond Orange Battery, | Capt. Chas. W. Fry. |

JONES' BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Hilary P. Jones

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Charlottesville Battery, | Capt. Jas. McD. Carrington. |
| 2. Richmond Courtney Battery, | Capt. W. A. Tanner. |
| 3. Louisiana Guard Battery, | Capt. C. A. Green. |
| 4. Staunton Battery, | Capt. Asher W. Garber. |

ANDREWS' BATTALION

Maj. James W. Latimer

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. 1st Maryland Battery, | Capt. Wm. F. Dement. |
| 2. Alleghany Battery, | Capt. John C. Carpenter. |
| 3. 4th Md. or Chesapeake Battery, | Capt. William D. Brown. |
| 4. Lee Battery, | Capt. Charles J. Raine. |

CORPS RESERVE BATTALION

FIRST VIRGINIA ARTILLERY

Capt. Willis J. Dance

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. 2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, | Capt. David Watson. |
| 2. 3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, | Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr. |
| 3. Powhatan Battery, | Lieut. John M. Cunningham. |
| 4. 1st Rockbridge Battery, | Capt. Archibald Graham. |
| 5. Salem Battery, | Lieut. C. B. Griffin. |

NELSON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William Nelson

- | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Amherst Battery, | Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick. |
| 2. Fluvanna Battery, | Capt. John L. Massie. |
| 3. Georgia Regular Battery, | Capt. John Milledge. |

8D CORPS (A. P. Hill)

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery

McINTOSH'S BATTALION

Maj. David G. McIntosh

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Danville Battery, | Capt. R. S. Price. |
| 2. Alabama Battery, | Capt. W. B. Hurt. |
| 3. 2d Rockbridge Battery, | Lieut. Samuel Wallace. |
| 4. Richmond Battery, | Capt. Marmaduke Johnson. |

GARNETT'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. John J. Garnett

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, | Capt. Victor Maurin. |
| 2. Norfolk Battery, | Capt. Jos. D. Moore. |
| 3. Pittsylvania Battery, | Capt. John W. Lewis. |
| 4. Norfolk Blues Battery, | Capt. Chas. R. Grandy. |

POAGUE'S BATTALION

Maj. William T. Poague

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Albemarle Battery, | Capt. James W. Wyatt. |
| 2. Charlotte (N. C.) Battery, | Capt. Joseph Graham. |
| 3. Madison (Miss.) Battery, | Capt. George Ward. |
| 4. Warrenton Battery, | Capt. J. V. Brooke. |

CORPS RESERVE BATTALIONS**PEGRAM'S BATTALION**

Maj. William J. Pegram

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Richmond Battery, | Capt. Wm. G. Crenshaw. |
| 2. Fredericksburg Battery, | Capt. Edward A. Marye. |
| 3. Richmond Letcher Battery, | Capt. Thomas A. Brander. |
| 4. Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery, | Lieut. Wm. E. Zimmerman. |
| 5. Richmond Purcell Battery, | Capt. Jos. McGraw. |

CUTTS' BATTALION

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. "A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., | Capt. Hugh M. Ross. |
| 2. "B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., | Capt. Geo. M. Patterson. |
| 3. "C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., | Capt. John T. Wingfield. |

From the foregoing we see that there were now with the Army 15 battalions with a total of 62 light bat-

teries. Each battalion had a field-officer in addition to its commander, and a complete commissioned staff. The five battalions comprising the artillery of each corps constituted a division of artillery under the corps chief of artillery, who reported to and received orders direct from the corps commander, while the chief of artillery of the Army reported to and represented the commander-in-chief in his dealings with the corps artillery. In the whole scheme of reorganization, one cannot but see the features of the brilliant Alexander cropping out, and the final success of his efforts to divorce the artillery from the tactical control of Gen. Pendleton, except in so far as he represented the commander-in-chief in his capacity as administrative chief of artillery.

By the time the reorganization was completed, Col. Baldwin, the Chief of Ordnance, had received a fresh consignment of 14 Napoleons from Gorgas, who was energetically pushing forward the manufacture of the improved gun in Richmond. These, in addition to the 14 captured pieces, were at once issued to the battalions in the field in as equitable a manner as possible, only two 3-inch rifles going to the Horse Artillery. The distribution of guns was now as follows:

Cabell's Battalion, 8 rifles, 8 Napoleons.

Garnett's Battalion, 11 rifles, 4 Napoleons, 2 howitzers, and one 6-inch Whitworth.

Dearing's Battalion, 5 rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 6-inch Whitworth.

Henry's Battalion, 4 rifles, 12 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 6-inch Whitworth.

Eshleman's Battalion, 10 Napoleons, 1 howitzer, and one 6-inch Whitworth.

Alexander's Battalion, 11 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 3 howitzers.

Carter's Battalion, 8 rifles, 6 Napoleons, 2 howitzers.

Jones' Battalion, 4 rifles, 10 Napoleons.

McIntosh's Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons.

Andrews' Battalion, 10 rifles, 6 Napoleons.

Pegram's Battalion, 8 rifles, 9 Napoleons, 2 howitzers.

Dance's Battalion, 10 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers.

Cutts' Battalion, 10 rifles, 3 Napoleons, 5 howitzers.

Nelson's Battalion, 6 rifles, 8 Napoleons, 4 howitzers.

Thus, it is seen that about equally distributed among the three corps were one hundred and three 3-inch rifles, one hundred and seven 12-pounder Napoleons, thirty 12-pounder howitzers, and four 6-inch Whitworths, or a total of 244 guns of comparatively superior type to those which had been in use within the past few months. But, while the material was much improved by substituting the captured rifles and the Napoleons of home manufacture for the old 6-pounders, and while the batteries were equally equipped in the number of pieces, that is four to a battery, a distressing lack of uniformity in material existed. This was of course a glaring defect, greatly increasing the difficulty of ammunition supply and impairing the general efficiency. Theoretically it was capable of correction, but practically there were many difficulties in the way. Some batteries wanted rifles, others Napoleons, and few were willing to be armed with howitzers alone. The gunners in the various batteries had become familiar with their material of whatever character, and the mere suggestion that uniformity of battery armament should be enforced at once raised a hue and cry on the part of all for the material of their individual preference. For the sake of general uniformity none were willing to waive those preferences. After all, this attitude was natural, and it would have required a bold chief indeed to ignore the human phase of the situation. Believing that the good to be accomplished by unifying the battery armaments was not commensurate with the general dissatisfaction such a step would surely arouse, Gen. Pendleton declined to raise the issue and so a great evil was allowed to exist to the very end.

In the selection of a chief of artillery for the new corps, the services of one who had been actively engaged in every battle from Bull Run to date were recognized. In the whole army, there was not one who deserved promotion more than Reuben Lindsay Walker, and his elevation was welcomed by all and accepted in a spirit of profound satisfaction by the Artillery. Less brilliant

than Alexander, he yet possessed the highest virtues both as a man and as a soldier, and throughout his long career gave many evidences of his peculiar ability as an artillerist, especially as an organizer.

Here it should be remarked that in no arm of the service was promotion so slow as in the Field Artillery. In the list of battery commanders in May, 1863, we find a number who had served in that capacity since the outbreak of the war, and less than 30 of the original artillery officers had attained the rank of field-officers after two years of honorable and arduous service. Many of these were among the most efficient officers in the Army from every standpoint. Col. Long, Lee's military secretary, said that the personnel of the Artillery was unsurpassed by any troops in the Army, and many officers in other arms have declared that the Artillery was the most distinguished arm of the service. It was the *esprit de corps* of the Artillery alone which kept its officers true to their stripe, notwithstanding the unfavorable opportunity for their advancement, and few sought promotion by transferring to other arms, Rosser, Dearing, and J. R. C. Lewis being among the exceptions, while Col. Stephen D. Lee was promoted out of the Artillery.

It has become the habit of historians to declare that the Federal at all times excelled the Confederate artillery in material and personnel. Even Col. Henderson in his Aldershot lecture on the American Civil War fell into the error of making so general and unqualified an assertion.* Certainly, as far as the Army of Northern Virginia is concerned, the quality of the personnel of the Field Artillery was not surpassed if equalled by any similar arm then in existence, a fact which seems to be indisputable when the inferiority of its material, ammunition, equipment, stores, horses, training and all the other disadvantages under which it labored are considered.

**Science of War*, G. F. R., Henderson, p. 245. But see *Evolution of Modern Strategy*, by Lieut.-Col. F. N. Maude, in which it is said that the three arms of the Confederate Army were intrinsically superior at the beginning of the war.

At the outbreak of the war the regular batteries served as models to the Northern volunteers. One of these was grouped with three manned by volunteers, and the latter very naturally profited by the example set them. Again, the supply of horses in the North and West was practically inexhaustible, while in the South there were few left at the close of the second year of the war. Not only did the North possess the national school of arms, which it was able to maintain in uninterrupted activity for the technical education of its more scientific officers, but it also conducted several schools of gunnery while its armies operated in the field. In a measure, West Point was offset by the Virginia Military Institute, but had the South been free to conduct schools of gunnery for its artillery officers, it would have been unable to provide them with ammunition. After the war commenced its only school of instruction was that of actual experience, and a large majority of its junior artillery officers fired a gun for the first time on the field of battle. Surely the personnel must have possessed equal if not superior qualities to those of their antagonists, to accomplish the results they did. One need only follow the rapid development which they brought about to be satisfied that they were not ordinary or inefficient men. We have seen what the stage of this development was in May, 1863. Now let us examine conditions in the Federal Artillery at the time.

If we accept the evidence of Gen. Henry T. Hunt, Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, an officer of great ability and unsurpassed special knowledge as an artillerist when he wrote, the Federal Artillery in May, 1863, was in a most unsatisfactory condition.* In spite of the splendid organization which McClellan had given it and its initial services in the war under Hunt, a general decline in the efficiency of the arm had set in before the end of 1862. Field-officers of artillery had become to be regarded as an unnecessary expense, and their muster into the service was forbidden; so just at the time

* *Battles and Leaders*, Vol. III, p. 259.

the Confederates were doing all in their power to improve the organization of their artillery by creating battalions with an adequate number of competent field and staff officers, the Federals were destroying the tactical cohesion of their artillery by denying it the necessary officers, and instead of remaining in the artillery irrespective of promotion, many of the best artillery officers in the Army of the Potomac at once transferred to other arms in which better opportunities for advancement were to be found. Thus, such experienced artillerymen as Hays, De Russy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffin, and Ayres sought promotion in the cavalry and infantry. While every effort was made to maintain the Confederate batteries at full strength, however depleted the units of the other arms, in the North no adequate measures were taken to supply recruits for the artillery, and the batteries were frequently dependent on the troops to which they were attached for men enough to work the guns in action. While Pendleton was maintaining a remount depot for his command at Winchester under Maj. Richardson, inadequate as it was, and scouring the country, even as far as Georgia and Florida, for draught animals, always being favored by the Quartermaster-General in the matter of horses, the Federal batteries were often forced to wait for remounts until the cavalry, and even the medical and quartermaster trains had been supplied, a fact which illustrated the general feeling in the army towards the field artillery. While the Confederate organization was being solidified and molded along the lines dictated by experience, in the North all experience was ignored and the Chief of Artillery was in effect relieved by Hooker from all but administrative work. In lieu of the perfect mechanism of the arm under Hunt on the Peninsula, Hooker substituted chaos. With the command of the Artillery at his own headquarters to be exercised by his chief only upon specific orders, there resulted such confusion and disorder that the artillery had to be practically reorganized after a splendid organization had already

been attained and sacrificed. Thus while the Confederates were building up, the Federals had been tearing down. During the period in which the former were organizing their artillery into corps divisions, all under a strongly-centralized command, and appointing more and more field officers, the Army of the Potomac had no artillery commander-in-chief, and of the 14 artillery brigades it possessed, nine were commanded by captains and one by a lieutenant, in addition to their battery duties, while but four were commanded by field officers!

Such was the condition of the Federal Field Artillery, when it entered upon the Gettysburg campaign, with its 65 batteries and 870 splendid guns. It will, therefore, as stated by Gen. Hunt himself, be perceived by comparison that the organization of the Federal Artillery was at this period in every way inferior to that of the Confederates. Nothing but the same individual courage and intelligence among the Northern artillerymen, as was to be found in the corresponding arm in Lee's Army, saved the former from a complete breakdown at Gettysburg. All the more honor is due them for the account they there gave of themselves, but let us hear nothing more of the superiority of the Federal Artillery personnel, except in point of numbers. In that respect the Confederates were greatly outclassed.

The return of May 20 gives the artillery personnel of Lee's Army as 253 officers and 4,708 men present for duty, and a paper aggregate of 7,279. These figures do not include Dearing's Battalion and two batteries on picket, nor two others with Ransom. The return of May 31, the last before the battle of Gettysburg, gives the Artillery, less Alexander's and Garnett's battalions, a total effective strength of 4,460. The 52 batteries reported therefore averaged 86 officers and men present, and adding 860 for the 10 batteries not included in the return, an effective aggregate of 5,320 is obtained. This is not far from correct, since the aggregate present on May 10 was 5,010. From these figures it is seen that the average battery strength was about 3 officers and

80 enlisted men, a fact which well illustrates the importance Lee attached to the efficiency of his artillery, and the tremendous effort which had been made by the Chief of Artillery and his subordinates to maintain the batteries at a serviceable strength. In the infantry and cavalry there were battalions and squadrons at this time with less than 100 men.

The aggregate strength of the Federal Artillery engaged in the Gettysburg campaign was 7,188, the number of batteries 65, and the number of guns 370, or about 110 officers and men and 6 pieces to the battery.

Having examined the organization of the Field Artillery, let us look into that of the Confederate Horse Artillery.

Immediately after the battle of Chancellorsville, Stuart was directed to concentrate his division at Culpeper, meanwhile guarding his front and the Confederate left along the Rapidan, and before May 9, Jones' Brigade with Chew's Battery was ordered from the Valley to join him. By May 20, the strength of his division, including the Horse Artillery, was 8,198 present and 11,905 present and absent.

Early in April the horse batteries had been organized into a separate corps under Maj. R. F. Beckham, but were temporarily left with the brigades with which they had served, subject to the orders of the brigade commanders.* The first step in the organization of the Horse Artillery into a tactical unit had therefore been taken when the Army was reorganized on May 30.

The growth of the battalion had been slow but sure. Stuart from the first had proved an ardent advocate of the increase in the number of horse batteries, placing great reliance upon their services, and displaying unusual interest in their proper development. Indeed, though his historians do not include the horse batteries in the organization of the cavalry, Stuart considered them as much a part of his command as the cavalry regiments themselves. After Ashby raised Chew's Battery

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, p. 858.



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT PRESTON CHEW
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY

and employed it so successfully, Stuart, it will be recalled, had organized the Stuart Horse Artillery. Its original commander, as we have seen, was John Pelham, who, just graduated from West Point, had been commissioned by the Confederate Government at Montgomery as a lieutenant of artillery, and sent to Lynchburg in charge of the ordnance office there. From that point he was ordered to Winchester, where he organized and drilled Alburdis' Wise Battery, which he commanded at Bull Run with conspicuous efficiency. When assigned in the fall of 1861 to the duty of organizing Stuart's Horse Battery, he gathered about him a most remarkable and superior set of men, mostly from the cavalry, some from Virginia, and some from Maryland, under Dr. James Breckinridge. To these were added about 40 from Talladega County, Alabama, under Lieut. William M. McGregor. It was not long before Hart's light battery of Washington, South Carolina, was converted into a horse battery.

The experiences of the first Maryland invasion in which the cavalry was so active and opposed to an enemy well provided with horse batteries, convinced Stuart of the urgent need of more artillery for his own command. The day after the battle, Pelham's Battery, which had received a large accession of recruits from Maryland, was drawn upon for the men with which to create a new horse battery, to the command of which Capt. M. W. Henry was assigned, and on November 18 the light battery of Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman, from Lynchburg, was converted. The men of Moorman's Battery had been mustered into the service April 25, 1861, as a company of infantry, under the name of the "Beauregard Rifles," and sent to Norfolk, where for lack of muskets it had been temporarily armed with Parrott guns. When the Army was reorganized a year later it was still serving as artillery at Sewell's Point and elsewhere about Hampton Roads, and was then definitely mustered into the Confederate service as a battery of artillery, and placed in a battalion with Grimes',

Huger's, and Nichols' light batteries, under Maj. John S. Saunders. Before its conversion it had, therefore, served, and with great credit, throughout the Peninsula, Second Manassas, and Maryland campaigns.

When Pelham was promoted major of horse artillery, Breathed succeeded to the command of his battery, while McGregor succeeded Henry upon the latter's promotion. During the winter of 1862, Brockenbrough was promoted major, and his battery, the 2d Baltimore Artillery, which had been detached for duty in the Valley with Jones' and Stuart's brigades, was also converted and placed under the command of Capt. William H. Griffin. Another horse battery, McClannahan's, had been formed by converting Imboden's Staunton battery, but this battery was not regularly brigaded with Stuart's Battalion until 1864, and Griffin's battery did not join Beckham's Battalion until Jenkins arrived at Gettysburg.

When Stuart finally concentrated his division at Culpeper towards the end of May, the Stuart Horse Artillery Battalion was composed as follows:

Maj. R. F. Beckham

1. Ashby Battery,	Capt. Robert Preston Chew.
2. 1st Stuart Horse Artillery,	Capt. James Breathed.
3. Washington (S. C.) Battery,	Capt. James F. Hart.
4. 2d Stuart Horse Artillery,	Capt. William M. McGregor.
5. Lynchburg Battery,	Capt. Marcellus N. Moorman.
6. 2d Baltimore Battery,	Capt. William H. Griffin.

There was, therefore, a battery of horse artillery for each of the six cavalry brigades under Hampton, Fitz Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Jones, Robertson, and Jenkins, respectively, as well as one for Imboden's independent cavalry command.

At the end of May, the strength of the five batteries of horse artillery present with Stuart at Culpeper was 18 officers and 519 men present for duty, with a paper aggregate of 701, or an average effective battery strength of about 107. These five batteries together pos-

sessed 24 pieces of artillery, three being armed with four and two with six pieces.

Stuart, who was making every effort to increase the strength of the Horse Artillery in material, as well as in personnel, sought to retain all the captured pieces in his possession for his own batteries, and this led to an altercation between him and the Chief of Ordnance, who was unable to recover the guns for distribution. In the correspondence which ensued, Stuart resented the use of the expression that these guns had been "appropriated by the Stuart Horse Artillery," which he erroneously, and no doubt because of a guilty conscience, attributed to Col. Baldwin. The difficulty was finally adjusted, however, by Gen. Lee assuming the burden of the remark, which he denied was used by him in any objectionable sense, and Stuart was allowed to retain two 8-inch rifles and directed to turn in the three other captured guns in his possession.

Beckham was endeavoring to provide all his batteries with six pieces, a step which met with the disapproval of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chief of Artillery, for the sole reason that the additional horses for this increase in armament were not available. Even the dismounting of some of the light batteries had become almost a necessity for lack of horses, but in some way Beckham soon managed to supply the necessary number to complete the quota of his battalion in spite of the fact that the ambulance and ammunition trains were so poorly provided with animals as to be almost unserviceable. Concerning Beckham's work in refitting his battalion and establishing it upon a sounder basis, Stuart in his letter to headquarters was most complimentary.

Meantime, Hampton, Fitz Lee, and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse batteries of Breathed, McGregor, Hart and Moorman, lay about Culpeper. The Artillery was encamped on the farm of John Minor Botts, who was a strong anti-secessionist and bitterly complained that "Ten thousand men should burn his rails without splitting any." Jenkins' Brigade with Griffin's Bat-

tery had been assigned to duty in the Valley. On the 22d of May, Gen. Stuart reviewed that portion of his division present, many distinguished personages appearing, among them Gens. Hood and Randolph. Great numbers of ladies also attended, which of course pleased the gallant cavalry commander. Shortly afterwards, Robertson's Brigade arrived from North Carolina, and on June 4, Jones' Brigade with Chew's Battery from the Valley, so that the following day another review of the entire division was held, at which Gen. Lee was expected to be present. In this Stuart was much disappointed, but the "pageantry of war proceeded." Eight thousand cavalry, with the battalion of artillery in the lead, passed under the eye of the division commander in column of squadrons.

So unique is this incident in the career of that grim fighting machine, the Army of Northern Virginia, that especial interest attaches to it. One is involuntarily impelled to pause and reflect upon the exuberance of the spirit of that youthful soldier, who, in spite of war's dreadful tragedy all about him, and in which he himself was a leading actor, could so indulge his fancy in the very presence of the enemy. The following interesting account of the review is taken from the war-time diary of one of Stuart's gunners:

"Early this morning we started to the field, where the troops were to be reviewed by passing by the eagle eye of their great commander. The place where the review was held is a beautiful and nearly level plain about four miles northeast of Culpeper Courthouse, and little over a mile southwest of Brandy Station, and on the west side of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.*

"When we, Chew's Battery, arrived on the field some of the Cavalry regiments were already forming in dress parade order for the review procession. At about 10 o'clock the whole column, which was about two miles long, was ready and in splendid trim to pass in review before its illustrious and gallant chief, and his brilliant staff.

"As soon as the whole line was formed, Gen. Stuart and his staff dashed on the field. He was superbly mounted. The trappings on his proud, prancing horse all looked bright and new, and

*Now Chesapeake & Ohio R. R.

his side arms gleamed in the morning sun like burnished silver. A long black ostrich plume waved gracefully from a black slouch hat, cocked upon one side, and was held with a golden clasp which also stayed the plume. Before the procession started, Gen. Stuart and staff rode along the front of the line from one end to the other. He is the prettiest and most graceful rider I ever saw. When he dashed past us, I could not help but notice with what natural ease and comely elegance he sat his steed, as it bounded over the field, and his every motion in the saddle was in such strict accordance with the movements of his horse that the rider and his horse appeared to be but one and the same machine. Immediately after Gen. Stuart and staff had passed along the front of the whole line, he galloped to a little knoll in the southwest edge of the field near the railroad, wheeled his horse to front face to the field, and sat there like a gallant knight errant, under his waving plume, presenting in veritable truth every characteristic of a chivalric cavalier of the first order. He was then ready for the review, and the whole cavalcade began to move and pass in review before the steady, martial, and scrutinizing gaze of the greatest cavalry chieftain of America.

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"Three bands of music were playing nearly all the time while the procession was moving, a flag was fluttering in the breeze from every regiment, and the whole army was one grand, magnificent pageant, inspiring enough to make even an old woman feel fightish.

"After the whole cavalcade passed the review station, at a quick walk, the column divided up into divisions, brigades, and regiments, which maneuvered all over the field. The last and most inspiring and impressive act in the scene was a sham battle, the cavalry charging several times with drawn sabers and the horse artillery firing from four or five different positions on the field. I fired ten rounds from my gun.

"Hundreds of ladies from Culpeper Courthouse and surrounding country stood in bunches on the hills and knolls around the field looking at the grand military display.

"A special train from Richmond stood on the track just in rear of the review stand, crowded with people, and, judging from the fluttering ribbons at the car windows, the most of the occupants were ladies. Gen. Hood's Division of infantry was drawn up upon the north side of the field, viewing the cavalry display, and also for support in case the Yanks would have attempted to take a hand in the show. There is a heavy force of Yankees camped on the north bank of the Rappahannock, only about five miles from the review stand.

"By about four o'clock this evening the whole affair was over, and the troops withdrew from the field and repaired to their respective camps."*

**Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery*, Neese, p. 168.

One would have thought that this affair was sufficient to satisfy Stuart's love of the "pomp and circumstance" of war. But no. When he found that Gens. Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, and Pendleton would arrive at his camp on the 8th, another pageant was ordered to be held. But much less of that display for which Stuart had so great a weakness was attempted on the occasion of the third review, for Gen. Lee, always careful not to tax his men unnecessarily, would not allow the cavalry to take the gallop, nor the artillerymen to fire their guns.

On this occasion an incident occurred which, aside from its amusing features, is of valuable interest to the student because of its bearing on Stuart's character. Capt. Chew had not come to Culpeper with any exalted ideas as to the pomp of war. In fact, his battery was reduced in point of appearance to the lowest plane to which constant hardship and service could bring it. He had only arrived from the Valley the night before and with horses and men equally worn, found himself suddenly on parade before the Commander-in-Chief. What wonder then if, conscious of the ungainly appearance of his half-starved horses, and in a spirit of pride, the battery first sergeant should seek to improve the outward appearance of the battery by bestriding a fine, sleek mule! Just as the far-famed Ashby Battery, the senior in rank in its battalion, and certainly the equal of any other in point of service, approached the reviewing stand in the very lead, Stuart's proud eye detected the active ears of the mule at the head of the battery, and with extreme impatience and disgust quickly dispatched one of his aides to direct Capt. Chew to have both his first sergeant and the mule leave the field! Says the sergeant in his diary, "I cared very little about the matter, but the mule looked a little bit surprised, and, I think, felt ashamed of himself and his waving ears, which cost him his prominent position in the grand cavalcade.

"No doubt Gen. Stuart is proud of his splendid cavalry, and well he may be, for it certainly is a fine

body of well mounted and tried horsemen. . . . True a mule was not built for the purpose of ornamenting a grand review or embellishing an imposing pageant, but as mine so willingly bears the hardships and dangers of the camp and field, I thought it not indiscreet to let it play a little act in some of the holiday scenes of war."

One can picture the amusement this whole incident afforded the youngsters of Stuart's staff, at their chief's expense, not to mention Gens. Lee, Pendleton, and the distinguished foreigners, who composed the reviewing party. Perhaps no other general in the Confederate Army would have paid the slightest attention to that worthy mule. Of one thing we are certain,—there could not have been many mules in use as mounts in Stuart's Cavalry and Horse Artillery at this time, this one having slipped in, so to speak, over night!

But few other instances of such military frivolity on the part of the Confederates are recorded. When in March, 1864, Gen. Pendleton was sent to Dalton, Ga., to inspect the artillery of Johnston's Army, after reviewing Hood's and Hardee's artillery and seeing it drill on a number of occasions, he was tendered a grand sham battle by Hood's entire corps, in which blank ammunition was used. The precedent for this display was no doubt that which Hood and Pendleton had both witnessed a year before at Culpeper.

Before Stuart's participation in his "horse play" at Culpeper, the movement of Lee's army which resulted in the Gettysburg campaign had commenced. Longstreet's and Ewell's corps had already reached Culpeper Courthouse, while Hill's Corps was left in front of Hooker at Fredericksburg. After the review the cavalry brigades were immediately assigned to posts along the river, and Beckham proceeded towards Beverly Ford that night, and placed four of his batteries in camp near Saint James Church. Fitz Lee's Brigade under Munford was assigned to the duty of picketing the upper Rappahannock. Munford established his camp across the Hazel River in the vicinity of Oak

Shade. W. H. F. Lee established his brigade and Breathed's Battery near Welford's house on the Welford Ford Road; Jones' Brigade held the Beverly Ford Road, and Robertson's remained at the Botts and Barbour farms picketing the lower fords. Saint James Church stood about 200 yards to the west of the main road to the ford and opposite it, and on the east of that road in a large grove of trees stood an old brick house known as the Thompson or Gee house, on an elevation from which the fields on both sides of the road for a distance of 500 yards to the north were commanded. The grove was occupied by one regiment of Jones' Brigade, the others bivouacking in the edge of the woods, which skirted the fields to the north of the church. Beckham, with Chew's, Moorman's, McGregor's, and Hart's batteries, bivouacked in the edge of the woods beyond, in sight of though in advance of the cavalry. Beyond the camp of the battalion, unbroken woods extended on both sides of the road for more than a mile, and as far as the highland overlooking the river low-grounds and Beverly Ford. From the latter point, Beckham's and Jones' camps were about $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 miles.

Stuart, with his train in readiness for an early start, had established his headquarters at a residence on Fleetwood Hill, about a half mile east of Brandy Station, two miles down the road in rear of Saint James Church. Fleetwood Hill completely commanded the large open plain which surrounded it, with the exception of the Barbour House Hill, of slightly greater elevation. Such was the situation on the night of the 8th when Stuart, entirely ignorant of any concentration of the enemy's cavalry on the north side of the river, issued his orders to march at an early hour.

Meantime, Pleasonton was approaching from the north, with orders to make a reconnaissance in force as far as Culpeper Courthouse if possible, to verify the reports that the Confederates were moving westward from Fredericksburg. Pleasonton's force consisted of

two small brigades of infantry, some 8,000 men in all, and about 8,000 cavalry, including Robertson's Brigade of horse artillery of four batteries. Dividing this force into two columns of equal strength, he ordered the first under Gregg to cross at Kelly's Ford at dawn, and the second under Buford, which included all of Ames' infantry, to move by way of Beverly Ford, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles above the railroad bridge, and $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Kelly's Ford. Great care was exercised by the Federals during the night to conceal their presence from Stuart's pickets, and in this they succeeded.

At 4:30 A. M. on the 9th Buford's two leading regiments dashed across Beverly Ford and rapidly drove the troops on picket there back towards the woods north of Saint James Church. Upon learning that the enemy was advancing from the ford, Beckham directed Capt. Hart, whose battery was on the right of the battalion, to place a gun in the road by hand, while the batteries were ordered to hitch up and gallop back to the Gee House Hill, some 600 yards in rear, and to go into position there. Before the teams could be harnessed, however, the enemy was almost upon the artillery camp, and had begun to fire upon the horses at the picket lines. But at this juncture Maj. Flournoy, with about 100 men of the regiment which had bivouacked in the grove, dashed forward and temporarily checked the enemy, which not only saved Beckham's guns, but gave time for Jones to bring up the 7th Virginia Cavalry from the main camp. Meantime, Hart had thrown two pieces into action by the road, and Beckham in less than 20 minutes after the first alarm was establishing his guns at the grove. The 7th Regiment, upon coming up, immediately charged, but was repulsed and driven back along the road past Hart's two guns, leaving them entirely isolated. Says Maj. McClellan, of Stuart's staff, "These gallant cannoneers on two occasions during this memorable day proved that they were able to care for themselves. Although now exposed to the enemy, they covered their own retreat with canister, and safely re-

tired to the line at Saint James Church, where they found efficient support.”*

During the charge of the 7th Regiment, the gunners, standing in silent awe by their pieces perfectly aligned along the wave-like swell north of the brick house, watched the savage conflict between the horsemen in their front, fascinated by the scene, and as Hart fell back, alternately retiring his two guns from point to point along the road, a wild cheer from Beckham's line preceded the simultaneous flash of his 16 guns. Just as the sun rose, the crash of the guns burst upon the ears of the enemy's troopers, and soon the woods which they had entered were rent with shrieking shells. Beckham's steady fire forced the enemy to cover, while they sought positions in which to place their artillery, none of which had yet arrived from the ford. Thus did the Horse Artillery hold Buford at bay, having lost nothing but the field desk of the major, which jostled from the head-quarter's wagon as it galloped off to safety.

The other regiment of Jones' Brigade now took position on the left of the church, and Hampton with four of his regiments occupied the rise between it and Beckham's guns at the grove. About 8 A. M., W. H. F. Lee moved down from Welford Ford towards the sound of the firing and placed his dismounted troopers behind a stone fence on the Cunningham farm, while Johnston's section of Breathed's Battery moved down stream from Freeman's Ford where the battery had been on picket, crossed the Hazel River, and took up a position near the Green House on a hill behind W. H. F. Lee's line, from which it had a clear field of fire in every direction. This position soon proved to be the key-point of the Confederate line of defense. The other section of Breathed's Battery moved back from Freeman's to Starke's Ford.

A determined attack was made by the enemy's dismounted men, supported by a battery of four pieces,

**The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, McClellan, p. 286. Also see article in *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, June 26, 1880, by Maj. J. F. Hart.

upon W. H. F. Lee's line, but it was repelled by the Confederate sharpshooters, and Johnston's guns, but not until several mounted charges made by the 10th Virginia and 2d North Carolina Cavalry cleared the field, driving the Federals back to the cover of the woods along the Beverly Ford Road, and seriously threatening their flank. Hampton had, meantime, extended his right beyond the church, so as to partially envelop the enemy's left, and together with Jones now advanced. From this time until 10 A. M. the lines swayed back and forth. During the early morning, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, supported by the 6th United States Regiment, made a superb mounted charge upon the Confederate artillery position, over a plateau some 800 yards wide. The regulars, heedless of Beckham's shrapnel, shell, and canister, actually reached his guns, and, dashing between them, passed on only to be attacked simultaneously on both flanks by the Confederate troopers, who drove the survivors back. There are few instances recorded of a similar charge upon so strong a line of artillery. Scarlett's charge at Balaclava was no more daring than the one which Smith led at Saint James Church, the latter possessing the additional feature that it was premeditated and not the result of accident.

Beckham's pieces now redoubled their fire, having suffered none from the charge, and furiously shelled the woods in their front, where the enemy was gathering in increasing numbers. The artillery position was a commanding one, and no doubt, had its flanks been guarded, could have been held indefinitely. But the situation was becoming serious in another quarter, for the head of Gregg's column was approaching Stevensburg from Kelly's Ford. Stuart had dispatched two regiments under Wickham and Butler and one of Moorman's guns to the support of Robertson's Brigade, which had moved forward to Kelly's Ford early in the morning, and believing the force of 1,500 men between Brandy Station and the ford sufficient to guard the road to Culpeper

Courthouse, proceeded to the church. His camp of the night before had been broken and nothing remained at Fleetwood Hill but a section of Chew's Battery under Lieut. John W. Carter, which had been retired from the fight after its ammunition was all but exhausted.

When Pleasonton found that Buford's column could not overcome the resistance of the three Confederate brigades opposed to it in front of Beverly's Ford, he decided to wait until Gregg could move up to his assistance. The latter had readily effected a crossing at Kelly's Ford about 6 A. M., Col. Duffie with four regiments of cavalry and a section of Pennington's Battery in the lead. Duffie's orders were to move on Stevensburg, whilst Gregg with the rest of the column proceeded towards Brandy Station in order to effect a junction with Buford. Robertson had fallen back along the direct road from Brandy Station to Kelly's Ford, and the two regiments dispatched by Stuart to his support were unable in spite of the most gallant efforts to prevent Duffie's advance upon Stevensburg. But orders now came for Duffie to join Gregg's main body and he at once commenced to retrace his steps towards Madden's, covering the movement with his guns while Wickham's regiment retarded his progress in every way possible. Meantime, unknown to Robertson, Gregg had advanced directly upon Brandy Station, and actually came within sight of Fleetwood Hill directly in the Confederate rear before his approach, which had been concealed by numerous groves, was discovered by Stuart's Adjutant-General, who had been left behind to maintain communications. The leading regiment of Wyndham's Brigade was already emerging into the open about Brandy Station, within cannon shot of Carter's guns. Without hesitating an instant, the young lieutenant brought one of his pieces from the road to the top of the hill and boldly pushed it to the forward crest. A few imperfect shell and some round shot was all the ammunition in the limbers, but with these a slow fire was at once opened upon the enemy's moving column, while

first one and then another of the mounted cannoneers was sent to inform Stuart of the peril.

The bold front which Carter put up led Gregg and Wyndham to conclude that the hill was more formidable than it was. At any rate, there was some hesitation on their part and considerable delay while Clarke's section of Pennington's Battery sought to prepare the road for a charge. Every moment of this delay was precious to the Confederates, for had Gregg succeeded in planting his guns on Fleetwood Hill, Stuart's position would have been most precarious. The first courier found Stuart among Hart's guns near the church, and not until the second message arrived, and he heard the sound of Carter's and Clarke's guns in his rear, did he countermand his order to Capt. Hart to ride back and verify the report.

The 12th Virginia and the 35th Battalion were immediately withdrawn from Jones' line, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Fleetwood Hill, and ordered by Stuart to gallop back to Carter's assistance. Minutes seemed like hours to Carter. Not a man but the cannoneers of his section and Maj. McClellan of Stuart's staff occupied the hill. The enemy had been imposed upon for a time, but at last Wyndham's regiment in column of squadrons, with standards and guidons fluttering, galloped forward and commenced the ascent of the hill. Just as Carter was retiring his guns, the enemy not 50 yards away, and the last round having been fired, Col. Harman with the leading files of the 12th Virginia galloped up to the crest from behind, and without hesitating dashed at the enemy. The rest of the regiment had strung out along the road in great disorder due to the rapidity of his movement, and as the men arrived in small groups, they were no match for Wyndham's more collected force. Stuart arrived in a few moments, having ordered Hampton and Jones to retire from the church and concentrate at Fleetwood, while Robertson on the Kelly's Ford Road was advised of the situation.

Reforming his regiment Harman desperately engaged the enemy, while charge and counter-charge swept across the face of the hill. Lieut.-Col. White, with the 35th Battalion, had arrived shortly after Col. Harman, and with two squadrons dashed around the west side of the hill, and charged three guns of Martin's Battery, which Gregg had already brought up, driving off the cavalry support. But the gunners stood firm and a hand-to-hand struggle ensued, in which neither side asked quarter. This battery was the horse battery which Pleasonton had with him at Hazel Grove on May 2, when together with Huntington's batteries it repulsed Winn's attack. In his report, Martin says: "Once in the battery, it became a hand-to-hand fight with pistol and sabre between the enemy and my cannoneers and drivers, and never did men act with more coolness and bravery, and show more of a stern purpose to do their duty unflinchingly, and above all to save their guns; and while the loss of them is a matter of great regret to me, it is a consolation and a great satisfaction to know that I can point with pride to the fact that, of that little band who defended the battery, not one of them flinched for a moment from his duty. Of the 36 men that I took into the engagement, but 6 came out safely; and of these 30, 21 are either killed, wounded, or missing, and scarcely one of them is there but will carry the honorable mark of the sabre or bullet to his grave."

White's men did not long retain possession of Martin's guns, for the few troopers he had with him were soon surrounded by superior numbers and were compelled to cut their way out.

When the retirement of the Confederate line commenced, one of Beckham's guns, as we have seen, was with Butler's regiments, then engaged with Duffie; one of Hart's and two of McGregor's pieces had become disabled from the shock of recoil, a section of Chew's Battery had been sent to the right to join Robertson, and Carter's section of this battery was at Fleetwood Hill. Thus there were but eight guns still in action at the

church at the time. Leaving Moorman's remaining three pieces with Jones' 11th Virginia Regiment in position at the church, Beckham with the rest of the artillery, including Hart's and McGregor's batteries, accompanied Hampton's brigades to the rear, which came into action just after Flourney's Regiment of Jones' Brigade had charged the 6th New York Battery, a section of which it captured, but soon relinquished. Hampton's Brigade advanced at a gallop in magnificent order, in column of squadrons, with Hart's and McGregor's batteries abreast of the leading line. As the column approached the hill, its summit and the plateau east of the hill and beyond the railroad was covered with Federal cavalry. Diverging to his left, Hampton crossed the railroad east of the hill, striking the enemy's flank with the head of his column, while Hart galloped his battery to the crest of the hill and opened fire on the enemy who had been driven from the summit. But he only succeeded in firing several shots with a single gun before the carriage which had been partly repaired was permanently disabled. McGregor now succeeded in placing two pieces in position on the crest, and hardly had they gone into action when the guns were charged by a party of the enemy's cavalry, which from the extreme Federal left came thundering down the narrow ridge, striking the unsupported batteries in flank, and trying to ride down the cannoneers. The charge was met by the gunners alone, who, with pistols, sabers and rammer staffs drove the hostile troopers from among the guns and caissons. Lieuts. Ford and Hoxton with their pistols killed both the brave leader of the charge, Lieut.-Col. Broderick, and Maj. Shelmire, while private Sudley of McGregor's Battery knocked one of the enemy from his saddle with a sponge staff.

About the time the desperate attempt of the 1st New Jersey Regiment to take the guns was repulsed by Beckham, Jones' last Regiment with Moorman's three guns arrived from the church, as did Capt. Chew with the section which had been with Robertson. Beckham

quickly placed every available gun in position along the crest and opened fire upon the enemy about Brandy Station.

Hampton was more than holding his own on the plain to the east, but the enemy was still contending for Brandy Station, and a few were desperately defending Martin's silent guns near the eastern base of the hill. Lomax's 11th Virginia spreading out on both sides of the road to the station finally charged the latter, rode completely over Martin's guns and pursued the defenders for some distance down the Stevensburg Road. In the meantime, Hampton had, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight with pistol and saber, overborne the enemy in his front and followed upon their heels until compelled by the well-directed fire of Beckham's guns to forego the pursuit. It was impossible even at close quarters by reason of the dust and smoke to tell friend from foe, and Beckham, rather than lose the effect of his fire, continued to direct it upon the immense mass of horsemen flying down the road in his front. The artillery fire from Fleetwood Hill was most accurate and effective and had, before the withdrawal of the enemy commenced, several times broken the formations of his cavalry.

Meantime W. H. F. Lee's Brigade with one regiment of Jones' Brigade and Johnston's section of Breathed's Battery had, by threatening Buford's rear, kept the latter's force from advancing to the aid of Gregg, in spite of the fact that the direct route lay practically open, and before dispositions could be made for the advance Gregg had been repulsed. As soon as Gregg withdrew, Stuart promptly formed a new line along the eastern slope of the range of hills which, commencing at Fleetwood, extended irregularly to the river at Welford's Ford. Soon after Jones withdrew from the church, exposing W. H. F. Lee's right flank, the latter retired and occupied the hills overlooking the Thompson house, his line connecting with and prolonging that which Stuart had established. Munford, with Fitz

Lee's Brigade, was momentarily expected to arrive and occupy the commanding ground about the Welford house.

To the South, Duffie had arrived near Brandy Station in time to cover Gregg's withdrawal by Rappahannock Ford, and the activity of the Federals was now shifted to Buford, who, extending further and further to his right, until W. H. F. Lee's left was enveloped, launched an attack from the high ground just south and west of the Green House. The movement of the enemy had forced Johnston to withdraw his guns about 2 p. m., and in doing so he was joined by Breathed with the other section of his battery, the whole retiring from point to point and firing upon the advancing Federals. Buford now sent forward a part of his infantry, and followed up its advance with a mounted charge of two regiments, which was quickly repelled. In the struggle W. H. F. Lee was wounded about 4:30 p. m. Before the attack had been repulsed Munford arrived on W. H. F. Lee's left with three regiments of Fitz Lee's Brigade from Oak Shade and at once threw forward a heavy line of skirmishers with which Breathed's Battery advanced. But Buford was already falling back upon Beverly Ford. Munford followed the Federals up closely while Breathed doggedly hung upon their heels with three guns and plied the retreating column from every available position until the pursuers were checked by the enemy's infantry and several batteries in position near the ford.

Pleasanton afterwards attributed his retirement to the fact that the purpose of his reconnaissance had been accomplished since the presence of the Confederate Infantry at Brandy Station was developed by his column. But he must have kept his information from Hooker, who on the 12th of June was, according to his own words, entirely in the dark as to the Confederate movements on his right, and Gen. Lee's intentions.* Pleasanton's statement that the Confederate Infantry

**Conduct of War*, Vol. I, p. 158.

was seen disentraining at Brandy Station is wholly false, for the first division of Ewell's Corps marched to Stuart's assistance from Rixeyville, four miles north of Culpeper Courthouse, by way of Botts' farm to Brandy Station, and did not begin to arrive at the latter point until Pleasonton had made his dispositions to withdraw. So again it is seen how prone to error this "Knight of Romance" was.

The battle of Brandy Station has been gone into in some detail, because it was the first engagement in which mounted troops were almost exclusively engaged on both sides, and because it was one in which the Confederate Horse Artillery displayed a most surprising degree of mobility. Its successful employment was in marked contrast to the comparatively ineffective use of the Federal batteries. At every important point of the field, we have found Beckham's guns playing a leading rôle, but we search in vain for any material influence which the guns of Pleasonton's column bore upon the issue. The few which were brought into prominent action were handled with great courage by the gunners, but they apparently had little or no effect, whereas the position taken by Beckham at the church had proved the nucleus about which the whole defense formed. Furthermore, the fire of Beckham's massed batteries at that point had practically brought Buford's column to a standstill, enabling W. H. F. Lee to move upon the Federal flank and check all hope of successful attack until the Federal front could be partially changed to meet his threat, and in the defense of Lee's line, almost at right angles to that of Jones' and Hampton's, Johnston's two guns had played an important part.

Again, when Gregg had all but occupied Fleetwood Hill with his batteries, it was Carter's section of Chew's Battery which snatched the opportunity from the enemy and by the unaided efforts of a handful of bold gunners saved Stuart, certainly from defeat, if not from a rout. Beckham's rapid movement with Hampton to the rear and the prompt massing of his batteries at Fleetwood

not only secured the position which Carter had prevented Gregg from taking, but contributed materially to the breaking of the Federal column on the plain below with which Hampton was desperately engaged, and the fire of the batteries was most effective upon the retreating enemy. One of Moorman's guns had rendered splendid service with Butler's regiment in opposing Duffie, while Chew with a section of his battery in moving to the support of Robertson's Brigade on the Kellysville Road, and then rapidly back to Fleetwood at Beckham's summons, had traversed the field from end to end in time to arrive at the decisive point at the critical moment. The movements of the various batteries of Beckham's command exhibited not only remarkable mobility, and a rare ability on the battalion commander's part to obtain concert of action between his battery units, but also a most exceptional amount of initiative on the part of his battery commanders who, when assigned a special mission by direct order or by chance, solved the problem which fell to them with skill and determination.

In no battle of the war did the Artillery display a higher degree of independence. This was as it should have been, for if one objection to horse artillery exists, it is as to its vulnerability on account of the large target it presents while in motion due to the great number of animals it requires. Then, too, it is sometimes argued that much time is lost in the care and disposition of the cannoneers' mounts. But such objections are specious, and, even were they material, would be more than counterbalanced by the celerity of movement and the consequent diminishment in the time of exposure. However this may be, Beckham's batteries certainly proved the ability of the Confederate Horse Artillery to take care of itself, for twice in one day the same batteries were ridden over by the enemy's cavalry, and yet the gunners managed to save themselves and their material from harm by their own defensive power. Not so much as a trace was cut, nor a team stampeded by the enemy. It is true this immunity from serious injury

was due, in a measure, to the fact that the troopers who got in among the guns on both occasions were mounted, and therefore unable to secure the guns, etc., which they might have captured had the attacking force been dismounted. But, then it must be remembered that the speed of the mounted men alone enabled the enemy to reach the guns which would have been quite impossible under the circumstances of each case for foot troops. It was that same mobility which made it possible for Hart and McGregor to move at the head of Hampton's Brigade from the church to Fleetwood Hill, that made it possible for Smith to dash across the open in the face of the artillery, and for Broderick to rush down upon the flank of the guns before they could change front.

But even when cavalry possesses the requisite boldness and dash to accomplish such feats as those of Smith's and Broderick's men, the gunners will always possess a great advantage in the brief hand-to-hand conflict which will ensue, for the majority of the mounted men will as a rule pass on through the guns, unable to draw rein. This was certainly the case in both instances when Beckham's batteries were reached by the Federal cavalry, and also when Flournoy charged Clarke's and Martin's batteries. In the last instance, the Federal gunners remanned their guns after Flournoy swept by, and continued in action until finally overpowered by Lomax, by whom the three guns were turned over to Hart's Battery, the gunners of which opened fire with two of the captured pieces.

In the battle of Brandy Station, the Confederate Artillery loss was 1 killed, 10 wounded, and 1 missing, the heaviest individual battery loss being in Moorman's Battery, in which there were 1 man killed, 3 wounded, and 1 captured.*

*Maj. McClellan, in his history of Stuart's campaigns, does not mention Moorman's Battery in connection with this battle, and in the excellent account of the battle by Lieut. G. W. Beale, 9th Va. Cavalry, which appeared in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, of August 11, 1912, no mention whatever of Moorman's Battery is made. But see Beckham's report and the history of the battery by Capt. J. J. Shoemaker, p. 39. The author also has a letter from Capt. Shoemaker, who was 1st Lieutenant of the battery at the time, graphically describing the part of the battery in the battle.

Some idea of the ammunition expenditure of the Horse Artillery may be gathered from the fact that a single piece of Chew's Battery is reported by its gunner to have fired during the engagement 160 rounds. But that such an enormous expenditure for a single piece was by no means general is proved by the fact that this gun burnt out at the breech before the day was over, and was turned in as disabled.*

Of the part of the Artillery in the fight, Stuart in his report has to say: "The conduct of the Horse Artillery, under that daring and efficient officer, Maj. R. F. Beckham, deserves the highest praise. Not one piece was ever in the hands of the enemy, though at times the cannoneers had to fight, pistol and sword in hand, in its defense. The officers and men behaved with the greatest gallantry and the mangled bodies of the enemy show the effectiveness of their fire."

We must now leave Stuart and the Horse Artillery in order to follow the movements of the main army. But, before doing so, it should be said that in all the operations of the cavalry leading up to Gettysburg, Beckham's guns took an active part. It should also be said that in crossing the Potomac at Rowser's Ford on the 27th of June, the practice of submerging the guns and caissons and towing them across stream on the river bottom while the ammunition was carried over in feed bags, was resorted to by Beckham and was, therefore, not one exclusively employed by Forrest in the west, as some writers seem to think.

**Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery*, Neese, p. 179.

CHAPTER XXX

FROM FREDERICKSBURG TO GETTYSBURG

DURING the winter of 1862-63, Jackson had caused his Topographical Engineer to prepare a detailed map of the districts through which it would be necessary to pass in going from the lower Valley through Maryland to Pennsylvania.* This map was the most accurate and remarkable one of its kind made during the war. It showed every defensive position from Winchester to Carlisle, and upon a study of this map Lee matured his plans for the next campaign, which he desired to make a decisive one. Longstreet proposed to send a force into Tennessee to unite with Bragg and Johnston, the latter then being at Vicksburg, which place it was impossible for him to save. By concentrating such a large force in Tennessee, Longstreet believed Rosecrans could be crushed, Cincinnati threatened, and Grant drawn off from Vicksburg.† But Lee preferred to invade the North, agreeing with Longstreet that in taking this step the campaign should be offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. Lee's idea was to force Hooker to attack him in a strong position of his own selection and he no doubt felt as Jackson did when he said "we sometimes fail to drive the enemy out of his position, but they always fail to drive us out of ours."

Gen. Lee's decision was reached near the close of May and by the 1st of June he had completed his arrangements for the ensuing campaign. Before the movement began, his plans were so fully matured and made with such precision that the exact locality at which a conflict with the enemy was expected to take place was indicated on his map. This locality was the town of Gettysburg.‡ He was satisfied that if he could defeat

*Prepared by Capt. Jed Hotchkiss of his staff.

†*Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania*, Longstreet; *Battles and Leaders*, p 245; also see *From Manassas to Appomattox*, Longstreet, p. 336.

‡*Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, Long, pp. 267, 268.

the Federal Army he could also drive it across the Susquehanna and possess himself of Maryland, Western Pennsylvania, probably West Virginia and Washington, as well as relieve the pressure in the west and southwest. The plan being fully approved by Mr. Davis in a personal interview, Lee commenced the movement on June 2 by sending Ewell's Corps to Culpeper Courthouse, soon followed by Longstreet, while A. P. Hill was left in observation of the enemy at Fredericksburg, charged with the duty of screening the movement to the west. By the 8th of June, the main body of the Army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Culpeper Courthouse, from which point Lee on the 9th was able to send forward some of his infantry and Carter's and Alexander's battalions of artillery to the relief of Stuart at Brandy Station when, as we have seen, he was assailed by Pleasonton.

On the 5th, when preparations were in progress for the removal of army headquarters from Fredericksburg, two corps having already left, the enemy appeared in force on the opposite bank, and in the afternoon opened a heavy artillery fire near the mouth of Deep Run, under cover of which they established a pontoon bridge, over which a small body of infantry was crossed. The evening and night was spent by Pendleton in establishing the artillery defense with the batteries of the 3d Corps, but the enemy's movement proved to be a feint, and soon after midday of the 6th, in company with the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Artillery proceeded to Culpeper, arriving there the morning of the 7th. The Artillery of the 1st and 2d Corps had accompanied their respective corps to the point of concentration.

June 10, Ewell's Corps left Culpeper for the Valley. Milroy's Federal Division, about 9,000 strong, occupied Winchester, while McReynolds' Brigade held Berryville. Kelly's Division of about 10,000 men was at Harper's Ferry with a detachment of 1,200 infantry and a battery, under Col. Smith, at Martinsburg. Ewell

reached Cedarville, *via* Chester Gap on the evening of the 12th, whence he detached Jenkins' Cavalry Brigade with Griffin's Battery, and Rodes' Division with Carter's Battalion to capture McReynolds who, discovering the approach of the Confederates, withdrew to Winchester. Rodes then pushed on to Martinsburg, and by the fire of Carter's Battalion, almost unaided, drove the garrison out of its works and across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Smith's Federal battery in retreating by the Williamsport Road was pursued by Jenkins, and lost five guns with all their caissons, teams, and 400 rounds of ammunition. In the meantime, Ewell with Early's and Johnson's divisions and the corps artillery had arrived near Winchester on the evening of the 12th. The next morning Early's Division, with Jones' and Dance's battalions of artillery, was ordered to Newtown, where they were joined by a battalion of Maryland infantry and Griffin's Battery. Johnson moved along the direct road from Front Royal to Winchester driving in the enemy's pickets, while Early advanced along the pike to Kernstown and then to the left so as to gain a position northwest of the town, from which the defensive works could be attacked with advantage. While Early was maneuvering for a position, Johnson formed line of battle two miles from the town preparatory to making an attack and was opened upon by a battery of artillery near the Millwood Road. Col. Andrews at once brought up Carpenter's Battery in command of Lieut. W. T. Lambie, which from a position to the left of the Front Royal Road blew up one of the enemy's caissons and drove off his guns. But almost immediately 12 or 15 long-range pieces in and near the town uncovered and opened upon Lambie's guns, forcing them to retire. Dement's Battery in reserve also suffered some loss and was driven from the field.

It was late in the day before Early was ready to attack. His progress had been opposed by a battery on Pritchard's Hill, which compelled him to make a longer

detour than he had anticipated. But finally Hays' Brigade was moved around through the woods to the Cedar Creek Pike, and along the road to a suitable position, from which to assail Pritchard's Hill. This hill was found by Hays to be occupied by a considerable force of infantry, as well as by the battery, and Gordon was sent by the same route pursued by Hays, to join the latter in the attack. Together Hays and Gordon drove the enemy across the Cedar Creek Pike, and Abraham's Creek as far as Milltown Mills, and into their fortifications on Bower's Hill, the latter being an exceptionally strong position, well defended by artillery, and most difficult of access by reason of the boggy creek bed in its front. During the retirement of the enemy from Bower's Hill, Maj. Latimer directed Carpenter from the position to which he had retired to open with a section of rifled pieces upon them, which was done with excellent effect, but again the enemy's massed artillery actively replied, whereupon about dark Latimer withdrew the battery and placed it in park with the rest of Andrews' Battalion, which was not engaged again that night or the following day. Early reformed his division, three brigades in the front line and one in reserve, while the enemy vigorously shelled his troops and Lambie's guns further to the right. Night fell before the attack could be organized and the men slept in position on their arms, while a terrific storm raged and torrents of rain fell upon them.

During the night, the Federal artillery was withdrawn from Bower's Hill and the south and west side of the town, only a thin line of skirmishers being left to confront Early and Johnson. Before 9 A. M. on the 14th, Early gained Bower's Hill, from which Ewell was able to see the enemy's main work to the northwest of the town. Early was accordingly directed to move to the west of the town and seize a small open work near the Pughtown Road, which commanded the main work, while about 11 A. M. Johnson moved east of the town to divert attention from Early and interfere as much as

possible with the work of fortification which the Federals were busily engaged in. He accordingly advanced to a point between the Millwood and Berryville roads and threw forward a regiment in skirmish order which successfully engrossed the enemy's attention.

Leaving Gordon's Brigade and the Maryland Battalion with Griffin's and Hupp's batteries at Bower's Hill, Early with the rest of his division, Jones' Battalion of artillery under Capt. Carrington, and Brown's Battalion, less Hupp's Battery, under Capt. Dance, moved by a long circuit of some ten miles under cover of the intervening ridges and woods, and about 4 P. M. gained a wooded hill (one of the ranges known as Little North Mountain), opposite the enemy's position and within easy artillery range of it. While Col. Jones was engaged in placing the guns the men were allowed to rest. At the north extremity of the ridge, just south of the Pughtown Road, a cornfield, and at the south end an orchard, afforded excellent positions for artillery to fire upon the opposing works. The enemy had no pickets thrown out towards the north and west, although their main advanced work consisted of a bastion front facing Early's position. From this work a line of parapets ran northward about 150 yards across the Pughtown Road to a small redoubt, occupied by two guns and an infantry support. So completely were the Federals unaware of Early's presence, that two miles to the right of the position he had gained, the rear of their line confronting Gordon at Bower's Hill could be seen.

Jones immediately upon arriving at the ridge carefully reconnoitered the position with his battery commanders and directed a battery of his own and two batteries of Dance's Battalion, 12 guns in all, to be brought up by Dance to the position on the right of the ridge, which position was about three-fourths of a mile to the left front of the bastion. Carrington with two of Jones' batteries was then directed to occupy the cornfield on the left of the ridge, a position somewhat nearer the enemy's work, well to its right front, and

from which it could be partially enfiladed. All of the guns were held under cover on the rear crest immediately in rear of the positions assigned them, extra ammunition brought up, and each battery commander and gunner pointed out his special portion of the target. The remaining batteries were held in reserve at the rear base of the ridge, ready to relieve those in position.

Hays' Brigade, with Smith in support, was brought up by Early and prepared to advance under cover of Jones' fire. When the infantry had been refreshed after a rest of about two hours, Jones gave the signal for Dance and Carrington to open. Instantly the twenty guns were pushed forward to the military crest by hand and opened simultaneously, crossing their fire on the opposing works. The Federal guns immediately opposite Early's position were helpless from the first, although an effort was made to keep them in action. As soon as the Confederate fire commenced, the line opposite Gordon began to fall back towards the main work, and it was upon these troops that Latimer, east of the Pike, caused Lambie to fire.

If the guns in the bastion and the small work on its right replied to Carrington's group Dance was free to fire upon them with the greatest deliberation, and if they shifted to the Confederate right group, Carrington's nearer group had necessarily to be neglected by them. Nor were they able under the most accurate cross-fire of the two groups to concentrate with effect upon Hays' line as it advanced leisurely across the intervening space. The works constructed for their cover were well defined targets for the Confederate gunners, who had no doubt whatever as to their true objective, and under such circumstances it was but a question of a few minutes before a superiority of fire was attained by the Confederate guns in their unexpected and suddenly disclosed positions.

As soon as Early had seen that the Federal defense was overwhelmed by the fire of his artillery, he had sent Hays' Brigade forward, the men of which ad-

vanced without molestation across the open to within 200 yards of the enemy's works. Within thirty minutes the hostile fire was completely subdued, and the defenders began to leave their intrenchments and fall back upon the supports forming in the rear, whereupon the signal for Jones to cease firing was given and the Confederate assaulting column rushed up the slope, through the brushwood abattis, and into the larger work, bayoneting the cannoneers who remained at their posts. Of the six rifled guns in this work, two were immediately turned upon the fleeing enemy and the troops forming to advance to the support of the captured line. The Federals now abandoned the small works to the north of the bastion, which were promptly occupied by Smith's men, whereupon Dance shifted his fire to the main Federal fort, holding his original position in order that he might sweep the opposite ridge, should it be recovered by the enemy.

The occupancy of the whole line of detached works gave the Confederates complete command over the main Federal position. Thus had the artillery, much as at Harper's Ferry the year before, but with even smaller loss, enabled the infantry to seize an exceptionally strong defensive line. No wonder the latter was filled with enthusiasm for the gunners.

In the operations leading up to so successful a result Jones and his battery commanders displayed marked ability and most excellent judgment. In the first place, though always well up to the front in the turning movement, they exhibited no undue haste, and before rushing into position saved time and guarded against mistakes by thoroughly reconnoitering the position to be occupied by the guns. This having been done, the batteries were brought up quietly, and without the slightest confusion assigned their tasks. Nor were the pieces exposed until the instant all were ready to open fire. The method of bringing them into action on this occasion is known as "creeping." Although a most ordinary procedure, and one which common sense

would always seem to dictate in circumstances like those in which Jones found himself placed, a perfect storm of discussion concerning "creeping" at one time broke out among the artillerymen of the Continent, the *pros* and *cons* appearing in numerous pamphlets.* It is such artificial issues that overcome the patience of practical soldiers to whom it seems that they have no place whatever in serious treatises on the technique and tactics of artillery.

As soon as Hays and Smith had secured the hill, Carlington moved his eight guns to its crest. In the meantime, Hays had been reënforced by Smith, and had with the captured guns dispersed the column which endeavored to recapture the position. An attack upon Gordon's position at Bower's Hill had also been repulsed, so that the Federals contented themselves by turning all the guns in the main fort and those in the redoubt on the ridge to its north upon Early, to which Jones replied as soon as he had brought up his batteries. From the captured position the Confederate guns were able to fire into both of these works, as well as upon the infantry masses near them, and continued in action until nightfall. Although Hays' and Smith's brigades had been formed along the rear crest of the ridge for an attack upon the main work of the enemy, the number of the latter, the difficulty of the intervening ground, and the growing darkness, all combined, rendered a further advance unadvisable. But it was apparent to all that the enemy had suffered severely from Jones' fire and that his position was untenable. Furthermore, Jones had early in the night brought all of his guns up and placed them behind the abandoned works.

Anticipating that Milroy would endeavor to escape during the night, Ewell, just after dark, ordered Johnson with a part of his division, and Lieut.-Col. Andrews with Dement's Battery of Napoleons, and Raine's

*See *Field Artillery With the Other Arms*, May, p. 126; also see Von Schell, p. 48.

and Carpenter's rifled sections, eight guns in all, to move to a point about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Winchester on the Martinsburg Pike to intercept the enemy's retreat, or to attack from the north at daylight, in concert with Early and Gordon, should he hold his ground. The remainder of Andrews' Battalion was left with Latimer in front of Winchester, somewhat to the southeast of the town.

Finding the direct road to the designated point almost impassable in the night, Johnson moved across country until he struck the road leading from the Winchester and Martinsburg Pike to Charles Town, and marched *via* Jordan Springs towards Stephenson's Depot, five miles from Winchester. By 3 A. M. he was within four miles of the Martinsburg Pike, marching rapidly towards it, Andrews' guns well closed up upon the infantry. As the head of the column reached the railroad some 200 yards from the pike, it was discovered that the enemy, who had abandoned all his guns, was moving north in full retreat, and almost instantly the fire of musketry broke out between the heads of the two columns. Johnson promptly formed his infantry in line across the Winchester-Harper's Ferry Road, over which he had approached the pike, a stone wall providing excellent cover for the men. In the meantime, the batteries had been halted about 200 yards from the railroad, and the leading gun of Dement's Battery ordered forward to the depot, whence it was directed to be placed in the road near the railroad bridge. Soon the other piece of the same section of Dement's Battery was ordered to occupy a position on the left of the road, and well to the front. Neither of these pieces was able to fire upon the pike at this time, however, on account of the skirmishers in their front. But soon the skirmishers fell back, followed by the enemy, and Dement's guns opened with canister at a range of less than 150 yards, and became desperately engaged in defending themselves against the Federal infantry. Andrews now posted Dement's second section and Raine's section

along the edge of the woods to the left of the road, and somewhat further from the pike than Dement's two guns, and Lambie's section of Carpenter's Battery at a point about 200 yards to the right of the road to guard the flank of Johnson's line. Hardly had these dispositions been made when Milroy came on with his infantry and cavalry, and attacked, making repeated and desperate efforts to cut his way through to Martinsburg. The 1,200 men which Johnson had in his first line were now reënforced by Walker's belated brigade, and after failing in several frontal attacks, and then in an effort to turn the Confederate flanks, a part of the Federal column, some 2,300 men, surrendered. The rest scattered through the woods and fields, Milroy himself, with about 250 cavalry escaping to Harper's Ferry, but before morning, the Confederate cavalry had rounded up many of the Federal stragglers.

In the fighting at Stephenson's Depot, Andrews handled his guns with remarkable ability, all of them being heavily engaged with the enemy's infantry at close range for nearly two hours. The guns were shifted from point to point with unusual celerity, and met each attempt to turn Johnson's flanks with a well directed and rapid fire of canister, following up the enemy's dispersed groups after his column was broken. One of Raine's guns, with an infantry support of but seven men, compelled several hundred Federals retreating in disorder along the Jordan Springs Road to surrender. This instance illustrates the tremendous moral influence of pursuing guns upon disorganized troops. Especially effective was one of Dement's guns which during the action occupied the railroad bridge and held it against a large body of the enemy that endeavored to cut its way over. In this section commanded by Lieut. Contee, the loss was 1 killed and 18 wounded, the latter including the section commander. In the same section, 15 horses were killed or disabled.

In his account of the affair, Gen. Edward Johnson says: "Before closing the report, I beg leave to state

that I have never seen superior artillery practice to that of Andrews' Battalion in this engagement, and especially the section under Lieut. Contee (Dement's Battery), one gun of which was placed on the bridge above referred to, and the other a little to the left and rear. Both pieces were very much exposed during the whole action. Four successive attempts were made to carry the bridge. Two sets of cannoneers (18 out of 16) were killed and disabled. Lieut.-Col. Andrews and Lieut. Contee, whose gallantry calls for special mention, fell wounded at this point. Lieut. John A. Morgan, First North Carolina Regiment, and Lieut. Randolph H. McKim, took the place of the disabled cannoneers, rendering valuable assistance, and deserving special mention."*

Johnson's total loss in the operations of the 18th, 14th, and 15th was but 14 killed, and 74 wounded. Some idea of the desperate work done by Andrews' gunners at Stephenson's Depot may be got from the fact that on that occasion he lost 2 men killed, 2 officers and 12 men wounded, more than 10 per cent of those engaged, whereas the infantry loss was less than 2 per cent of the force engaged. The total number of captured Federals was about 4,000, including 108 officers. The enemy abandoned 800 loaded wagons, 800 horses, a large quantity of commissary and quartermaster stores, and all their guns. Including those captured by Early, 28 pieces of ordnance were secured. Ewell's total loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing, aggregate 269.

Ewell at once informed Rodes at Martinsburg of Milroy's flight, but as Jenkins was on the Potomac near Williamsport on the morning of the 15th, there was no cavalry with which Rodes could intercept the escaping Federals. That evening, Rodes crossed the river at Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins forward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th moved his entire

*See account of this affair in *Recollections of a Soldier*, by the Rev. Randolph H. McKim.



MAJOR JAMES BREATHED
CHIEF HORSE ARTILLERY

division to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road to Boonsborough, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg, and Early moved to Shepherdstown to threaten Harper's Ferry. In these positions, Ewell's divisions rested until June 21, while Longstreet and Hill closed up. The 2d Corps in a brief series of operations had not only swept the route clear for the advance, with the exception of 11,000 Federals at Harper's Ferry, but had secured 28 pieces of superior ordnance with which to complete the armament of its batteries besides turning over the surplus guns and a large amount of supplies to the Army.

On June 18, as Ewell's Corps approached Winchester, Hooker put his army in motion from Falmouth for Manassas. His plan to interpose between Lee's flanks was opposed by Lincoln, Halleck and Stanton, in spite of the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia was spread over a distance of more than 100 miles, and as Lincoln surmised, "was very slim somewhere." When Hooker abandoned his position along Stafford Heights, Hill started on the 14th for the Valley *via* Culpeper Courthouse and Front Royal, Garnett's, Poague's, and Cutts' battalions accompanying Heth's, Pender's, and Anderson's divisions, respectively, with the battalions of McIntosh and Pegram organized as a corps reserve.

Longstreet's Corps, with Henry's, Cabell's, and Dearing's battalions accompanying Hood's, McLaws', and Pickett's divisions, respectively, and Alexander's and Eshleman's battalions organized as the corps reserve, left Culpeper on the 15th and moved along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge to cover the gaps. Hill passed in rear of Longstreet, and when he was safely in the Valley, the latter moved westward through Snicker's and Ashby's gaps, the two corps uniting near Winchester about the 20th. The march along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge had been an arduous one for Walton's battalions, for not only were the roads followed extremely rough and difficult, and the heat oppressive, but the artillery was frequently called upon to

make long digressions from the route to support the cavalry and detachments of infantry in meeting the threats of the enemy on the flank of the column. The Cavalry with the Horse Artillery had, while endeavoring to screen the movement, been almost constantly engaged, encountering the enemy at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, and losing over 500 men in these operations.

On the 16th the Chief of Artillery, after a week of strenuous labor at Culpeper supervising the organization of the artillery trains, and assisting in arranging for the reserve supply of ammunition, left for the Valley and soon joined army headquarters which was with the 1st Corps. Between the 23d and 25th, after resting in camp near Millwood and Berryville for four or five days, the 1st Corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and the 3d Corps at Shepherdstown. Robertson's and Jones' brigades of cavalry with Moorman's and Breathed's batteries remained at Ashby's Gap, while Chew's, McGregor's, and Hart's batteries, as we have seen, accompanied Stuart in his movement around the enemy's rear with Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's brigades.

On the 21st, Gen. Lee ordered Ewell to move forward and take possession of Harrisburg, and the following day Rodes and Johnson with Carter's and Andrews' battalions, the latter under Latimer, and Early with Jones' Battalion, took up the march. Rodes and Johnson proceeded *via* Chambersburg to Carlisle, and Early's Division moved *via* Greenwood and Gettysburg to York, with orders to join the main body at Carlisle after destroying the Northern Central Railroad, and the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. Brown's and Nelson's battalions organized as the corps reserve accompanied Johnson's Division.

On the 25th and 26th, Hooker also crossed his army over the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, and moved to the vicinity of Frederick. Here he threatened the Confederate rear through the South Mountain passes, should Lee move north, and also covered Washington,

but he soon found that his hands were tied by Stanton and Halleck, who did everything possible to compel his resignation, which was tendered and accepted on the 27th. At midnight, Meade was placed in command of the Army of the Potomac. Meanwhile, Lee with the 1st and 3d corps had reached Chambersburg and ordered Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell at Harrisburg. Ewell with Johnson's and Rodes' divisions had reached Carlisle. The following day, the 28th, Early reached York and sent Gordon forward to destroy the bridge, which was done, however, by a small party of Federal militia, falling back before the Confederate advance. Gen Lee did not learn until this day of Hooker's crossing, for Stuart with the larger part of the cavalry was entirely out of touch with the Army, and Robertson with his own and Jones' Brigade had not moved into Pennsylvania with the Army. Therefore, Lee was in utter ignorance of the movements of the enemy (just as Hooker had been at Chancellorsville), until one of Longstreet's spies arrived about midnight on the 28th, with accurate information as to the position of five of Meade's corps, and Lee now learned that Meade was at Frederick. That the absence of Stuart from the immediate front and flank of the Army during its advance into Pennsylvania was a grievous error on somebody's part seems certain, but the point cannot be gone into at length here. It is by no means clear, however, that the mistake is justly attributable to Stuart. Before he separated from the Army with the larger part of his division, he placed one brigade and part of another in immediate touch with army headquarters, and this force was at all times subject to the directions of Stuart's superiors. The force was not used, but that was not Stuart's fault. Stuart certainly had the sanction of Gen. Lee for the movement he undertook, and if the troops he left with the Army had been properly employed, irrespective of what orders Stuart may have left with Robertson, the absence of the cavalry would never have been assigned as one of the causes of the Confeder-

ate reverses in Pennsylvania. There is much ground for the belief that Lee counted on Stuart doing that which he had authorized Stuart to leave for Robertson to do, whereas Robertson, without direct orders from Lee failed to do without any fault on his part what Stuart would have done in similar circumstances. It would, therefore, seem that Lee suffered more from the absence of Stuart than from that of the cavalry, some of which he had but did not use; and again, it may be said, that since Stuart was authorized to separate from the Army of Lee, the latter as commander-in-chief must bear the blame for all consequent mishaps.*

As soon as Lee learned of Hooker's move across the Potomac and that the Federal army was marching towards South Mountain, he at once arrested the movements of his corps which had been hitherto ordered and determined to concentrate his army at Cashtown. Hill's Corps was accordingly ordered to move toward that point on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's Division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden's command from the Valley. Ewell was also recalled from Carlisle to the point of concentration, and on the evening of the 30th his reserve artillery and trains with Johnson's Division as an escort arrived near Chambersburg, and Ewell himself with Early and Rodes reached Heidlersburg. Since Jenkins' Brigade with Griffin's Battery, which had covered Ewell's advance towards Harrisburg, were the only mounted troops present, the advance of the Federals upon Gettysburg was unknown. Heth's Division of Hill's Corps had reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's Brigade of that division, which had been sent forward to procure a supply of shoes, found Gettysburg occupied by the enemy, and returned nine miles to Cashtown, its commander being unwilling to hazard an attack with his

*See *Stuart's Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign*, Mosby; also Col. Mosby's and Col. Robertson's articles in *Battles and Leaders*; *Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, McClellan; *The Battle of Gettysburg*, Henderson; and numerous other authorities pro and con.

single brigade. Buford had early on the morning of the 29th crossed into and moved up the Cumberland Valley, *via* Boonesborough and Fairfield, with Gamble's and Devens' cavalry brigades, after sending Merritt's to Mechanicstown as a guard for his trains, and on Tuesday afternoon, June 30, under instructions from Pleasonton had entered Gettysburg.

Meade, who, like Lee, desired to fight a defensive battle, very soon after taking command on the 28th selected a strong position for his line along Parr's Ridge, behind Pipe Creek. This ridge formed the divide between the waters of the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay. From Gettysburg, near the eastern base of the Green Ridge and covering all the upper passes into Cumberland Valley, good roads led to all important points between the Susquehanna and the Potomac, as a result of which the town was of great strategic importance. On the west of the town, distant nearly half a mile, there is a somewhat elevated ridge running north and south with the Lutheran Seminary on the crest. This ridge, known as Seminary Ridge, was covered throughout its whole length with open woods. From the crest the ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising forms another ridge about 500 yards from the first, upon which, nearly opposite the Seminary, stood the McPherson farm buildings. The western ridge, wider, smoother, and lower than the first, intersects the latter at Oak Hill, a commanding knoll at its northern extremity, and about one and a half miles north of the Seminary. From Oak Hill, the southern face of which was bare, there is a clear view of the slopes of both ridges and the valley between them. West of McPherson's ridge, Willoughby Run flows south into Marsh Creek, and south of the farm buildings and directly opposite the Seminary, a wood bordered the run for about 300 yards, and stretched back to the crest behind. The Seminary stands midway between two roads and about 800 yards from each, the first running from Gettysburg southwesterly to Hagerstown, *via* Fairfield; the second

northwesterly to Chambersburg, *via* Cashtown. Parallel to and 150 yards north of the Chambersburg Pike is the bed of an unfinished railroad, with deep cuttings through the two ridges. North of the town the country is comparatively flat and open; on the east of it Rock Creek flows south. South of the town, and overlooking it, is a ridge of bold high ground, terminated on the west by Cemetery Hill, and on the east by Culp's Hill, which bending around to the south extends half a mile or more and terminates in low grounds near Spangler's Spring. Culp's Hill is steep and well wooded on its eastern face, which slopes downward to Rock Creek. From Cemetery Hill, a ridge known as Cemetery Ridge extends southward for a mile or more nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, 1,000 yards to the west. On a line in prolongation of Cemetery Ridge rise two bold knolls, known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top, respectively. The configuration of the ground comprising Cemetery Ridge is such that its crest forms a line similar to the shank of a fish hook, with the crest line of Culp's Hill as the barb. The intervening ground between Cemetery and Seminary ridges consisted of rolling fields, intersected by numerous fences. Between the two ridges runs the Emmittsburg Road, which leaving the southern extremity of Seminary Ridge crosses the depression in a northeasterly direction, and passing over Cemetery Hill descends to the town. Such are the general features of the battlefield of Gettysburg.

So impressed was Buford with the strength of the various positions about Gettysburg, that no sooner had Pettigrew withdrawn before his advance, than he decided to secure them to Meade. Expecting the early appearance of the Confederates in force, he assigned Devens' Brigade to the quarter of the field north, and Gamble's to that west of the town, sent out scouting parties along all the roads to collect information, and informed Reynolds of the situation. His pickets extended from below the Fairfield Road along the eastern bank of Willoughby Run to the railroad cut, then

easterly some 1,500 yards north of the town to a wooded hillock near Rock Creek. Meade arrived on the night of the 30th, with his headquarters and the Reserve Artillery under Hunt at Taneytown, about 12 miles south of Gettysburg. The 1st Corps was at Marsh Run, the 11th at Emmittsburg, the 8d at Bridgeport, the 12th at Littletown, the 2d at Uniontown, the 5th at Union Mills, the 6th and Gregg's cavalry at Manchester, and Kilpatrick's cavalry was at Hanover. Thus, while the Confederates were concentrating near Gettysburg, the Federal Army was widely scattered over the region to the south and east of it. But Meade was soon convinced that the movement of the enemy towards the Susquehanna had been abandoned, and while he issued carefully drawn orders to prepare the Pipe Creek line for defense, he also provided for an offensive movement in case developments should justify it.

At this time the three Confederate corps were converging by easy marches on Cashtown, where Lee, now more or less conversant with the positions of the Federal corps, proposed to await an attack. Stuart was still out of touch with the Army, and Robertson and Imboden had not had time to come up. Pickett's Division had been left at Chambersburg to await Imboden's arrival, and Law's Brigade had been detached from Hood's Division and sent to New Guilford Courthouse, a few miles south of Fayetteville, with orders to remain there until Robertson's command arrived.

As soon as Hill on the 30th learned from Pettigrew that the enemy was in Gettysburg, he informed Lee of the fact and also Ewell that he intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in his front. His orders were specific not to bring on an action, but his thirst for battle was unquenchable, and like the German lieutenants in 1870 he rushed on, and, as we shall see, took the control of the situation out of the hands of the commander-in-chief. It was Hill, therefore, who committed the second great mistake of the Confederate campaign, the practical elimination of the cavalry being the first.

CHAPTER XXXI

GETTYSBURG—JULY 1

THE Confederate situation on the morning of July 1 was briefly as follows: Of the nine divisions, eight with the exception of Law's Brigade were in motion towards Gettysburg, Ewell, in conformity with Hill's plan, having at an early hour ordered Rodes and Early to move on that point from the roads they were pursuing toward Cashtown. Six of the divisions with the reserve artillery of the three corps and the trains were concentrated upon the turnpike from Fayetteville to Gettysburg.

At 5 A. M., Hill with Heth's and Pender's divisions and Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions of artillery had left Cashtown, and at 8 A. M. Buford's scouts, about three miles west of Gettysburg, on the Cashtown Road, reported Heth's advance. Heth pressed on and found Gamble's cavalry brigade in position on the McPherson Ridge from the Fairfield Road to the railroad cut, supported by Calef's regular battery, one section of which was stationed near the left of the line and the other two across the Chambersburg or Cashtown Pike.* Devens' squadrons prolonged Gamble's line to Oak Hill.

As Heth advanced, he threw Archer's Brigade to the right and Davis' to the left of the Cashtown Pike with Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades in support. Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions, though well up, were unable to gain positions from which to prepare the attack before Heth launched his brigades, and the batteries were left to act as best they could, without any definite plan or objective. Hence, Heth's first attack was well resisted by Buford's dismounted troopers, who would have been unable to hold their lines had they been first subjected to a heavy artillery fire. Heth

*This battery was distinguished as Duncan's Battery in the Mexican War.

would almost certainly have been able by a proper concert with Pegram and McIntosh to seize Buford's position before the latter was reinforced.

Upon receiving Buford's report, Reynolds started for Gettysburg with Wadsworth's small division of two brigades, and Hall's 2d Maine Battery, ordering Doubleday and Howard to follow with their corps. Hearing the sound of battle as he approached the town, Reynolds directed his troops to cross the fields towards the firing, and himself joined Buford at the Seminary. It was now past 10 o'clock, and Heth had formed for attack. Reynolds placed three of the regiments which he had brought up north of the railroad cut, and two south of the pike, substituting Hall's Battery for Calef's, thus relieving the dismounted troopers, who had alone opposed Hill for the past two hours. Cutler's regiments were hardly in position when they were furiously charged by Davis' Brigade and swept back to Seminary Ridge under the fire of Pegram's guns, which also forced Hall to retire his battery by sections. Reynolds had meantime sent to the rear to hurry Doubleday forward and one of the latter's regiments, together with the two which had been posted south of the pike under Col. Fowler, charged Davis' Brigade and drove it from the cut with terrible loss to both sides. The Confederate brigade, losing all its field-officers but two, and many of its men, was disabled for the rest of the day. Just as Davis' Brigade overlapped Cutler's on the right, so Meredith's, the other brigade which Reynolds had brought up, overlapped Archer's on the latter's right. As Meredith's Brigade entered the wood west of the Seminary, it was ordered forward by Reynolds in a furious charge upon Archer's Brigade, turning the Confederate flank, capturing Archer and most of his men, and pursuing the others beyond Willoughby Run. Almost at the moment of victory, the superb Reynolds, who with that magnanimity which characterized his soul, had disregarded the affront of Meade's appointment over him, and had only sought to aid his

new commander and serve his country to the utmost of his ability, was killed in the wood by a sharpshooter. But with Wadsworth's Division he had, with rare promptitude and gallantry, "determined the decisive field of the war." In the words of Gen. Hunt, it may be said that "to him may be applied in a wider sense than in its original one Napier's happy eulogium on Ridge: 'No man died on that field with more glory than he, yet many died, and there was much glory.'"

Soon after the repulse of Davis and Archer, Rowley's and Robinson's divisions of two brigades each with the four remaining batteries of the Corps arrived. Of Rowley's Division, Stone's Brigade occupied the interval between Meredith and Cutler, and Biddle's Brigade with Cooper's Battery took position on the ridge between the Fairfield Road and the wood. Reynolds' Battery replaced Hall's, and Calef's rejoined Gamble's Brigade, which with Devens' had been withdrawn from the field about 11 A. M. and stationed as a reserve in rear of the Federal left. Robinson's Division was also held as a reserve near the base of Seminary Ridge. Gen. Howard arrived about noon and, assuming command, directed Gen. Schurz commanding the 11th Corps to prolong Doubleday's line towards Oak Hill with two of his divisions and three batteries, and to post his third division and two batteries on Cemetery Hill as a rallying point.

Heth had, meantime, been preparing to renew the attack, and, as soon as Pender arrived to support him, was ordered to advance by Hill. The greater portion of Heth's line now moved to the attack south of the Cashtown Pike, with Pender's Division formed in a second line. The nine batteries of Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions occupied positions west of Willoughby Run, with Lane's, Poague's, Cutts', and Garnett's battalions held in reserve along the pike some distance to the rear. Pegram's entire battalion went into action on a low crest just to the right of the turnpike, while Rice's Battery and Hurt's section of Whitworths joined it. Johnson's Battery and Hurt's other section

occupied a commanding hill further to the right near the Fairfield Road, while the 2d Rockbridge Battery, under Lieut. Wallace, was stationed just to the left of the pike. The two battalions at once opened with a slow fire which gradually grew in intensity as the Federal guns uncovered. Hurt's Whitworths were energetically employed in shelling the woods and soon Maurin's Battery of Garnett's Battalion moved up to the relief of one of Pegram's batteries, which had exhausted its ammunition.

At this juncture there were nine batteries engaged on either side. But Hill was not to deliver the attack unaided, for, approaching Gettysburg and guided by the sound of battle, Rodes had directed his march along the prolongation of Seminary Ridge, with three brigades on the western and two on the eastern slope, while Ewell ordered Carter to seize Oak Hill for his battalion of artillery. By 1 o'clock the approach of Ewell had been detected, and by 2 o'clock the column had begun to arrive over the Middletown Road and Carter was establishing his guns in position. Whereupon Howard called on Sickles at Emmittsburg, and Slocum at Two Taverns, for aid.

Col. Carter moved out ahead of Rodes' line, and placing W. P. Carter's and Fry's batteries in position on Oak Hill opened a destructive fire upon the enemy's line running along the ridge west of the town to the railroad cut. The effect of these two batteries, though in a position much exposed to the artillery and musketry fire of the enemy, was such as to cause Schurz, who had prolonged Doubleday's line to the right, to change front with his two divisions and occupy a low ridge half a mile north of the town. This change of front left a gap between his left and Doubleday's right covered only by the fire of Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries posted behind it. To meet the movement effected by Schurz, whose line was now at right angles to that of Doubleday and confronting Rodes, Carter moved Page's and Reese's batteries to the

Confederate left. Page's Battery went into action at the foot of the ridge occupied by O'Neal's Brigade, and opened with canister upon the enemy's infantry, which advanced to the attack. Disregarding at first the fire of the Federal batteries, a number of which had taken position in the valley north of the town and had concentrated upon him, Page was finally driven back to a more retired position. How persistently W. P. Carter at Oak Hill and Page maintained their fire is shown by the fact that within a short space of time the former lost 4 men killed and 7 wounded, while the latter lost 4 men killed and 26 wounded, and 17 horses.

McIntosh and Pegram had from the first crossed fire with Carter, and from their positions had not only assisted in forcing Schurz to abandon his original line, but had been able, by advancing two of McIntosh's batteries to the hollow east of Willoughby Run, to enfilade a large mass of infantry in the railroad cut, completely clearing it of the enemy.

The Federal attack on Rodes' left had become serious. Not only was Page's Battery compelled to retire, but Iverson had lost three of his regiments, or about 1,000 of his men, and the flank was being gradually turned. Leaving Fry's Battery in its original position on the ridge, Col. Carter rapidly moved Carter's, Page's, and Reese's batteries to its eastern base behind Doles' Brigade, which now held the extreme Confederate left. These batteries, by a tremendous effort, succeeded almost single-handed in checking the Federal advance and driving back both the infantry and artillery of the enemy from the threatened point. Carter's Battery, though much depleted and damaged, delivered a most effective fire with reckless daring.

At this juncture, about 3:30 p. m., Early's Division began to arrive on Rodes' left, and Devens' dismounted troopers who had been holding a hillock on Rock Creek were driven off by Doles' skirmishers. Barlow, however, advanced his division supported by Wilkerson's Battery, and recovered the position, but in

order to connect with Barlow's left, it was necessary for Schurz to push forward his center, and still further attenuate his line.

As Early arrived, he took in the situation at a glance, and directed Jones to throw his battalion into action east of Rock Creek, and somewhat north of Barlow's position. With twelve pieces Jones soon opened at easy range upon the flank of Barlow's massed division, taking part of it in reverse. No troops could withstand such a fire long. No sooner had Jones opened than Gordon's, Hays', and Avery's brigades in line, with Smith's in support, moved out and attacked Barlow, Gordon on the right connecting with Doles on Rodes' left. The Confederate line was now, about 4 P. M., thoroughly reestablished, and from right to left consisted of Heth's, Rodes', and Early's divisions, supported by four battalions of artillery, or seventeen batteries, all in action.

A bloody contest now ensued between Barlow and Early in which the former was desperately wounded, and Wilkerson's Battery severely punished after losing its commander. The whole 11th Corps or right wing of the Federal line was soon driven back almost to the town, where Schurz sought to establish a new line upon a brigade and Heckman's Battery which he drew from Cemetery Hill for the purpose. Jones had suffered the loss of several men and one gun, which was struck and bent by a solid shot. Three of his pieces had also been rendered temporarily unserviceable by projectiles wedging in the bore. But as soon as Early's advance had masked his fire upon Barlow's retreating masses, he sent Carrington's Battery across the creek in order that it might secure a better position in front of the town.

Doubleday had been vigorously attacked by Rodes on his right, and both Heth and Pender of Hill's Division on his left. Early's success completely uncovered his right, which was overlapped a quarter of a mile or more by Rodes. But still retiring slowly to the base

of Seminary Ridge, where Col. Wainwright commanding the artillery of the 1st Corps had massed 12 guns south of the Cashtown pike, and Stewart's Battery slightly north of it, the Federals offered a desperate resistance. Buford had thrown about half of Gamble's dismounted troopers forward on the left, south of the Fairfield Road. Heth's Division had suffered severely and Pender had moved into the front line. On the Confederate side, Gen. Pendleton was seeking to move Johnson's Battery to a position well to Heth's right, from which to enfilade Doubleday's left, and had ordered Garnett's Battalion forward along the pike and Poague's Battalion to move up under cover to the right between Johnson and Pegram. The artillery cordon was thus almost completed from the Fairfield Road to Rock Creek, when about 4 p. m. the whole Confederate line advanced to the final attack. Schurz, then Doubleday, gave the order to fall back upon Cemetery Hill, but not until Davison's section of Stewart's Battery had raked Scale's Brigade in column on the pike, and Wainwright's guns had inflicted great punishment upon Perrin in spite of Pegram's and McIntosh's fire. Wainwright, mistaking the order, had clung to Seminary Hill, until, seeing the infantry retreating to the town, he moved his batteries down the Cashtown Pike, where they were overlapped on both sides by the Confederate skirmishers at close range. There, he was compelled to abandon a gun all the horses of which were killed. Schurz was also compelled to leave a gun on the field.

The Confederate batteries now advanced rapidly from their several positions, and at once went into action along Seminary Ridge, while the infantry pursued the retreating Federals through the town, which was taken about 4:30 p. m. along with some 5,000 prisoners, principally men of the 11th Corps, who had lost their way in the streets on the way to the rear.

Doubleday's and Schurz's men rallied upon Steinwehr's Division of the 11th Corps. Steinwehr's men had been well posted behind the stone walls along the

slopes of the hill, and in the houses thereon. As they arrived, the troops of Doubleday's Corps were formed on Steinwehr's left and Schurz's on his right. Buford assembled his squadrons on the plain west of Cemetery Hill, covering the Federal left flank and checking the pursuit, while Wainwright and Osborn posted the ten batteries of the two corps in strong positions on the hill covering every approach to its summit. A regiment comprising the train guard was promptly placed by Wadsworth on Culp's Hill. Hancock, much beloved and admired by the Federal troops, now arrived and assumed command, and soon under the energetic direction of Hancock, Howard and Warren, strong entrenchments of stone, earth and timber began to appear all along the crests of Cemetery and Culp's hills. The sorely-tried Federals, much inspired by Hancock's presence and the knowledge that his corps would soon arrive, had no thought of abandoning their small Gibraltar upon which the tide of defeat had washed them, without the most desperate resistance.

While the Federals were busily occupied in preparing their position for defense, Gen. Pendleton with his staff was engaged in reconnoitering Seminary Ridge as far south as the road leading eastward from the ridge, through the Peach Orchard and Devil's Den. Garnett's Battalion had already been ordered up along the Fairfield Road to the ridge, where Pendleton had intended to mass a large number of guns, within easy range of Cemetery Hill, but Gen. Ramseur, whose brigade had just occupied the town, met Pendleton while selecting positions for his guns and urged him not to go into action at the point decided upon, lest the enemy's batteries should be provoked into firing upon his men, who were much exposed. Leaving Capt. Maurin with the batteries of Garnett's Battalion in park just behind the crest opposite the town, Pendleton again set about the exploration of the ridge, soon sending Col. Walker an order to move up his battalions, and the Commander-in-Chief detailed information about the road leading past the enemy's left flank.

From his station on Seminary Hill, Gens. Lee and Longstreet had witnessed the enemy retreating to Cemetery Hill. Lee's desire was to have Ewell secure possession of the heights in his front. An order to do this was sent Ewell by Lee, but with the caution not to bring on a general engagement until the Army was all up. The position was a formidable one, and its strength was being rapidly increased. The 2d Corps had been much cut up. Rodes had lost 3,000 men or more, and besides a loss of about 500 of his men, Early had sent two of his brigades well out to his left to watch the York Road, over which the approach of part of the 12th Corps was reported. Hill's two divisions had been very roughly handled and had lost heavily. They had been withdrawn to Seminary Hill, as soon as Early's troops entered the town, leaving Ewell with only about 8,000 men to hold it and secure the prisoners. Ewell, by acquiescing in the order he received, led Lee to believe that the attempt to take the hill would be made and offered no objection to its execution. But Johnson's Division with Latimer's, Dance's, and Nelson's battalions of artillery under Col. Brown, were momentarily expected by Ewell, and he delayed pending their arrival. These troops, however, did not arrive until near sunset, and meantime the firing had all but died out. During the fatal delay, portions of the Federal 12th and 3d Corps arrived. Before Johnson's Division came up, the enemy was reported to Ewell to be moving to his left flank, and upon its arrival he ordered it to move around to meet the threat and occupy Culp's Hill, half a mile to the east of Cemetery Hill, and Col. Brown at once set about a search for a route by which to move his artillery into position on Culp's Hill, which he expected would soon be in Johnson's possession. At this juncture, orders arrived from Gen. Lee for Ewell to draw his corps to the right, but Ewell in person persuaded the Commander-in-Chief to permit him to carry out his original design. Unknown to Ewell, Culp's Hill had been occupied early in the evening by Wadsworth's Di-

vision, and so when at midnight Johnson's Division was moved around to its base, a reconnoitering party found the enemy in possession, and no attempt was made to seize it. Latimer had meantime moved his battalion to the extreme left by a wide detour, and gone into position on Benner's Hill, between the York and Baltimore roads in front of Culp's Hill, where the batteries were parked for the night.

General Hunt states that a Confederate attack on Cemetery Hill was impracticable before 5:30 P. M., and that after that the position was perfectly secure. But this statement is too general, and therefore not at all satisfactory. That Ewell was guilty of unnecessarily delaying seems quite clear. The truth seems to be that he did not grasp the rare opportunity presented him and that it slipped by while he intentionally awaited the arrival of Johnson's Division and Brown's Artillery. It is not contended that Ewell should have assaulted after 5:30 P. M. After that time, the Federal position on Cemetery Hill was, as Gen. Hunt declares, no doubt perfectly secure against the force Ewell could hurl against it, and Johnson was undoubtedly too weak to carry Culp's Hill later in the night. The time at which Ewell should have taken the position was when Schurz fell back in more or less disorder before him. At that time, Culp's Hill was entirely unoccupied, and Steinwehr was alone in position on Cemetery Hill. It would seem that Ewell's troops could have followed Schurz up the slopes practically protected against the fire of Steinwehr's men by the enemy retreating in his front. Gordon had practically routed Barlow's Division and was actually among the latter's men when Ewell himself ordered the pursuit to cease. Hear what Gordon has to say: "The whole of that portion of the Union Army in my front was in inextricable confusion and in flight. They were necessarily in flight, for my troops were upon the flank and rapidly sweeping down the lines. The firing upon my men had almost ceased. Large bodies of Union troops were throwing down their arms and sur-

rendering because in disorganized and confused masses they were wholly powerless either to check the movement or return the fire. As far down the lines as my eye could reach, the Union troops were in retreat.* Those at a distance were still resisting, but giving ground, and it was only necessary for me to press forward in order to insure the same results which invariably follow such flank movements. In less than half an hour, my troops would have swept up and over those hills, the possession of which was of such momentous consequence. It is not surprising, with a full realization of the consequences of a halt, that I should have refused at first to obey the order. Not until the third or fourth order of the most peremptory character reached me, did I obey."† Now, here it is to be observed that if Doubleday was still resisting well out to Gordon's right, as he certainly was at the time Gordon pressed forward to the town, he could not have been securely intrenched on Cemetery Hill. As a matter of fact, Steinwehr alone, as we have seen, was there. Gen. Hunt himself states that Doubleday reached the hill after Howard's two divisions fell back on Steinwehr, and also that the 1st Corps was reformed before the 11th Corps. He also states that the 11th Corps was reformed with some difficulty and that not until Doubleday and Howard had established their line did Wadsworth occupy Culp's Hill with the 500 men of the train guard. It appears then, from his own words, that during the interim between Gordon's enforced halt north of the hill and near its base and the time Doubleday reformed, a period of at least half an hour, there were no troops whatever on Culp's Hill and only Steinwehr and the two other divisions of the 11th Corps, the latter in a state of disorganization, on Cemetery Hill. Little should have been expected by Ewell in the way of an artillery preparation for his attack. In fact, the terrain offered few good positions for his artillery, and even had it been capable

*No doubt Gordon could see the retrograde movement of Doubleday's line before Bodes and Pender.

†*Reminiscences of the Civil War*, John B. Gordon.

of rendering him valuable aid, that fact does not ex-tenuate the grievous error of his allowing the enemy to intrench and reinforce himself. When he did move, it was in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Com-mander-in-Chief, though the latter's consent was finally secured and Johnson's entire division, too weak to carry Culp's Hill, was placed in a position from which communication with the rest of the Army was most difficult. In fact, it was practically eliminated from the field of utility for the remainder of the battle.

As to the point of Ewell's ability to take Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 1st, there is, however, the greatest diversity of authority. One of his own staff officers declares as the result of a personal reconnaissance that it was perfectly practicable.* At any rate, Lee's original orders should have been obeyed and the attempt made. In failing to do this, Ewell committed the third great mistake of the campaign. The fact that Lee's consent to the movement of John-son's Division around to the left had been secured does not in any way signify that his original views were altered by Ewell's representations. When that division arrived, Lee had learned through the personal recon-naissance of Col. Long of his staff that it was no longer practicable to assault Cemetery Hill. He knew that Ewell had by his procrastination allowed the golden opportunity to slip through his fingers, and that some other move was necessary.

But now let us view the situation from another stand-point. Let us regard Ewell's action in the most favor-able light possible, assuming, contrary to the fact, that he received no order from Lee to follow up Schurz. Even then it would seem he was guilty of a most inex-cusable tactical blunder, for certain it is no general should halt his troops in pursuit, with a hill immediately in front obviously offering a rallying point for the enemy. The mere fact that a routed or even a defeated

*Capt. James Power Smith. See his valuable paper, "General Lee at Gettysburg," read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, April 4, 1906.

enemy makes for a particular point is sufficient to prompt an energetic commander to seek in every way possible to deny his adversary access thereto. Cemetery and Culp's hills by their very nature should have filled Ewell with a consuming desire to reach their crests and discover what lay beyond them. He should have longed to secure their summits if for no other reason than to keep the enemy from doing so. So long as a single regiment of his corps was capable of pushing on in fairly good order, it should never have been allowed to halt until stopped by exhaustion or by the enemy. Troops, however weary, do not rest on ordinary hillsides with the great unknown on the rear crest, and had whatever force Ewell may have sent forward in this case been checked in its ascent by Steinwehr, the strength and exact location of the latter would have been discovered. The information thus secured would have at once enabled Ewell to seize Culp's Hill, if not Cemetery Hill, and with the former in his possession the latter would have soon become untenable along with the whole position subsequently occupied by Meade's troops.

The Confederates had now become hopelessly committed to the offensive, and just as Lee was compelled to abandon the position near Cashtown as his line of defense, so Meade was being gradually drawn away by circumstances from the defensive position he had selected behind Pipe Creek. Gettysburg, like a great magnet, had drawn both armies forward from their chosen fields of action, for neither Lee nor Meade was able to overcome its attraction. Meade was compelled to reinforce Buford, then Reynolds, then Howard, then Hancock, to save them, while Lee was unable to relinquish the contact which Hill, contrary to the general plan of campaign and specific orders, had brought about.

When Meade was thoroughly informed of the situation at Cemetery Hill by Hancock and others, he immediately set his remaining troops in motion for Gettysburg by forced marches, wisely recognizing Gen.

Hunt as his tactical Chief of Artillery and directing him to make all necessary dispositions concerning the arm. Leaving Taneytown about 11 p. m. Meade and Hunt reached the battlefield shortly after midnight and soon reconnoitered the position. The general features of the field have been explained. The Federal line, though hurriedly established upon the natural ridges, overlooked the open country to the north and the depression to the west. From Big Round Top on the south to Culp's Hill at the point of the fish hook on the east, the distance was about three miles. The line possessed a great advantage in that troops could be quickly transferred from point to point of the crest line by moving them across the interior area. Meade saw at once that the position and his force would permit him to establish about 25,000 infantry and 100 guns along each mile of his front, and that his flanks were at once unsailable and unturnable if properly defended. Not only did the natural flanks of the position rest upon precipitous and rocky slopes, but they were screened from artillery fire by thick growths of trees. As he viewed the favor which fortune had bestowed upon him, Meade's regrets concerning the necessary abandonment of Pipe Creek were dispelled.

Running roughly parallel to the shank of the Federal hook, which was some two miles long from Little Round Top to the bend at Cemetery Hill, nature with a bold hand had marked out the main Confederate position along Seminary Ridge. At the close of the 1st of July, Ewell's Corps covered the front from Benner's Hill around Culp's and Cemetery Hill, to Seminary Hill and the Fairfield Road, his line passing through the town. Johnson was on the left, Early in the center, and Rodes on the right. Hill's line occupied Seminary Ridge, his left connecting with Ewell. Trimble, vice Pender, was on the left, Anderson on the right, and Pettigrew, vice Heth, in reserve on the rear slope of the ridge. The Artillery of the 2d and 8d Corps bivouacked that night along the line, generally in rear of the infan-

try. Latimer occupied Benner's Hill, while Brown held Jones' and Dance's battalions for the night somewhat in Johnson's rear in readiness to be moved to Culp's Hill should it be taken. Carter's batteries remained in position along the ridge north of the town, together with Nelson's Battalion. Col. Walker held Pegram's, Mc-Intosh's, Lane's, Poague's, and that part of Garnett's Battalion which had not been placed in position by Pendleton, along the rear crest of Seminary Ridge, ready to take up positions on the forward crest at dawn.

The exterior line of the Confederates is thus seen to have been not less than 5 miles in extent with communication from point to point rendered most roundabout and difficult by reason of its concavity towards the enemy. Furthermore, Lee's force enabled him to occupy this line with not over 18,000 infantry, and 50 guns per mile, or about half the number of guns and muskets per mile of the enemy's position. The Federal formation was deep and narrow, while that of the Confederates was extensive in width and shallow. The relative disposition of the two armies was, therefore, such that the utmost coöperation between the various parts of the exterior line, together with the concentration of its fire effect, was essential to compensate, in an attack upon the interior line, for the lack of the momentum of a superior mass at any given point of assault. Without these two elements, it now seems evident that any attack, however gallantly delivered, was predestined to fail through sheer lack of momentum. No problem could be presented which involves to a higher degree than did Gettysburg the absolute necessity of fire superiority to the success of the offensive.

Such was the condition of affairs at the close of the 1st of July. While Lee's original desire to seize Cemetery Hill during the early part of the evening had been thwarted, he still believed the important position could be successfully assailed at daybreak in spite of Longstreet's advice to turn his attention to the enemy's left in the vulnerable quarter to which Pendleton had

called attention. But while the views of Lee and Longstreet differed at this time, the fact remains that the latter had already been urged to hasten forward his troops in order to be ready to discharge and carry out the part which circumstances might dictate. But Longstreet at heart never accepted the necessity for the abandonment of the original plan to fight a defensive battle. While with Lee on Seminary Hill on the afternoon of the 1st, he openly expressed his disapproval of the former's intention to attack Cemetery Hill in the morning, saying, "If the enemy is there in the morning, it is because he wants to be attacked." He left his commander-in-chief, according to his own statement, with these parting words upon his lips, and such an expression on his part gives a fair insight into the spirit in which he set about the task of conforming to the general plan. To say the least, he was not enthusiastic, and lacking enthusiasm, that great lubricant of the military machine, it is small wonder that his subsequent movements were characterized by delays. When one's heart is not in his work, difficulties which otherwise might be easily disregarded, and in a large measure overcome, at once become all but insurmountable. To understand Longstreet's movements from now on, one must recognize the fact that he was at least an unwilling actor of a most important rôle, a rôle in which every particle of his old energy and enthusiasm was necessary to bring about success.

Whatever orders were given Longstreet and the other corps commanders, it seems certain that on the night of July 1 every available man was expected to be at the front early the following morning, and so when late in the evening, after conferring with some of his corps and division commanders, Lee finally accepted their view and decided to attack as advised by Longstreet, he had every reason to expect that the 1st Corps would be on hand and ready to undertake its mission. After the engagement of the first day, Gen. Pendleton had again examined the ground southwest of the town,

and finding the ground in front of the southern part of Cemetery Ridge much less difficult than that opposite Hill's troops which were already in position opposite Cemetery Hill, its practicable character was again reported to Gen. Lee. By that time, Col. Long had reconnoitered the Federal right and reported adversely against the chances of a successful attack in the morning in that quarter, and the Commander-in-Chief had conferred with Ewell and his division commanders whose views coincided with Pendleton's about the proper quarter in which to make an assault. Gen. Pendleton declared that Lee told him when he reported the result of his second reconnaissance that he had already ordered Longstreet to attack by way of the Peach Orchard at sunrise the next morning, and requested him to reëxamine the ground in that direction at dawn.*

Whether Longstreet was directly ordered by Lee to attack the Federal left at daybreak on the 2d or not, is immaterial to this record. Suffice it to say, a great blunder, the fourth of the campaign, was committed either by Gen. Lee or by Gen. Longstreet. Much authority both adverse to, and in support of, the latter exists. If he was not ordered to attack at an early hour, he should have been, and if he was directed to do so, he failed to execute his orders.†

*Longstreet, in a vicious article in *Battles and Leaders* and later in his book, endeavored to discredit the statements of Gen. Pendleton relative to this reconnaissance. Not only has he been the only one to question the word of the Rev. Wm. Nelson Pendleton, whose whole life was devoted to truth and the service of God, but he has, also, been the only soldier of the Confederacy to impugn the character of Gen. Lee. In expressing sentiments in his writings entirely at variance with those of Longstreet, the general, Longstreet, the embittered politician, simply weakened the force of his arguments. Into this he was undoubtedly provoked by the animosities and criticisms of *post-bellum* politics. One is almost glad to believe, as claimed by many, that he never really wrote *From Manassas to Appomattox*, but, after all, whether he did or not, he is responsible for the sentiments expressed by his literary agent, and it is doubtful if so much jealousy of Virginia and Virginians as that which is evidenced in this book could have been engendered in his soul subsequent to the war, unless the germ had lain there from the first. The writer, though but a child of six years at the time, vividly recalls a conversation between his father and Gen. William Mahone, while he was perched upon the latter's knee, in which the General said, "It is too bad Longstreet has let them goad him into mixing up his military record with politics," or words to that effect. Both Mahone and the writer's father were victims of much the same political odium attaching to Longstreet, at the time, but Mahone was wiser than Longstreet, and though the superb little soldier was actually charged by his more unscrupulous enemies with cowardice, he was never provoked into defending himself against the absurd accusation. His remark made a lasting impression upon the writer's mind, though its meaning was not fully comprehended for many years.

†See *Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, Alexander, and *Advance and Retreat*, Hood, both in support of Longstreet.

Longstreet's supporters make entirely too much of the technicality of whether or not a specific order was received by him to attack at an early hour. He was culpable in not having his corps on the field ready to attack, should the developments of the night require it. He was with Lee the afternoon of the 1st, and has frequently declared that he was conscious of a state of mental distress and uncertainty on the part of his commander-in-chief. Since he did not know himself and did not believe that Lee knew what to expect on the morrow, all the more incumbent was it upon him to have his troops present and prepared for any contingency. Longstreet knew that Ewell and Hill had both been heavily engaged and that they had run up against a snag. From this he must have known that the exigency of the occasion required the immediate presence of the 1st Corps. His troops had been set in motion for Gettysburg. The question whether or not he was to attack the next day was immaterial. His duty, irrespective of an order for attack, or further orders of any kind, was to bring his command up at the first practicable hour. That a large part of the 1st Corps could have arrived much earlier than it did is not denied, for the main body of that corps went into bivouac within four miles of the field at midnight. In not appearing as soon as possible, Longstreet was guilty of the same lack of the spirit of coopération which kept him away from Chancellorsville. Had he done at Gettysburg what the situation as known to him should have disclosed to the commander of one-third of the entire army to be necessary, he would have been present when needed and no delay would ever have occurred, even had no orders for attack been issued on the 1st. But here it should be said that Longstreet's delay was not the sole mistake made at Gettysburg, though many people entirely lose sight of those which had preceded it. Had Stuart been present, no battle would have been fought on the 1st. Had Hill obeyed orders, no battle would have been fought on the 1st. Had Ewell risen

to the occasion on the 1st, Longstreet's attack on the 2d would not have been necessary. How can it be justly said that Longstreet lost the battle of Gettysburg? Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill together and in an equal degree contributed to the failure of the campaign. As to the battle itself, it is inconceivable how one can distinguish between the wanton sacrifice of opportunity on the part of Ewell, and the delay of Longstreet, in favor of the former.

CHAPTER XXXII

GETTYSBURG—JULY 2D

THE Artillery of the 2d and 8d corps, as well as all the divisions thereof, were upon the field and in position on the morning of the 2d. The Reserve Artillery of the 1st Corps had been held in camp near Greenwood the preceding day, and Cabell's, Henry's, and Dearing's battalions were attached to McLaws, Hoods, and Pickett's divisions, respectively, as usual. Little information had sifted back to the rear during the day of the events transpiring at the front. Early in the evening, however, the news reached the various portions of the 1st Corps that Hill and Ewell had been heavily engaged and were driving the enemy. At 4 P. M., McLaws and Hood with Cabell's and Henry's battalions left Greenwood, and marching 18 miles went into bivouac at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg. Marching again at dawn they arrived near the field between 6 and 8 A. M.

Late in the evening of the 1st, information was received in the rear that Hill and Ewell had come to a standstill before the enemy in a strong defensive position, and soon orders arrived for the Reserve Artillery of the 1st Corps consisting of Eshleman's Battalion, 9 guns, and Alexander's, 26 guns, to move forward at 1 A. M. Marching steadily over good roads with a bright moon, the two battalions halted in a grassy, open grove about a mile west of Seminary Ridge at 7 A. M., where the animals were watered and fed. At this juncture, Col. Alexander was sent for by Longstreet, and riding forward found him with Lee on Seminary Ridge. It was explained to Alexander that the 1st Corps would assault the enemy's left flank and he was directed to take command of the corps artillery and reconnoiter the sector assigned him. He was particularly cautioned to keep his batteries out of sight of the signal station on

Big Round Top, in moving them into position. Placing Maj. Huger in command of his own battalion, Alexander at once set about making his reconnaissance, which was most thorough, extending over about three hours. By noon Alexander had led his own, Cabell's, and Henry's battalions by a meadow screened from the Federal signal station to a point in the valley of Willoughby Run, where they remained behind that portion of Seminary Ridge to be occupied by Longstreet's infantry. After disposing his batteries he rode back to learn the cause of the non-arrival of Hood and McLaws. Dearing's Battalion was with Pickett, and Eshleman's was held in reserve by Alexander in rear of the ridge, with the ordnance train.

Col. Walker had early in the morning posted the artillery of the 8d Corps along Seminary Ridge with the exception of Poague's and part of Garnett's battalions, the latter under Maj. Richardson, both of which he held in reserve on the rear crest. Thus Alexander's line of guns was extended to the left by Walker's as far as the Seminary. In the 2d Corps Col. Brown still held the extreme left with Latimer's Battalion. About 4 A. M. Latimer had after a most careful reconnaissance selected the only eligible position which was on the face of Benner's Hill, where he experienced much difficulty in securing proper cover for his caissons and limbers. His position was directly in front of Culp's Hill, and just across Rock Creek therefrom. Brown's Battery occupied the right of the line, Carpenter's the center, and Dement's and one section of Raine's the left. The guns were much crowded, and no room existed for the 20-pounder Parrott section of Raine's Battery, which under Lieut. Hardwicke, with Graham's Battery of Dance's Battalion, was posted further to the rear and right near the toll gate on the Hanover Road. Carter's Battalion still occupied the ridge held by Rodes' Division northwest of the town. Dance's Battalion was placed under Col. Carter's command early in the morning, and, after sending Graham's Battery to the left,

Carter posted Watson's Battery on the ridge just to the left of the railroad cut, Smith's on its right near the Seminary, and Dance's own battery under Lieut. Cunningham on the right of Seminary Hill and to the left of the Fairfield Road. Hupp's Salem Battery under Lieut. Griffin was held in reserve. Jones' Battalion was held well in rear of Ewell's left to guard against any attempt to turn that flank and was therefore eliminated from the action of the day. Just before sunset, he sent the Parrott section of Green's Battery at the request of Stuart to join Hampton at Hunterstown, three miles distant, and at 3 p. m. Tanner's Battery, which had exhausted its ammunition on the 1st, was ordered to the rear with the trains. Nelson's Battalion was held in reserve in rear of the ridge and about 500 yards to the left of the Cashtown Pike until 11 A. M., when it was moved into park immediately in rear of the Seminary, where it remained until dark in readiness to occupy a selected position in the front line. Thus it is seen that Ewell and Brown had not more than 48 of their 80-odd guns actually in position, and bearing on the Federal lines on the 2d of July, for Jones' and Nelson's battalions and Hupp's Battery were not engaged during the day. Yet, Gen. Lee had directed Ewell to create a diversion in Longstreet's favor, as soon as the guns of the 1st Corps were heard, converting it into a real attack if a favorable opportunity offered.

Early in the morning when nearly all the Confederate Army had reached Gettysburg, or its immediate vicinity, a great number of Meade's troops were still on the road. The 2d Corps and two divisions of the 5th under Sykes arrived about 7 A. M., and Crawford's Division joined about noon. Lockwood's Brigade arrived from Baltimore at 8; De Trobriand's and Burling's brigades of the 3d Corps at 9, and the Artillery Reserve, with an ammunition train close in its rear, containing besides the usual supply, 20 additional rounds of ammunition for every gun in the Army, from Emmittsburg at 10:30 A. M.

The lack of energy on the part of the Confederates in completing their dispositions for attack was in marked contrast to Meade's activity. At every point of his line of defense, the Federal commander and his staff officers were to be seen. As the Federal troops came up, all but exhausted by their long forced marches, which extended throughout the night and morning in spite of the oppressive heat, they were not allowed to rest until placed in position. The 12th Corps (Slocum's under Williams) occupied Culp's Hill on Wadsworth's right, the 2d Corps Cemetery Ridge from which the 8d Corps was drawn to prolong the line to Round Top; the 5th Corps was placed in reserve along the Baltimore Road near Rock Creek; and the Reserve Artillery, under the immediate command of Gen. Tyler, in a central position on a cross road from the Baltimore Pike to the Taneytown Road. A part of Buford's cavalry occupied the left, while Kilpatrick's and Gregg's cavalry divisions were posted well out on the right flank. The 1st and 11th Corps still held Cemetery Hill. The batteries of the various corps were strongly posted in rear of the infantry lines, and the more advanced guns on Cemetery and Culp's hills were protected by epaulments and gun pits.

Some slight demonstrating on the part of Ewell at daybreak had led Meade to order Slocum to attack the Confederate left with the 5th and 12th Corps, so soon as the 6th Corps should arrive to support him, but as the ground in his front was found unfavorable by Slocum, and the 6th Corps did not arrive before Ewell's activity ceased, the offensive was not assumed in this quarter by the Federals. Furthermore, Meade was apprehensive about his left, and was well satisfied to remain passive as long as each hour enabled him to strengthen his line in that quarter with the constantly arriving troops. In the meantime, Gen. Hunt, by his foresight in providing extra reserve ammunition, was

able to replenish the caissons of the 1st and 11th Corps, which had been practically emptied the preceding day.*

At the first blush of dawn, Gen. Pendleton made his reconnaissance as directed, examining the ground almost up to the Federal position. Finding no difficulties which appeared to him insuperable, but detecting the movements of large masses of the enemy's infantry in the rear of the hostile line, he communicated with both Lee and Longstreet, urging upon them both that an immediate attack be made. Again and again he sent messages to the Commander-in-Chief by his staff officers, to impress him with the necessity of prompt action, and was informed that they were invariably transmitted to Longstreet by Gen. Lee, who was much annoyed by the latter's procrastination. But Longstreet did not arrive with Lee to examine the ground until noon. As they finally viewed the enemy's position from Seminary Ridge, near the Warfield house, the main features of the enemy's position appeared as follows: near the base of Cemetery Hill was Zeigler's Grove a mile and a half due north of the base of Little Round Top. From Zeigler's Grove Cemetery Ridge, with a well defined crest, ran 900 yards or more south to a smaller but prominent clump of trees, where it turned sharply back for 200 yards, then south again for 700 yards to Weikert's house. So far the ridge was smooth and open, in full view of and from 1,400 to 1,600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. At Weikert's, it was lost in a large body of rocks, hills, and woods, lying athwart the direct line to Big Round Top, the Taneytown Road bending around to the east of the broken ground. This rough space extended some 400 yards west of the line of the ridge prolonged toward Plum Run. Along its southern edge, it was bounded by low marshy ground, stretching back to the base of Little Round Top, half a mile or more from Weikert's house, and its western boundary was wooded from north

*Hunt had formed the special ammunition train previously referred to upon his own responsibility and unknown to Hooker, who had never accorded his Chief of Artillery much consideration in the way of assigning him to the tactical direction of the arm.

to south. In front of these woods and Plum Run, stretched an open space 300 yards wide, a continuation of the rolling fields in front of Cemetery Ridge. Plum Run flows in a southeasterly direction towards Little Round Top, and then bends to the southwest at a point where it receives a small branch from Seminary Ridge. In the angles formed by these streams is a bold, rocky height, 100 feet lower than and 500 yards due west of Little Round Top. With a steep eastern face the hill is prolonged as a ridge generally in a northwesterly direction between Plum Run on the north and Plum Run Branch on the south to Seminary Ridge from which it springs towards the east as a spur. The surface of the northern face of Devil's Den Hill proper is intersected by innumerable ledges and outcroppings of rocks, among which are many holes and boulders. From these peculiar formations the hill takes its name. The marshy bottom forming the valley of Plum Run, and the slopes of the two conical hills known as the Round Tops, are also strewn with massive boulders. A cross road running along the north of Devil's Den and the Taneytown Road intersected the Emmittsburg Road at a peach orchard on the Devil's Den Ridge, 1,100 yards west of Plum Run. For a distance of 400 yards from the stream, the road was bounded on the north by trees and on the south by a wheat field. From the Peach Orchard, the Emmittsburg Road ran diagonally across the rolling fields between the Seminary and Cemetery ridges, a mile and a half to Zeigler's Grove. For half a mile from the orchard the road ran along a ridge perpendicular to the Devil's Den Ridge, and nearly parallel to and 600 yards distant from Seminary Ridge. From Devil's Den to the wooded crest of Seminary Ridge the distance was therefore about 1,700 yards. The junction of the two bold ridges at the orchard formed the salient of the Federal lines, and it was upon this point that Longstreet's Corps was to be hurled. If the enemy could be driven from the orchard by Longstreet, Gen. Lee believed the latter's artillery massed at that com-



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT ARCHELAUS HARDAWAY

manding position would be able to assist the infantry in reaching Cemetery Ridge. From the Peach Orchard Longstreet's attack would be in oblique order, and if driven home would roll up the Federal left. Had the attack been rendered before 9 A. M., before the Federal 8d and 6th Corps and the Reserve Artillery were in position, and before the enemy's lines were strengthened by nearly a whole day of energetic labor on the defensive works, the Confederates would undoubtedly have accomplished their design. The first indication the Federals had of Longstreet's presence was when Sickles at Hunt's suggestion sent forward a party to reconnoiter the woods 600 yards in his front. The presence of the enemy, however, when detected gave Sickles little concern, for already news of Sedgwick's near approach with the 6th Corps, the largest in the Federal Army, had been received, and Hunt, who from Devil's Den Ridge had been attracted by the superior command of Big Round Top, had set off to examine the extreme left and see that proper precautions were taken in that quarter to save the conical height from falling into the hands of the Confederates. When Hunt returned to the Peach Orchard after visiting Round Top and reporting all safe to Meade, Birney's Division was posted along the Emmittsburg Road on the Devil's Den Ridge, Graham's on Birney's right in two lines in front of the Smith house, and Burling had been ordered up to reinforce Birney at the salient. Hunt had already sent to the Reserve Artillery for some of his batteries, and as Turnbull's arrived, he replaced with it Seeley's Battery of the 8d Corps, which Capt. Randolph had placed on Graham's right, the latter shifting its position to the left of the Smith house. Randolph had also posted Smith's Battery on the rocky hill at Devil's Den, Winslow's in the wheatfield, Clark's on the left face of the salient or southern slope of the ridge, and his own at the angle looking west.

Sickles' Corps was obviously too weak to hold the advanced line or salient formed by the junction of the

two ridges at the orchard, and Sykes' 5th Corps which had been ordered to reinforce him was momentarily expected. No sooner did the Confederate fire open than Meade also sent for Caldwell's Division on Cemetery Ridge, a division of the 12th Corps on Culp's Hill, and soon after for part of the recently arrived 6th Corps. McGilvery's Artillery Brigade also soon arrived from the Reserve, and Bigelow's, Phillips', Hart's, Ames', and Thompson's batteries were ordered into position along the crests.

Pickett's Division had left Chambersburg at 2 A. M., but after a march of 22 miles went into camp, three miles from the field at 4 P. M. Yet McLaws' entire division and Hood's, with the exception of Law's Brigade, had arrived within striking distance of the field early in the morning. Longstreet deliberately waited for the arrival of Law's Brigade before he made the slightest effort to place his infantry in position. This alone was not the only cause of delay, for leaving New Guilford Courthouse with Bachman's Battery at 8 A. M. Law had rejoined Hood before noon. At this time Hood and McLaws were on the Chambersburg Road about a mile west of the town. We have seen that Alexander had easily avoided the exposed point with his artillery column, and had ridden back to discover the cause of Longstreet's delay. Yet, he has subsequently sought to defend that delay when it is proved by his own action that there was no reason for it. Longstreet had caused his infantry to countermarch and take a devious route *via* Black Horse Tavern, in order to avoid detection from the Federal signal station. At length, after many vexatious and useless halts, his column arrived, Hood in front, at the Emmitsburg Road along Seminary Ridge opposite Little Round Top, and on the right of Anderson's Division of the 8d Corps which had been extended towards the south during the morning. In spite of Longstreet's devious route to screen his flank movement, it had been discovered by the Federal signal party.

Both Pendleton and Col. Long of Lee's staff had examined the positions which Walker's batteries had taken along Seminary Ridge from which to support the advance of the 1st Corps, and all was at last ready. Gen. Lee had been sorely tried throughout the day by what appeared to him, at least, to be an inexplicable delay on Longstreet's part. Ewell's and Hill's artillery had already opened upon Cemetery Hill by way of diversion in favor of the 1st Corps.

Upon arriving Longstreet deployed his divisions each in two lines with Hood on the right and extending east of the road to a point about 1,000 yards south of the orchard, his left prolonged by McLaws, whose line crossed the road to the rear. Reilly's, Latham's, Garden's, and Bachman's batteries of Henry's Battalion of 20 guns, were posted among the trees on the ridge in rear of Hood. Although there was no sign of any enemy on the right, as a precaution a regiment was detached and stationed at Kern's house, half a mile down the Emmitsburg Road. While forming his line, Law had been greatly attracted by Big Round Top, and learning from some prisoners, which the mounted scouts he had sent to reconnoiter its southern base had captured, that it was weakly held and that the Federal medical and ordnance trains were unguarded in its rear, and could be reached by a good farm road, he protested to Hood against a frontal attack and begged to be allowed to make a detour around the Federal flank. Hood's orders were positive, but he was induced by Law's persistent representations to communicate the information the latter had secured to Longstreet. Soon Capt. Hamilton of his staff, by whom the message was sent to the corps commander, returned and directed Hood by Longstreet's order to begin the attack at once as previously planned. If Hood's message reached Longstreet, he, Longstreet, had no just ground for his subsequent contention, that he had urged in vain to be allowed to turn the Federal left, instead of making a frontal attack. Whether Lee had previously insisted

upon such an attack or not, it seems certain that his views would have been materially altered by such information as that in Law's possession. And, again, while the ground in his front was such that Longstreet's attack necessarily became a frontal one, the movement of his corps with respect to the whole army was designed to be tactically a flank attack. Upon discovering that his blow would fall short of the flank, a fact unknown except to him, it was Longstreet's duty to inform the Commander-in-Chief. Yet, he subsequently had the effrontery to declare that "he would and could have saved every man lost at Gettysburg, had he been permitted to do so." No. Longstreet was stubborn. He had been ordered to do that which he did not want to do, which was to participate in an offensive engagement, and he did not propose to contribute anything on his own initiative to the success of a battle, the fighting of which he had all along opposed. The severest arraignment of Longstreet ever penned is the account of the battle of Gettysburg by Gen. Law, in which, in an attempt to shoulder the blame on Lee for its loss, he unwittingly fixes the responsibility for Longstreet's failure to turn the left flank, beyond peradventure of a doubt, upon Longstreet himself.*

The order of attack issued by Longstreet as soon as his divisions were in line of battle was for the movement to begin on the right, Law's Brigade leading, the others taking it up successively toward the left. It was near 5 p. m. when the infantry advanced. The artillery on both sides had already been warmly engaged the better part of an hour. Alexander's Battalion with 18, Cabell's with 18, and Henry's with 10 guns had been in action since about 3:45 p. m. Henry's Battalion had moved out with Hood, and as the Federal Artillery was well posted and prepared for the attack, his batteries were soon after coming into view heavily engaged. Cabell's Battalion had

*See "The Struggle for Round Top," E. M. Law, *Battles and Leaders*, Vol. III, p. 322.

at once gone into action behind a stone fence near Snyder's house, about 700 yards from the Federal batteries, to support Henry. His position afforded little cover for the guns, and the well-directed fire of the opposing artillery at once caused him serious loss in men and horses. To help him, Alexander had Huger move Moody's, Ficklin's, Parker's, and Taylor's batteries with their 18 guns to the Warfield house and open at a range of 500 yards from the orchard. Alexander now had 54 guns of the 1st Corps in action, which he and Longstreet both believed would in a short while be able to crush in Sickles' line and silence his batteries. But so accurate was the practice of the Federal guns, that two of Fickling's pieces were soon dismounted. The labor of running the guns up after each recoil to the crest of the rocky slope was so exhausting to his cannoneers that Moody was compelled to call for volunteers from Barksdale's Brigade nearby to handle his four 24-pounder Parrotts and two 12-pounder Napoleons. Eight infantrymen promptly responded, two of whom were killed and three wounded before night.

When Hood finally launched his infantry, it advanced rapidly across the valley in front of the left leg of the salient angle held by the Federals, all the time under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, and brushing his skirmishers out of the way, soon struck Sickles' main line. The advance continued steadily, driving the enemy to the confines of Devil's Den, where the troops of both sides on this portion of the field seemed to dissolve in the rugged area. In less than an hour Hood's troops had carried Devil's Den opposite his center and captured three pieces of Smith's Battery, which from the rocky height had severely punished the attacking infantry. In the meantime, Law, supported by a part of Robertson's Brigade, had in spite of Hood's orders, swept over the northern slope of Big Round Top, cleared it of the enemy, and, turning somewhat to the left, advanced upon Little Round Top in rear of the hill which Hood's center had carried. Henry's Bat-

talion had done all in its power to support Hood's infantry, devoting much attention to Smith's Battery on Devil's Den Road, which had enfiladed and inflicted much loss upon the attacking troops. Cabell had also turned two of his guns upon this battery with fine effect. In the meantime, however, Hood's left brigade had been subjected to great annoyance and loss by the fire of the enemy along the ridge on its left and had been frequently compelled in its advance to change front to repel the movements against its flank. McLaws had held his men well under cover during the artillery preparation. In spite of the superior number and metal of the enemy's guns, Alexander's own batteries stood manfully to their task, determined to shake the Federal line at the angle, and save McLaws' infantry as much as possible in their advance. The ammunition expenditure was enormous, but fortunately the reserve supply was close at hand behind the ridge. At such close range, the Confederate fire was more accurate than usual, while many of the Federal projectiles passed over the crest behind the Confederate batteries, and were lost in the valley beyond. The thick growth of trees on the ridge also served to reduce the effect of the shells that burst short of the crest. But the Federal batteries were still holding their own when Alexander, about 6 P. M., ordered Maj. Dearing, who had arrived in advance of his battalion, and reported to him, to move up Woolfolk's and Jordan's batteries with their ten pieces, which had been held in reserve behind the ridge, to the support of the other four batteries of the battalion under Huger. But before these batteries joined Huger, at the Warfield house, Cabell had ceased firing and given the signal with three guns for McLaws' Division to charge. Leaping the wall behind which they had lain, McLaws' men rushed past the guns in Kershaw's front, crushed in the angle of Sickles' line by seizing the Peach Orchard, and drove the enemy back in confusion from their salient position, thereby relieving the pressure on Hood's left.

The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle exposed the flanks of the batteries on the advanced crests, which fell back firing in order to cover the retirement of the infantry behind Plum Run. Many guns of different batteries had to be abandoned by the Federals because of the destruction of their teams and cannoneers. Some were hauled off by hand, but the loss was heavy. Bigelow's 9th Massachusetts Battery made a stand close by the Trostle house in a corner of a field to which the guns were hauled by prolonges, where it was ordered by McGilvery to remain in action at all hazards until a line of artillery could be formed in front of the wood beyond Plum Run. This line was soon formed by collecting all the serviceable batteries and fragments of batteries which had been withdrawn, and, together with Dow's Maine Battery fresh from the reserve, Bigelow succeeded in checking the pursuit and enabling all but one of the abandoned guns to be recovered.

As McLaws' Division rushed past the guns at the Warfield house, masking their fire, Alexander ordered all six of his batteries to limber to the front, and charged with them in line across the plain, going into action again at the orchard. Perhaps no more superb feat of artillery drill on the battlefield was ever witnessed than this rapid change of position of Alexander's Battalion. For 500 yards the foaming horses dashed forward, under whip and spur, the guns in perfect alignment, and the carriages fairly bounding over the fields. Every officer and non-commissioned officer rode at his post, and not a team swerved from the line, except those which were struck down by the blizzard of Federal shell. Fortunately most of the enemy's projectiles overshot their mark, and as the great line of six batteries with over 400 horses reached the position abandoned by the enemy, "action front" was executed as if by a single piece. Hardly had the teams wheeled, and the trails of the pieces cleared the pintle-hooks when again a sheet of flame burst from the 24 guns of Alexander's magnificent battalion. Few artillerymen have experienced the sen-

sation which must have come to Alexander at this moment, for seldom has such a maneuver been executed on the battlefield.

The ground over which the battalion had advanced was generally good, but obstructed in one place by a rail fence. Seeing a body of Federal prisoners being moved to the rear, Dearing had shouted to them to remove the rails in the path of the artillery. "Never was an order executed with more alacrity. Every prisoner seemed to seize a rail, and the fence disappeared as if by magic." But the joy of the charge was not all. It was the artillerist's heaven to follow the routed enemy after a prolonged duel with his guns, and to hurl shell and canister into his disorganized and fleeing masses. To Alexander's ears, the reports of his guns sounded louder and more powerful than ever before, and the shouts of his gunners directing the fire in rapid succession thrilled his own and the soul of every witness of the fight with exultant pride.

There is no excitement on earth like that of galloping at the head of a rapidly advancing line of artillery, with the awe-inspiring rumble of the wheels, mingling with the clatter of innumerable feet close behind. The momentum of the great mass of men, animals, and carriages almost seems to forbid the thought of attempting to check the force which has been set in motion. With his mount bounding along almost as if borne on the breeze of the pursuing storm, the eye of the commander instinctively searches the terrain for his position, while a hundred, perhaps five hundred, human beings, and as many dumb warriors, joyfully laboring in the traces, watch his every movement. At last the leader's right arm shoots upward, then outward. No words are necessary, and if spoken would be superfluous. In that dull roar of the onrushing mass no voice but that of Jove could be heard. The swoop of the fleetest hawk is not more graceful nor more sudden than that which follows. Every man and horse knows his part and must perform it, for mistakes at such a moment are fatal. But, first

of all, out of the orderly chaos which ensues, the dark warriors come to rest as if in the ominous silence gathering breath with which to shout their defiance, while the attending men and beasts are springing to their posts. The joy of the charge is forgotten. Though every hand and limb is still trembling with the old thrill, a greater joy is now in store for all, for flash! bang! scre-e-ch—boom—a shell has burst among the flying foe. Small wonder then that Alexander cherished no regret over having declined the command of a brigade of infantry. Surely there was glory enough for any soldier to be found at the head of such a command as he led across the fields and into action in front of Little Round Top!

After the enemy fell back upon the ridge in their rear, Longstreet's batteries fired upon every part of the hostile line in range, especially devoting their attention to McGilvery's group of 28 guns behind Plum Run. Three of Anderson's brigades, Wilcox's, Perry's, and Wright's, pressed forward against Humphreys' line and forced it back to Cemetery Ridge, under cover of two of Gibbon's regiments and Brown's Rhode Island Battery. Later they succeeded in breaking the Federal line and seized many guns, but were driven out and fell back about dusk under a heavy artillery fire from McGilvery's massed batteries.

Further to the right one Confederate regiment alone succeeded in crossing Plum Run and actually got in among Bigelow's Battery fighting hand to hand with the cannoneers. Although, of the 104 men and 88 horses of this battery, 28 men and 65 horses were killed or wounded, still it maintained itself without losing a gun, and the gallant captain, who himself was wounded, faithfully discharged the important trust committed to him. In doing so, he gave evidence, as in the case of Beckham's gunners at Brandy Station, of the great resisting power of artillery, even when unsupported.

Hood's center, as we have seen, had seized and still held Devil's Den, but Law, who had reached the slope of Little Round Top, had been driven back to its base by

Weed's and Vincent's brigades and Hazlett's Battery, which Warren on his own initiative had stationed at the summit, just as Longstreet's attack commenced. The placing of Hazlett's six guns in this position was a marvelous feat, and one which, in view of the precipitous and rugged slope of the mountain would have seemed impossible under ordinary circumstances. But, together the infantry and the cannoneers dragged them to the top just in time to repel Law's troops, who were already clambering up the slopes. The fighting for the possession of Little Round Top was desperate. Weed and Hazlett were both killed and Vincent wounded. The first had himself won great distinction in the Peninsula campaign, as an artillerist, and again at Chancellorsville, where he served as chief of his corps artillery. Shortly before his death he had been promoted from a captain of artillery to a brigadier-general of infantry. Brave Hazlett, whom we have met on other fields, fell while bending over his former chief to receive his last message. Hood's men, however, clung to the base of the mountain, Devil's Den and its woods, and captured three of Smith's guns.

It was now after 7 p. m. and Longstreet's troops, who had become disjointed in their attack, were engaged in more or less isolated combats. His artillery took part wherever it could. "The fuses of the flying shells streaked the darkening sky like little meteors."

As the Federal reinforcements had arrived piecemeal, they had been beaten in detail until by successive accretions they greatly outnumbered Hood and McLaws. The fighting had been confined largely to the Peach Orchard, Little Round Top, and the rugged area of Devil's Den, behind the ledges and bowlders of which the sharpshooters of both sides had been thickly posted. At the close of the day, the Confederates held the base of both the Round Tops, Devil's Den, and the Emmitsburg Road, with skirmishers thrown out as far as the Trostle house. The Federals held the summits of the Round Tops, the Plum Run line, and Cemetery Ridge.

Before 8 p. m. the fire on both sides began to slacken, and by 9 the field was silent and Longstreet's men rested on their arms conscious of the fact that their work had only begun.

Now let us see what had been done on other parts of the field to support Longstreet's attack. We have seen that Anderson's three brigades assaulted Humphreys on the left of the 1st Corps. In this movement Wilcox was ably supported by Patterson's Battery of six pieces, and one gun of Ross's Battery, all of Lane's Battalion. That Anderson's troops were desperately engaged is shown by the fact that at one time Wilcox took 8 and Wright about 20 pieces of the enemy's artillery.

Of Hill's artillery, Poague's Battalion took position along Anderson's line in two groups. The left group consisting of five pieces of Graham's and Wyatt's batteries under Capt. Wyatt occupied the ridge behind Anderson's left, while Capt. Ward with five guns of his own and Brooke's Warrenton Battery moved out to the crest some 500 yards in advance of the ridge, when Anderson's brigades advanced. On Poague's left, Pegram's Battalion under Brunson occupied a position behind a stone wall on the ridge opposite Cemetery Ridge, losing during the day 9 men and 25 horses. Further to the left and behind the same wall, McIntosh was posted. Poague and Brunson both succeeded in partially enfilading the Federal batteries along the Emmitsburg Road and greatly aided Alexander in subduing their fire and driving them from their advanced positions. In this McIntosh also assisted, but was principally engaged in diverting the fire of the batteries on Cemetery Ridge from Longstreet's and Anderson's troops. On McIntosh's left, Lane with the two 20-pounder Parrotts and three 8-inch navy rifles of Wingfield's Battery, and the five remaining pieces of Ross's Battery, engaged the Federal Artillery on Cemetery Hill. Beyond Lane, and just to the right of the Fairfield Road, Maj. Richardson with nine pieces of Garnett's Battalion also fired actively upon the same guns, and was late in the

day able to divert the fire of some of them from Ewell's troops. So much for the part of the 3d Corps. In the main, Walker's batteries were active and effective, and no complaint whatever is to be made of the support rendered by the artillery of the 2d Corps, 55 guns of which were engaged though mostly at extreme range.

Ewell like Hill had been ordered to support Longstreet's attack by active demonstrations. The successful performance of his rôle was essential to the success of the main attack in order that Meade might not draw troops from the point of the hook to support those at the end of the shank. We have seen that but 48 pieces of his artillery had been placed in position in the morning, a fact which almost presaged a lack of energy on his part. But 32 of these were actively engaged. About 4 P. M. Latimer was ordered to open from his position at Benner's Hill. As soon as his guns were unmasked, the enemy replied with a superior number of guns from Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, causing many casualties in the battalion. Soon the Federals planted some guns well out to Latimer's left front, enfilading Carpenter's Battery and practically silencing it. By this time one section of Dement's Battery had entirely exhausted its ammunition, and one of Brown's pieces had been disabled. Brown himself was wounded and his men so cut up that but two pieces could be maintained in action. Latimer was now compelled to retire his battalion with the exception of four pieces which he left under cover to repel any advance which the enemy might attempt.

It was now sunset. Jones' Battalion was absent from the field altogether, and neither Carter's nor Nelson's had fired a shot. The three batteries of Dance's battalion in position behind Ewell's right had alone, of all the artillery of the 2d Corps, supported Latimer by firing upon Cemetery Hill and the batteries posted there. Latimer's contest had been most unequal. Ewell's demonstration which should of course have been made soon after Latimer opened fire was delayed, and the infantry only got fairly to work after he had

been terribly cut up and compelled to withdraw his guns. Finally Johnson's Division advanced and Latimer boldly opened with the four pieces which he had left in position, drawing the overwhelming fire of the massed batteries of the enemy upon him. Perceiving that the Federals were shifting the position of many of their guns so as to play upon Latimer and Johnson, Richardson on Hill's left redoubled his efforts to divert their fire and partially succeeded. It was at this juncture that the overbold and youthful Latimer was struck down, while heroically cheering on the few cannoneers that remained at their posts. The wound which the "boy major," as he was called, received in his arm, resulted in his death from gangrene on August 1st. Col. John Thompson Brown, the Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps, characterized Latimer as a gallant and accomplished officer, and a noble young man. "No heavier loss," said he, "could have befallen the Artillery of this corps." And Ewell, who was not given to flattery as his reports will show, wrote of him, "The gallant young officer served with me from March, 1862, to the second battle of Manassas. I was particularly struck at Winchester, May 25, 1862, his first warm engagement, by his coolness, self-possession, and bravery under a very heavy artillery fire, showing when most needed the full possession of all his faculties. Though not twenty-one when he fell, his soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those of any officer in my command." And writing of the battle Gen. Pendleton said, "Here the gallant Maj. Latimer, so young and yet so exemplary, received the wound which eventuated in his death." While Gen. Lee did not mention Latimer in his report of the battle his admiration of the youthful artillerist was unbounded and frequently expressed.

Entering the Virginia Military Institute in 1859, Latimer promptly volunteered when the Corps of Cadets was sent to Richmond in April, was at once assigned to duty with the artillery being organized in the camp of instruction, and was soon commissioned a lieutenant in

the battery raised by Capt. A. R. Courtney. During his military career, he occupied many posts of honor and responsibility and enjoyed the perfect confidence of his men and officers. When a lieutenant and under the command of Jackson, his old tutor, the latter wrote of him in his report of the Valley campaign: "This young officer was conspicuous for his coolness, judgment, and skill with which he managed his battery, fully supporting the opinion I had formed of his high merit." Ewell constantly referred to him as his "Little Napoleon." After receiving his wound at Gettysburg, and being removed from beneath his horse, which had fallen upon him, he continued, though half dazed by his fall, to supervise and direct the movements of his battalion. That night he was sent to the rear, and later removed to Harrisonburg from Winchester, where he died. As his final hour approached, the attending physician, seeking to secure his last message, asked him if he feared to die. "No," was his reply, "for my trust is in God." The day before a friendly chaplain who sought to console him asked him upon what he based his hopes for the future. "Not on good works," he replied, "but on the merits of Jesus Christ alone." Such was the spirit which inspired his indomitable soul. That he rests with Jackson who can doubt? And what higher tribute may be paid the memory of the "Boy Major" whose portrait now hangs with those of Crutchfield, and Cutshaw, and Rodes, and Colston, and Allan, and Paxton, and a host of others, among his comrades at the Virginia Military Institute, garlanded with laurels of immortal fame, than to say that he was the peer of any of them, and that in his own arm of the service, he was the fit companion of Pelham, of Breathed, of Chew, and the others whose deathless names fill these pages.*

When Johnson advanced against Culp's Hill, he found only one brigade—Greene's of the 12th Corps—in position, the others having been dispatched to the aid

*For a full account of Joseph White Latimer's military career, see *Memorial Virginia Military Institute*, Walker, p. 328.

of Sickles at the Peach Orchard. This, of course, was the very contingency against which Lee by directing Ewell's demonstration had sought to guard. Greene, supported by a large number of guns, fought with desperation, and soon, reinforced by about 1,000 men of the 1st and 11th Corps, succeeded in holding his own intrenchments. Johnson, however, seized those abandoned by Geary and Ruger near the Baltimore Pike, but darkness prevented him from profiting by the advantage within his reach. Early, with great spirit, assaulted and carried a part of Cemetery Hill, ascending by way of the ravine between it and Culp's Hill. Breaking the line of the 11th Corps and overrunning Ricketts' reserve batteries, the two assaulting brigades were soon face to face with the excellent position occupied by Stevens' Battery of 12-pounders, which swept the head of the ravine. Without support from Rodes, who had also been ordered to attack, Early's troops were driven from the hill. As they fell back the cannoneers of Ricketts' two batteries heroically recovered their guns by a vigorous attack upon the disorganized Confederates, driving off with hand spikes, rammers, stones, and even fence rails, those attempting to secure the pieces. Thus did Ewell's effort miscarry, which enabled Longstreet to be checked by Meade, who was free to transfer troops almost at will from his right to his left. In the words of Col. Taylor, "The whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of the several commands, and no decisive results attended the operations of the second day." Longstreet had failed to attack at the time he was expected to do so, which, as has been said, was the fourth great mistake of the campaign. The fifth was committed by Ewell in failing to co-operate with him.

While all had by no means worked smoothly on the Federal side, due to the frequent disregard of orders by Meade's corps commanders, yet, in the main, the tactical conduct of the defense was as fine as that of the offense was faulty. This fact was largely due, of course,

to the peculiar character of the Federal position, which was so compact, as well as covered by the accidents of the ground, that troops could easily be shifted from point to point. Nevertheless, full advantage was taken of this fortunate circumstance by Meade. Again Hunt proved to be the Nemesis of the Confederates, and time and again his artillery was found massed just at the right point to deny them success, for it was McGilvery at Plum Run, who checked Longstreet, and it was Stevens on the right who hurled Early from the ridge he had all but won. During Longstreet's attack, Hunt had supported Sickles with 11 batteries with 60 guns of his general reserve alone. In addition to these guns, the 2d, 8d, and 5th Corps had 80 guns in action. Against these 140 pieces, Longstreet had but 62 guns on the field, and Anderson's Division but 5 in advance of Seminary Ridge.

While the artillery on both sides suffered severely in men and horses, the total loss of ordnance was three Federal guns, two of which only could be removed by the Confederates from the field.

The fire of the Confederate Artillery was most effective, but it was hopelessly outmatched in numbers. Longstreet's batteries were assigned an almost impossible task, for after driving battery after battery from the field, fresh ones continued to appear. Hunt's report says: "The batteries were exposed to heavy front and enfilading fires and suffered terribly, but as rapidly as any were disabled they were retired and replaced by others." And so, after the most persistent and heroic efforts on the part of Alexander's artillerymen to silence the enemy's batteries, at the close of the day they were rewarded by seeing not less than 75 Federal guns in position with ever-increasing infantry supports near-by. Yet there was no sign of discouragement in the Artillery.

When night fell, the Confederate Infantry, with the exception of Hood's and McLaws' Division on the right, and Johnson's on the extreme left, bivouacked approximately in the positions it had occupied in the morn-

ing. But while the Infantry rested, it was necessary for the Artillery to be refitted for the morrow. A splendid moon lit up the field and greatly assisted the work. The sound horses were watered and fed, while those killed and disabled were replaced by drafts from the wagon trains in rear. Extra caissons were brought up, ammunition issued, the lines rectified and such cover as was possible provided for the guns and their detachments.

The losses in Alexander's own battalion had been very heavy, probably not less than 75 men and twice that number of horses. Taylor's Battery alone lost 9 men. But the heaviest loss was in Fickling's (Rhett's or Brook's) South Carolina Battery, which had two 12-pounder howitzers dismounted and 40 cannoneers killed or wounded.

An incident in connection with Taylor's or Eubank's Battery is especially worthy of being preserved. While it was dashing forward to the orchard corporal Joseph T. V. Lantz, a veteran gunner, was struck down by a shell, which broke both his legs above the knees, and soon died. When some of his companions attempted to remove him from the field, he said, "You can do me no good; I am killed; follow your piece." Nearby lay the body of a young cadet, Hill Carter Eubank, who only a few days before had left the Virginia Military Institute to enlist in the battery originally commanded by his father. The facts are stated simply to show the character of the men who manned the Confederate guns. No artillery ever possessed a more superb personnel, and equally heroic incidents concerning them might be recounted indefinitely.

In Cabell's Battalion, the losses were unusually severe. McCarthy's Battery lost 9 men and 13 horses. Lieuts. R. M. Anderson and John Nimmo, with the rifled section of this battery alone, expended 200 rounds of ammunition in less than 2 hours, in a duel with Smith's Battery on Devil's Den Hill. Manly's Battery had moved forward to the orchard with Alexander's

Battalion and suffered accordingly. Fraser's Battery not only lost its veteran commander, but one of its lieutenants and 11 men. When Lieut. Furlong succeeded to the command of the battery, he was able to man but two pieces. Capt. Carlton was also wounded, Lieut. Motes succeeding to the command of the Troup Battery. During the night it was withdrawn to be refitted. In Henry's Battalion, which had been actively engaged from the first in support of Hood, the losses were also severe. One of Reilly's 3-inch rifles had burst, but two 10-pounder Parrotts captured by Hood's men from Smith's Battery were turned over to and secured by the battalion. Although Dearing had reported in person to Alexander before the capture of the Peach Orchard and had taken part in the fight, his battalion did not arrive upon the field until after dark, when it went into bivouac behind the ridge.

During the night it became known that the artillery along the whole line would be called upon to open at an early hour, and before morning Eshleman's and Dearing's battalions were moved up to Alexander's left, with Cabell and Henry on his right. Gen. Pendleton and Col. Long visited every portion of the line before morning, verified the positions of the guns, and gave specific directions to the Artillery of all three corps as to its part on the morrow. With the exception of the massing of all the batteries of the 1st Corps along the ridge at the Peach Orchard, the positions of the Artillery remained generally unchanged. Brown and Walker, like Alexander, made every effort to prepare their batteries for the renewal of the battle, and everywhere the fullest confidence reigned in the Artillery. Apparently there was no uneasiness over the small supply of reserve ammunition at hand, a matter with which the gunners, as a whole, were unfamiliar, perhaps fortunately so. But it seems certain that some account should have been taken of the condition of the ammunition supply, as a matter of extreme importance to the success of subsequent operations. The expenditure of the past two days

had been enormous, and it was apparent to all that an unusual amount would be required the day following. It would be interesting indeed to be able to follow the movements of the ammunition trains and their methods of supply, but one searches in vain for a record of these things. Fortunately, nowadays, the trains, especially the ordnance trains, are both regarded and treated as an integral part of an army.

CHAPTER XXXIII

GETTYSBURG—JULY 3d

THE dawn of July 3d found the two armies approximately in the positions occupied by them at the close of the fighting the evening before. Though Cemetery Ridge remained intact in the hands of the Federals, yet the operations had resulted at every point in an advantage to the Confederates in spite of the fact that they had failed to accomplish all they had attempted to do. Longstreet had seized and occupied the advanced Federal position on the left, Ewell's left held the breastworks on Culp's Hill on the extreme Federal right, and tremendous loss had been inflicted on Meade's army. The advantage gained by Ewell would, it was believed, enable him to take the Federal line in reverse. Gen. Lee, therefore, determined to renew the assault. Longstreet, in accordance with this decision, was reinforced by Pickett's three brigades and Dearing's Battalion of artillery, which arrived after dark, and ordered to assail the heights in his front at dawn, while Ewell was directed to make a simultaneous assault on the enemy's right. But Meade did not supinely await the development of the Confederate attack as planned. A great group of guns was placed in position during the night, to bear on Johnson's Division, which had been strongly reinforced, and at 4 A. M. Geary and Ruger advanced under cover of the artillery to wrest their intrenchments from the Confederates. By 8 A. M. Ewell, in spite of the most desperate efforts on the part of Johnson's men, was forced to relinquish the captured works. Longstreet's dispositions had again been delayed and the fighting on the left had commenced long before the 1st Corps was ready to coöperate. It rendered Ewell no effectual support whatever. The sixth great mistake had been committed in this failure on the part of the

2d and 8d Corps to attack simultaneously, and again Meade had been free to reinforce one of his flanks at the expense of the other.

The change in the condition of affairs compelled Gen. Lee to alter his plan of attack. A reconnaissance disclosed to him that the Federal position from Round Top to Culp's Hill was occupied at every point by infantry and artillery. There was, however, one point upon which an assault could be directed with a reasonable prospect of success. The word reasonable is used because subsequent events showed that success would have been attained had Lee's orders been executed. This point was where Cemetery Ridge sloped westward to form the saddle over which the Emmittsburg Road passed. Lee believed that by forcing the hostile line at that point and directing his attack toward Cemetery Hill, he could take the Federal right in flank. He also perceived that once having gained the saddle in the ridge, the fire of the enemy's left would be neutralized, since it would be as destructive to friend as to foe. The task was accordingly assigned to Longstreet, while as before Hill and Ewell were to support him, and about 150 guns were to be massed to prepare for the assault. These conclusions were reached at a conference held during the morning on the field in front and within cannon range of Round Top, there being present Gens. Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and various staff officers. The plan of attack was fully discussed and it was decided that Pickett, whose men were fresh and thirsting for battle, should lead the assaulting column supported by McLaws and Hood. A. P. Hill was also to support the attack with such force as he could spare. It was never in any way contemplated that Pickett should alone make the assault. He was to be given the lead for the sole reason that since his troops were unweakened by previous fighting it was naturally assumed they would be more effective than Hood's and McLaws', which had been terribly punished. Any one familiar with war knows that soldiers are not like wolves which become more fierce at

the sight of blood. The best troops are the most human men, and while the best troops are able temporarily to set aside, they are never able entirely to dispel, their fears of death. The more losses they sustain, the more difficult it is for them to set aside those fears. Pickett's men were not only fresh, but were inspired by a desire to reap their share of the glory of the battle, which had been denied them by their absence from the field the day before. While it had remained in the rear, its veteran soldiers, though individually glad to escape the horrors of battle, were none the less collectively fearful lest they might arrive too late to satisfy the pride of their command.

The sole objection offered by Longstreet to the plan proposed at the conference was that the guns on Little Round Top might be brought to bear on the right flank of his column, but this point was disposed of apparently to his entire satisfaction by Col. Long of Lee's staff, who suggested that they could be neutralized, if not silenced, by a group of Confederate guns massed for the purpose. None of the awful forebodings which Longstreet has subsequently declared he entertained were expressed by him. He made no attempt to point out the inevitable failure of the attack, and gave no evidence of a feeling that the post of honor assigned his corps was virtually a forlorn hope, in which it was to be ruthlessly sacrificed by the "blood-thirsty Lee."* Yet he has declared that he used the following words to the Commander-in-Chief at the conference: "That will give me 15,000 men. I have been a soldier, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body of 15,000 men who could make that attack successfully." These remarks, which Longstreet in fact would hardly have dared make, are important if they were actually made, for they show that his heart was still not in his work, and

*See Longstreet's absurd article in *Battles and Leaders*, Vol. III, p. 339, and also his book.

prove as previously stated that his spirit throughout the battle was not one of coöperation, and also, that he positively did not gather from the discussion at the conference that Pickett's Division was alone to assault. Yet he also argues that Pickett was wantonly sacrificed by Lee in spite of the fact that he, Longstreet, made not the slightest effort to support the division which, actually by his own words, accomplished all the entire corps was expected to do. The narrative will show that it was Longstreet himself who sacrificed Pickett's Division, and also that its much misunderstood charge, so commonly and erroneously attributed as a grievous error to Lee, was in fact a feat which vindicates the Commander-in-Chief of any possible blame for having attempted the impossible. To believe Longstreet is to recognize that he had in a sense staked his professional opinion against the possibility of the successful issue of the battle. It was then with his moral force, the greatest power of any general, set against the successful performance of his part, that Longstreet undertook the execution of his orders. He says, "With my knowledge of the situation, I could see the desperate and hopeless nature of the charge, and the cruel slaughter it would cause. My heart was heavy when I left Pickett." Picture Longstreet, the "old war-horse," the "Sledge Hammer" of the Army of Northern Virginia, beset with anticipations of loss in battle! Can anything be more absurd, for among all his other virtues as a general that of ability to steel his heart against inevitable losses and not count the cost when occasion demanded was by far the finest. Well might his heart have been heavy when he left Pickett, for he must have known that no steps had been taken, and that he did not intend to take any, to support him.

Upon the representation that he could not uncover his right by withdrawing Hood and McLaws, Longstreet was assigned seven brigades of Hill's Corps. These with Pickett's made ten brigades for the column of attack.

Alexander was early apprised of the alteration of the plan, and in order to bring his guns to bear on Cemetery Hill a good many changes in the positions of the 1st Corps batteries were necessary. The batteries had been posted before daylight on the rolling ground about the Peach Orchard, and by reason of the open character of the position were necessarily exposed. The enemy's guns were generally in pits or behind epaulments along the ridge opposite, and though they fired occasional shots during the morning, Alexander reserved his fire in order to save ammunition. The shifting of his batteries to meet the change of orders was conducted as quietly as possible by Alexander, but with his usual energy and skill, and although the enemy's artillery became somewhat more active, the new line was established by 10 A. M. Alexander now had in position 75 guns, all well advanced, in an irregular curved line about 1,800 yards long, beginning in the Peach Orchard and ending near the northeast corner of the Spangler wood. Along this line Cabell's, Dearing's, Eshleman's, Alexander's under Huger, and Henry's battalions were posted in the order named from left to right. Maj. Richardson, with the nine 12-pounder howitzers of Garnett's Battalion, also reported to Alexander by Pendleton's orders, and his pieces which were of too short range to be effective along Hill's front were directed to be held under cover close in rear of the forming columns of infantry, with which it was intended they should advance. Pickett's Division had already arrived at the orchard and the men were eating and resting, ignorant of the fate which awaited them, but all conscious of serious work ahead.

A few hundred yards to the left and rear of Alexander's line began Walker's line of 60 guns, the batteries of which were generally posted as on the previous day, extending along the ridge as far as the Hagerstown Road. Nearly a mile to the north of Walker's left, two Whitworth rifles of Hurt's Battery were posted on the same ridge. In the interval 10 guns of Carter's Battalion occupied positions on the right and left of the

railroad cut, and to their right connecting with Walker's left, Watson's and Smith's batteries and a section of Hupp's of Dance's Battalion, with 10 guns, took position. Latimer's Battalion, now under Capt. Raine, remained in rear of Johnson's left, as did Jones' Battalion, while Nelson's Battalion had also been ordered to that point with directions to engage the enemy's guns on Culp's Hill, if practicable. Capt. Graham, with four guns, occupied a hill about 2,500 yards northeast of Cemetery Hill, and was alone of the three battalions on Ewell's left engaged during the day. Thus in the 2d Corps, Brown placed in position but 25 pieces on the morning of the 3d, and these were restricted to the use of solid shot because of the utter unreliability of the fuses provided for their shell.

The sole activity on the part of the Confederate Artillery during the morning had been that of Wyatt's five guns, or the left group of Poague's Battalion, which opened fire upon the enemy's position about 7 A. M. A number of Federal batteries soon concentrated their fire on Wyatt, and Poague promptly ordered him to desist from a further waste of ammunition in so unequal a contest, in which nothing was accomplished but the explosion of a Federal caisson, and the loss of 8 Confederate horses. Col. Poague afterwards learned that Wyatt had been ordered by A. P. Hill to engage the enemy.

On the Federal side, Hunt had placed 166 guns in position before the attack commenced, and during the engagement 10 more batteries from the reserve were brought in action, raising the number of his guns to 220, as against 172 employed by the Confederates. If there was ever an occasion when every available piece was needed in the front line, it was that of the artillery preparation preceding Longstreet's assault, yet there remained unemployed in the 2d Corps 25 rifles and 16 Napoleons, and in the 3d Corps fifteen 12-pounder howitzers. As the Chief of Artillery had since daybreak on the 3d been busily engaged visiting every portion of

the Confederate position from left to right he must have known of the absence of many of these guns from the line. Specific orders were personally given by him to the various group and even battery commanders. His aim was to secure a concentrated and destructive fire, under cover of which the infantry might advance. The problem now seems to have been a simple one so far as the posting of the batteries was concerned, for even had it been impracticable to place them all actually in position, they might have all been held in readiness under cover. Most careful instructions were given by Pendleton on this point, and while he did actually supervise the convenient placing of the ordnance trains, he seems to have failed for some reason to verify personally the posting of the batteries. Subordinate artillery commanders are of course responsible for such neglects as the actual failure to bring their own guns into action, and in this respect, Col. Brown, of the 2d Corps, was undoubtedly remiss, subject, however, to the limitations imposed upon him by the orders of his corps commander, and those orders, it would seem, were responsible for the elimination of Nelson's, Jones', and Raine's battalions. Walker's failure to engage his 15 howitzers was due solely to the ineffectiveness of their range, so no fault is to be found with the artillery dispositions of the 8d Corps, and Alexander brought every piece of the 1st Corps into action.

Viewing the disposition of the Confederate Artillery before the attack, a grave error should have been detected, and for this error the Chief of Artillery, subject also to the orders from the Commander-in-Chief, was responsible. Since Lee assumed no direct control over his artillery, only informing himself of its general situation through Col. Long of his staff, Pendleton must receive the blame. Not only did he permit 56 of his guns to remain idle as pointed out before, but he allowed 80 of the 84 guns of the 2d and 8d Corps, which were engaged, to be brought into action on a mathematically straight line, parallel to the position of the

enemy and constantly increasing in range therefrom to the left or north! It was indeed a phenomenal oversight on his part, as declared by Col. Alexander, not to place a part of the Artillery, at least, north of the town and east of the prolongation of his line of guns at the center to enfilade the shank of the fish-hook, and cross fire with the guns on Seminary Ridge. Even had Nelson's and Jones' battalions, or either of them, both of which remained idle with the exception of Milledge's Battery of the former, been massed in such a position, far greater effect would have been obtained by the Artillery, and the actual disposition of the rest of the battalions, which for some reason unknown to us might have been necessary, need not have been altered. Concentrated fire does not necessarily mean massed batteries. And especially is this true when the artillery of the offense may be disposed about the arc of an enveloping line. With batteries widely dispersed about such an arc, the enemy at the more interior or more restricted position is at a great disadvantage, for just as the sheafs of the surrounding groups converge upon a comparatively small area, so the artillery fire of the defense becomes divergent and hence less concentrated. No more beautiful illustration could exist of the possible relative effectiveness of artillery fire under such circumstances than the terrain of Gettysburg. There, artillery disposed about the outer arc would necessarily inflict overwhelming and simultaneous losses upon the thickly-massed batteries and infantry supports on Cemetery Ridge and its adjoining spurs, whereas the fire of the defending batteries would, by virtue of the depression in their front, either be compelled to ignore the attacking infantry, or the opposing batteries beyond and above it. And even if part of the artillery of the defense was assigned to each of these missions, concentration would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, artillery fire directed at Seminary Ridge was either effective to the highest degree, or totally noneffective, for "overs" and "shorts" were lost. There was no infantry between

and beyond to suffer from wild shots as there was on the heights occupied by the Federals. Again, whatever the target selected by the inner batteries, their fire would have been frontal with respect to the guns on the outer arc, whereas every group on the latter line would have crossed its fire with that of some other group. Hunt occupied a position similar to that at the hub of a wheel; Pendleton could have and should have grouped his batteries about a part of the rim. The lines of the spokes clearly illustrate what the comparative result of the fire of the two artilleries would have been, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the superiority of the Federal guns in number and weight of metal would have been more than compensated for by the natural advantages of the Confederate position in so far as the artillery was concerned. Certainly Hunt would have been put to it to shift his batteries from point to point. In fact, it would have been impossible for him to do so, for they were terribly cut up even by the frontal fire which was actually encountered.

These conclusions are not speculative, but are fully borne out by an incident of the battle, which shows what the possibilities really were. Quite by accident, during the cannonade preceding Pickett's charge, Milledge's Battery of Nelson's Battalion fired 48 rounds upon Cemetery Hill—the most vulnerable point to artillery fire, by reason of the practicability of enfilading it, along the whole Federal line. The effect of Milledge's fire is described by Col. Osborn, Chief of Artillery, 11th Corps, as follows:

"The fire from our west front had progressed 15 to 20 minutes when several guns opened on us from the ridge beyond and east of Cemetery Hill. The line of fire from the last batteries, and the line of fire from the batteries on our west front, were such as to leave the town between the two lines of fire. These last guns opened directly on the right flank of my line of batteries. The gunners got our range at almost the first shot. Passing low over Wainwright's guns, they caught us

square in flank and with the elevation perfect. It was admirable shooting. They raked the whole line of batteries, killed and wounded the men and horses, and blew up the caissons rapidly. I saw one shell go through 6 horses standing broadside.

"To meet this new fire I drew from the batteries facing west the 20-pounder Parrott Battery of Capt. Taft, and wheeling it half round to the right brought it to bear on them. I also drew from the reserve one battery and placed it in position on Taft's right.

"Fortunately for us, these batteries, placed in the new line, at once secured the exact range of their immediate adversaries. In a few minutes the enemy's fire almost ceased, and when it again opened, and while the fire was progressing, it was irregular and wild. They did not again get our range as they had it before we replied."*

Col. Osborn had in position over 60 guns along the line of the 11th Corps. If less than 50 rounds of Confederate ammunition caused so much damage to that enormous group of artillery, what, may we ask, would several thousand have done?

The formation of the column of attack consumed more time than had been contemplated, and about 11 A. M. before it had been completed some of Hill's skirmishers provoked the enemy into premature activity by attempting to seize a barn between the lines. Gradually the Federal Artillery opened up, which tempted Walker's guns to reply, and before long Hill's line was subjected to the cannonade of over 100 guns. But soon the roar of artillery died out and the field was again as silent as a churchyard.

On the Federal side, Hancock's Corps held Cemetery Ridge with Robinson's Division of the 1st Corps on Hays' right in support, and Doubleday's at the angle between Gibbon and Caldwell. Newton, who had succeeded to the command of the 1st Corps, vice Reynolds, was in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Com-

**Philadelphia Weekly Times*, May 31, 1877.

pactly arrayed on its crest was McGilvery's artillery consisting of his own batteries and a number from the Artillery Reserve. This group consisted of 41 pieces. Well to the right of McGilvery, Capt. Hazard had massed the 26 guns of the 2d Corps in front of Hays and Gibbon. Woodruff's Battery was posted in front of Zeigler's Grove, and on his left in succession were posted Arnold's Rhode Island, Cushing's United States, Brown's Rhode Island, and Roity's New York batteries. The two last named batteries had been heavily engaged the day before, and so much cut up that they now brought into action but four guns each. Besides these, Daniel's Horse Battery was posted at the angle, and soon after the action commenced Cowan's First New York Battery with 6 rifles was placed on Roity's left. A number of the guns on Cemetery Hill, as well as those of Rittenhouse on Little Round Top, could also be brought to bear on the point selected for Longstreet's assault. Leaving out the latter, which were partially neutralized by hostile groups, there were, therefore, 77 guns in two groups along the front of the 2d Corps, occupying the actual crest and plainly visible to the Confederates, who had brought to bear upon them approximately 150 pieces.

Aware of the great strength of their position, the Federals, after the early cannonade died out, simply sat still and waited for developments. On the Confederate side, it had been arranged that when the infantry column was ready, Longstreet should announce the fact by the fire of two guns of the Washington Artillery. At this signal all the Confederate guns were to open simultaneously on the batteries on Cemetery Hill, and the ridge extending towards Little Round Top. Alexander was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order to charge. Accordingly he established his observing station about noon at a favorable point near the left of his line of guns. Soon after establishing his station, Alexander received the following note from Longstreet:

"COLONEL—If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts

pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Gen. Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers."

This note naturally startled Longstreet's Chief of Artillery, who did not wish to substitute his judgment for that of the Commander-in-Chief who had ordered the attack to be made. No matter what Alexander may have thought at the time, he must have felt that too much responsibility was being shifted upon his shoulders by his corps commander. He therefore sent Longstreet the following message:

"GENERAL—I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort. And, even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very bloody cost."

Oh, the wisdom of that message, the able cunning, may we say, of the subaltern who sent it! Nothing that has ever been written or said can half so well give us an insight into Alexander's character. It shows us that not only was this able artilleryman prepared to execute his orders irrespective of personal views concerning the advisability of the general plan, that not only did he have a most thorough grasp of the situation in its present, as well as its future aspects, but that he also had an eye to the propriety of the shifting of authority upon subordinates. He at least did not propose to subject himself nor the Artillery to the possibility of becoming a scape-goat in event of a disaster, and promptly put the matter up to the subtle Longstreet in that light. *"If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, etc."* Well did Alexander use these words, and it may be said here that when the Chief of Artillery him-

self, whose duty it was to prepare the assault, inferred from the tone of the orders of the Corps Commander that there was an alternative plan, no other fact is necessary to prove that Longstreet entertained such an alternative. Where, may we require, did he find authority for it? Certainly his orders had been specific to make the attack, and those orders have been repeatedly held up to the world by him as not only faulty in the extreme, but as allowing him no alternative. He has even declared that he did not "dispute them further, because he saw that Lee's mind was made up," or words to that effect.* It is such fallacies as those which Longstreet has recorded that makes the world cry out, "Would that mine enemy would write a book!" And when one's enemy writes several books, it is even more delightful to read them.

To Alexander's astute dispatch, the following reply soon came from Longstreet:

"COLONEL—The intention is to advance the infantry, if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment arrives, advise Gen. Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack."

Let us underscore the "if" in this message, and again ask whence came the pernicious word. There was no "if" in Lee's orders. It was clearly of Longstreet's adoption. In other words he had set about his task prepared to complete it "if" he chose to do so, and this is not the spirit of a lieutenant who is committed heart and soul to the success of his superior. Jackson used no "ifs" in his orders for the execution of Lee's plans. He made his orders mandatory, and said to his subordinates, "You will do so and so," nor did he ever seek to shift responsibility upon his Chief of Artillery. He loved responsibility and never parted with it. This is what Lee subsequently meant when he said he would have won the battle of Gettysburg, had Jackson been present. Lee must have been keenly conscious of Longstreet's

*See *Battles and Leaders*, Vol. III, p. 348.



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM THOMAS POAGUE

unsympathetic support from the very beginning of the campaign, and cognizant of that dragging influence imposed upon his operations by the latter from the start, he would most certainly have assigned the 1st Corps to the less active part assigned to Hill after the first day, and placed the more enthusiastic Jackson on his right, where energy and promptitude were most required. Who can doubt that Jackson and not Alexander, Brown, or Walker, would have occupied the important station actually turned over by Longstreet to Alexander? Can we doubt that Jackson and not a subordinate, however able, would have himself selected the moment for the advance of his infantry? He did it at Chancellorsville, and why would he not have done it at Gettysburg?

Upon the receipt of Longstreet's reply, which on the whole, however, was couched in quite a different tone from his first message, Alexander was still unable to determine the extent of his discretion, nor was Gen. Wright, who happened to be present, able to help him out. Wright did say, however, that the Federal position was not as difficult to reach as it appeared to be, for he had almost carried a part of it the day before. Influenced by Wright's minimizing the difficulties to be encountered, and somewhat as he tells us "by a sort of camp rumor which I had heard that morning that Gen. Lee had said that he was going to send every man he had upon that hill," Alexander was reassured that no discretion as to the attack was intended and resolved to carry out his part in the way he believed to be in conformity with the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. His position was not an enviable one, and it is not surprising if his confidence was somewhat shaken by that intangible evidence of irresolution on the part of his immediate superior, which in some indefinable way makes itself so quickly felt to all. In this spirit it was that he rode back to see Pickett, whose division was but a short distance in his rear. Alexander did not express his feelings to Pickett, nor did he question him as to his views.

But by those means which human natures possess, he adroitly discovered Pickett's sentiments. Pickett he found to be unusually sanguine of success and highly gratified that his luck had favored him by giving him the chance to make the charge. This was the soldier over whose fate Longstreet's heart was so heavy. What a pity it seems that some of Pickett's spirit was not transmitted to Longstreet, and that the "camp rumor" concerning Lee's resolution, which in itself bespoke the high moral of the troops, did not engender more confidence in his lieutenant. But, while his troops were burning with ardor for the fight, their great, soft-hearted leader was sorely oppressed—his heart was already bleeding for them!

A few minutes with the fiery Pickett sufficed to dispel Alexander's uncertainty of mind, and he returned to his post stimulated by the contagious spirit of the gallant infantry leader. No delay could now be made, and no indecision on his part should contribute to the miscarriage of the attack, so he wrote Longstreet: "General: When our artillery fire is at its best, I shall order Pickett to charge." Note the word "shall" in this message. That word spelt a resolution born of Pickett which had supplanted the previous irresolution born of Longstreet.

All these things are moral factors it is true, and are no part of the tactics employed in the battle, but nevertheless it is such things that induce victories and defeats, and in them is often to be found the reasons for what would otherwise remain inexplicable. Not only the *esprit* of the officers and men at the moment of attack and the physical condition of the troops, but the general state of their military digestion, so to speak, is important when one undertakes to reason from effect to cause. It is not the mere tactical conception as included in orders that wins battles, and yet with absolutely no other knowledge we frequently arrive at conclusions concerning the reasons for the military failures and successes of the past. The most faultless

tactics are frequently set at nought by adverse psychological conditions, whereas the sheer *élan* of the troops will often counteract the most egregious tactical blunders. In the final analysis the whole theory of attack may be resolved into the truth that poor tactics, executed with spirit and confidence in the leaders, will more often guarantee success than those of the most approved form when the driving force of enthusiasm is lacking. This fact is more readily grasped if one but realizes that the culmination of attack is close contact, and that there will be no close contact gained by the offense unless the tactical plan, however perfect, is developed with a certain amount of rapidity, in order that changes may not be enforced by the enemy's movements. Enthusiasm alone will produce rapidity of execution. All this well illustrates the causes of Longstreet's lapses at Gettysburg. He himself has admitted that he was woefully lacking in enthusiasm for the part assigned him. Lacking this fundamental element of success, his movements were consequently not only tardy as a rule, but, when finally undertaken were not characterized by that vigorous push for which he was noted.

We have examined the situation on the Confederate side. Now let us view it from Cemetery Ridge as it appeared to Gen. Hunt about 11 A. M., using his own graphic description: "Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was covered by batteries already in line, or going into position. They stretched—apparently in one unbroken mass—from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad.* What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries

*Königgrätz and Sedan had not then been fought.

and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half-mile of open ground, which was beyond our effective musketry fire." Here let it be interpolated that Hunt, with the skill of the fine soldier that he was, accurately divined the intentions of the Confederates, expressing his conclusions as follows: "With such an object, the cannonade would be long, and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success. From the great extent of ground occupied by the enemy's batteries, it was evident that all the Artillery on our west front, whether of the Army Corps or of the reserve, must concur as a unit under the Chief of Artillery in the defense. This is provided for in all well-organized armies by special rules, which formerly were contained in our own army regulations, but they had been condensed in successive editions into a few short lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had become, from lack of use, mere survivals,—unintelligible except to the specialist. It was of the first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such condition as to make them an easy prey. There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to Gen. Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold their fire for 15 or 20 minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us,—but slowly, so that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault."

Before the Confederate Artillery was ordered to open, Alexander sent a courier to the rear with directions to Maj. Richardson to move up with Garnett's nine howit-

zers, which he had decided to lead forward nearly to musket range at the head of Pickett's Infantry, where they would be of more service than in its rear. But unfortunately for Pickett, though fortunately perhaps for Pickett's batteries, Gen. Pendleton had sent them to cover behind Hill's line, where they were not found in time to be used by Alexander. Inasmuch as the Chief of Artillery had placed these batteries at Alexander's disposal he was guilty of a grave mistake in detaching them without advising his subordinate. True, he moved them in order to shelter them more thoroughly, but the act was one of unwarranted interference, in the circumstances in which it was done.

Just before 1 P. M. a courier dashed up to the Washington Artillery and handed its commander an order written on the fly leaf of a memorandum book. Addressed to Col. Walton, its contents were as follows: "Headquarters, July 8, 1863. Colonel: Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing. If the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy on the rocky hill. Most respectfully, J. Longstreet, Lieutenant-General commanding." The order to fire the signal guns was immediately communicated to Maj. Eshleman, and the report of the first gun of Miller's Battery soon rang out upon the still summer air. There was a moment's delay with the second gun, a friction primer having failed to explode. The interval was but a short one, but during it the heart of two great armies could almost be heard to throb. Instantly a canopy of smoke spread over the Peach Orchard, and exactly at 1 o'clock, the roar and flash of 188 Confederate guns announced the opening of the conflict. In a few seconds, the artillery of both armies rent the air with the deep notes of the guns, and the crescendo of bursting shell, while the earth trembled as if Jove had placed his feet upon the pedals of a great organ. Truly might Mars have applauded the tremendous throb and looked down with delight from his Olympic seat upon

the fire-wreathed arena of Gettysburg, for never in this world had such a warlike scene been set before. The Federal position seemed to have broken out with flashing guns at every point, and from Little Round Top to Cemetery Hill the ridge blazed like a volcano. Hunt had just completed his dispositions at Little Round Top when the Confederate signal guns were heard. Describing the field as he viewed it from that point, he says: "The scene was indescribably grand. All the Confederate batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them; then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taneytown Pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had "decamped," in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position occupied by Gen. Newton, behind McGilvery's batteries, from which we had a fine view, as our guns were now in action." Describing the Artillery fire of both sides, Hunt further says: "Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates,—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything there could seek shelter. . . . I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events. . . . Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests, I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to

Gen. Meade to advise its immediate cessation, and preparation for the assault, which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead. Being told that the General had gone to the Cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not there, and on telling Gen. Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown Road to meet the fresh batteries, which I had ordered up, I met Maj. Bingham, of Hancock's staff, who informed me that Gen. Meade's aides were seeking me with orders to 'cease firing.' So I had only anticipated his wishes." So much for the Federal side.

Before the cannonade opened Alexander had made up his mind to give Pickett the order to advance within 15 or 20 minutes after it began, but when he observed the full development of the Federal batteries, knowing that the enemy's infantry was suffering little behind the accidents of the ground and the sheltering walls along the ridge, he could not bring himself to give the word. He afterwards said that it seemed madness to launch the infantry into that fire with an open area about 1,800 yards wide to traverse. So he let 15 minutes pass into 25, hoping vainly that the effect of the Confederate artillery fire might soon produce more serious effects. At the end of this time he wrote Pickett: "If you are coming at all, you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least 18 guns are still firing from the cemetery itself." Five minutes after the sending of the message, Hunt ordered his batteries to cease firing, and those at the Cemetery were seen to limber up and retire to the rear. It had not been the custom in the Federal Artillery to withdraw temporarily in anticipation of an

infantry assault, in order to save ammunition, though such a practice had all along been followed by the Confederates. So Alexander believed that if fresh batteries were not shortly brought up by the enemy, the position could be carried. Observing with his glass for five minutes or more the crest which was still swept by the fire of the Confederate guns, he was unable to detect a sign of life on the deserted position. The dead and wounded men and horses, together with numerous disabled carriages, alone occupied the ground. He then wrote Pickett: "For God's sake, come quick. The 18 guns are gone; come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly."

Pickett had taken Alexander's first note to Longstreet, who read it and said nothing. Pickett then said, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet, unwilling to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering him not to do so, but equally unwilling to give the word for the charge in pursuance of Lee's orders, simply turned his head away, with the result that Pickett, whose heart was in the right place, saluted and said, "I am going to move forward, sir," and then galloped off to his division, and immediately put it in motion.

Longstreet claims that he nodded his head in answer to Pickett's question. But even if he did, that was a remarkable way for a corps commander to set his assaulting column in motion. His whole attitude and conduct was not well calculated to impart to the leader of his column that fiery ardor which alone could win success. Fortunately, Pickett's nerve was unimpaired by Longstreet's conduct. Had a less bold spirit been in the lead, the 1st Corps would never have made the attempt. The whole incident is chilling to the spirits of one who follows it, though it had no such effect on Pickett. In the light of after events, it seems almost too bad he had the resolution to make the attempt, for we are now able to see that with the exception of his individual enthusiasm and that of his men, not one element of success was present.

Most of the Confederate reports declare that at this juncture the Federal batteries were silenced, in the sense than they were subdued. Again we see how dangerous it is to reach the conclusion that silent guns are harmless guns, for in this instance their retirement was but the calm before the storm which was to break out with renewed fury. The moment was in fact far more ominous of what was to follow, than propitious for the assault.

Leaving his staff, Longstreet rode to Alexander's observing station. It was then about 1:40 P. M. Alexander explained the artillery situation to him, feeling then more hopeful of success, but expressing a fear less his ammunition might be exhausted before the crisis of the attack. "Stop Pickett immediately and replenish your ammunition," said Longstreet. But Alexander demurred on the ground that the effect of the artillery preparation would be lost, and also because there was but a little reserve ammunition left. Longstreet then said to him: "I don't want to make this attack. I would stop it now, but that Gen. Lee ordered it and expects it to go on. I don't see how it can succeed."

Let us pause again and ask ourselves if this was not a pitiful situation in which the superb 1st Corps found itself. Think of it! How could aught but disaster ensue with such a one at its head? Its bold leader had utterly succumbed and instead of being his old self, the man of iron nerve and will, he was now at the crucial instant of the war, suffering from all the frailties of a weak mortal. We know that Longstreet possessed great personal courage, but as a leader, on this occasion, he was most certainly, as proved by his own words, the victim of "cold feet." It was his duty to order that charge. If, in his opinion, it was so grievous a mistake as he later declared it to have been, his course was clear. He should have, in the presence of Lee and his staff, made his protest, in writing, if necessary, and upon being overruled, he should have gone back to his command with teeth set and sought to impress his division and brigade commanders not only with the necessity of success,

but with the practicability of the assault. Had he done this, the attack would probably have succeeded, but even had it failed, Longstreet would have been scot-free of all blame and Lee would have been the first to publish his protest, in order that his lieutenant might be promptly and absolutely absolved before the world. As it was, the magnanimous Lee assumed all the blame in order that his lieutenant might not be rendered less efficient as a leader, by the destruction of the confidence of his men. Lee knew that his own character, record, and motives alone could stand the strain which the blame for the loss of Gettysburg would impose upon the one who assumed it, and it was his willingness to shoulder the responsibility of the many risks that he took during the war, which made him the moral equal, if not superior of, any captain of history. It is interesting to speculate what the career of a soldier with such moral force might have been had he possessed the means at the disposal of, and the ambitious lust for power which inspired Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon. Though not generally classed with these as a great captain, history will in the course of time liken him with respect to the higher virtues of the soul to Hannibal, who from the dispassionate record now appears to have been the strongest man that ever bore arms. Eventual success in war is the most potent irrigant of that fame which grows greener and greener with time. Defeat is the blighting sun which scorches and shrivels military reputations until nothing remains but the gullies and waste places of failure, from which no garlands are plucked. These are facts which the names of Hannibal and Lee alone have set at naught. But to return again to our narrative.

What Col. Alexander's feelings were upon hearing Longstreet's words is difficult to imagine. We can hardly assume that he was surprised, but we can be sure of one thing,—he was not shaken in his resolve to do his best. The heart of Pickett himself was no bolder than that which beat in Alexander's breast. He listened, but dared not offer a word. He realized that the battle

was lost if he ordered his guns to cease firing, for he knew that the ammunition supply was too low to permit of another artillery preparation; the guns had hardly cooled during the past three days. There was still a chance of success, and it was not his part by word or deed to sacrifice it, and though he failed to see it, the recordation of these sentiments on his part remains one of the greatest indictments of the superior whom he has so ardently sought to defend.

While Longstreet was still speaking to his Chief of Artillery, the die cast itself, for Pickett's immortal division swept out of the woods in rear of the guns and presented its gray breast to the enemy. The line swept on with bayonets flashing in the sun like the spray on the crest of a great wave. At the head of his brigade rode Gen. Dick Garnett, of the old 9th Infantry, just out of the ambulance, but stimulated with hope of fresh glory. As he passed Longstreet, he threw back the cape of his frazzled blue overcoat and, raising himself erect in the saddle, waved a grand salute to his corps commander.

After riding forward with Garnett a short distance, Alexander returned to his line, with a view to select such of his guns as had enough ammunition to follow Pickett.

While the great artillery duel had been in progress, and before the infantry advanced, a serious danger threatened Longstreet's right. This was the appearance of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, which moved upon that flank and commenced massing in the body of timber extending from the base of Big Round Top westward to Kern's house on the Emmittsburg Road. Reilly's and Bachman's batteries of Henry's Battalion had been promptly ordered to change front to the right and had opened fire upon the enemy's cavalry with such effect as at once to drive it beyond the wood and out of sight. In the meantime, part of Stuart's Cavalry was arriving on the right and soon formed line at right-angles to that of Hood's Division, while Hart's Horse Battery was stationed on the Emmittsburg Road at the

angle, and later succeeded in driving off Merritt's Federal Cavalry Brigade which deployed for the attack.

The infantry column led by Pickett had been poorly formed. Six brigades, or those of Brockenbrough, Davis, McGowan, Archer, Garnett, and Kemper, with about 10,000 men, were in the first line, with a second line composed of Lane's, Scale's, and Armistead's brigades, very much shorter than the first on its left, following 200 yards in rear. The remaining brigade, Wilcox's, was posted in rear of the right of the column, both flanks of which rested in the air with no support in its rear. As the infantry rushed through the line of guns and debouched upon the plain in front of the ridge, the Federal Artillery, which had become almost silent, broke out again with all its batteries, the 18 guns at the cemetery promptly reappearing in action. The Confederate batteries, which had been compelled to reserve their fire while the infantry was moving past them, reopened over its head, as soon as the attacking troops advanced about 200 yards. But the Federal guns which had been so skillfully concealed for the time being and shoved to the forward crest to repel the assault, utterly ignored the Confederate batteries, and concentrated with the utmost precision upon the infantry. Meantime, Alexander had formed about 18 guns, including five from Garden's and Flanner's batteries, of Henry's Battalion, on the right under Maj. John C. Haskell, and four from the Washington Artillery on the left, three under Capt. Miller, and one of Norcom's or Eshleman's old battery under Lieut. Battles. In the center only about one gun in every four could be ordered forward. The ammunition had all but run out along the line, and the caissons which had been sent to the ordnance train had not returned. The train had also been moved by Pendleton to a more distant point than the one it first occupied, to escape the fire, which had been directed at the batteries on the right of Walker's line on the ridge. Alexander soon advanced with Eshleman's, Haskell's, Lieut. Motes' Troup Artillery (Capt. Carlton having

been wounded), and several other guns, to a swell of the ground just west of the Emmittsburg Road, where he sought to protect Pickett's column by firing upon the enemy's troops, advancing to attack its right flank. The four guns which Haskell advanced from the Peach Orchard and the four on his left under Capt. Miller and Lieut. Battles of the Washington Artillery, were so far to the front of Pickett's route that they were able to enfilade the Federal Infantry massing to meet the assault. The effect of their fire was for a time terrific, but soon attracted that of not less than 20 guns which practically silenced them after disabling a number of pieces and many men and horses.

The troops of Heth's Division, decimated by the storm of deadly hail which tore through the ranks, had faltered and fallen back before the combined artillery and musketry fire of the enemy. This had impelled Pender's Division to fall back also while Wilcox's Brigade, perceiving that the rest of Hill's troops were unable to reach the Federal position, had failed so far to move forward to Pickett's support. The disintegration of the infantry column had set in when the column had traversed about half the intervening space. The Federal line overlapped it on the left 800 yards or more, and was crowded with guns. The fire upon the unsupported left, the advance of which was retarded by numerous fences, could be endured but a short time. Already the artillery support which had been expected from the 8d Corps was failing, by reason of the batteries having indulged in the earlier duel of the morning. That useless waste of ammunition was now to be sorely felt. Garnett and Armistead had been killed, Kemper wounded, and over 2,000 of Pickett's men had fallen within 30 minutes, before the end of which time the shattered remnants were driven from the position they had carried.

Just as the Confederate column began to advance, the reserve batteries which Hunt had ordered up had arrived, and Fitzhugh's, Weir's, and Parsons' were put in

near the clump of trees, while Brown's and Arnold's batteries, much crippled, were withdrawn, Cowan's being substituted for the former. McGilvery's group had promptly reappeared and opened a destructive oblique fire upon the right of the assaulting column, greatly aided by Rittenhouse's six rifles on Little Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy in enfilading the Confederate lines. The steady fire from McGilvery's and Rittenhouse's groups caused the column of attack to drift to the left out of its true course, so that the weight of the assault fell directly upon the position occupied by Hazard's group of batteries. Hunt had counted on the cross fire of his artillery groups halting the Confederate column before it reached the Federal position, but in this he was disappointed, for Hazard, who had exhausted his shell, was compelled to remain silent until the Confederate Infantry arrived within the zone of canister effect. The orders of the corps commander, which, contrary to Hunt's directions, had resulted in Hazard's expenditure of all his shell in the artillery duel preceding the assault, deprived the defense of nearly one-third of its guns in the early stage of the attack, and entirely of the effect of the cross fire which had been planned. Hunt subsequently declared that Pickett's troops could never have reached Hazard's batteries had his orders not been superseded. But this is neither here nor there. They did reach the ridge in spite of the tornado of canister fire which Hazard opened upon them when within about 200 yards of his batteries.

As the Confederate brigades closed upon the Federal position, the fire fight of the infantry commenced in earnest. It lasted but a short time and soon Pickett's men, who with the exception of the more-advanced ones had never halted, surged on. As the rear line merged with the first the troops swarmed over the fences and disappeared in the smoke and dust which concealed the enemy's guns. Already the Confederate guns, except those with which Alexander was engaging the enemy on

the right, had been compelled to suspend their fire. The stars and bars were now discerned fluttering among the Federal guns, but the enemy was closing in upon Pickett's men from all sides in spite of every effort which Walker's and Alexander's batteries made to prevent it. Ewell's Infantry and Artillery were all silent, leaving Meade free to draw troops from his right to assist in the repulse of Pickett.

From the Confederate position, the awesome tragedy was grand and thrilling, and the onlookers watched it as if life and death hung upon the issue. "If it should be favorable to us," wrote one of the Confederate officers, "the war was nearly over; if against us, we each had the risks of many battles yet to go through. And the event culminated with fearful rapidity. Listening to the rolling crashes of musketry, it was hard to realize that they were made up of single reports, and that each musket shot represented nearly a minute of a man's life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if 100,000 men were engaged, and that human lives were being poured out like water."

Just as Pickett's troops had reached the Federal position, Col. Freemantle, of Her Majesty's Army, who until then had occupied a post of vantage behind Hill's Corps on the ridge, came upon the field, and in the belief that the attack had fully succeeded declared to Longstreet that he would not have missed the scene for anything in the world.

When Pickett, who was riding with his staff in rear of his division, saw that Hill's brigades on his left were breaking up, after sending two aides to rally them, a third was sent to Longstreet to say that the position in front would be taken, but that reinforcements would be required to hold it. Longstreet, in reply, directed Pickett to order up Wilcox, and Pickett sent three messengers in succession to be sure that the order was promptly acted upon. As the fugitives from Pettigrew's Division came back, Wright's Brigade of Anderson's Division was moved forward a few hundred yards

to cover their retreat. Already a stream of fugitive and wounded soldiers had begun to flow from the ridge to the rear, pursued by the enemy's fire from the right and left, and it was apparent to all that Pickett's men, unless strongly reinforced—could not hold on. After about 20 minutes, when the fire had all but ceased, and during which time ever-increasing masses of Federal infantry were seen to be moving from all directions upon his men, Wilcox's Brigade of about 1,200 men, with some 250 of Perry's Florida Brigade on its left, charged past the more-advanced Confederate batteries. Not another man was ordered forward, and nothing remained for them to support, for Pickett's Division had by this time simply crumbled away under the terrific infantry and artillery fire, which had been concentrated from all sides upon it.

The victory which for a moment had seemed within their grasp had eluded the Confederates, 4,000 of whom had fallen or been captured in the assault. No troops could have behaved more gallantly than those who participated in the attack, and none could have displayed higher qualities of courage and discipline than those of the whole army when it became apparent that Pickett had been repulsed. While Wilcox's Brigade was making its charge, Gen. Lee, entirely alone, had joined Col. Alexander. The Artillery of the 1st Corp had ceased firing in order to save ammunition in case the enemy should attempt a counter-stroke. Wilcox's charge was as useless as it was tragic. The brigade advanced but a short distance before it was overcome by the fire of the enemy, and compelled to halt, whereupon Lee ordered it to be withdrawn and placed in position behind the batteries with Wright's Brigade to oppose the enemy, should they advance. The Commander-in-Chief was no doubt apprehensive of such action on Meade's part and personally did everything he could to encourage his troops, especially the disorganized stream of fugitives moving to the rear. "Don't be discouraged," said he to them, "It was my fault this time. Form your ranks

again when you get under cover. All good men must hold together now." Only when they had all passed, and it was seen that no attack by the enemy was intended, did Gen. Lee leave the threatened point. The officers of every grade on that part of the field seconded his efforts to preserve order and reform the broken troops, and the men so promptly obeyed the call to rally that their thinned ranks were soon restored and the line reestablished. There was no sign, whatever, of panic or even discouragement. The troops, though mortified over their repulse, longed for the enemy to attack in order that they might efface the blot of their first serious defeat.

While the broken infantry was streaming to the rear and being reformed, Alexander's guns alone and entirely unsupported opposed the enemy at the Peach Orchard. His ammunition was now almost entirely exhausted, so no notice was taken of the desultory fire of the hostile batteries. Occasionally Alexander's batteries were compelled to fire with canister upon the Federal skirmishers, which were thrown forward, but the enemy's guns refrained from molesting the Confederate batteries. Already some of Alexander's batteries had withdrawn entirely from the field to refit, and those in the best condition now returned after having partially refilled their chests with ammunition and boldly remained in advanced positions until late in the day without a single infantryman in their fronts along certain portions of the line. But Meade's Army was so much shattered and discouraged by the losses it had incurred that he did not feel able to attempt to follow up his success. He saw that Lee had merely been repulsed and not routed, and that two whole divisions, those of McLaws and Hood, lay across his path. Swinton also declares that besides the heavy losses they had sustained in repulsing the attack, the Federal troops were thrown in much confusion by the intermingling of the various commands. The aggregate Federal loss of the three days had reached the enormous figure of 28,000 men,

including Reynolds, Gibbon, and many other of the most valuable officers; Hancock was wounded. While the Confederates had been defeated, it is very easy to see why Meade was unable to reap the fruits of his victory. The idea that there was a gap in the Confederate right is absurd, and had Meade attacked Lee, it seems certain he would have received as bloody a repulse as had been inflicted upon Pickett. In this respect we must agree with Longstreet, Hunt, and Swinton, in preference to the views of Alexander. The largest bodies of organized Federal troops available at the close of the attack were on Meade's left. An advance to the Plum Run line of the troops behind it, as Hunt points out, would have brought them directly in front of Alexander's batteries, which still crowned the ridges along the Emmittsburg Road; a farther advance would have brought them under a flank fire from McLaws and Hood. It is true that Alexander possessed little ammunition for his guns, but most of what was left was canister and the field of fire which the Federal Infantry would have had to traverse would have presented the opposing artillery with an opportunity not less favorable than that at Second Manassas. Only a few rounds per gun would have been necessary.

Finding that Meade was not going to follow up his success, Longstreet prepared to withdraw his advanced line to a better defensive position. Hood and McLaws were ordered to fall back slowly before Meade's skirmishers, and during the afternoon Alexander withdrew his guns from the Peach Orchard one by one. By 10 p. m. the batteries of the 1st Corps had been retired to the positions occupied by them along Seminary Ridge on the 2d of July, and the infantry was firmly established with the Peach Orchard still in its possession. Stuart had rejoined the Army on the night of the 2d, and had promptly assumed the duty of protecting the flanks, which he still guarded.

Merritt's attack on the Confederate right had been followed up by a bold charge of the Federal Cavalry led

by the gallant Farnworth, who had lost his life in the fight. On the Confederate left, four of Stuart's brigades had successfully opposed three of Gregg's near Cress's Ridge, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Gettysburg. Stuart's position offered excellent opportunities for the use of his horse artillery, reinforced by a section of Green's Battery of the 2d Corps, Griffin's Horse Battery of Jenkins' Cavalry Brigade, and Jackson's new horse battery. In this affair Breathed and McGregor had taken no part at first by reason of lack of ammunition, but later in the day had appeared on the field and rendered valiant service, holding Gregg in check until nightfall. In this quarter, both Stuart and Gregg held approximately their original positions, but the Federal Cavalry had succeeded in foiling Stuart's design to fall upon Meade's rear. Chew's and Moorman's batteries were not engaged at Gettysburg with the Cavalry, having been left in the rear between Hagerstown and the river, and Imboden's independent Cavalry Brigade with McClanahan's Horse Battery of six pieces only reached the field late on the 8d. It had been engaged throughout the campaign in raids on the left of the advancing army.

During the afternoon of the 8d, Lee abandoned his plan to dislodge Meade and determined upon immediate retreat to Virginia, and under cover of darkness withdrew Ewell's Corps to the ridge, and drew back Longstreet's right to Willoughby Run. Imboden, with his 2,100 men, was assigned the duty of organizing all the transportation of the Army into one vast train 14 miles long, and conducting it without a halt to Williamsport, and from thence to Winchester. Eshleman's Battalion with eight pieces, Tanner's 4-gun battery of the 2d Corps, Lieut. Pegram of Hurt's Battery with a Whitworth, and Hampton's Cavalry Brigade with Hart's Battery were ordered to report to him, so that the escort included 28 guns in all.

The great battle was over with the close of the third day. Nothing will so impress the student with its magnitude as the statistics of the Artillery arm.

Allowing the Confederates a maximum of 55,000 infantry present on the field during the three days and 272 guns, we find that in the battle the proportion of artillery to infantry was about five pieces per thousand men. Meade had engaged about 78,000 infantry with 310 guns, exclusive of the Horse Artillery. The Federal proportion of artillery to infantry was therefore smaller than that of the Confederates, being about four guns per thousand men. As a matter of fact, however, the proportion actually engaged was larger, for practically all of Meade's artillery was utilized at one time or another, while much of Ewell's artillery was idle. The supply of ammunition carried into the field for the Federal artillery consisted of 270 rounds per gun, whereas that for the Confederate artillery was but 150 rounds per gun. This fact still further increased the relative superiority of the Federal artillery.

Gen. Hunt reported an expenditure in action for the Federal artillery of 32,781 rounds, an average of 106 per gun. Ewell's Corps reported 5,851 rounds expended, and Hill's Corps 7,112 rounds. Ewell, therefore, averaged 90 rounds per gun, and Hill about 110 for the 65 guns which they each brought into action.

The greatest reported individual expenditure of a Confederate battery was that of Manly's which expended 1,146 rounds during the campaign, or an average of about 287 rounds per gun. This battery was principally engaged on July 3. McCarthy's rifled section, however, expended 600 rounds, or 300 per gun, and one piece of his battery under Lieut. Williams alone expended 300 rounds of shell and canister on the 3d.

The intensity of the fire of the two artilleries was, as may be seen from the foregoing figures, greatly in favor of the Federals whose relative strength in artillery, based upon the Confederate average expenditure per gun, was as 318 to 213, instead of 310 to 272, for it is not merely the number of guns present during the battle that determines the volume of fire. No report was

made of the expenditure in the 1st Corps, but all 88 of its guns were engaged and undoubtedly averaged as many rounds as those of Hill's Corps, or 110 each. Their expenditure was, therefore, fully 9,000 rounds, which brings up the aggregate for the Army during the battle to 90,000 rounds. Thus for the 213 guns engaged, excluding the Horse Artillery, the Confederate expenditure averaged 103 rounds per gun as compared to 106 for the Federal guns. Again, losses alone do not determine density of fire. In the solution of this problem we must also consider the relative positions of the adversaries. It is apparent that a less intensive fire upon the compact Federal position, upon which nearly all the defenders were massed, would cause greater loss per gun than a much heavier fire upon the more extended outer line. This is proved by the fact that the killed and wounded, exclusive of the missing, in the Federal reserve, with 108 guns engaged, numbered 280 or an average of 2.1 per gun, whereas in Longstreet's Artillery with 88 guns, the total loss was 271 or an average of 2.6 per gun. It must also be borne in mind that normally the loss incurred by offensive artillery in the open and within the zone of musketry effect is greater than that inflicted upon the defensive artillery more or less under cover. In Ewell's Corps, the total artillery loss was 182, and in Hill's Corps 128, or an average for each of 2 per gun.

The destruction of artillery horses on both sides was very great. In the 3d Corps alone, with a total of 77 guns, 190 horses were killed in action, 80 captured, 187 abandoned on the road, and 200 subsequently condemned as unserviceable, or a total of 627 lost in the campaign! The average loss per battery must, therefore, have been about 50 animals or two-thirds of the original number.

The heaviest loss in personnel sustained by any battalion was of course that of Huger's, or Alexander's own command. In that battalion with 6 batteries and 26 guns, 138 men and 116 horses, or over 5 men and 4 horses per

gun, were killed or wounded. As the personnel of the battalion did not exceed at the outset a total of 480, its loss in the battle itself, not counting the missing, was not less than 28 per cent of the whole, principally due to artillery fire. But if these figures, applicable to a special case, seem astounding, what of those concerning the whole Artillery Corps for the campaign? We have seen that the Artillery personnel on May 31 did not exceed 5,800 officers and men in number. Certainly not over 4,500 of these came upon the battlefields of the campaign. Of that number 94 were killed, 437 wounded, and in marked contrast but 77 were reported missing! The aggregate loss sustained by Lee's Artillery between July 1 and his return to Virginia two weeks later, was, therefore, 608, or a loss of 13.5 per cent of the entire effective personnel! When we consider that but a handful of men were captured no further evidence is necessary as to the character of the service rendered by his artillerymen. It is such figures that make one realize that Gettysburg was more than a defeat. It was a disaster from which no army, in fact no belligerent state, could soon recover. The destruction of artillery material, in spite of the fact that but five guns were lost, was enormous. Two of these guns were abandoned near the Potomac by reason of the failure of their teams, two disabled pieces were left on the field, and a third disabled piece which had been withdrawn was later captured by the enemy's cavalry. The guns were more than replaced by the seven captured pieces, but not the harness, fittings, equipment, and horses, and hundreds of its staunchest veterans were lost to the Artillery forever. Latimer, Fraser, and Morris, were but three of the six artillery officers who sealed their devotion to the cause with their life, but among the 26 wounded were such valuable men as Majs. Read and Andrews, and Capts. Brown, Woolfolk, Page, Carlton, Thompson, and Norcom.

CHAPTER XXXIV

GETTYSBURG—THE RETREAT

JULY 4 found the Artillery generally posted along Seminary Ridge, with some of Alexander's batteries on the right drawn back towards Willoughby Run. An anxious inventory of the ammunition on hand had been taken late the day before, and much to the relief of all it was found that enough remained for one day's fight. Fortunately Meade was not in an aggressive mood and nothing was attempted by him, so the Artillery was not engaged during the day.

Shortly after noon, a rainstorm of almost unsurpassed fury broke upon the field and soon bemired the roads, causing great difficulty in assembling the train about Cashtown, and much suffering to the teams. Wagons, ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds were mingled in the roads and adjacent fields in one great and apparently inextricable mass, while the wounded found no shelter from exposure to the storm. Every vehicle was loaded with wounded men, whose sufferings could not be alleviated. The situation was awful. But about 4 P. M. the head of the train was put in motion from Cashtown and the ascent of the mountain in the direction of Chambersburg began. For the terrors of the retreat, which ensued, one must consult Gen. Imboden's graphic account.* Suffice it here to say that by daylight on the 5th the head of the column had reached Greencastle, 15 miles from Williamsport, having traversed two-thirds of the distance to the Potomac.

About dark on the 4th, the withdrawal of the Army began. Hill's Corps followed immediately after the train, taking the Fairfield Road, while Longstreet followed Hill. But the storm and the consequent condition of the roads impeded the movement so that Ewell was unable to leave his position until daylight on the morning of the 5th.

**Battles and Leaders*, Vol. III, p. 420.

The retreat was a terrible march for the Artillery, crippled as it was by the loss of so many horses in battle, and the exhaustion of others. So many, lacking shoes, became totally lame on the stony roads, that squads of cannoneers had to scour the country along the route for horses which were requisitioned when the farmers would not sell them.

Walker's battalions were withdrawn from Hill's old line about dusk and ordered to follow the 3d Corps, while Alexander's moved to Black Horse Tavern about 5 p. m. where they were held in a great meadow adjoining the Fairfield Pike with orders to watch the passing column, and take their place immediately behind Walker's command. Here the horses, still in harness, were allowed to graze during the night as Walker's batteries did not pass by until 6 o'clock the following morning. The refreshment thus gained for the worn animals was most welcome and enabled them to march for 19 hours to Monterey Springs with hardly a halt, and after resting from 1 to 4 A. M. to resume the march for 14 hours more, not going into bivouac until they reached Hagerstown at 6 p. m. the 7th. It was on the march of the 5th that Maj Henry was compelled to abandon two howitzers for lack of teams. Upon reaching camp about one mile from Hagerstown, the Artillery of the 1st and 3d corps was given a rest of several days.

Ewell's Corps did not withdraw from before Gettysburg until the morning of the 5th. Green's Battery, which had served on the left with Hampton, had joined its battalion the preceding night while Tanner's had accompanied Imboden. Capt. Raine, who succeeded Latimer in command of Andrews' Battalion, had fallen back on the 4th to a position astride the Cashtown Road with Nelson's Battalion on its left. Dance's and Carter's battalions followed Johnson's and Rodes' divisions to the rear during the night while Jones' Battalion remained in position with Early's Division as the rear guard. Brown, therefore, held three of his battalions

across the enemy's path until the last infantrymen moved off. Practically all of his field transportation, together with that of the other artillery commands, was taken to convey the wounded to the rear. Carter, Jones, and Dance, never saw their wagons again, as they were captured or destroyed by the enemy's cavalry on the retreat. Brown's entire command reached the artillery rendezvous at Hagerstown on the morning of the 7th after an arduous but undisturbed march with the rear guard of the Army.

In spite of the awful disaster which had befallen it, the magnitude of which was not at first realized by the Army, the spirits of the men were buoyant and the Army as a whole was by no means discouraged. They simply viewed the unsuccessful issue of the campaign as unfortunate because more fighting would be necessary, but never once did the idea of ultimate defeat take hold of them. The storm of the 4th and 5th was far more responsible for the gloominess of the situation than the defeat of Gettysburg, and with the reappearance of sunshine, the irrespressible spirits of the men quickly rose. Thus it was that they plodded back to old Virginia rollicking and making the best of the hardships of the retreat. To their good humor and enjoyment the queer German inhabitants of the region through which they passed contributed much.

The practice of forcible requisition was one in which the gunners especially had had long experience at home, as well as abroad, and was known to the service as "pressing for shorts." By this process alone were the batteries able to save their guns and it was certainly, in the circumstances, justifiable. An incident recounted by Col. Alexander is so amusing and full of interest that it is here given in his own words to illustrate the method of securing draught animals on the retreat:

"Near Hagerstown I had an experience with an old Dunkard which gave me a high and lasting respect for the people of that faith. My scouts had had a horse transaction with this old gentleman, and he came to see me about it. He made no complaint, but

said it was his only horse, and as the scouts had told him we had some hoof-sore horses we should have to leave behind, he came to ask if I would trade him one for his horse, as without one his crop would be lost.

"I recognized the old man at once as a born gentleman in his delicate characterization of the transaction as a trade. I was anxious to make the trade as square as circumstances would permit. So I assented to his taking a foot-sore horse, and offered him besides payment in Confederate money. This he respectfully but firmly declined. Considering how the recent battle had gone, I waived argument on the point of its value, but tried another suggestion. I told him that we were in Maryland as the guests of the United States. That after our departure the government would pay all bills we left behind, and that I would give him an order on the United States for the value of his horse, and have it approved by Gen. Longstreet. To my surprise he declined this also. I supposed then he was simply ignorant of the bonanza in a claim against the Government and I explained that; and telling him that money was no object to us under the circumstances, I offered to include the value of his whole farm. He again said he wanted nothing but the foot-sore horse. Still anxious that the war should not grind this poor old fellow in his poverty, I suggested that he take two or three foot-sore horses, which we would have to leave anyhow, when we marched. Then he said, 'Well, sir, I am a Dunkard, and the rule of our church is an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, and a horse for a horse, and I can't break the rule.'

"I replied that the Lord, who made all horses, knew that a good horse was worth a dozen old battery scrubs; and after some time prevailed on him to take two, by calling one of them a gift. But that night, about midnight, we were awakened by approaching hoofs, and turned out expecting to receive some order. It was my old Dunkard on one of his foot-sores. "Well, sir," he said, 'you made it look all right to me to-day when you were talking; but after I went to bed to-night I got to thinking it all over, and I don't think I can explain it to the Church, and I would rather not try.' With that he tied old foot-sore to a fence, and rode off abruptly. Even at this late day it is a relief to my conscience to tender his sect this recognition of their integrity and honesty, in lieu of the extra horse which I vainly endeavored to throw into the trade. Their virtues should commend them to all financial institutions in search of incorruptible employees."

Upon reaching Greencastle on the 5th with his convoy, Imboden's trouble began. Not only did the citizens assail his train, but the Federal Cavalry in small foraging parties began to molest his progress. He was

almost captured himself, but succeeded in throwing a section of McClannahan's Horse Battery in action with canister, which drove off the largest band. After a great deal of desultory fighting during the day, he succeeded in reaching Williamsport that afternoon with the head of his column, the rear arriving next day with Hart's Battery, the cavalry meanwhile guarding the route on the west. Thus did this energetic officer reach the Potomac with all the wagons of the Army, not less than 10,000 draught animals, and practically all the wounded which were able to be removed from Gettysburg—several thousand in number. Only a small number of wagons had been lost and few horses, this in spite of the fact that during that awful march of fifty-odd miles, there were neither rations for the men, nor forage for the animals. But Imboden soon set the inhabitants to work cooking for the wounded Confederates and his train guard, and at last for the first time since leaving Gettysburg the horses were unharnessed and turned out to graze. This welcome halt was an enforced one, for the enemy's cavalry had destroyed the bridge across the river, which was unfordable by reason of the freshet. At Williamsport the train guard was fortunately strengthened by the arrival of two regiments of Johnson's Division, returning from Staunton whither they had escorted the prisoners taken at Winchester on the advance. They brought a supply of ammunition both for the infantry and artillery.

The morning of the 6th it was reported that 7,000 Federal cavalry with 18 guns were approaching Williamsport. Imboden promptly placed his guns under Capt. Hart in position on the hills which concealed the town, and set about organizing and arming his teamsters as a support for his infantry and dismounted troopers. By noon, about 700 of the wagoners, led by convalescent officers, were available for the defense. A heavy fight ensued in which Eshleman's Battalion, Richardson's two batteries of Garnett's Battalion, Hart's and McClannahan's batteries, all took part.

By making a bold display of his artillery and marching his wagoners hither and thither, causing them to appear at widely separated points, Imboden greatly imposed upon Buford, and Kilpatrick, and succeeded in holding them in check until Fitz Lee arrived in their rear, and caused them to withdraw along the Boonsborough Road. In this affair, which was opened by the artillery on both sides, Eshleman, by the bold advance of his four batteries, secured an enfilade fire upon the enemy, and aided by McClannahan's guns inflicted great loss upon them while the infantry, a part of which was led by Capt. Hart, together with the dismounted troopers, charged the Federals and forced them back, capturing 125 before they reached their horses. The teamsters fought so well that this affair has been called the "Wagoners' Fight." Very fortunately for the Army, Imboden had been able to ferry two wagon loads of shell across the river from the ordnance train during the action in the nick of time, Moore's Battery having already exhausted its ammunition when the fresh supply arrived. It may here be added that this ordnance train had been ordered by Gen. Lee to Gettysburg from Winchester and would have reached the Army certainly by the 8th had it not retreated.

By extraordinary energy and good management, Gen. Imboden had been able to save the transportation of the entire Army, which could not have been replaced.

The next morning the Army began to arrive at Williamsport and the work of constructing bridges commenced. Over 4,000 Federal prisoners, who had been escorted to the rear by the remnants of Pickett's Division, with Stribling's and Macon's batteries, were ferried across the river before the 9th, and sent on to Richmond, *via* Staunton, in the charge of Imboden, with a single regiment. In the meantime, Maj. John A. Harman, noted for his energy and ability, was tearing down warehouses along the canal and building pontoons with the timbers thus secured to repair the bridge at Falling Waters, which, however, was not completed until the

night of the 18th. During the time which intervened the Army was in a precarious position. A line of battle had been selected and prepared by the engineers with its right flank on the Potomac near Downsville, passing by St. James' College and resting its left on the Conococheague. The 1st Corps held the right, the 3d the center, and the 2d the left as at Gettysburg. The Artillery marched from Hagerstown on the 9th and 10th and occupied the line, and for the next three days was engaged with the infantry in continuous labor fortifying the position. The Commander-in-Chief had called upon the whole Army for a supreme effort and in furthering his plan of defense, Gen. Pendleton and his subordinates were most energetic in their coöperation. Alexander with his own and Dearing's and Henry's battalions occupied a position on the extreme right near Downsville. Three batteries of Cabell's Battalion were posted astride the Williamsport and Sharpsburg Pike, Lieut. Motes with Carlton's Battery being attached to Wofford's Brigade near St. James' further to the left. Walker's battalions occupied the center north of St. James' between Hagerstown and the Potomac. McIntosh's and Brunson's battalions, or the Corps Reserve, generally occupied those portions of the line held by Anderson and Heth, respectively, while Lane, Garnett, and Poague supported the divisions to which they were usually assigned. Brown's battalions occupied the left of the line, Nelson's batteries covering the Williamsport and Funkstown roads. Carter's Battalion was posted in a strong position to the rear in front of the bridge at Falling Waters.

From the 8th to the 12th of July, Stuart with Chew's, Breathed's, McGregor's, Moorman's, and Griffin's horse batteries covered the Confederate front. These days were occupied by severe fighting between the Confederate Cavalry and the divisions of Buford and Kilpatrick at Boonsborough, Beaver Creek, Funkstown, and on the Sharpsburg front. While both sides claimed the advantage, Stuart succeeded in delaying the advance

of Meade's army until the Confederate Infantry and Artillery were thoroughly intrenched, so that when he uncovered the front the Federals found it too strong to be assailed without carefully maturing their plans. The 6th Corps had alone followed Ewell on the 5th as far as Fairfield, the rest of the Federal Army remaining on the battlefield for two days burying the dead, caring for the wounded, and bringing order out of the chaos into which the troops had been thrown by their prolonged defense. A third day was lost to the pursuit at Middletown to procure supplies and bring up the trains, and had it not been for the storm of the 4th and 5th and further rains on the 7th and 8th the Confederates would have safely crossed the Potomac before they were overtaken. As it was, Meade might have attacked on the 12th, but simply contented himself with a reconnaissance resulting in his determination to feel Lee's line on the 13th. A general attack was to follow if a favorable opening was discovered. But, by the 13th, the ford at Williamsport was passable, the bridge lower down stream had been completed, and Lee issued orders for the crossing of his army during the night. Ewell was to cross at the ford, and Longstreet followed by Hill with the Artillery of the three corps at the pontoon bridge. Caissons were ordered to start from the lines at 5 P. M., and the infantry and guns at dark. The withdrawal was effected with great skill and celerity, in spite of almost insurmountable obstacles, so that when the Federals, after making various demonstrations the day before, advanced to the attack on the 14th they found but a few hundred stragglers in their path.

The night movement on the part of the Confederates entailed the utmost hardship upon the Army, especially upon the Artillery. A heavy rainstorm had set in before dusk, and continued almost until morning. The routes to the crossings generally lay over narrow farm roads, rough and hilly, which were soon churned into all but impassable mires by the leading artillery carriages. No

moon lit the way and the night was unusually dark, but large bonfires along the shore illuminated the crossings. From sunset to sunrise the artillery battalions, in spite of the most tremendous exertions on the part of the men, were able to cover but three or four miles, and many horses perished from exhaustion. Nevertheless all the Artillery was saved except two unserviceable howitzers of Henry's Battalion, which became stalled and were abandoned. After daylight, the weather cleared so that by 1 P. M. Hill's rear guard crossed the river under cover of Carter's guns at the bridge head. The Artillery then retired before the enemy's skirmishers which had been pressing the pursuit during the morning and took up a strong position on the south bank, while six of Garnett's, Lane's 20-pounder Parrotts, and Hart's two Whitworths were posted on his right and left by Gen. Pendleton, who personally conducted the defense of the crossing. For ten hours the old officer remained at this important post, unaided by a single member of his staff, all of whom were without horses and some of whom themselves were broken down by their exertions of the past two weeks. For 28 hours the Chief of Artillery was without a morsel of food, and for 40 was unable to gain a moment's rest.

Lee had intended to cross the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County, and there oppose Meade's advance, but while waiting for the Shenandoah River to subside, the Federals crossed below and seized the passes he had expected to use. Pushing his army southward along the eastern slope of the mountains, Meade threatened to cut Lee off from Gordonsville and the railroad. The danger was averted, however, by Longstreet's timely arrival at Culpeper on the 24th, followed by Hill, while Ewell moved up the Valley and crossed the Blue Ridge at Thornton Gap. By August 4, the entire Army was united behind the Rapidan with Stuart in its front at Culpeper, and the enemy behind the Rappahannock. Thus did the second invasion of the North terminate.

Livermore's estimate, which is believed to be more accurate than the Confederate returns, places the aggregate Confederate loss in the battle of Gettysburg at 28,068, of which number 8,908 were killed, 18,785 wounded, and 5,425 missing, as opposed to a Federal loss of 8,155 killed, 14,529 wounded and 5,865 missing, aggregate 28,049. The losses of the Confederate Artillery itemized by battalions were:

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Cabell's Battalion -----	8	29	0	37
Dearing's Battalion -----	8	17	0	25
Henry's Battalion -----	4	23	0	27
Alexander's Battalion -----	19	114	6	139
Eshleman's Artillery -----	8	26	16	45
Jones' Battalion -----	2	6	0	8
Andrews' Battalion -----	10	40	0	50
Carter's Battalion -----	6	35	24	65
Dance's Battalion -----	3	19	0	22
Nelson's Battalion -----	0	0	0	0
Lane's Battalion -----	3	21	6	30
Garnett's Battalion -----	0	5	17	22
Poague's Battalion -----	2	24	6	32
McIntosh's Battalion -----	7	25	0	32
Pegram's Battalion -----	10	37	1	48

The aggregate loss of the Confederate Artillery was therefore 582 as opposed to a loss of 736 in the Federal Artillery, exclusive of the Horse Artillery on both sides.

In the battle we have had occasion to note the absence of a number of prominent Confederate Artillery officers, but, Pegram, Andrews, Cutts, Hardaway, and Garnett joined their commands either near the end or soon after the close of the campaign. In Maj. John C. Haskell, of Henry's Battalion, a new character in the drama, and one destined to play a leading rôle henceforth, has appeared. We heard little of Col. Walton at Gettysburg, though he was present. As stated by Longstreet, he was getting too old for active command and his health had stood the rigours of the Virginia winters very poorly. He had already expressed a desire to be transferred to the southern department, but was retained as Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps for some time.*

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 699.



MAJOR JAMES WALTON THOMSON
Killed at High Bridge, 1865

From the magnitude of Gettysburg as an artillery battle it may seem at first glance to require extended criticism, but upon closer examination such is not the case as far as the Confederate Artillery is concerned. Other than the criticisms already offered, few others need be made. The battle of the 3d of July was not lost through lack of artillery support, as asserted by many critics. True, the artillery fire was not maintained as vigorously to the end as it might have been had there been an abundance of ammunition. But it has been clearly shown that the artillery preparation was as thorough in Longstreet's front as the position of the guns would allow up to the very crisis of the attack which was when Pickett's column engaged in the infantry fire fight. Had Alexander and Walker possessed all the guns that could have been brought into action, they could not have maintained Pickett in his advanced position without the timely coöperation of a large infantry support. In fact the assaulting infantry itself masked the guns actually in action. Men, not shell, were needed at the high tide mark. Artillery can help infantry forward, but it cannot prevent overwhelming numbers converging under cover of the terrain upon it from many directions. That there were grave errors committed in the disposition of the artillery is not disputed, but this point is not usually made. The general criticism is that the artillery preparation for Longstreet's attack failed. That this is not true is proven by the very fact that Longstreet's Infantry did reach the enemy's guns and advanced much of the distance free from serious opposition on the part of the hostile artillery. His failure, then, was due to the lack of weight at the decisive point, both because he attacked with lack of concert among his troops, and because with whatever force he assaulted, the enemy remained free to outnumber him by transferring troops from other quarters of the field. The lack of coöperation of the 2d Corps Artillery was not due to Pendleton, nor to Brown, but to Ewell, the corps commander.

CHAPTER XXXV

REORGANIZATION AFTER GETTYSBURG—THE WINTER OF 1863-64

THE period of several weeks of inactivity following upon the arrival of the Army behind the Rapidan was one of welcome and necessary rest. During this time so many convalescents and absentees returned to the Army that soon it was raised to a strength of nearly 60,000 men. The organization of the Artillery remained for a time unchanged with the exception of the temporary addition of Capt. Thomas E. Jackson's Charlottesville Battery to Beckham's Horse Artillery Battalion. McClannahan's Horse Battery, meantime, continued under Imboden's detached command, so that with Stuart's Division there were now seven horse batteries.

The distribution of the Artillery on July 31 was as follows:

1st Corps, 5 battalions, 22 batteries, 83 guns, 96 officers, and 1,724 enlisted men present for duty, aggregate present and absent 2,873.*

2d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 84 guns, 95 officers, and 1,448 enlisted men present for duty, aggregate present and absent 2,892.

3d Corps, 5 battalions, 20 batteries, 62 guns, 86 officers, and 1,564 enlisted men present for duty, aggregate present and absent 2,727.

The effective strength of the Artillery with the Army was therefore over 5,000, and the paper strength nearly 8,000, with 229 guns. Before August 10 the present for duty increased to 5,747, and the aggregate paper strength to 8,825. With the 1st Corps there were then 83, with the 2d Corps 81, and with the 3d Corps 77 pieces of artillery, or a total of 241 guns. Of this num-

*For guns of 1st Corps at this time see *Rebellion Records*, Vol. LI, Part II, p. 740, Walton's letter.

ber there were twelve 20-pounder Parrotts, thirty-nine 10-pounder Parrotts, sixty-four 8-inch rifles, two Whitworths, ninety-eight Napoleons, five 24-pounder howitzers, and twenty-one 12-pounder howitzers. In the entire Corps there were but 8 battery wagons, and 82 forges, while there were 228 caissons or nearly one per gun.*

In the Gettysburg campaign, Lee had engaged, according to Col. Taylor, 50,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 4,000 artillery, but this estimate of the Artillery is, we believe, too small by 500 men. By August 10, however, it is certain that there was one man in the Artillery for every ten present in the Infantry. Thus it is seen that Lee, like Frederick and Napoleon, compensated for the decrease in his infantry by maintaining his artillery in the face of all difficulties.

Besides the Field Artillery actually with the field Army, there was a large force under Gen. Arnold Elzey, in and about the defenses of Richmond. Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot commanded a battalion consisting of Smoot's Alexandria, Thornton's Caroline, Rives' Nelson, and Hankins' Surry batteries. This battalion occupied the works together with Col. T. S. Rhett's four heavy artillery battalions. Serving with Ransom's Division in the Department of Richmond were four battalions as follows:

MOSELEY'S BATTALION

Maj. E. F. Moseley

Richmond Battery,
James City Battery,
Goochland Battery,
Yorktown Battery,

Capt. W. J. Dabney.
Capt. L. W. Richardson.
Capt. Jonathan Talley.
Capt. E. R. Young.

BOGGS' BATTALION

Maj. F. J. Boggs

Richmond Battery,
Albemarle Battery,
North Carolina Battery,

Capt. S. Taylor Martin.
Capt. N. A. Sturdivant.
Capt. L. H. Webb.

*See *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 686, for complete summary of material, August 10, 1863.

BRANCH'S BATTALION

Maj. James R. Branch

Mississippi Battery,	Capt. W. D. Bradford.
South Carolina Battery,	Capt. J. C. Coit.
Petersburg Battery,	Capt. R. G. Pegram.
Halifax Battery,	Capt. S. T. Wright.

UNATTACHED

Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg't,	Capt. Alexander D. Moore.
Macon (Ga.) Battery,	Capt. C. W. Staten.

STARK'S BATTALION

Maj. A. W. Stark*

Mathews' Battery,	Capt. A. D. Armistead.
Giles Battery,	Capt. D. A. French.

These 15 light batteries must have possessed a total personnel of not less than 1,000 men and 60 guns. There was, therefore, a large reserve force of artillery in his immediate rear, which Lee could call upon in an emergency, though of course the service of the officers and men who had been held at the base had not been such as to make them as efficient as those with the main army.

Since the reorganization of the Artillery in May, it had greatly increased in efficiency, but the Pennsylvania campaign had practically destroyed its field transportation, and the batteries were themselves almost dismounted. During the retreat it had, therefore, been necessary to still further reduce the baggage allowances in order to supply the batteries and ordnance trains with teams. At this time, the artillery transportation was fixed at two 4-horse wagons for the Chief of Artillery and his entire staff, including the medical officers, one 4-horse wagon for each corps chief and his staff, one 4-horse wagon for each battalion headquarters, one 4-horse wagon for all the battery officers of each battalion, and two 4-horse wagons for the forage and

*Attached to Wise's Brigade.

supplies of each battery. Surplus baggage was directed to be turned over to the Chief Quartermaster at once.*

The following April a slight additional reduction was made in the allowance of transportation, and but one 4-horse wagon was authorized for the Chiefs of Artillery and their entire staffs, while one 2-horse wagon for the medical supplies of each battalion and one 4-horse wagon for the mess equipment of every 500 men actually present were added. Thus it is seen that the baggage train of the Artillery of the Army when complete consisted of not more than 160 wagons, requiring only about 650 horses. It is doubtful if any other equal force of artillery ever took the field with such a limited train. But we must remember that but two wagons were allowed army, corps, and division headquarters, and but one for brigade headquarters, at this time. By a rigid enforcement of the orders relative to the baggage allowance, the field batteries were provided with an average of about 50 horses before August 10, though some of them were still sadly deficient in the number of their animals.

While the Artillery of the 1st and 8d corps lay in camp near Orange Courthouse and that of the 2d Corps at Liberty Mills, the most strenuous efforts were made by Gen. Pendleton to fully rehorse his command. His investigations of the horse problem were wide and thorough. Learning that horses temporarily disabled were not adequately cared for by the agents of the Quartermaster Department, and that numbers of them which under a proper system might be restored to a serviceable condition were allowed to perish from neglect, he reported the condition of affairs to the Commander-in-Chief.† He suggested that animals unfit for service should be turned over to individual farmers who should be encouraged to save them for their own needs, and not allowed to be herded in great droves. Under

*G. O. No. 77, A. N. V., July 16, 1863.

†*Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1262.

See his interesting letter, *Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 648, August 18, 1863.

the prevailing system, diseased animals merely spread contagion and none could receive individual attention. A farmer would ordinarily be only too glad to settle one or two horses for light work, and he would in many cases improve rather than impair their unfortunate condition, which was principally due to exposure and lack of nourishment. Gen. Pendleton also declared that not less than 800 good artillery horses could be secured in Albemarle County alone, if the proper methods were pursued. Quartermasters and their agents, unknown to the people, could not secure these animals, he said, but artillery officers, whose interest in the service was necessarily greater than that of mere purchasing agents, would by tact and good judgment be able to purchase them for about \$600.00 apiece, or even perhaps trade worn and feeble battery horses for the fresh ones. At any rate, many could be secured by impressment as a last resort. But very little seems to have been done at this time, however, to remedy conditions, and again, on September 8, the Chief of Artillery called the Commander-in-Chief's attention to this very vital matter, which threatened the efficiency of the whole artillery arm. His recommendations to the Superintendent of Transportation at Richmond were now as follows:

"First. The establishment of a sort of general horse district in the counties of Halifax, Pittsylvania, Henry, Patrick, Franklin, Campbell, and Bedford, with depots, stables, etc., under the care of a responsible superintendent, who should select his own agents, and have the care of all the horses of this army to be resuscitated, etc.

"Second. The procurement from time to time, by this same officer or others in connection with his charge, of a number of fresh horses, to be taken to the depots in said district and kept with those renovated, for transfer when needed to the field.

"Third. The establishment of suitable places of accommodation for horses removed to and from this district and the army, so as to insure their being suitably provided for in transit."*

As far as we know this plan, which in its general aspect was adopted, was one of the first attempts to

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 697. *Ibid.*, p. 715.

organize a remount depot in this country, certainly in the Confederacy. It was to be established in a region still fat with forage, where slave labor was cheap and plentiful and one well removed from the theater of military operations.

So well received were Pendleton's suggestions that Maj. Paxton, whom he recommended to be placed in charge of the establishment, was soon appointed and directed to organize the remount department, with headquarters at Lynchburg. Before spring he had accomplished much in segregating diseased animals and restoring them to health by means of infirmaries, as well as in collecting animals for future use. Yet, disease was so widespread, extending throughout the section and as far as the North Carolina line, that of the 8,000 animals in Paxton's charge over 600 died before February. The system adopted by the Department for parceling out the animals in small herds, foraging, exercising, and caring for them, was nevertheless such an apparent improvement over old methods that the Chief of Artillery recommended that the 1,500 animals which would be required to rehorse his command be left in charge of Maj. Paxton, until actually needed in the spring. More apprehension was entertained at this time concerning the lack of transport animals than remounts, and Gen. Pendleton urged that his agents be allowed to draw upon the supply of mules in Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama, and this suggestion was approved by the Commander-in-Chief.*

Early in September Longstreet's suggestion to transfer troops from Virginia to Tennessee for the purpose of reinforcing Gen. Bragg was adopted. There remained several months of open weather and it was hoped that some success could yet be won in the West. But before the movement commenced the short route to Chattanooga, *via* Bristol and Knoxville, was no longer available, and Longstreet was compelled to take the roundabout route from Petersburg *via* Weldon,

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 1182, 1188.

Wilmington, and Augusta. Leaving Orange on the 9th, the infantry of the 1st Corps was moved to Petersburg by rail, while Alexander's, Walton's, and Dearing's battalions marched. Hood's and McLaws' divisions and Alexander's six batteries with 26 guns entrained on the 17th and reached their destination after a tedious journey, in which it took nearly eight days to cover less than 850 miles. Meanwhile, Pickett's Division with Dearing's Battalion of Artillery was assigned to duty along the James River, relieving Jenkins' and Wise's brigades, the former having accompanied Hood and the latter going to Charleston, S. C. Walton's Battalion remained at Petersburg. On the 23d, Pickett was assigned to the command of the Department of North Carolina, with headquarters at Petersburg, Va. Henry's and Cabell's battalions moved to Hanover Junction with Pickett's Division, but on the 13th were ordered by easy marches into camp in the neighborhood of Gordonsville *via* Louisa Courthouse. On October 5, Lamkin's Nelson Battery was attached to Henry's Battalion, to the permanent command of which Maj. John C. Haskell had succeeded. But on the 9th this battery, which was unarmed, was transferred to Cabell's Battalion. Maj. Henry had been promoted and transferred to the West.

An important promotion had meanwhile been made in the Artillery Corps. It was apparent that Col. Crutchfield would be *hors de combat* for many months, and a permanent Chief of Artillery for the 2d Corps was much needed. Accordingly one of the two existing vacancies in the grade of brigadier-general of artillery was filled by the promotion of Col. Armistead Lindsay Long, formerly Military Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, and he was assigned to duty as Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps. The circumstances connected with the selection of Long for this position will be discussed later. Suffice it to say here that while he was in every way competent to fulfill the position to which he was appointed, yet his assignment to this high tactical

command was thought by some to overslaugh the claims of Col. Brown to seniority in the Artillery of Ewell's Corps during the absence of Crutchfield. While there was no open resentment of his appointment, nevertheless it would seem that Col. Brown's claim to seniority in the 2d Corps was disregarded notwithstanding the fact that he was a highly efficient officer and had exercised command in every campaign since April, 1861. It will be recalled that he was the original battery commander of the 1st Company of Richmond Howitzers when it left Richmond for Yorktown. From that time to the day of his death he never missed an hour of duty. Although an officer with no military training prior to the war, he was a natural soldier and had no superiors in point of courage. He was a man of too high a sense of duty to allow any disappointment which he may have felt to affect him. He never complained to his associates, and showed no signs of bitterness to his superiors. His personal and family correspondence shows that he himself accepted conditions in a most magnanimous spirit, but his friends were less philosophical in the matter. They felt that again the West Point influence had overreached a gallant, meritorious officer who, irrespective of the fact that he was a civilian before the war, had proved himself to be eminently qualified to command and, therefore, entitled to consideration upon his military record in the service of the Confederacy, without regard to circumstances before the war. This belief was heightened by the fact that Col. Brown had served as Acting Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps since the day of Crutchfield's elimination, and that although he had not shown any particular brilliance at Gettysburg, the minor part played by his command there was known to have been due to Ewell's and not his fault.

During the period of inactivity, in which the Confederate Army was gradually recuperating its strength, two corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent to reinforce Sherman's Army, and in spite of

Longstreet's absence the two armies were numerically more nearly equal than in the past campaign. This condition induced Lee to attempt to force Meade to an engagement while his army was reduced. Crossing the Rapidan on the 9th of October, Lee moved to Madison Courthouse and thence eastward, screening his movements by the cavalry and the mountain spurs and forests between himself and his enemy. But before Lee arrived near Culpeper Courthouse on the 11th, Meade had learned through his cavalry of the danger to his right, and withdrew along the railroad to the line of the Rappahannock, Stuart driving Pleasanton from the old field of Brandy Station back upon the Federal Army. Cabell's Battalion had been left in front of Gordonsville, and Haskell's had been moved forward to Liberty Mills. The rest of the Artillery accompanied the Army on its circuitous march and throughout the subsequent campaign in which there was much skillful maneuvering on both sides and very little fighting. By the 18th, Lee was back again on the Rappahannock. The main Army lay in camp about Culpeper, while Stuart occupied the country on the north side of the river. By November 7, Meade reached the Rappahannock immediately behind which and in his front lay Ewell's Corps, with Early's Division behind Brandy Station, Rodes' covering Kelly's Ford on the right, and Johnson's between them. Hill's Corps held the line of the river on Ewell's left. A pontoon bridge had been thrown at the site of the old Rappahannock Bridge and the *tete de pont* on the north bank was alternately picketed by a single brigade of Early's and Johnson's divisions and a battery of artillery. When the Federals reached the river Hays' Brigade and Green's Louisiana Guard Battery held the work on the north bank, while Dance's and Graham's batteries occupied a redoubt on the south side of the stream where they were placed merely to prevent a crossing should the bridge-head be taken, but they had no command whatever of the terrain on the north shore.

The Federal advance consisted of the 5th and 6th Corps, which promptly occupied the hills in front of Hays, and opened fire upon the work on the north bank with a battery. To this, Lieut. Moore in command of Green's Battery boldly replied, but was soon overwhelmed by two other batteries while Graham and Dance vainly sought to assist him. At dusk a heavy mass of the enemy's infantry rushed Hays and captured most of his men, and the Louisiana Battery. Of the two officers and 76 enlisted men of the battery, but 28 of the latter escaped, with 9 of their 54 horses. The two 10-pounder Parrotts and the two 8-inch Dahlgren rifled pieces of the battery were taken by the enemy along with all the carriages and about 400 rounds of ammunition.

In the meantime, Early had ordered up his infantry and Jones' Battalion, while Massie's Fluvanna Battery of Nelson's Battalion also arrived and engaged the Federals. But at daybreak on the 8th, Lee withdrew to his former position on the Rapidan. Although the season was late, and Meade had first eluded Lee and then recovered his original position, he was not willing to go into winter quarters until he had himself undertaken offensive maneuvers in order, by some success, to satisfy the expectations of the administration in Washington.

Ewell's Corps now occupied a line from the base of Clark's Mountain to Mine Run, a small tributary of the Rappahannock, and covered Mitchell's, Morton's, Raccoon, and Summerville's fords; Hill's Corps that from Orange Courthouse to Liberty Mills; while Stuart, as usual, covered the front and flanks of the Army. Both corps had been much reduced by winter furloughs, no further operations before winter being expected. Already the Confederates had begun to prepare for a long rest, when at dawn, on November 26, Meade set his entire army in motion towards Germanna Ford, hoping to cross the Rapidan at that point and surprise Lee. But his movement, though shrouded with the utmost secrecy, was instantly discovered by Stuart. Lee at

once ordered Hill to form a junction with Ewell at Verdierville, and the latter to occupy a strong position behind Mine Run. In spite of every precaution, many delays impeded the Federal advance, and Meade's troops did not cross the Rapidan until the morning of the 27th. Meanwhile the Confederates had completed their concentration and thrown up strong log and earth breastworks. When Meade finally arrived in front of Lee on the morning of the 28th, he found himself confronted by 80,000 infantry and 150 pieces of artillery behind works even stronger than those his own men had thrown up at Chancellorsville. This was a bitter disappointment to the Federal commander, but he diligently set to work to find an opening and next day Warren reported favorable conditions for assault on the Confederate right, while Sedgwick seemed to have discovered equally good ones on the other flank. Orders for the simultaneous attack on both flanks were issued, but when the Federal artillery of the center and right opened not a sound came from Warren. His men had sized up the strength of Lee's works more accurately than their leader, for each had pinned a slip of paper on his breast with his name on it in order that the wearer might be identified. Reconnaissances both by Warren and Meade satisfied them of the futility of an assault, which if successful would be at the cost of not less than 80,000 men. Lee, too, was much disappointed by the retreat of the Federals across Ely's Ford to Culpeper Courthouse on the night of December 1, and so suddenly and rapidly was it accomplished that he was unable to overtake them on the 2d. Thus ended the Mine Run campaign and the operations of 1868.

The Army was now promptly prepared to go into winter quarters. The Infantry was generally held along the Rapidan, while the Artillery with the exception of two or three battalions was scattered along the line of the Virginia Central Railroad for the greater convenience of foraging the horses. Gen. Long's 2d Corps Artillery with the exception of Nelson's Battalion,

which was kept on picket duty along the Rapidan, was located in and about Frederick Hall, and four of Col. Walker's 8d Corps battalions, after camping for a month on the farm of Maj. Lee near Madison Run in Madison County, erected their huts in the neighborhood of Cobham and Lindsay stations, about 10 miles west of Gordonsville, with headquarters at Meeksville, while Cutts' Battalion like Nelson's remained on picket near Rapidan Station. It was at this time that Lieut. Richard Walke, ordnance officer on Mahone's staff, was promoted captain of artillery and assigned to duty as Inspector-General of the 8d Corps Artillery, while Maj. Herbert M. Nash was appointed Surgeon. Captain William W. Chamberlaine had served on Col. Walker's staff for some time as Corps Adjutant.

The Horse Artillery, which was continuously engaged in the cavalry operations during the months of September, October, November, and December, was ordered into winter quarters at Charlottesville on December 21st. Gen. Lee and Governor Letcher had reviewed the infantry and Stuart's command at Culpeper Courthouse on November 5, when again Beckham's Battalion passed before the great soldier at the head of the cavalry, to the tune of Hampton's mounted band.

Leaving the Rapidan country the horse batteries, worn and depleted by months of continuous fighting and marching, toiled over the bottomless roads to the Rivanna, which they reached on the 22d. The camp site selected for the battalion was located on the Earlyville Road, about five miles from Charlottesville. For the next two weeks, the men were busily engaged erecting log huts and stables. It was in this very locality that Burgoyne's Hessians had been cantoned by Washington after their capture at Saratoga during the Revolutionary War.

Officers of the Horse Artillery declare that the winter of 1863-64, part of which they spent at Charlottesville, was the severest ordeal through which they passed

while in the service. The cold winds which swept over the mountainous district, and the heavy falls of snow caused the greatest suffering to men and beasts. Alternately bemired and frozen, the roads were impassable and the fields offered no opportunity for exercise. The period of winter quarters was simply a struggle by horses and men for existence, with scant provender for the former, and an unusual deficiency in rations and clothing for the latter. But these conditions were quite general in the artillery camps.

Soon after placing his corps in winter quarters, Gen. Pendleton, with headquarters at Louisa Courthouse, assigned Majrs. Page and Wolffe, and Lieuts. Peterkin and Dandridge of his staff to the duty of examining the forage conditions in the region between the railroad and the James River, from a point slightly west of Charlottesville, to one just east of Beaver Dam Depot. These officers were required to locate, and report by December 10 upon, the available supply of corn, oats, hay, straw, and fodder, as well as the grist mills in the respective districts designated for their inspection. Thus it is seen that the rich farming lands of the James River Valley, hitherto free from the presence of the armies, was expected to support the Artillery during the winter. The river counties with their Nile-like low grounds had before the war comprised the finest agricultural section of the state, and although the James River Nabobs were no longer personally superintending the cultivation of their estates, being off with the Army, their wives remained at home and managed to keep most of their slaves at work, thus supporting their own as well as a great number of refugee families from the more exposed parts of Virginia. The Valley of Egypt was hardly more fertile than the bottom lands between Lynchburg and Richmond along the James, and those along the Rivanna from Charlottesville to Columbia.

Many vacancies in the Artillery now existed, so that numerous officers, who had previously been confined to the lower grades, at last had before them prospects of

advancement. Early in November, Gen. Pendleton had been called upon for his recommendations for promotion, and after conferring with Gen. Long, Col. Walker and Gen. Stuart, submitted them on November 20.* The authorized commissioned personnel at this time was based, of course, upon the number of guns with the Army. Including those of the 1st Corps with Longstreet in Tennessee, and those of the Horse Artillery, the number actually in service was 244, while the full legitimate armament entitled the Artillery to 276. Arrangements were already nearly completed to supply the deficiency by substituting more Napoleons for the howitzers that had been lost and become unserviceable through ordinary wear and tear. The authorized complement of officers included, therefore, 8 brigadier-generals, 7 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, and 17 majors, whereas there were actually commissioned but 2 brigadier-generals, 6 colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, and 17 majors. The existing general and field-officers were as follows:

Brigadier-Generals—W. N. Pendleton and A. L. Long.

Colonels—S. Crutchfield, J. B. Walton, J. T. Brown, H. C. Cabell, R. L. Walker, and E. P. Alexander.

Lieutenant-Colonels—A. S. Cutts, R. S. Andrews, T. H. Carter, H. P. Jones, W. Nelson, and J. J. Garnett.

Majors—B. F. Eshleman, S. P. Hamilton, F. Huger, R. F. Beckham, James Dearing, T. J. Page, W. J. Pegram, D. G. McIntosh, W. T. Poague, J. B. Brockenbrough, C. M. Braxton, J. Lane, R. A. Hardaway, J. C. Haskell, J. P. W. Read, C. Richardson, and Jas. Reilly.

Of these many were unfit for active service. Col. Crutchfield, whom Jackson had earnestly sought to have made a brigadier-general, and whose service had been distinguished from the first, was practically disabled by the wound he had received at Chancellorsville. For him, the Chief of Artillery recommended service about the defenses of Richmond. Col. Walton was no longer capable of performing active service, and his re-

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 889, and *Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton*, p. 309.

quest to be assigned to duty at Mobile was endorsed by Pendleton, while Alexander was recommended to be made permanent Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps. Col. Cabell, an officer of great integrity and personal courage, but lacking in energy and ability as a field soldier, was recommended to be transferred to the command of the battalion of field artillery at Richmond, and Lieut.-Col. Lightfoot transferred to the field army and placed in command of Cabell's Battalion. Lieut.-Col. Andrews, an officer of tried ability, was still an invalid from the wounds he had received at Cedar Run, in 1861, and Stephenson's Depot, in June, 1863. In justice to him, it was declared that he should be assigned to a less active field, preferably to ordnance duty, for which he was well qualified. Lieut.-Col. Garnett, in the opinion of the Chief of Artillery, in spite of his training and the high expectations of all, had proved unsuited to the artillery service. It was believed he could be more useful on conscript service than in his present position, and such a change was recommended. Maj. Brockenbrough, though a most efficient officer, was still disabled from the wound he had received at Fredericksburg, and was incapable of performing active duty. Accordingly Gen. Pendleton recommended Col. Alexander to be brigadier-general; Lieut.-Cols. Carter, Jones, and Cutts to be colonels; Majs. Dearing, Eshleman, Huger, Braxton, Pegram, McIntosh, Poague, Beckham, Hardaway, and Richardson, to be lieutenant-colonels; and Capts. Cutshaw, Jordan, Miller, Stribling, Raine, R. C. M. Page, Watson, McGraw, M. Johnson, Ward, Maurin, Moorman, Chew, and Breathed, to be majors with the following general assignments:

Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery

1st CORPS

Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander, Chief of Artillery

Huger's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. F. Huger, South Carolina.
	{ Maj. T. S. Jordan, Virginia.
Beckham's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. R. F. Beckham, Virginia.
	{ Maj. J. P. W. Read, Georgia.

Eshleman's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. B. F. Eshleman, Louisiana.
 { Maj. M. B. Miller, Louisiana.

RESERVE

Col. H. P. Jones, Virginia

Lightfoot's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot, North Carolina.
 { Maj. S. P. Hamilton, Georgia.

2D CORPS

Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long, Chief of Artillery
 Col. T. H. Carter, Assistant Chief of Artillery

Page's Battalion, { Maj. R. C. M. Page, Virginia.
 { Maj. M. N. Moorman, Virginia.

RESERVE

Col. J. T. Brown, Virginia

Cutshaw's Battalion, { Maj. W. E. Cutshaw, Virginia.
 { Maj. R. M. Stribling, Virginia.
 Hardaway's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. R. A. Hardaway, Alabama.
 { Maj. T. J. Page, Virginia.

3D CORPS

Col. R. L. Walker, Chief of Artillery

Pegram's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. W. J. Pegram, Virginia.
 { Maj. Joseph McGraw, Virginia.
 McIntosh's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. D. G. McIntosh, South Carolina.
 { Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, Virginia.
 Poague's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. W. T. Poague, Virginia.
 { Maj. George Ward, Mississippi.

RESERVE

Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia

Richardson's Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson, Virginia.
 { Maj. Victor Maurin, Louisiana.
 Cutts' Battalion, { Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts, Georgia.
 { Maj. John Lane, Georgia.

HORSE ARTILLERY

Lieut.-Col. James Dearing, Chief of Artillery
 Chew's Battalion, Maj. R. P. Chew, Virginia.
 Breathed's Battalion, Maj. James Breathed.

The foregoing schedule includes 2 colonels less and 1 lieutenant-colonel and 8 majors more than the law allowed, and provided for 7 promotions from the 1st, 8 from the 2d, and 9 from the 3d Corps, and 4 from the Horse Artillery, which was about as fair a distribution as could be made. It will also be observed that the two reserve battalions of each corps were grouped under a single field officer, which was done at the suggestion of Gen. Long. It is also to be noticed that Maj. M. W. Henry, to the command of whose battalion Haskell succeeded, had dropped out by transfer to the Western Army. It seems strange that Dearing should have been recommended to succeed Beckham as senior officer in the Horse Artillery. This must have been at the instance of Stuart with whom Pendleton had conferred, for no such transfer would have been proposed except at his request. Dearing had a natural love for the cavalry and later transferred to that arm as a brigadier-general.

The foregoing recommendations of the Chief of Artillery with the reasons upon which they were based, give one a valuable insight into the affairs of the Artillery at the time, but the welfare of the arm seems not to have been the only consideration before the appointing power. Influence, prejudice, politics, the bane of armies, were not foreign to the Confederacy, and it was many months before the needs of the service overcame the obstacles thrown in the way of final action. Garnett, meanwhile, retained his command, while Col. Walton remained in Virginia until spring in command of the Artillery with Pickett, consisting of Eshleman's and Dearing's battalions. Cabell was also retained and his battalion was held throughout the winter at the front as an army reserve with Fraser's, Manly's, and McCarthy's batteries at Somerville, Raccoon, and Morton's Fords, and Carlton's Battery in support in rear of the last two. Haskell's Battalion was temporarily attached to the 3d Corps, in the absence of Longstreet. Col. Cabell seems to have been well aware of

the fact that he was not in favor, but was determined that he should not be ousted and resolutely held on to the last, giving up his guns only at Appomattox.

As time wore on and it became apparent to Pendleton that the needs of the Artillery were simply being disregarded, he again addressed Gen. Lee on the subject of the necessary promotions as follows:

"Although I know you are anxious to secure the promotion of our many meritorious officers, and regret, as I do, the obstacles that have hitherto hindered favorable action upon the recommendations in their behalf, I deem it my duty to submit for your consideration some additional facts recently brought to my notice.

"*First.* Some of the best officers in the corps, finding how extremely difficult it is to rise in it at all, in proportion to service and merit, are making arrangements for more promising positions in other arms; nor can this be wondered at or even objected to as unpatriotic. Men the most devoted must be expected to value rank alike, as an evidence that their services are appreciated, and as an important condition toward more extended service. No man of merit ever disregards the question of promotion, and much as officers may be willing to sacrifice at times like these, they cannot ignore so universal and powerful a sentiment as that associated with martial honor.

"Even those officers who have no idea of seeking other service, and whose simple sense of duty will keep them steadfast until the end, in spite of disproportionate reward, are compelled to consider themselves and their commands regarded with less than justice, and after all that can be allowed for high principle, we must conclude that it is not in human nature not to be more or less disturbed by such a reflection, nor can such disturbance be without its injurious effects upon the public service.

"In addition to these considerations, the fact is worthy of particular attention that a number of the battalions have with them only one field officer, so that in contingencies frequently occurring, the senior captain, not always well qualified for the charge, has to command a battalion, serious as are the responsibilities belonging to the position. It is certainly important that this difficulty be corrected before the next active campaign.

"You will, I know, appreciate the case, and again ask for such action on the part of the President and the Secretary as may be practicable toward remedying the evil indicated."*

These were strong arguments, and were too true to be further neglected. At this time, there were in the

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1193, letter dated February 22, 1864.

three corps and the Horse Artillery 214 artillery officers present for duty, with an effective strength for their arm of 4,898, and a paper strength of 7,187.* The grand total of the Army of Northern Virginia, exclusive of Longstreet's command, was but 85,000 officers and men on paper, yet there were 2,418 officers of infantry and 881 of cavalry. These figures give some idea of how little opportunity the artillery arm afforded for promotion as compared to the others, notwithstanding the fact that the proportion of the artillery personnel to that of the infantry and cavalry, combined, was as 1 to 10. We must also consider that casualties in the Infantry and Cavalry were by virtue of the nature of those arms much greater among the commissioned personnel than in the Artillery.

That the matter of promotions in the Artillery was vigorously pressed by Gen. Lee is certain, for by S. O. No. 77, A. N. V., March 19, 1864, the following assignments were made:

Brig.-Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, Chief of Artillery

1ST CORPS

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery

Cabell's Battalion,	{ Col. Henry Coalter Cabell.
	{ Maj. S. P. Hamilton.
Haskell's Battalion,	{ Maj. John Cheves Haskell.
	{ Maj. James Reilly.
Huger's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger.
	{ Maj. Tyler C. Jordan.
Jones' Battalion,	{ Col. Hilary P. Jones.
	{ Maj. John P. W. Read.
Washington Artillery,	{ Col. Jas. Birge Walton.
	{ Maj. Benj. F. Eshleman.

2D CORPS

Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery

Braxton's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton.
	{ Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman.
Brown's Battalion,	{ Col. John Thompson Brown.
	{ Lieut.-Col. Robert A. Hardaway.

*Ibid., p. 1191.

Carter's Battalion,	{ Col. Thomas H. Carter.
	{ Maj. Richard C. M. Page.
Cutshaw's Battalion,	{ Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw.
	{ Maj. Robert M. Stribling.
Nelson's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. William Nelson.
	{ Maj. David Watson.

3D CORPS

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery

Cutts' Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. Allan S. Cutts.
	{ Maj. John Lane.
Pegram's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. William Johnson Pegram.
	{ Maj. Joseph McGraw.
McIntosh's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. David Gregg McIntosh.
	{ Maj. Marmaduke Johnson.
Peague's Battalion,	{ Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague.
	{ Maj. George Ward.
Richardson's Battalion,	{ Maj. Charles Richardson.
	{ Maj. M. B. Miller.

In this assignment, Jones was given Dearing's Battalion, Cutshaw succeeding to the command of Jones' old battalion, while Richardson succeeded Garnett, and Braxton succeeded Andrews.

Soon Gen. Long divided his artillery into two divisions, the first under Brown, consisting of Nelson's, Hardaway's, and Braxton's battalions, and the second under Carter, consisting of Cutshaw's and Page's battalions.* Hardaway and Page then commanded Brown's and Carter's old battalions, respectively.

Early in March Beckham was promoted and transferred to the western army, whereupon Dearing was promoted and succeeded to the command of the Horse Artillery, the organization of which was now as follows:†

HORSE ARTILLERY‡

Lieut.-Col. James Dearing
Maj. Robert Preston Chew

Ashby Battery,	Capt. James W. Thomson.
1st Stuart Horse Artillery,	Capt. James Breathed.

* *Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1267.

† For Dearing's assignment to H. A., see *Ibid.*, p. 1264.

‡ Griffin's Battery attached to Maryland line under Gen. Bradley T. Johnston. Jackson's Battery with Jones in Department of Western Virginia.

2d Stuart Horse Artillery,
Lynchburg Beauregards,
Washington (S. C.) Battery,

Capt. Wm. M. McGregor.
Capt. J. J. Shoemaker.
Capt. J. F. Hart.

Before the opening of the next campaign, Eshleman was also promoted and given command of a newly-organized battalion from among the batteries around Richmond, and Capt. William Miller Owen, formerly adjutant of the Washington Artillery, became its major and battalion commander. Thus, with the exception of the retention of Cabell in active command, we see that the original recommendations of the Chief of Artillery were finally very closely followed, and general satisfaction prevailed. It was about this time that Lieut.-Gen. J. C. Pemberton, the unfortunate defender of Vicksburg, tendered his resignation and requested to be assigned to the Artillery with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.* On May 12 he was assigned to Ransom's Division in the Richmond defenses as Chief of Artillery.†

Favorable weather in February tempted Meade to undertake a renewal of operations, but the prompt appearance of Lee induced the Federal commander to forego his activity, not, however, until he had attacked Ewell's line. Nearly all the Confederate pickets were taken. The preparedness of Brown's Artillery alone saved the breaking of the Confederate line. The batteries of the 2d Corps, unaided, hurled the Federals back and administered a bloody repulse to them with slight loss to themselves. But for their prompt and energetic action, instead of being a small affair, a disaster would have befallen the Army.

On the 29th of February, Gen. Custer with about 2,500 picked troopers and a section of horse artillery, moving along the Earlyville Road, approached within one mile of the Horse Artillery camp before he was discovered by the merest accident. It so happened that Capt. Moorman with two of his men while going fishing

*Ibid., p. 1296.

†Ibid., Vol. XXXVI, p. 994.

saw the raiders approaching, and galloped back to camp to give the alarm. The enemy appeared so suddenly that the parked guns were all but captured. By the time Maj. Chew was able to get his batteries hooked up, the raiders were actually among the huts looting the camp and shooting down the stray horses which it had been impossible to drive in from the fields in which the animals had been turned out. A few shots from Moorman's guns while the teams were being brought up served to check the enemy sufficiently to enable Chew to place his batteries in position and open upon the raiders, who were seemingly more intent upon the destruction of the camp than the capture of the guns. The artillery fire soon drove Custer off, and thus did Chew entirely unsupported by infantry or cavalry save Charlottesville, with about 200 cannoneers, including the sick and the dismounted men who were always called in the Artillery Company "Q". In accomplishing this result, an interesting stratagem was utilized. The 16 guns present were formed in line, and manned by the dismounted cannoneers, while the rest of the men, bearing an old standard, were formed by Chew and Breathed into a squadron behind the guns. There was not a musket or carbine in the outfit, few pistols, and fewer sabers. Most of the men, however, bore sticks and clubs to represent arms. The few small arms were, of course, ostentatiously employed, with such effect that the enemy mistook the line of mounted cannoneers for a cavalry support. In the meantime, the guns were actively plied, while Custer held most of his men beyond the river, uncertain as to the number of his enemy. He had captured Capt. Moorman's two companions before they reached camp. From them little information could be secured. In fact they intentionally assumed a most puzzling manner. Custer, himself, then questioned a negro inhabitant of the neighborhood, who stated with every appearance of candor that the artillerymen had lied, and that Confederate troops were

encamped all the way from the river to Charlottesville, and had with them not less than 60 guns. This interview was on the south side of the river on a hill above the bridge at Burnley's Mill, about a mile from the Artillery camp, and while it was transpiring several shells burst near the group. About the same time, Chew moved his pseudo cavalry to the flank of the guns and cried out in a loud voice, "Tell Col. Dulaney to bring up the Seventh Regiment." The Federals heard the command, and naturally assumed the superb cavalry regiment had been moved from the Valley, where it was actually in camp, to the defense of Charlottesville. That night Custer retired towards the Rappahannock, having accomplished nothing but the burning of the Horse Artillery cantonments and Burnley's Mill, while Chew moved his battalion four miles down the Scottsville Road, unwilling to rely on Dulaney's support. But the next day, when Custer was found to have decamped, he returned to his old quarters, and rebuilt his huts. The men had lost nearly everything they possessed in the way of surplus clothing. The bountiful supply must have greatly improved the outfit of the Federal raiders. For the next few days rumors of Custer's return were rife and a bold lookout was maintained. On the 20th of March, the battalion was ordered to Gordonsville for security, where it remained until the opening of the next campaign, in camp on the farm of Bolling Haxall. While there a large supply of fresh horses was expected by the batteries, but the total number received was 88.

Meanwhile the following resolutions were received by the Horse Artillery Battalion from the Town Council of Charlottesville, as a testimonial of the appreciation of its people:

"Whereas, The recently attempted raid of the Yankees on this place was undoubtedly checked and finally repulsed by unequalled coolness and courage of the gallant officers and men of the artillery battalion, encamped a few miles north of Charlottesville, wholly unsupported as they were by either infantry or cavalry; and,

"Whereas, Our town was thus unquestionably saved from pillage, and the public stores and the railroad bridges from destruction; therefore, be it

"Resolved, That on behalf of the citizens of Charlottesville we, the council of the town, do hereby return our thanks to the officers and men of the said artillery battalion for their gallant and heroic conduct on the occasion above mentioned, with the assurance of our lasting and grateful appreciation of the service thus rendered us,

"Resolved, That the above preamble and resolutions be handed to the commander of the battalion, in order that he may communicate the same to the officers and men of his command in the manner he may deem most appropriate.

"By order of the Council, March 7, 1864.

"A. ROBERT MCKEE, Clerk.

*"To Maj. M. N. Moorman,
"Commanding Battalion,
"Stuart Horse Artillery."*

It was after the arrival of the battalion at Gordonsville that Capt. Moorman was promoted major and transferred to Braxton's Light Artillery Battalion, then at Frederick's Hall, Lieut. J. J. Shoemaker succeeding him as Captain of the Beauregard Rifles Battery of Lynchburg, while Maj. Chew became the battalion commander with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

The next hostile move after Custer's raid was in March when two columns of Federal cavalry under Gen. Kilpatrick and Col. Dahlgren, respectively, moved out from Culpeper Courthouse, the first towards Richmond, and the second with orders to destroy the artillery at Frederick Hall, and then proceed down the James River, form a junction with Kilpatrick's column, capture Richmond, destroy the city, and liberate the prisoners on Belle Isle. This was a big order for Dahlgren. Nearly succeeding with respect to reaching Richmond, he would certainly have succeeded in destroying the 2d Corps artillery, had it not been for the foresight of Gen. Long. Anticipating a cavalry raid upon his camp, he had early applied for two regi-

ments of infantry as a guard. When refused this support, he secured 125 muskets, which he distributed among his cannoneers and organized them by battalions into companies of riflemen.

Dahlgren captured the pickets at Germanna Ford, crossed the Rapidan, and arrived within a few miles of the Artillery camp before his approach was reported. Gen. Long, immediately upon learning of the danger, ordered Lieut.-Col. Braxton to place a battery in position to command the road over which the enemy was approaching, to deploy his company of sharpshooters as skirmishers, and to withdraw his other batteries to a position near the railway station. At the same time, Col. Brown was directed to place his battalion in position to guard the approaches below the depot, while Cutshaw's and Carter's battalions were held in rear of Brown's and Braxton's, and sharpshooters from the supporting batteries were also sent forward and deployed. These dispositions were barely completed when the Federal raiders came in view of Marye's Battery on the road. Seeing the battle flag flying above the guns, and catching a glimpse of the bayonets of the sharpshooters, Dahlgren halted in some surprise, having been led to believe that the artillery at Frederick Hall was without an infantry support. He now inquired of a local contraband whether or not there was infantry with the artillery, to which the negro replied, "Yes, Massa, plenty of it." Being doubtful whether the negro knew what was meant by infantry, Dahlgren asked how he knew it. "Because," was the answer, "the infantry had stickers on the ends of their guns." Convinced by the evidence of the negro that the artillery was not unprotected, Dahlgren made a detour to the left, keeping beyond the range of the guns. The only loss sustained by the Artillery was that of the members of a court-martial, which was in session in a house on the enemy's line of march; whereupon a wag remarked that as the court, prisoners and witnesses were all present the trial might go on and the proceedings be sent to Gen.

Long, from Point Lookout, or Fort Delaware. The prisoners escaped, however, with one exception, during the following night. The two raiding columns failed to coöperate, due to Dahlgren being led astray by a faithful negro slave. Kilpatrick reached the inner line of defenses of Richmond, and, attacking alone, was repulsed. Dahlgren moving down the James River Valley, some of the distance on the tow path of the canal, burned many barns, seized all the horses for his men he could lay his hands on, and almost captured Mr. Sedden, the Confederate Secretary of War, and Gen. Wise, who were visiting their families at "Sabot Hill" and "Eastwood." But these worthies escaped on fleet horses, and took the news of the Federal approach to Richmond, where the Richmond School Cadets, and a nondescript band of departmental clerks and Home Guards, the latter consisting of old men and boys, were hastily thrown across Dahlgren's path, while the Tredegar Iron Works Battalion turned out to guard Belle Isle. The raiders galloped into an ambush which had been skillfully laid for them and were signally defeated. Dahlgren himself, and many of his men, were killed, and only a remnant of his band escaped.* Thus did the Federal plans come to naught, and thus did Gen. Long by the most admirable foresight save the Artillery of the 2d Corps. On three separate occasions a negro had materially befriended the Artillery.

Gen. Pendleton had spent the month of January on leave of absence in Lexington with his family, but returned to Artillery Headquarters at Louisa Courthouse on February 8. He was soon summoned to Richmond, and ordered to Dalton, Ga. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Army of Tennessee, had, upon taking command, found the Artillery of that Army in a highly-disorganized state and at once applied to the War Department for Col. Alexander to be sent to straighten things out. Writing on December 27 about the con-

*See *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee*, Long, p. 320, and *Battles and Leaders*, Vol. IV, p. 95. Also an interesting personal narrative in the *Century Magazine*, April, 1894, by Mrs. Ellen Wise Mayo.

ditions of his army, to Gen. Bragg, who was virtually Mr. Davis' Chief of Staff, Gen. Johnston said:

"The artillery also wants organization, and especially a competent commander. I, therefore, respectfully urge that such a one be sent me. I have applied for Col. Alexander, but Gen. Lee objects that he is too valuable in his present position to be taken from it. His value to the country would be more than doubled, I think, by the promotion and assignment I recommend."* To this communication, Gen. Bragg replied in March, in part, as follows:

"Col. Alexander, applied for by you, as Chief of Artillery, is deemed necessary by Gen. Lee in his present position. Brig-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, an experienced Officer of Artillery, has been ordered to your headquarters to inspect that part of your command, and report on its condition.

"Should his services be acceptable to you, I am authorized to say you can retain him.

"I am exceedingly anxious to gratify you on that point, for I know the deficiency existing.

"It is more than probable that such a junction may soon be made as to place Col. Alexander under your command."†

The foregoing correspondence gives one an idea of the estimation in which Alexander was held throughout the service. Since Gen. Pendleton exercised only an administrative command of the Artillery, he was naturally more available than Alexander for such duty as required by Gen. Johnston. Leaving Louisa Courthouse, March 4, he arrived at Dalton, *via* Atlanta, a week later, with Lieuts. Peterkin and Hatcher, of his staff, and immediately set to work. There is no reason to believe that his assignment was not satisfactory to his new commander, notwithstanding the fact that a younger officer had been applied for. Gen. Johnston's greeting was most cordial, and the artillery situation in its general aspects was at once laid before Gen. Pendleton.

The personnel of Johnston's Artillery at this time numbered approximately 4,500, exclusive of Alexander's command. Energetic measures had already been taken to supply the western batteries with a full

**Johnston's Narrative*, p. 288.

†*Johnston's Narrative*, p. 289.

complement of horses. Maj. Beckham had recently been promoted colonel, and transferred from Stuart's Horse Artillery to Johnston's Army, having been succeeded by Dearing, who had also been promoted. Maj. Bondurant had also been promoted at the instance of Gen. D. H. Hill, and transferred, as a lieutenant-colonel, and Chief of Artillery of D. H. Hill's Division. Pendleton at once took occasion to recommend for the position of Chief of Artillery, Col. Thomas H. Carter, of Virginia.

Some idea of the old general's energy and his peculiar fitness for work of the character to which he had been assigned may be had from the fact that although he only arrived in Johnston's camp at daybreak on the 11th, he commenced his inspection of the three reserve battalions commanded by Lieut.-Col. Hollinguist at noon the same day. This command constituted about one-third of all the artillery with the Army. Accompanied by Maj. Preston, Inspector-General of Artillery, and one of his aides, and provided with one of Gen. Johnston's own mounts, he made a minute inspection of the battalions assembled on the usual drill grounds, including the material, harness, field transportation, horses and stables. He was surprised to find the animals in fair condition, the guns, carriages and harness in very good order, and much evidence of intelligent care and energy. Conditions were so much better than he had expected to find them that at once he recognized the fact that the trouble lay elsewhere.

A grand review of the Artillery of Hood's and Hardee's corps was appointed for the 12th, to be followed by minute daily inspections of their various battalions. By the 16th, the actual work of inspection had been completed, and written inquiries submitted to the battalion commanders, in which various interrogations relative to the service were propounded. On the 16th, Gen. Hood conducted an imposing drill of his corps for the benefit of Gen. Pendleton, followed by combat exercises in which about 20,000 men, including infantry, artillery, and cavalry, engaged with blank ammunition.

Much to the disappointment of the Chief of Artillery notice was received the 19th that Brig.-Gen. Shoup had been ordered from Mobile to join Johnston as his Chief of Artillery. Shoup was a graduate of the United States Military Academy, had served at Vicksburg with great credit, and was reputed to be an able officer, but his preferment over Carter appears to have been only another evidence of the advantage held by West Pointers. Certain it is that his service had not been as illustrious as that of "Tom" Carter, of Pampatyke, a distinguished graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, a kinsman of Gen. Lee, a man of unblemished personal character, and with a record as a soldier second to none in the Confederacy.

Another great artillery drill and sham battle was tendered Pendleton by Gen. Hardee. But the event, while equally inspiring, was less eventful than the former one, on which occasion one of Hood's major-generals and part of his staff had been unceremoniously unhorsed by their affrighted mounts. This incident no doubt established the precedent for the grand review in Paris in 1910, when the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army was thrown at the feet of the President of the Republic. Gen. Hardee's bride was evidently more at home in the saddle than some of the western knights, for she attended the review mounted, and accompanied by a number of brilliant staff officers, without accident.

While in the West, Gen. Pendleton preached to the troops on many occasions. His military views and suggestions were in the main approved by Gen. Johnston, and reorganization had so far progressed during his presence that the task remaining for Gen. Shoup was much simplified. The main trouble had been found to be with the senior officers. Returning to Richmond, on March 29, *via* Charleston, where he and his staff officers inspected the harbor defenses, Pendleton promptly laid his report on the Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, and his recommendations regarding it, before the Presi-

dent. A conference with Mr. Davis, Mr. Sedden, and Gens. Bragg and Cooper, resulted in his being ordered back to Dalton to urge Gen. Johnston to make an aggressive move as speedily as possible, in order to distract the Federals and prevent the massing of more troops under Grant in Virginia. But before returning to the West, he visited Gen. Lee at the front, who concurred in the importance of his mission. Remaining with Johnston but two days, during which time he pressed upon him the desires of the administration, Gen. Pendleton was back in Richmond again by April 21, and soon joined the Army.

We have seen that in personal appearance he much resembled Gen. Lee. An amusing incident which occurred during his presence in Richmond should here be recounted. One afternoon he was stopped by a tipsy Irishman on Broad Street, who began haranguing and gesticulating violently as he detailed some fancied grievance. The ladies of the party wished to go on, but the General insisted on listening patiently for a few moments, then said, "My friend, you are talking to the wrong person." "My," said Paddy, "ain't you Mass' Bob?" "No," replied Gen. Pendleton. "Look and see if you don't know me." This answer seemed to steady the excited soldier. He came a little closer, peered into the General's face a moment, then giving himself a violent slap on the leg, exclaimed, "I'll swear if it ain't old Artillery." And with many apologies the embarrassed soldier allowed the general to pass on.

When Gen. Pendleton returned to the Army he found not only that Longstreet had returned to Virginia, and that many changes had occurred, but that all was not running smoothly in the administration of the Artillery. Gen. Long, it seems, desired that all connection between the Artillery and the Infantry in so far as the authority of division commanders was concerned, should be officially severed by order, and that the corps chiefs should be free to administer their commands as integral units. While this view was clearly expressed

in *Orders No. 69, June 4, 1863*, reorganizing the Artillery, and while the Commander-in-Chief deprecated a clash of authority by reason of its misinterpretation, yet he was unwilling to destroy the old associations between the artillery battalions and the divisions with which they had so long served. These associations he regarded as a distinct asset. In this respect Gen. Long was overruled, and soon a better understanding ensued.

A further effort was also now made to equalize the armament of batteries and the strength of the battalions, and as more horse batteries were needed, Alexander and Long were each called upon to recommend a battery for conversion, the first from Huger's, and the second from Hardaway's Battalion. Alexander was also called upon to use his influence to secure the assignment of King's Battalion, to the 1st Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.* Longstreet had returned to Virginia with his two divisions and Alexander's own battalion some time before this and had gone into camp near Mechanicsburg, about six miles south of Gordonsville. The return of Longstreet's men, who had served with marked distinction in the West, was honored by their being reviewed by Gen. Lee, the first ceremony of the kind he had conducted since October, 1862, when he reviewed his army in the Shenandoah Valley. Describing the scene, Gen. Alexander wrote: "It took place in a cleared valley with broad pastures, in which our two divisions of infantry, with my old battalion of artillery, could be deployed. . . . It is now over 40 years, but in imagination I can see to-day the large square gate posts, without gate or fence, for troops had been everywhere in that vicinity, marking where a country road led out of a tall oak wood upon an open knoll in front of the centre of our long double lines. And as the well-remembered figure of Lee upon Traveller, at the head of his staff, rides between the posts and comes out upon the ground, the bugle sounds

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXVI, Part II, pp. 944, 945. This battalion had been serving in Southwest Virginia in a different department.



COLONEL DAVID GREGG McINTOSH

a signal, the guns thunder out a salute, Lee reins up Traveller and bares his good gray head and looks at us, and we give the rebel yell and shout and cry and wave our flags and look at him once more. For a wave of sentiment—something like what came a year later at Appomattox, when he rode back from his meeting with Grant,—seemed to sweep over the field. All felt the bond which held them together. There was no speaking, but the effect was as of a military sacrament.”

Many changes had occurred both in the artillery officers and the batteries in the Army during the winter and spring. Besides Griffin's 2d Maryland Horse Battery, Dement's and Brown's 1st and 4th Maryland batteries, the latter now under Lieut. W. S. Chew, had also been transferred to the Maryland line. Blount's, Caskie's, Macon's, and the Fauquier Battery, the latter now commanded by Marshall, had been transferred under Maj. J. P. W. Read to Whiting's Division, and Owen's Washington Artillery Battalion to Colquitt's Division, both on duty in the Department of North Carolina. Early in May, Col. H. P. Jones was assigned to the command of these two battalions. The remnants of the Louisiana Guard Battery had been sent to Richmond for reorganization.

On the 1st of May, the Artillery with the Army on the Rapidan was organized as follows:

1ST CORPS

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, Chief of Artillery

HUGER'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger

Maj. Tyler C. Jordan

Brooks' (S. C.) Battery,
Madison (La.) Battery,
Richmond Battery,
Bedford Battery,
Bath Battery,
Ashland Battery,

Capt. William W. Fickling.
Capt. Geo. V. Moody.
Capt. William W. Parker.
Capt. J. D. Smith.
Capt. Esmond B. Taylor.
Capt. Pichegru Woolfolk, Jr.

THE LONG ARM OF LEE

HASKELL'S BATTALION

Maj. John C. Haskell
Maj. James Reilly

Rowan (N. C.) Battery,	Capt. John A. Ramsey.
Palmetto (S. C.) Battery,	Capt. Hugh R. Garden.
Nelson (Va.) Battery,	Capt. James N. Lamkin.
Branch (N. C.) Battery,	Capt. John R. Potts.

CABELL'S BATTALION

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell
Maj. S. P. Hamilton

Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg't,	Capt. Basil C. Manly
1st Co. Richmond Howitzers,	Capt. Edward S. McCarthy.
Pulaski (Ga.) Battery,	Lieut. Morgan Callaway.
Troup (Ga.) Battery,	Capt. Henry H. Carlton.

2D CORPS

Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, Chief of Artillery
Col. John Thompson Brown, Chief of First Division

HARDAWAY'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Robert Archelaus Hardaway

Powhatan Battery,	Capt. Willis J. Dance.
1st Rockbridge Battery,	Capt. Archibald Graham.
Salem Battery,	Capt. Charles B. Griffin.
2d Co. Richmond Howitzers,	Capt. Lorraine F. Jones.
3d Co. Richmond Howitzers,	Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr.

NELSON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William Nelson
Maj. David Watson

Amherst Battery,	Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
Fluvanna Battery,	Capt. John L. Massie.
Georgia Battery,	Capt. John Milledge.

BRAXTON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton
Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman

Alleghany Battery,	Capt. John C. Carpenter.
Stafford Battery,	Capt. Raleigh L. Cooper.
Lee Battery,	Capt. William W. Hardwicke.

THE LONG ARM OF LEE

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Col. Thomas H. Carter, Chief of Second Division

CUTSHAW'S BATTALION

Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw
Maj. Robert M. Stribling

Charlottesville Battery,	Capt. James McD. Carrington.
Staunton Battery,	Capt. Asher W. Garber.
Richmond Courtney Battery,	Capt. Wm. A. Tanner.

PAGE'S BATTALION

Maj. Richard Channing Moore Page

King William Battery,	Capt. William P. Carter.
Jeff Davis Alabama Battery,	Capt. William J. Reese.
Louisa Morris Battery,	Lieut. _____.
Richmond Orange Battery,	Capt. Charles W. Fry.

8D CORPS

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery

POAGUE'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague
Maj. George Ward

Madison (Miss.) Battery,	Capt. Thomas J. Richards.
Warrenton Battery,	Capt. Addison W. Utterback.
"C" Battery, 1st N. C. Reg't,	Capt. Joseph Graham.
Albemarle Battery,	Capt. James W. Wyatt.

McINTOSH'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. David Gregg McIntosh
Maj. Marmaduke Johnson

Richmond Battery (Johnson's),	Capt. Valentine J. Chilton.
Danville Battery,	Capt. Berryman Z. Price.
2d Rockbridge Battery,	Capt. Wm. K. Donald.
Hardaway's Alabama Battery,	Capt. Wm. B. Hurt.

PEGRAM'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Wm. Johnson Pegram
Maj. Jos. McGraw

Richmond Letcher Battery,	Capt. Thomas A. Brander.
Richmond Purcell Battery,	Capt. George M. Cayce.
Richmond Crenshaw Battery,	Capt. Thomas Ellett.

Pee Dee (S. C.) Battery,
Fredericksburg Battery,

Capt. Wm. E. Zimmerman.
Capt. Edward A. Marye.

CUTTS' BATTALION

Col. Allen S. Cutts
Maj. John Lane

"B" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Geo. M. Patterson.
"A" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. Hugh M. Ross.
"C" Battery, Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield.

RICHARDSON'S BATTALION

Maj. Charles Richardson
Maj. M. B. Miller

Norfolk L. A. Blues,
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery,
Norfolk Battery,
Pittsylvania Battery,

Capt. Chas. R. Grandy.
Capt. R. Prosper Landry.
Capt. Jos. D. Moore.
Capt. Nathan Penick.

HORSE ARTILLERY

Maj. Robert Preston Chew, Chief of Artillery

BREATHED'S BATTALION

Maj. James Breathed

Washington (S. C.) Battery,
1st Stuart H. A. Battery,
2d Stuart H. A. Battery,
Lynchburg Beauregards,
Ashby Battery,

Capt. James F. Hart.
Capt. Philip Preston Johnston.
Capt. Wm. M. McGregor.
Capt. J. J. Shoemaker.
Capt. James W. Thomson.

With Ransom's Division near Petersburg was Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot's Battalion, consisting of Hankins' Surry, Rives' Nelson, and Thornton's Caroline batteries; with Hoke was Eshleman's Battalion consisting of Martin's, Owen's, and Payne's batteries; and at Chaffin's farm was Maj. A. W. Stark's Battalion, consisting of Armistead's Mathews, and French's Giles batteries, Lieut.-Col. E. F. Moseley's Battalion of Cumming's and Miller's North Carolina, Staten's Georgia, and Young's Yorktown batteries, and Maj. J. C. Coit's Battalion of Bradford's Mississippi, Kelly's South Carolina, Pegram's Petersburg, and Wright's Halifax batteries. Including the eight batteries of

Owen and Eshleman, with Colquitt and Whiting, and Green's Louisiana and Sturdivant's Albemarle batteries, unassigned, there were then not less than 26 field batteries in the neighborhood of Richmond and Petersburg, while there were 52 light and 5 horse, or a total of 57 field batteries with the Army on the Rapidan. With this army there were exactly 213 guns.* The artillery personnel numbered May 1st about 4,800 effectives. Deducting this number from the effective strength of the Army, and we have 213 guns for 57,000 infantry and cavalry, or a proportion of nearly 4 guns per thousand men of the other arms. The proportion of horse guns to cavalry was exactly 2.5 per thousand, there being 8,000 troopers and 5 horse batteries of 4 guns each. At this time the effective strength of the Federal Army under Grant was about 119,000, including an artillery personnel of 10,210 and 818 guns, or a proportion of about 8 guns per 1,000 of the other arms. One must admire the ability of Lee to maintain so high a proportion of artillery in spite of the seemingly insurmountable difficulties in his way. Yet his field army was outnumbered in guns by the enemy by nearly a third.

**Rebellion Records*, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1086. Gens. Humphreys and Alexander estimated that there were 224.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE ARTILLERY COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY COMPARED

BEFORE taking up the narrative of the next campaign, it may be interesting to glance once more at the four senior artillery officers of the Army at the time the Artillery arm had attained its maximum efficiency in personnel, material, and organization. At the close of its third year, it was truly a formidable corps, though somewhat reduced in the number of its guns. With the purely military record of its commanders, we are already quite familiar, but what was the contemporary and what is a fair estimate of them at this time?

Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, by far the senior in age as well as in rank among the officers of this arm, like Bishop Polk of the Western Army, entered the service of the Confederacy, as we have seen, from the service of the church. Born at Lexington, Virginia, December 28d, 1809, he was appointed a cadet at the United States Military Academy in 1826, graduating with his class. While at West Point he formed a lasting friendship with Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. Assigned to the Artillery, he served one year in the garrison of Augusta, Ga., with the rank of second lieutenant, and was then ordered back to the Academy as assistant professor of mathematics. Subsequent to this duty, he served with troops at Fort Hamilton, where he resigned in 1833 to accept the chair of mathematics at Bristol College, Pennsylvania, later becoming connected with the faculty of Delaware College. In 1837, he became a clergyman in the Episcopal Church, influenced to enter the ministry by the spirit of revival, which reigned at West Point while he was a cadet, many of his school-day companions doing the same. When the war broke out, he was serving as rector of the Lexington parish. His entrance into the Confederate

military service as the original commander of the Rock-bridge Artillery has already been mentioned.

While Gen. Pendleton possessed many virtues as an administrator, he lacked the dash requisite to popularity as a soldier. The officers and men of the Army knew little about his ceaseless activity in matters pertaining to the equipment and arming of his command. His constant attention to the care and preservation of the material and horses was practically unknown to them, nor are such things of a nature calculated to add to the reputation of a soldier. They are regarded as matters of course, and little interest is shown by the troops in them. Boldness and dash in the presence of the enemy appeal to the soldiery of an army. With such qualities an officer, entirely lacking in administrative ability and skill as an organizer, will acquire repute quite incommensurate with his true merit. The faithful performance of the drudgery of the service adds little to the lustre of a military name.

Pendleton was never conspicuous as a leader in battle, though, as we have shown, he was by no means lacking in courage. He was regarded from the first as slow and lacking in aggressive spirit, and his natural caution due to his age led to unfounded accusations. His name was unjustly coupled with the midnight route at Shepherds-town, after the battle of Sharpsburg, in an unpleasant way. Notwithstanding a court of inquiry, appointed to investigate the incident, clearly established the fact that no blame attached to him for his conduct on that occasion, yet a military reputation is bound to suffer, even when unjustly involved in such an incident. In this case, the tongue of the scandal monger was simply set to wagging all the more. Unfortunately, Pendleton was again present and in command when the Artillery was withdrawn from the heights of Fredericksburg before Sedgwick's advance. Not only was he absolutely free of blame on this occasion, but as has been shown and testified to by Gen. Early, who was with him, the guns were removed over the protest of the Chief of Ar-

tillery. The withdrawal on this occasion was the result of a serious mistake on the part of one of Gen. Lee's own staff officers. Pendleton's critics entirely overlooked the fact that Early, who was really in command at Fredericksburg, withdrew his troops at the same time, yet no question ever arose over the conduct of Early. The readiness with which Pendleton's action was taken up and adversely discussed shows the sentiment in the Army with respect to him. The feeling was not unknown to Pendleton. His staff officers got wind of the calumnies that were being circulated and very promptly informed him, in order that he might defend himself against such gross injustice. Gen. Pendleton at once addressed Gen. Lee upon the subject, with the result that he received the following letter from the Commander-in-Chief, which should for all time dispose of any doubts as to the propriety of his conduct on this occasion.

"ORANGE, September 15, 1863.

"GENERAL—Your letter of 8th inst., inclosing one from Maj. Page, reached me at a time when I was pressed by business that had accumulated during my absence. I cannot now give the matter much attention, and have only been able to read partially Maj. Page's letter. I think the report of my dissatisfaction at your conduct is given upon small grounds, the statement apparently of your courier, upon whom I turned my back. I must acknowledge I have no recollection of the circumstances, or of anything upon which it could have been based. The guns were withdrawn from the heights of Fredericksburg under general instructions given by me. It is difficult now to say, with the after-knowledge of events, whether these instructions could, at the time, have been better executed, or whether if all the guns had remained in position, as you state there was not enough infantry supports for those retained, more might not have been captured.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"R. E. LEE,
"General."

It would seem that Pendleton's critics did not know that some of the batteries, which were withdrawn in obedience to the order which Chilton transmitted er-

roneously, had proceeded too far towards the rear to return in time to take part in the final action. They only knew a part of the story—that is, that all the Artillery was withdrawn, and that some of it did not return.* What was known was sufficient, however, for those who were willing enough to put the worst construction on the affair. They took full account of Pendleton's haste to withdraw his guns, in obedience to the peremptory order he received, the tenor of which order they did not know, but they overlooked the haste with which he returned to his position when the error in that order was discovered.

The fact that Gen. Lee suggested the permanent retention of his Chief of Artillery in the West by Gen. Johnston while it certainly proves Pendleton was not indispensable to the Army of Northern Virginia, does not prove his services were not valued. The Artillery had gradually attained a corps organization under three most competent corps chiefs. These officers were not only administrative, but tactical commanders, and under their immediate control fell all the artillery of the Army. Very naturally Pendleton, whose duties had become in the process of evolution purely administrative, could be better spared than Alexander, who was applied for by Johnston, or either of the other two tactical commanders, Long and Walker. It must not be thought, however, that Pendleton had become superfluous because no tactical command remained to him. One only need recall the splendid service he rendered the Artillery by that general supervision, which led in one instance to the creation of the remount department, and in another to the establishment of forage districts in the winter of 1863-64. The Artillery, in fact the Army, owed much to his foresight in innumerable matters of this character, which were quite beyond the province of the corps commanders and their chiefs of artillery.

After everything is said in his favor that can be said, the fact remains that Gen. Pendleton, though admired

*For foregoing incident see chapter on battle of Chancellorsville.

by those who knew him for the integrity of his character, was not rated by the officers and men of the Army of Northern Virginia as an efficient field soldier. We believe, however, that it has been shown that he was far more efficient than he was thought to be by his contemporaries, who were generally ignorant of his true worth and services. In the popular and contemporary estimate of Pendleton, an element entered, the influence of which we can now fully appreciate. The delicate task of the various reorganizations of the Artillery from the beginning to the end of the war fell solely upon his shoulders. Promotion was necessarily very slow, and much discontent existed among officers really entitled by their services to reward, but for whom the number of vacancies at no time afforded promotion. Under such circumstances, dissatisfaction was as general as it was inevitable, and to Pendleton, whose recommendations were final, the malcontents of course attributed the fact that their merits were not recognized. His position was not an enviable one, and, lacking those qualities which enable a commander to silence the voice of the malcontents under him by the brilliancy of his achievements, it was not strange that Pendleton's popularity as a soldier suffered. The old officer fully appreciated the unenviable character of the duty he was called upon to perform, but never once did he complain. He set about his task with the utmost resolution to perform it as best he could, and relieve Gen. Lee of as much of the burden of command as he could take upon himself. His recommendations, as we have seen, were invariably the result of the most careful consultation of the wishes of the corps and division commanders of the Army, and were never submitted until he had brought to bear upon the claims of all the most mature deliberation, with the result that the selections of the Chief of Artillery were quite generally believed by unprejudiced parties to be judicious and eminently fair in every respect. The knowledge on the part of Gen. Lee that Pendleton would allow no political or personal considerations to

influence him in making his recommendations, was alone a sufficient reason for his retention as Chief of Artillery, especially since there was no necessity for his exercising a tactical command. It would indeed have been difficult to find another as conscientious and as free of all bias as was Pendleton.

Personally Gen. Pendleton, so much like Gen. Lee in appearance, was a most lovable man. His influence for good in the Army was great, and never once, despite the asperities of war, did he lose sight of his mission as a minister of the gospel, for he was a Christian of the highest order, in fact as well as by profession. It is a well-authenticated fact that on more than one occasion his entrance into battle was preceded by an invocation of a blessing upon the enemy. It is related that at Haynesville, his first engagement, before giving the word of command to open fire he raised his hand aloft and in a loud voice, so that his men might hear, exclaimed: "May God have mercy upon their souls."*

After the war, Gen. Pendleton, who had made a noble sacrifice to the cause in the loss of his only son, Col. A. S. Pendleton, returned to his pulpit in Lexington, where he spent a part of his remaining years in close and constant companionship with his immortal leader. Together Pendleton and Lee ceaselessly labored, the one as rector, the other as a vestryman, in building up the Episcopal Parish of their community. Outliving Gen. Lee some years, Pendleton died January 25, 1888, and, like his former commander and devoted friend, is buried in Lexington, beside his son, and within the shadow of Jackson's monument.

Brig.-Gen. Armistead Lindsay Long, next in order of seniority to Pendleton in the Artillery, was an officer of exceptional merit and high accomplishments. Born in Campbell County, Virginia, September 8, 1825, he was graduated from the United States Mili-

*When asked if this were true by a brother-minister, the Rev. Mr. Royce, now rector of New Windsor Parish on the Hudson, Gen. Pendleton admitted that it was. Thus the incident seems to be without the vale of mere tradition. The Rev. W. N. Pendleton was granted the degree of Doctor of Divinity in 1868.

tary Academy in the Class of 1850. On duty as a second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery at Fort Moultrie for two years, he was then promoted first lieutenant, serving for the next nine years on the frontier of New Mexico, at Barrancas Barracks, Fort McHenry, Fort Monroe, and taking part in the various Indian campaigns in Indian Territory, Kansas, and Nebraska. When the crisis between the States arrived, he was on duty at Augusta, Georgia, from which point he was transferred to the National Capital, where he resigned his commission June 10, 1861, after 11 years of service. While in the Old Army, he had been placed under Capt. Hunt, later Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, for special instruction, and under the tutelage of that able artillerist he had acquired an exceptional knowledge of the theory as well as the practice of gunnery. He also served, in 1860, as aide on Gen. E. V. Sumner's staff.

An interesting anecdote concerning Gen. Hunt and Long may here be recounted. At Appomattox Gen. Hunt sought out Gen. Long to render him such services as he could. In the course of their conversation, Hunt told his old friend that he was not satisfied with the artillery preparation at Gettysburg, inasmuch as he, Long, had not done justice to his instruction; that the Confederate batteries, instead of concentrating their fire on the point of attack, were scattered over the whole field. Long was much amused at the criticism of his former tutor and said: "I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered wondered what you would think about it."

Repairing to Richmond immediately after resigning from the Old Army, he accepted a commission as Maj. of Artillery in the Confederate service, and soon accompanied Gen. Loring in the capacity of Chief of Artillery to West Virginia.* After this service in the Trans-Alleghany Department, he was assigned in the

*Resigned June 1, 1861; reached Richmond July 18, on which day he was appointed Major of Artillery.

fall of 1861 to duty under Gen. Lee as chief-of-staff in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. When Gen. Lee was given command of the Army of Northern Virginia Long was appointed his military secretary with the rank of colonel. In this capacity he was recognized as the artillery expert of Gen. Lee's staff, and rendered valuable service in connection with the Artillery at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. In his professional ability and special knowledge of artillery Gen. Lee reposed great confidence, and it is readily seen that his assignment to tactical command was most acceptable to Army Headquarters. His preferment over Col. Brown as Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps was not viewed at headquarters as a slight in any sense to that officer, and as he ranked Alexander and Walker, and held his commission in the Artillery, his prior appointment to them as brigadier-general was not a technical promotion over their heads. Yet, in a sense, his preferment over Alexander, Walker, and Brown especially, was felt to be at the time not wholly justifiable, in spite of his eminent ability and long service. This was most natural, since he had not been so thoroughly identified with the Artillery as they and others had been. It was the old story of the claims of line officers and staff officers. The former always feel that active duty with troops entitles them to more consideration than officers, even superior in rank, whose service has been principally on the staff.

In the selection of Long for Chief of Artillery of the 2d Corps, the personal equation undoubtedly entered, and such influences must never be lost sight of in the consideration of army, as well as other appointments. It must also be remembered that his service in the Old Army had been longer than that of any other artillery officer of the Confederate Army.

Thirty-nine years of age at the time of his appointment as brigadier-general, he was six feet tall and of handsome and commanding presence. His hair was dark, and his complexion swarthy. A small military

mustache gave him a decided French appearance. In manner Gen. Long was most affable, even gentle, but beneath his pleasing exterior there lay a sternness of character apparent to all. Of wide intellectual attainments and rare culture, he was perhaps one of the most profound military scholars in the Army. He certainly had no superior in the Confederacy in the theoretical knowledge of his special arm, and beside was a tactician of exceptional merit. As an organizer, he was superior to Alexander, and probably the equal of Walker, but he lacked the unusual dash of the former. We believe it is a fair estimate of Gen. Long to say that taken all in all he was one of the most accomplished officers in the Army of Northern Virginia.

As to his personal character, no one who has read his *Memoirs of Gen. Lee*, the best military historical work of the kind yet written, can entertain a doubt. Bereft of his eyesight after the war and at the time this splendid work was written, he displayed in its preparation the most remarkable patience and persistence, and evidenced a lack of bias and prejudice equalled by few writers on the war. It also testifies to the careful mental training of the author, and his wide knowledge of the military science in all its branches.* Gen. Lee entertained a high regard for him as evidenced by the following testimonial written after the war: "Gen. A. L. Long entered the Confederate service in 1861, and has served continuously till the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865. His conduct during that time has been marked by zeal and gallantry. . . ."

Reuben Lindsay Walker, Chief of Artillery 8d Corps, was the last to attain the rank of brigadier-

*After the war closed, Gen. Long was appointed Chief Engineer of the James River and Kanawha Canal Company. In 1869 he lost his eyesight from injuries received from the explosion of a caisson in the service, and subsequent exposure. He then removed to Charlottesville, where he resided until his death, April 29, 1891. It was during the last twenty years of his life that he wrote his *Memoirs of General Lee*, which were published in 1886. He also wrote reminiscences of his own career, a comparative sketch of Stonewall and Andrew Jackson, and a *History of America in the Seventeenth Century*. By reason of his infirmity, he was compelled to use a slate prepared for the use of the blind, and to depend upon the members of his family and on his friends for much assistance. Under all these disadvantages he labored on uncomplainingly, recording the history of his immortal leader of whom he was a most devoted admirer, cheerful and courageous to the end.

general in Lee's Artillery. He was born on his paternal estate, Logan, Albemarle County, Virginia, May 29, 1827, and was therefore about the same age as his kinsman, Gen. Long. In his veins flowed the best blood of the Old Dominion, being a son of Capt. Lewis Walker, and a descendant of forebears who had been prominent in the early settlement of the western part of the State. By every influence of blood, environment, and tradition, he was trained to be a leader of his fellows, and was perhaps the most picturesque figure in Lee's Army. Of immense frame and exceptionally broad shoulders, he was as handsome in figure as in countenance. Six feet four inches or more in height, his hair was long and dark, and a sweeping mustache and imperial beard added to his soldierly appearance. Above all he was a superb horseman and seemed to have been born to the saddle in spite of his immense stature. In repose his face wore a grave expression, and a piercing black eye, capable of great intensity, enhanced the individuality of his features. His brow was massive and his head sat gracefully upon his shoulders. Looking into his handsome face, no man could doubt the determination and the will-power which animated and characterized his being. In manner Walker was not particularly alert, and while by no means dull, his mind was not an active one. In physical hardihood, fixity of purpose, dogged determination, and dauntless courage, he was unexcelled by any officer in the Army. But while he was bold, he cannot be said to have possessed the dash of Alexander, Pelham, Pegram, Chew, or Breathed, or the intellectual brilliance of Long and Alexander. His forte was organization, and it was generally conceded that he had throughout the war the best organized artillery in the Army, whether it were a battery, a battalion, or a corps division under his command. His character was distinguished by great integrity, resolution and devotion to duty. His admiration for and confidence in Gen. Lee were unbounded, and few soldiers were ever as much beloved by officers and men

under their command as was Reuben Lindsay Walker. Upon being asked to give his estimate of Walker as a soldier, his old adjutant, Capt. William W. Chamberlaine, declared that in addition to Gen. Walker's ability as an organizer, his most striking characteristics were his intuitive knowledge of country, his appreciation of terrain, and his ability to select and occupy the best available positions for his guns and then to hold them with great pertinacity. From this, one sees how his experience as an engineer stood him in good stead as a soldier.

The following incident well illustrates Walker's character. As a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute, where he was graduated with the Class of 1845, he had for three years committed every offense, short of one which would have resulted in his dismissal. Gen. Smith, the Superintendent, narrates that he sought to reduce him to good order and submission in many ways. Threats, penalties, and punishments of the severest nature only sufficed to confirm the imperious youth in his course of utter disregard of all regulations. Admiring the young man for his lovable nature, his superb physique, and his unflinching courage in adversity, the Superintendent at last sought to appeal to his pride by appointing him a lieutenant in his first class year. From that time on, Cadet Walker was an example of all that was conscientious, dutiful and soldierly. Never once did he prove derelict in the discharge of the trust reposed in him. And this may be said of his career as an officer in the Army.

Walker followed the profession of Civil Engineering until the outbreak of the war. Visiting Richmond in February, 1861, he was promptly seized upon by Mr. Purcell, a patriotic citizen, who had undertaken to recruit and equip a light battery at his own expense, and placed in command of it. Not even was Capt. Walker permitted to return to his home, then at New Kent Courthouse, but he was hustled off with the famous Pur-

cell Battery to Aquia Creek, without even bidding his wife farewell. From the day of this unceremonious departure for the front, he had never had a day's leave of absence from his command, and when next he met his wife he was introduced to a child nearly a year old which had been born to his wife in his absence. Such was the fortitude of both men and women in those days. But this particular mother had suffered separation enough from her husband. From thenceforth she accompanied her soldier husband in the field. Mrs. Walker's ambulance and mules, driven by a faithful white retainer, was a familiar sight to the men of the Army of Northern Virginia. From battlefield to battlefield she moved with the ammunition trains, often bivouacking with her children along the roadsides in her improvised house on wheels, when the neighborhood afforded no shelter in the homes of friends and relatives. In her determination to remain close to her husband's side, not only did she accept all the hardships of campaign, but she also added a new member to her family. For a brief space only did this Spartan mother desert her husband in the midst of the perils of war. She followed him to the end, ready to carry his stricken body from the field, or minister to him in sickness and disease. On one occasion while her driver was absent Mrs. Walker's team of horses was impressed by a not-overscrupulous Confederate teamster. Other horses could not be purchased, but so insistent was the good lady that means of transport be secured for her ambulance, that soon her faithful retainer appeared with a fine pair of mules branded with the familiar "U. S." It has never been explained whence they came.

Strange to say that with all this loving care and constant attendance on the part of his wife, Walker was never once wounded, in the sixty-three engagements in which he participated during the war, nor was he invalided at any time. In latter years he even grew sensitive to the inquiry. "Why General, not wounded in the war?" Invariably he would draw himself up to

the full height of the giant that he was, and, squaring his massive shoulders, reply, "No, sir, and it was not my fault."*

And now we come to Alexander, who among the senior officers was the artilleryman *par excellence* of Lee's Army, though third in rank in his arm. A graduate of West Point in the Class of 1857, his service in the Engineer Corps, then as Commandant of the Corps of Cadets and instructor of gunnery, his service on the plains and in connection with the development of the Myer signal system, we are already familiar with, as well as with his early service in the Confederacy, first as artillery instructor, then as signal officer on Beauregard's staff, and then as Chief of Ordnance of the Army of Northern Virginia. To repeat, entering the Confederate service April 8, 1861, as a captain, at the age of 24 years, he was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of artillery in December, 1861, and colonel a year later. After the most distinguished service in every battle from Fredericksburg to date, he was commissioned brigadier-general of artillery February 26, 1864.

Although Alexander had accompanied Longstreet to Tennessee, and served in the capacity of his Chief of Artillery in the Knoxville campaign, not having reached Chickamauga with his battalion in time to participate in the battle, he was in fact, up to the time of his promotion, the inferior in rank of Colonels Walton and Cabell, though of the same grade with them. But while their inferior, he had for some time practically directed the tactical employment of the artillery of his corps.

*Surrendering with the army at Appomattox, Walker, who was promoted Brigadier-General of Artillery in January, 1865, retired to private life as a farmer, with a record of having participated in sixty-three engagements during the four years of his military service. In 1872 he removed to Selma, Ala., where he was Superintendent of the Marine and Selma Railroad. In 1876 he returned to Virginia in the employment of the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and was later Superintendent of the Richmond Street Railway Company. Soon he was engaged as constructing engineer of the Richmond and Alleghany Railroad, or the present James River Division of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway. In 1884 he became superintendent of construction of the Texas State Capitol, and resided at Austin until 1888. Much scandal in connection with the previous management of the work led the authorities to place it in his hands, by reason of his known integrity. He was handsomely rewarded for the faithfulness and efficiency with which he discharged the trust. He died at his home, "Point of Forks," on the James River, June 7, 1890, where he spent the last two years of his life as a farmer.

At Fredericksburg, he was the directing genius of Longstreet's defense. It was there, in referring to the positions of his guns on Marye's Hill, that he remarked to his corps commander: "We cover that ground so well, that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it." And as has been seen, Alexander's forecast was quite fulfilled. Again at Gettysburg where Col. Walton, his senior, and the nominal Chief of Artillery, was present, Alexander was in complete control of the Artillery in the fight. On former occasions, his recognized ability had merely enabled him to influence the disposition of the artillery under Walton's immediate control, but at Gettysburg we find him as a junior officer actually in command, while his senior was present and participating in the battle. This has always seemed a remarkable anomaly, not so much as to the wisdom of it, but that Walton would consent to it. A careful investigation and study of the matter discloses that it came about in the following way: Col. Walton was old, and physically unequal to the exertions of the campaign. Though a meritorious officer, of dauntless courage, and with a fine military record, he now lacked the energy to keep pace with events. Already one of his former battery commanders, Eshleman, had supplanted him as active leader of the celebrated Washington Artillery Battalion. Longstreet knew Walton's capabilities full well, and while he retained the gallant old officer as Chief of Artillery of his corps, both for political and personal reasons, he did not feel that he would be justified in committing the tactical leadership of the artillery to his hands, for those or any other considerations. In the movement upon Gettysburg, Walton's Battalion was held back, whether intentionally or not cannot be determined, but at any rate, Alexander arrived on the field some time in advance of Walton and was placed in charge of the artillery already up. An important mission was entrusted to him, and upon its discharge the young officer had already entered when

his senior arrived. The situation was such that when Walton did come up, no consideration of rank could be allowed to jeopardize the success of the battle already under way. Such arguments were unanswerable, and however chagrined Col. Walton may have felt, he was powerless to deny the force of the circumstances which debarred him from the exercise of the tactical command to which his rank entitled him. That he was chagrined is quite well established by the verbal testimony of his contemporaries and his own letters, and it was not long before he expressed the desire to be transferred to service at Mobile. In justice to the old officer, his wish should have been instantly complied with. In fact, he should have been given the opportunity to transfer, before being publicly overslaughed. But he was retained on the roll of the 1st Corps, and after being gradually sidetracked by being assigned to duty as Inspector-General of Artillery at Large and placed on detached duty, relinquished his commission in the 1st Corps July 8, 1864.

From the time of his first appearance in the Artillery, in fact in the Army, young Alexander was a marked man and one destined to attain preëminence in his arm. Rapidly he acquired a reputation which extended far beyond the Army in which he was actually serving. First Jackson sought to have him appointed a general officer in the infantry, then Johnston urged his transfer to the Western Army, with advanced rank. But he was too well appreciated in the Army of Northern Virginia to permit of his loss. Stephen D. Lee might be spared to the far South, but not Alexander to the West. The young Georgian was needed in Virginia.

In appearance, Alexander did not present so fine a military figure as did Long and Walker. Of about the average height, and of muscular build, yet he was by no means a handsome man. In fact, his features were rather irregular, and the scraggly, ill-shapen beard, which his youth afforded, failed to hide a decidedly ugly mouth. But his eye was bright and penetrating,

and about the man, both in his general appearance and carriage, was the unmistakable evidence of high breeding and exceptional intellect, and these appearances did not belie the facts, for he was the scion of a noble stock, and brilliant beyond his years. To the latter fact, his whole career at West Point and in the Old Army testifies. No man becomes an engineer officer and the Commandant of the Corps of Cadets at the United States Military Academy unless he possesses rare qualities of mind and heart combined.

In manner, Alexander was active and alert, and his whole character was vibrant with intenseness. Strong in likes and prejudices, he was yet most amiable and possessed the traits which make men socially popular. As an officer, he was quick to estimate the situation before him, prompt to direct, and inexorably firm in holding his subordinates to their duty. He possessed wonderful personal magnetism, and transmitted much of his own enthusiasm and spirit to his subordinates. Above all things, he detested delay. Full of dash and the love of responsibility, he perhaps expected too much of others, in this respect forgetting that few men possessed that *élan* which characterized himself. His was a nature which loved prompt action; he liked rapidity of motion; anything that savoured of slowness, of lack of energy, of excessive deliberation, provoked him sorely. His mind was the kind that had figured out and matured the plans in advance which most men pause to consider when the time for action comes. He courted favor from no one, and while immensely energetic and ambitious he was yet able to forego an offered advancement in another arm in the evident knowledge that he was needed in his own. Endowed with such a nature and exuberant with vigorous youth, it was natural that he should have chafed at the shortcomings of others, for in his genuine lack of vanity he was unable to appreciate the fact that he himself was not like other men. He invariably measured others by his own standard, and few came up to it. This habit made him rather critical, and he never hesi-

tated to express his views, hit whom they did, but he was never disloyal to Gen. Lee, nor to the memory of Gen. Longstreet. In fact, his devotion to the latter carried him, in an attempt to defend his old corps commander, beyond the limits of sound reasoning, as one who studies his book, in other respects a masterpiece of critical analysis, will discover.* Like Long, his writings prove him to be a man of exceptional intellect, a wide student of war and human nature, and to have possessed a remarkable lack of bias. In his memoirs, much after-acquired information was of course brought to bear upon the solution of the military problems of the war, however conscientiously he may have sought to view things from a contemporary standpoint. The author was a much wiser man when he wrote his book than when he was actually confronted by the problems which others were called upon to solve, but no one is misled by his sagacity after the event, for it is not difficult to distinguish between his contemporaneous foresights, and the maturer reflections of the author, or his hindsights.

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander, age 27 years, was a soldier, who, had he served Napoleon, would have been rewarded by a baton, for he possessed those soldierly characteristics so dear to the Emperor. He was far and away the superior of all others in his arm, whose opportunity was equal to his own. Like Gen. Hunt of the Federal Army, he was preëminent in the Artillery of his army. His opportunities were never equal to those of Senarmont and Drouot, for even Gettysburg cannot properly be compared to Friedland and Wagram; the tactical combinations were so different that the number of guns engaged forms no basis for comparison. Nevertheless, as written by Maj. May, R. H. A., the names of Hunt and Alexander are as worthy of remembrance as are those of the two great artillerists of the Grand Army. Then, too, it must be remembered

**Military Memoirs of a Confederate*, published by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1908.

that Alexander had no leader who held him always in hand, prepared to throw his masses of guns into action, as did Napoleon at the crisis of the combat, thus enabling the Artillery to reap the fame of victory, when the way to inevitable success had been carefully paved. On the contrary he, like the other artillery commanders, while given a free hand, was always expected to shoulder a burden from the first, which precluded the more brilliant maneuvers of the battlefields of the French. Their services were none the less valuable; they simply show in a different light. The issue largely depended on the efforts of the Confederate artillerymen, but no great reserve masses existed to be employed at the psychological instant, and win for their leaders the credit of having capped the climax, so to speak.*

From now on, the historical narrative of events will trace the military careers of Lee's senior artillerymen subsequent to the period of which we write. The foregoing discussion of their characters should give a better insight into the affairs of the Artillery in general.

*General Alexander, as we shall see, played a leading rôle in the Artillery until the close of the War. After the Surrender at Appomattox, he became Professor of Mathematics and of Civil and Military Engineering at the University of South Carolina, in which position he served from January, 1866, to October, 1869. He then became President of the Columbia Oil Company. In May, 1871, he became Superintendent of the Charlotte and Augusta Railroad, and in October, 1871, President of the Savannah and Memphis Railroad. In 1875 he became President and General Manager of the Western Railroad of Alabama, and of the Georgian Railroad and Banking Company. He was Vice-President of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad from 1880 to 1882, Capital Commissioner of the State of Georgia from 1883 to 1888, and from 1887 to 1893 President of the Central Railroad and Banking Company, and the Ocean Steamship Company. He wrote a valuable treatise on *Railroad Practice*. His death occurred in 1911.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE WILDERNESS

FOR six months the hostile armies had confronted each other along the Rapidan, and every man in both knew that the next campaign was to be the most serious one yet conducted. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who had been called from the West to take supreme command of the Federal forces, arrived in Virginia in March, establishing his headquarters at Culpeper Courthouse on the 26th. He had been by far the most successful Federal commander up to that time, and possessed an iron determination, which, coupled with the unlimited military resources placed at his disposal, served to revive the spirits of the North. Furthermore, his selection was a guarantee to those who knew him that military operations would be conducted from Army headquarters and not by the President, his cabinet, the press, and the politicians of the North.

Grant's strategy cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that his general plan was well formulated and it contemplated the thorough coöperation of the various Federal armies under his control, with a definite end in view. While that end was the subjugation of the South in the shortest possible time, the objective of the Army of the Potomac, under the immediate command of Meade, was the Army of Northern Virginia, and indirectly Richmond, since the two were by circumstances almost inseparably identified. Previous commanders had failed to appreciate the fundamental strategic principle that an enemy's capital must fall with the army which defends it, wherever that army may be. This fact was not ignored by Grant.

When Grant took charge the situation in Virginia was as follows: West Virginia was in the hands of the North, and all that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge. On the sea-coast,

Butler with the Army of the James, numbering about 80,000 men, held Fort Monroe and Norfolk. In North Carolina, the Federals held Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne, from which points Richmond could also be threatened. The 9th Corps under Burnside, 20,000 strong, was soon rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland, from which point it could reinforce Meade or operate independently along the coast.

Longstreet's Corps was at Gordonsville, Ewell's along the south bank of the Rapidan above Mine Run, and Hill's on his left, and higher up the river. The Confederate line was partially intrenched in position. Gen. Lee's headquarters were two miles northeast of Orange Courthouse. Meade's Army, consisting of Hancock's, Warren's, and Sedgwick's, or the 2d, 5th and 6th Corps, lay along the north bank of the Rapidan. The Army of the Potomac had never been so thoroughly equipped before, nor as powerful as a fighting machine. It was lavishly supplied with all a rich country could give it. The Army of Northern Virginia, on the other hand, little more than half as large as its persistent antagonist, was practically devoid of everything in the way of clothing and supplies. Its arms and the temper of the veterans which wielded them were, however, perhaps never better. Such was the situation on the 2d of May, when Gen. Lee with the utmost confidence examined with his glasses from Clark's Mountain on the south side of the Rapidan the Federal lines on the opposite bank.

Meade's activity in the direction of the upper fords had not deceived Lee for an instant, and on the 3d of May the Federals were discovered moving to his right, just as he had predicted they would be. He at once prepared to move upon Meade's flank with his whole force as soon as the enemy crossed the Rapidan and became entangled in the Spotsylvania Wilderness, through which the route selected by Grant lay. Again was Lee willing to forego the defense of a natural obstacle, which could in time be turned by superior num-

bers, in order to avail himself of the great advantage of a most difficult terrain, which he knew to be a *terra incognita* to his adversary. And again did the Federals play into his hands by entangling themselves in the gloomy wilderness, thus, in a measure, at least, neutralizing their numerical superiority.

The Army of the Potomac began to cross the Rappahannock at noon, May 3, its way having been prepared by Sheridan's Cavalry. Bridges were laid in advance at Germanna, Ely's, and at Culpeper Mine fords, covering a front of about seven miles. Hancock, preceded by Gregg's Cavalry, crossed at Ely's Ford, and moved to Chancellorsville, which placed him on the left; Warren, with Wilson's Cavalry in front, followed by Sedgwick, crossed at Germanna Ford and followed the Germanna Plank Road, due southeast, to Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick encamped for the night three miles south of the river. In these positions Meade's corps remained until 2 P. M. of the 5th, while the 65 miles of trains were crossing at Germanna and Culpeper Mine fords, the movement of which was more difficult than anticipated, and to which fact the unexpected delay in the advance was attributed. The situation was now about as follows: Near the Lacy house, where Grant, Meade, and Warren had established their headquarters, there were two roads, the Orange Turnpike on the right or south, and the Orange Plank Road on the north or left, both following the general direction of the river from Orange Courthouse to Fredericksburg and nearly parallel to each other. The route of the Federal Army lay directly across the two roads along the western border of the Spotsylvania Wilderness. When the Confederates gained contact with the Federal advance, Sedgwick's Corps in general occupied the Germanna, and Hancock's the Brock Road, while Warren's occupied the space within the obtuse angle made by the two.

About noon on the 4th of May, Lee put Ewell's Corps in motion along the Orange Turnpike, while

A. P. Hill with two divisions moved along the Orange Plank Road. The two divisions of Longstreet's Corps, in camp near Gordonsville, were ordered to move rapidly across the country and follow Hill's advance.

It was apparent from the first that the terrain selected by Lee for his initial operations would afford no opportunity for the effective employment of the Artillery, but instant steps were taken to bring it up and assemble it from its widely dispersed camps.

In the 1st Corps, Huger's Battalion which was recruiting at Cobham Depot, Haskell's Battalion, also in camp at that point, and Cabell's Battalion at Morton's Ford, where it had been on picket duty during the winter, were ordered on the 4th to rendezvous at Richard's Shop, where they arrived late in the night on the 5th, and at 8 A. M. on the 6th they marched for Parker's Store on the Plank Road in rear of the Army. Gen. Long's five battalions which had wintered at Frederick Hall, and which later in the spring had been moved to grazing camps near Liberty Mills in Orange County, also received orders to march on the 4th, and were concentrated early on the 5th at Locust Grove on the turnpike in rear of Ewell's Infantry. Walker, with four battalions of the 8d Corps, left Cobham and Lindsay depots on the 4th, and bivouacked that night near Verdierville, joining Hill on the 5th and accompanying Heth and Wilcox down the Plank Road. Cutts' Battalion of this corps, which had been on picket duty during the winter in the neighborhood of Rapidan Station, was directed to remain with Anderson's Division, which constituted the rear guard of the Army. The five batteries of the Horse Artillery which had wintered at Charlottesville and then moved to Gordonsville, were now operating with Stuart on Lee's right, and were constantly engaged in harassing the enemy's advance. The batteries had been ordered up from camp on the 4th, and most of them were engaged the next day with Rosser on the Catharpin Road.

The rapid concentration of the Artillery at the front was effected in a most creditable manner, and is sufficient evidence of the high state of efficiency of the arm at this time. Nothing so tests the metal of field artillery as long and rapid marching. In this instance it was assembled without a hitch of any kind, every battalion moving as if by clockwork. One need only measure on the map the distances covered by the various batteries between the 4th and 5th of May to appreciate the celerity of their movements. Suffice it to say that many of the batteries covered 30 miles or more in less than 24 hours, all finding their appointed positions without mishap of any kind.

Ewell's Corps was the first to gain close contact with the enemy. As it advanced along the turnpike on the morning of the 5th, the Federal column was seen crossing the road from the direction of Germanna Ford. Ewell had been instructed to regulate his advance by the head of Hill's column, which Stuart was to lead to the south of him, and not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet arrived. Promptly forming Johnson's Division across the road, he refrained from provoking the enemy, and communicated with Lee, who was still with Hill, but the position he occupied was on the flank of the Federal line of march, and very naturally such a collision soon led to active hostilities. Warren, whose troops were passing when Ewell came upon them, halted them and, turning to the right, made a vigorous attack upon Johnson's Division, with which Nelson's Battalion of artillery had been deployed. Milledge's Battery in front of Jones' Brigade on the right of the road was soon withdrawn when the infantry support was forced to fall back about two miles to the Flat Run Road, where it intersects the turnpike. Jones was roughly handled, but Stuart's Brigade was pushed forward and Rodes' Division was thrown in on its right, south of the road. When the line was thus reestablished, the Confederates pressed forward vigorously and, after desperate fighting in the dense woods which hid friends

and foe alike, drove back the enemy. Ewell's entire corps had now come up, Johnson's Division across the turnpike, Rodes on his right, and Early in reserve. Few practicable positions were available for artillery, but Nelson had placed some of his guns on a commanding ridge with a small field in their front on the right and about a mile from the Lacy house. Two of his guns were also placed on the road leading to the Germanna Road to operate with the infantry of the left wing. In these positions the Artillery rendered such aid as it could in repelling the attacks of the Federals during the afternoon.

Soon after Warren's repulse, Sedgwick moved up to his right to oppose Early, who moved into the front line and, supported by several of Nelson's guns, clung to his position on the Federal flank, in spite of every effort to dislodge him. The Federal efforts continued until nightfall.

The collision with Ewell at first led Meade to believe Lee had only left a division to oppose his progress, and to impose upon him while the main army was being concentrated across his path on the North Anna, but when Hill's advance was also discovered on the Plank Road, Meade abandoned his original view. It was but a short time after Ewell became engaged when Hill struck the Federal outposts near Parker's Store, just at the edge of the Wilderness, and drove them in upon Sedgwick's column which was moving along the Stevensburg and Brock roads to Spotsylvania Courthouse. Heth's Division, followed by the corps artillery with Poague's Battalion in the lead, first encountered the enemy's cavalry, whereupon Richards' Battery was thrown forward and assisted in driving in the outposts. The head of Hill's column reached an opening on the left of the Plank Road at midday, at a point about two miles from its intersection with the Brock Road, and was halted. From the ridge occupied by Heth, the enemy was seen in force to the north and dispositions were at once made for an encounter. The small clearing on the ridge af-

forded the only practicable position for artillery. There, near the Widow Tabb's house, Gen. Pendleton, after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, established Poague's Battalion. Poague moved one of his pieces down the road a few hundred yards and placed it in line with Heth's Infantry. This, as will be seen later, was most fortunate for the Confederates.

Immediately upon discovering Hill's presence, Meade recalled Hancock's Corps, which was marching from Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania Courthouse, and at 4 P. M. Hancock was ordered to drive Hill "out of the Wilderness," which he had entered. Wilcox was brought up to Heth's support and then ensued a desperate encounter between the individuals of both sides. Division, brigade, regimental, and even company leading was out of the question. At no time were more than a handful of men in sight from any one point, and the troops simply fell upon each other and locked in a death embrace, as chance directed their steps. As darkness approached, the flashing muskets alone marked the contending and intermingled lines. But never once was the road occupied in force by the enemy, for Poague's single piece, with the gallant battalion commander himself beside it, swept the approach and completely dominated it from first to last. The battalion from its position on the ridge was practically debarred from participating in the struggle, as its fire would have been as dangerous to friend as to foe in that seething cauldron which boiled beneath its muzzles. Meanwhile the other battalions of the 3d Corps were held in the immediate rear of Hill's Infantry.

When the battle closed at 8 o'clock, Ewell's and Hill's Corps had already formed a junction at a point about halfway between Parker's Store and the Orange Turnpike. Longstreet was now ordered to make a forced march during the night and arrive upon the field before dawn. Moving at 1 A. M. of the 6th, it was daylight when he reached Parker's Store on the Plank Road, three miles in rear of Heth and Wilcox.

All night Hill's advanced troops, who had maintained themselves so resolutely and successfully against Hancock's six divisions, heard the Federals preparing to renew the attack in the morning. Worn and much cut up by the fighting of the previous afternoon and expecting relief during the night, the infantry failed to prepare to meet the inevitable attack. The lines were much disordered, and commands were mixed. But not so with Poague's Battalion on the ridge in the clearing.

At 5 A. M. Hancock's troops swept forward and soon overlapped Wilcox's Division south of the road, rolling it up and compelling Hill's whole line to retire in confusion past the single battalion of artillery, which stood alone like a wall of flame across the enemy's path. Not until the great masses of Hancock's troops came face to face with the artillery did they cease to press forward, but no troops could pass through such a storm of fire as that which Poague now opened upon them. The gunners worked with almost superhuman energy, the muzzles belched their withering blasts, the twelve pieces blended their discharges in one continuous roar, and there among them stood beneath the dense canopy of smoke, which hovered above the four batteries, Lee himself as if with a halo of war above his head. The great commander knew then full well that between him and disaster Poague's Battalion stood alone. What glory for a soldier! This single incident brought more of honor to the little colonel of artillery than most soldiers attain in a life of service. It would be hard for some to imagine in those soft, mild eyes, so familiar to the writer, the light which must have radiated from them as he stood among his guns on the 6th of May, 1864, the bulwark of Lee's defense, and in the very presence of his immortal commander. But one who has been thrown with him, who has learned to know the quality of the man, must feel that no heroism could transcend the limits of his soul. And yet the incident is not referred to by the historians of our time. We read that Poague's Battalion was present in the battle of the Wilderness. No

more. Even Morris Schaff, whose writings are inspired with the noblest sentiments of appreciation, and whose studious work on the battle of the Wilderness is by far the best yet written, overlooks the heroic deeds of Poague, though no more ready hand than his ever brought the pen to bear with sweeter touch for friend and foe alike. In the saving of such incidents to posterity, of deeds unrecorded by contemporaries, almost unknown even to the present generation, one must feel thankful to the Goddess of Fame, nay, more, to the Almighty that it may be done.

For awhile as Gen. Lee stood among Poague's unsupported guns, matters were indeed in a critical condition for the Confederates. After sending a courier to hasten the advance of the 1st Corps, and another to prepare the trains to be moved to the rear, he at last discerned the dust thrown up by the hurrying feet of Longstreet's men. In perfect order, with ranks well closed and no stragglers, the double column swung down the road at a trot, and, regardless of the confusion which beset their path, these splendid troops pressed on to the point of danger. At their head rode Longstreet at his best, ardent for the fray, as if but now he had slipped the leash which held his tugging columns in check. Rapidly deploying into line on the right of the road, Kershaw's Division obliqued to the right under a withering fire to meet the Federal left which had all but outflanked Poague's batteries, and which was working havoc among them. On the left of the road, Field's Division also deployed and swept past the guns, among which the men detected Gen. Lee, whom they cheered lustily. When they perceived that "Marse Robert" contemplated leading them in the charge, they cried loudly for him to forego his intention. "We won't go unless you go back," shouted the Texans, while one of the gallant fellows seized his bridle rein and turned Traveller to the rear. Gen. Gregg then urged Gen. Lee to do as the men desired him to do, but it was with evident disappointment that Lee turned off and joined Gen. Longstreet.



MAJOR JAMES WHITE LATIMER
Mortally wounded at Gettysburg. 1863

As Longstreet's men swept onward, McIntosh's Battalion was thrown into position by Walker on Poague's left, while three of the guns of Price's Battery advanced along the Plank Road with the infantry. Pegram's Battalion soon went into action on the ridge, half a mile to the left of McIntosh's, to oppose the efforts of the enemy to penetrate between Ewell and Hill. Later on Cutts moved up to the support of Pegram, while Richardson's Battalion and Alexander's entire corps artillery were held in reserve at Parker's Store.

Longstreet's charge was irresistible; the Federals were first checked in their advance and then driven back past their first line of log works. Back and forth for two hours the lines of battle surged, settling down at length almost where they had rested during the night before.

Simultaneously with these events on the Confederate right, the Federals had made an unsuccessful effort to turn Ewell's left next the river, the brunt of the attack falling upon Early's Division, behind the flank of which Col. Carter had massed a number of his guns. The batteries there posted were heavily engaged and rendered splendid service in repelling the attack upon Gordon's Brigade. Cutshaw's Battalion was placed by Gen. Long on the right of the turnpike, relieving Nelson's batteries in their old position, while Hardaway's Battalion relieved those guns of Nelson's Battalion on the Germanna Road. Braxton's Battalion occupied a position further to the right, about midway between the turnpike and the Plank Road, from which point it was able to cross fire to a certain extent with Pegram's guns behind Hill's left. While seeking an advanced and much exposed position for the three battalions of his division early in the morning, the veteran artillery officer, Col. John Thompson Brown, fell, instantly killed by the bullet of a sharpshooter, adding another illustrious name to the list of artillery officers lost in battle. Little can be added concerning Col. Brown to what his superiors in his own arm have written of him.

In his report, Pendleton wrote of this much lamented officer: "To the fine qualities of a Christian gentleman of superior and cultivated intellect were added in Col. Brown very high excellencies as a soldier. Judicious, prompt, energetic and of dauntless gallantry, he had rendered conspicuous service in every campaign of the war. His example will not be forgotten in the arm to which he was an ornament, nor his memory be uncherished by a grateful country." And, of him Gen. Long, whose senior artillery division commander he was, wrote: "His loss was deeply felt throughout the whole army. He not only exhibited the highest social qualities, but was endowed with the first order of military talents. On every field where he was called to act he was distinguished for gallantry and skill. The Artillery will ever remember him as one of its brightest ornaments."*

By 8 A. M. Anderson's Division had rejoined Hill's Corps. Meanwhile, it had been discovered by Gen. Lee's engineer that the Federal left flank rested in the air only a short distance south of the Plank Road, near the unfinished railroad. When this was reported to Longstreet about 10 A. M. he at once organized a column of four brigades, G. B. Anderson's and Wofford's of his own, and Mahone's and Davis' of Hill's Corps, for the purpose of turning the Federal flank. Moving rapidly to the right and then forward, the column was deployed along the railroad at right angles to the hostile line. About 11 A. M. the four brigades, led by Col. Sorrell in person, Longstreet's Adjutant-General, advanced, striking the flank of the Federal line in reverse, while a general attack was instituted along the Confederate front. The success of Longstreet's brilliant movement was complete. From a tactical point of view no more beautiful movement was executed during the war, and it only serves to show the remarkable ability of Longstreet as a tactician when his was the plan that was

*For full and accurate account of the life and military career of this superb officer, see *The University Memorial*, p. 560.

being executed. Brigade after brigade of the enemy was rolled up and routed. Hancock, totally unable, in spite of the noted influence he exercised over his men, to stay their flight, was compelled to content himself with reforming them along the Brock Road, where luckily he had thrown up hasty intrenchments the preceding day. Panic had seized upon two whole Federal corps, and a great Confederate victory seemed assured when Longstreet, who rode forward south of the Plank Road, at the head of five fresh brigades to press his advantage, fell before a volley from one of Mahone's regiments advancing at right angles to his own course, and which mistook Longstreet and the group of officers about him for Federals. But Longstreet was not so seriously wounded that he could not place Gen. Field in command and direct him how to proceed. He explained that one of his columns should continue the direct attack, while the other moved further around Hancock's left by a route which Gen. Smith had reconnoitered and was thoroughly familiar with. If this were done, the already-broken enemy would be forced to surrender or be destroyed. Before Field, however, got under way, Gen. R. H. Anderson, his senior, then Gen. Lee himself, arrived. Longstreet's knowledge of the situation was of course not possessed by either Lee or Anderson. They only found the lines much disordered, and before the realignment which the former directed to be made could be effected, much delay had ensued. It was 4:15 P. M. before Field's and Anderson's divisions renewed the attack. Thus at the very crisis of the battle, when the enemy was not only already defeated, but an appalling disaster stared Meade in the face, Lee's second great lieutenant was smitten and this almost within gunshot of the field where Jackson fell just twelve months before. In fact part of the enemy's forces occupied the old Chancellorsville battlefield at the time.

It would almost seem that Providence was fighting against the Confederates. Certain it is that Fate was against them, for in the battle of the Wilderness even

another ill-fortune had fallen upon Lee's Army. Before 9 A. M. Gordon had discovered the exposed character of the Federal right wing, and had later verified the reports of his patrols by personal reconnaissance in its rear. He at once reported the fact to Early, and begged to be allowed to attack Sedgwick, with a view to rolling up his line. But Early objected on the ground that Burnside, whose troops were arriving on the field, would be found behind Sedgwick. Gordon knew from personal observation that Burnside was not there, and in vain he appealed, first to his division commander, then to Ewell, to be allowed to attack, urging them both to verify his own information. Ewell was completely dominated, however, by Early, and neither went himself nor sent any one to investigate the situation for him. About 5:30 P. M. Gen. Lee, astounded by the inactivity on the left, rode over from the right where Longstreet and Hill had been so heavily engaged, to discover the cause of Ewell's silence. Gordon, in the presence of both Ewell and Early, explained the situation to Gen. Lee as he knew it to be, with the result that he was ordered to attack at once. The attack took place just as the sun went down, too late to reap the fruits of a surprise which to Sedgwick was as great as Longstreet's flanking attack had been to Hancock. Moving around to their rear, Gordon alone drove the Federals from a large portion of their works and took 600 prisoners, and among them two general officers. But darkness intervened to save Sedgwick just as a bullet had saved Hancock and Warren, and so Grant's army was saved from destruction and enabled to fall back and establish a new line for the defense of which Burnside's entire and almost wholly fresh corps was now available.

Viewing Meade's precarious situation throughout the 6th, it seems certain that had Gordon been permitted to attack when he desired to, his effort, which would have been closely connected in time with Longstreet's success on the right, would surely have brought complete disaster to the Army of the Potomac. What he accom-

plished at 6 P. M. could have been done at 11 A. M., and with an enemy in his front and in rear of both flanks, it is inconceivable that Meade could have successfully withdrawn his army, even had the terrain favored him instead of practically eliminating all possibility of the movement of broken troops.

During the day, Stuart had persistently sought to penetrate to the left rear of Meade's Army, but found Sheridan confronting him at all points. The conflict between the cavalry of the two armies was continuous, and in the various more or less disjointed affairs between Stuart's brigades and those of Sheridan, the Horse Artillery was actively engaged. Johnston's Battery remained in position near Shady Grove, Thomson's and Shoemaker's being heavily engaged near Rowe's farm, and Hart's not far from Todd's Tavern. McGregor's Battery remained at Orange Courthouse, with W. H. F. Lee's Brigade. The nature of the cavalry operations in the dense country was such, of course, as to preclude the possibility of Chew's handling the battalion as a unit. On the 6th, when with Rosser, who was engaging Wilson on the Catharpin Road, Chew personally led Thomson's Battery in the charge of the cavalry brigade, and, throwing the guns into action just before the troopers struck the enemy, did fine execution with them. The next day at Rose's farm, where Stuart was in command, he again accompanied the cavalry in a charge with his old battery, much to the delight of Stuart, who now seems to have realized for the first time that in Maj. Chew, Pelham had a worthy successor.* Stuart's previous lack of appreciation of Chew was most natural, for the two had scarcely ever been thrown together before this time. It seems unfortunate that the association of such bold and congenial spirits was so brief. But the wide recognition of this artilleryman's

*"GEN. W. N. PENDLETON—Your note concerning Dearing is just received. Maj. Chew, the officer now in charge of the Stuart Horse Artillery, is doing so well that I am disinclined to put any one over him, although I have a high appreciation of the officer you propose. I think Chew will answer as the permanent commander, and, being identified with the Horse Artillery, is therefore preferable to others.

"J. E. B. STUART, *Major-General*, April 6, 1864."

ability and the reputation as an unexcelled leader of horse artillery which he had established for himself were all the more to his credit since he owed nothing to the great Stuart for them. Indeed, his service since Ashby's death had been quite independent of illustrious commanders, and he therefore reflected none of the lustre of others. He was a self-made soldier in the highest sense of the word, and the fact that he could by his own merit acquire precedence over such an officer as Breathed, so long and so familiarly associated with Stuart, may seem remarkable to those who have never known the man. Slight personal contact with him is sufficient, however, to brush away all surprise. Near seventy years old at the time this is written, Col. Robert Preston Chew retains the mental activity and much of the physical hardihood of youth. Erect, of full muscular development and above the average height, with a handsome face upon which character has delineated its unmistakable features, in appearance he is the ideal soldier, and he is as much beloved by those with whom he is now associated in his peaceful pursuits, as he was by the splendid men of the Confederate Horse Artillery during the war.*

*Col. Chew now resides in Charles Town, West Virginia. He tells the writer that he is engaged in writing the history of the Horse Artillery. May God spare him until he has completed the priceless record he alone is now capable of preparing, and for many years to come.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

SPOTSYLVANIA

GRANT had utterly failed on the 5th and 6th of May to carry out his plan of "swinging past" Lee's Army and placing himself between it and Richmond, and while Lee had delivered the Federal Army a stunning blow, it still remained on its route, now secure behind strong works, and with Hunt's tremendous force of artillery established in position with the usual skill of its commander. It was impracticable for the Confederates, who had established themselves upon the flank of Grant's line of operations, to attack Meade's Army. Whatever the conditions may have been in the Federal Infantry, which had been so roughly handled, and which had escaped complete disaster by the merest chance, Lee knew that Hunt was undismayed and that no troops could sweep over that superb line of guns in the Wilderness. So both armies lay behind their intrenchments on the 7th, contenting themselves with skirmishing along the front. Meanwhile, Lee kept a close lookout for a movement of the enemy to his right and directed the Chief of Artillery to open roads for the movement of the artillery in that direction, should it be needed there. The work was quickly accomplished by working parties from the various batteries of the 8d Corps, under the immediate direction of Col. Walker. At the same time, Gen. Long made a reconnaissance under orders from Gen. Ewell on the extreme left. Taking Jones' infantry brigade and W. P. Carter's Battery, Long moved around to Beale's house on the Germanna Road, where he struck several regiments of Federal cavalry, which were quickly dispersed by the battery. No other hostile troops being found, it was evident that the enemy was withdrawing from before the Confederate left, for the dead and wounded still lay upon the field in that quarter. Soon after Long made the report of his reconnaissance

to Lee, Stuart, about 3 p. m., discovered Meade's trains moving to the Confederate right, and later the unmistakable rumble of moving columns along the Brock Road was heard.

With roads clear of the trains, Meade had been ordered by Grant to move his troops at 8:30 p. m., and to establish one of his corps at the Courthouse, twelve miles distant, one at the crossroads known as the Brock House, and one at Todd's Tavern.

About dusk, Gen. Lee directed Pendleton to send a staff officer to Anderson, who had succeeded Longstreet in command of the 1st Corps, to guide him over the roads cut through the woods. Without a doubt in his mind as to Grant's intention, Lee had taken up the race for position at Spotsylvania. Going himself to Anderson, Pendleton described the route and left with him a competent staff officer to lead the column. Anderson's orders were to start at 3 a. m., but he knew the route he would have to follow to the Courthouse was longer than that pursued by the Federals, so he set his troops in motion at 11 p. m., four hours earlier than ordered. We shall see later how fortunate was the exercise of this initiative on his part. The Artillery of the 1st Corps, which had not been engaged the two preceding days, was ordered to follow the infantry column from Parker's Store.

Anderson's two divisions, with Alexander's Artillery, had about 15 miles to travel, but Fitz Lee and Hampton kept the road open and held back the cavalry during the night in front of Spotsylvania and at Corbin's Bridge, by blockading the narrow avenues of approach through the forest with felled timber. Alexander moved during the night by way of the Shady Grove Road and Corbin's Bridge, rejoining the infantry about daylight near the Po River, where the 1st Corps rested and prepared breakfast. Already the efforts of the Federals to brush the cavalry from their front could be heard in the heavy firing to the left. Grant and Meade, as was their

entire army, were sure the race had been won by them, and heavy attacks were being made by Wilson's Cavalry, on Rosser at the Courthouse, and by Warren's Corps on Fitz Lee at the Spindler farm on the Brock Road. Reaching the Brock House at 7 A. M., Anderson sent Kennedy's and Humphreys' brigades, with two batteries of Haskell's Battalion, to the assistance of Fitz Lee about a mile away, and Wofford's and Bryan's brigades with the rest of the Artillery to Rosser half a mile further to the front. Haskell's two batteries at once became involved in a desperate conflict, in which Capt. Potts was mortally wounded. After two hours they exhausted their ammunition, but not until they had rendered most effective service in repulsing a charge of three of Warren's brigades. Field's Division now came up to the support of Kershaw's two brigades, and extended his line to the left. Five batteries of Huger's Battalion were then posted by Alexander on a ridge in the edge of the pine thicket on the Todd's Tavern Road, where the cavalry had made its stand, and Cabell's Battalion was held in reserve. Fitz Lee when thus relieved joined Rosser at the Courthouse and together they compelled Wilson to retire before them. This enabled Wofford and Bryan to rejoin Kershaw.

After Robinson's repulse, Griffin's Division rendered two assaults, the first suffering a complete repulse, the second enabling the Federals to establish themselves under cover about 400 yards to the right front of the Confederate line, where they began to intrench. Crawford's Division next came up and extended Griffin's line to the left, and then Cutler's Division attacked the Confederate left without success, and prolonged Griffin's line of intrenchments to the right. During the latter's attack, all five of Cabell's batteries under Maj. Hamilton were brought into action. Meantime Haskell's two batteries, which had suffered severely on the Todd's Tavern Road under a reverse fire from a horse battery near the Courthouse, were withdrawn.

Anderson had won his race and Warren's whole corps had been halted over a mile short of its goal by two small Confederate divisions, and the bold use of the artillery, which in places had been brought into action within 400 yards of the enemy, and not over 100 yards from their skirmishers. Instead of being in position waiting for Lee at Spotsylvania Courthouse, the advance of Meade's Army was completely cut off from it and the direct routes thereto.

Both Lee and Meade now began to hurry forward their troops. Ewell had left the Wilderness at dawn and arrived in position on Anderson's right just in time to assist in severely repulsing the combined attack about 5:30 P. M., of Warren's and Sedgwick's corps upon Anderson's line. In this affair nearly every gun of Alexander's command was actually engaged, but only a few of Long's that were in position in front of the Courthouse took part, the bulk of the 2d Corps Artillery arriving later and going into park near the Courthouse for the night. The 8d Corps, under Early, which had been left behind as a rear guard, did not leave its old position until late on the 8th, bivouacking for the night near Shady Grove. During the day a single section of McIntosh's Battalion was engaged with the enemy's cavalry, which pressed upon the flanks of the 8d Corps as it advanced.

Upon arriving at Spotsylvania, early on the 9th, the 8d Corps, with the exception of Mahone's Division, extended Ewell's line of intrenchments to the right, while Mahone moved to a commanding position on Anderson's left, overlooking the Po. The Confederates had now established a line covering Spotsylvania Courthouse, with the 1st Corps on the left resting across the Po River, the 2d Corps in the center north of the Courthouse, and the 8d on the right crossing the Fredericksburg Road. While the brigades and divisions were frequently shifted, these positions were generally maintained during the battles that ensued.

During the 9th, while no attack was made by either side, an incessant sharpshooting was kept up, resulting in many losses to both sides, including the gallant Gen. Sedgwick, who was killed on the Brock Road. The day was largely devoted to the strengthening of old and the construction of new breastworks. The Confederate batteries were extended along the entire front of the line, and most of the guns placed in pits or behind slight epaulments. Cabell's Battalion occupied an elevation in rear of and slightly above Anderson's left, with four guns under Maj. Gibbes on the extreme left of the infantry line. On Cabell's right and in the second line were posted Haskell's Battalion, and Woolfolk's Battery. Huger's remaining five batteries were placed in the infantry line. Beyond them and also with the infantry, Page's and Braxton's battalions were in position with the 2d Corps. The field of fire for the guns at this point, as at the Wilderness, was very limited and the terrain afforded little opportunity for the effective use of artillery. Further to the right and on the left of the Courthouse clearing, Long posted Hardaway's and Nelson's battalions, while Cutshaw's was held in reserve on the road behind them. In the 3d Corps, Walker, upon arriving, dispatched McIntosh's Battalion to the extreme left, where it went into position behind Mahone at a point where the Shady Grove Road crosses the Po River. Poague's Battalion occupied the infantry works on the left of the 3d Corps line, Pegram's the line where it crossed the Fredericksburg Road several hundred yards from the Courthouse, and Cutts' a position on the extreme right in advance of the road to Massaponax Church. Richardson's Battalion was held in reserve behind the center. Thus it is seen that nearly every gun in Lee's Army was in position either in the advanced line, or in works close behind. The nature of the terrain absolutely forbade the effective massing of guns for the more effective command of a given field of fire. The situation demanded, if artillery were to be employed at all, that it should

fight with the infantry, and simply endeavor to sweep the field in its immediate front, and thus supplement the musketry fire. Truly the Artillery was to fight as infantry at Spotsylvania. There was to be no such thing as artillery tactics there. It was simply a question of how much it could increase the intensity of the fire of the defense. No question of the time and the manner in which that fire was to be delivered was open to discussion, for tactics were ruled out in favor of the knock-down-and-drag-out method, which the topography imposed upon the Artillery. Never in all the war was the Confederate Artillery called upon to serve in such a manner as in the days of Spotsylvania.

The principal activity of the enemy on the 9th was in front of the Confederate left and center, but the Artillery fired only a few rounds and those principally at the enemy's sharpshooters whenever they were seen to gather in sufficient numbers to afford a reasonable target.

Hancock crossed his three divisions over the Po on the afternoon of the 9th and occupied the Shady Grove Road, thus threatening the Confederate rear and endangering the trains which were parked on the road leading by the old Courthouse to Louisa Courthouse. Lee's main line was north of the Po, with its left, Field's Division of the 1st Corps, resting on the stream at a point just above the crossing of the Shady Grove Road. Mahone, as we have seen, had been posted with McIntosh's Battalion on the other side of the stream to protect the flank. Lee ordered Early on the morning of the 10th to move around Mahone's left and strike Hancock's right. Taking Heth's Division, Richardson's Battalion and Ellett's Battery of Pegram's Battalion, Early moved to the rear and then followed the Louisa Courthouse Road across the Po until he reached a road coming in from Waite's Shop on the Shady Grove Road. Moving about a mile along this road, he met Hampton's Cavalry falling back before Hancock, who had pushed out a column of infantry

somewhat to the rear of the Confederate line. After driving the Federal advance back to the Shady Grove Road, Early reached Waite's Shop, from which point Heth attacked in earnest, but he was twice repulsed in his effort to gain the ridge upon which only two of Barlow's brigades were posted with artillery, for Hancock had already withdrawn his other divisions. In this attack, Richardson's Battalion came under a heavy artillery fire, and was suffering severely, when Pendleton caused Cabell's Battalion, from its elevated position behind Anderson's left, to concentrate upon the enemy's guns. The effect was instant and Richardson was relieved from a nasty situation. A fire now broke out in the woods, and although Barlow had not been driven from his ridge by Early, Meade ordered him to withdraw to the north side of the stream. Mahone's Division now crossed from the east bank, as the road was clear, with several of McIntosh's batteries, and inflicted some loss upon the retiring Federals, who were compelled to abandon a gun which had been wedged between two trees by its affrighted team. Night was now approaching, and as the enemy was found with artillery well intrenched on the north bank, Early refrained from further attempts and soon Heth returned to the right, leaving Mahone in possession of the position on the Shady Grove Road, from which Barlow had been driven. To this point, all of McIntosh's guns were brought up during the night and intrenched.

During the fighting on the extreme left, Meade had made a tremendous effort to break Lee's line. First a demonstration was made against the right immediately in front of Spotsylvania Courthouse, but the attacking infantry was roughly handled and driven back to their trenches by Cutts' and Pegram's battalions. The main attack was directed against Field's Division on the left, and meeting with a bloody repulse was renewed at 3 P. M. with the same result. In these affairs Cabell, Huger, and Haskell were all heavily engaged. Alexander had posted their guns in such a way that they

partially enfiladed the approaches to the infantry line, and as Warren's troops advanced through the dense thickets in Anderson's front, the woods were riddled with canister, which effectually broke the enemy's formation. As the Federals emerged in bad order, unable to reform under the Confederate musketry fire, but few of them were able to press home, and these were cared for by the infantry, many of the men of which were double armed with the muskets previously abandoned in front of the works by the enemy earlier in the day. The intensity of the Confederate musketry fire, thus increased, was unusual. A lull of several hours now ensued. About 7 P. M. Hancock made the third assault on Anderson's line with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions supported by the 5th Corps. Near sunset, Anderson's skirmishers were suddenly swept back, and almost without warning the successive lines of the enemy were soon seen surging forward at the trot. Rushing forward, the front line dissolved, but on came the determined supports, driving the Confederates from their works, but failing to break their resistance. The line of the defenders was nearly bent back by the pressure and the fight continued in the rear of the breastworks until Anderson's Brigade, which had cleared its front, was able to turn upon the flank of the assailants and drive them over and beyond the works which they had so gallantly taken.

As to the character of the work the Artillery performed in these attacks, a vivid description of the foregoing affair by the adjutant of Cabell's Battalion is here inserted:*

"The troops supporting the two Napoleon guns of the Howitzers (1st company) were, as I remember, the Seventh (or Eighth) Georgia and the First Texas. Toward the close of the day, everything seemed to have quieted down, in a sort of implied truce. There was absolutely no fire, either of musketry or cannon. Our weary, hungry infantry stacked arms and were cooking their mean and meager little rations. Some one rose up and looking over the works—it was shading down a little toward the dark—cried out:

**Four Years under Marse Robert*, Stiles, p. 254.

'Hello! what's this? Why, here come our men on the run, from—no, by Heavens! it's the Yankees!' And before any one could realize the situation or even start towards the stacked muskets, the Federal column broke over the little works, between our troops and their arms, bayoneted or shot two or three who were asleep, before they could awake, and dashed upon the men who were at their low fires,—with cooking utensils instead of weapons in their hands. Of course they ran. What else could they do?

"The Howitzers—only the left, or Napoleon section was there—sprang to their guns, swinging them around to bear inside our lines, double shotted them with canister, and fairly spouted it into the Federals, whose formation had been broken in the rush and plunge over the works, and who seemed to be somewhat massed and huddled and hesitating, but only a few rods away. Quicker almost than I can tell it, our infantry supports, than whom there were not two better regiments in the army, had rallied and gotten to their arms, and then they opened out into a V shape and fairly tore the head of the Federal columns to pieces. In an incredibly short time those who were able to do so turned to fly and our infantry were following them over the intrenchments; but it is doubtful whether this would have been the result had it not been for the prompt and gallant action of the artillery.

"There was an old Capt. Hunter,—it seems difficult to determine whether of the Texas or the Georgia Regiment,—who had the handle of his frying-pan in his hand, holding the pan over the coals, with his little slice of meat sizzling in it, when the enemy broke over. He had his back to them, and the first thing he knew his men were scampering past him like frightened sheep. He had not been accustomed to that style of movement among them, and he sprang up and tore after them, showering them with hot grease and hotter profanity, but never letting go his pan. On the contrary, he slapped right and left with his sooty, burning bottom, distributing his favors impartially on Federal and Confederate alike—several of his own men bearing the black and ugly brand on their cheeks for a long time after, and occasionally having to bear also the captain's curses for having made him lose his meat that evening. He actually led the counter-charge, leaping the works, wielding and waving his frying-pan, at once a sword and a banner."

Now exactly how accurate this interesting account is, the writer cannot pretend to say, but it is valuable as is the following incident from the same pen:

"There were two men in the First Howitzers older than most of us, of exceptionally high character and courage, who, because of the deafness of the one, and the lack of certain physical flexibility and adaptation in the other, were not well fitted for

regular places in the detachment, or service about the gun. For a time, one or both of them took the position of driver, but this scarcely seemed fitting, and one or both were finally classed as ' supernumeraries,' but with special duties under the surgeon of the battalion, as bearers of our camping litters and our other simple medical and surgical outfit. For this and other reasons the elder of these two good and gritty soldiers was always called 'Doctor.'

"When the break occurred these two men, always at the front, were overwhelmed with amazement, not so much at the irruption of the enemy, as at what seemed to be the demoralized route of the Georgians and Texans. They ran in among them asking explanation of their conduct, then appealing to them and exhorting them, the Doctor in most courteous and lofty phrase: 'Gentlemen, what does this mean? You certainly are not flying before the enemy! Turn, for God's sake; turn, and drive them out!' Then with indignant outburst: 'Halt, you infernal cowards!' and suiting the action to the words, these choleric cannoneers tore the carrying poles out of their litters, and sprang among and in front of the fugitives, belaboring them right and left, till they turned, and then turned with them, following up the retreating enemy with their wooden spears.

"Some weeks later, after we had reached Petersburg in the nick of time to keep Burnside out of the town, and had taken up what promised to be a permanent position and were just dosing off into our first nap in forty-eight hours, an infantry command passing by, in the darkness, stumbled over the trail handspikes of our guns, and broke out in the usual style: 'Oh, of course! Here's that infernal artillery again; always in the way, blocking the roads by day and tripping us up at night. What battery is this anyway?' Some fellow, not yet clean gone in slumber, grunted out: 'First Company Richmond Howitzers.' What a change! Instantly there was a perfect chorus of greetings from the warm-hearted Texans. 'Boys, here are the Howitzers! Where's your old deaf man? Trot out your old Doctor. They're the jockeys for us. We are going to stay right here. We won't get a chance to run if these plucky Howitzer boys are with us.' ""*

Clearly Meade could not break Anderson's line. But he met with better success in the center, where he had massed about 40,000 of his men against Ewell's line. With the eye of an engineer, he had detected the weak point, where a long salient jutted out in advance of the

*The Richmond Howitzers had a splendid reputation throughout the Army. The personnel was unusual. Stiles and others tell us that it included many professional and college men, and that one of the privates actually kept a diary throughout the war in Greek. There was a law club in the battery, a trained Glee Club, and orations were frequently delivered in Latin at the gatherings of the men, as well as Greek odes.

general line, and in front of which there was a most limited field of fire. He saw that an overwhelming force massed near the enemy's line could by sheer weight break it at that point. In the hasty extension of the Confederate line on the 8th, Ewell, to keep on high ground, had occupied with his left and center an elevation running nearly a mile in advance of Anderson's line, then bending back so abruptly that the gorge of the immense salient was but three-fourths of a mile wide. The forward angle of this salient was occupied by Doles' Brigade, of Rodes' Division, and Smith's Howitzer Battery of Hardaway's Battalion. It has since the events of the 10th been known as the "Bloody Angle."

From the first, Meade had been reconnoitering and feeling Ewell's weak point. The Confederates behind the works had thrown up traverses on both sides of the salient at close intervals to protect themselves against the enfilade fire of the Federal skirmishers, and other than this no effort had been made to correct the evils of the position. On the morning of the 10th, Long had relieved Braxton's and Page's battalions, substituting Nelson's and Hardaway's battalions for them. Nelson now occupied Johnson's and Hardaway Rodes' front.

At 5 P. M. Col. Emory Upton silently led twelve regiments with fixed bayonets and loaded muskets through the thicket in Doles' front, after carefully explaining the part each was to play. Upon reaching the works, half the leading column of attack was to sweep to the right and half to the left down the faces of the salient, while a second line was to remain in position at the angle and open fire to the front.

Upton's men succeeded in rushing the works at the angle, and after a desperate hand-to-hand encounter, swept the Confederates from behind their traverses; many combatants on both sides were killed and wounded. But as the Federals swept through the gap thus made, Daniels' Brigade on one side, and Stuart's on the other drew back from their lines and fell upon

the flanks of the enemy, while Battle's and Johnson's brigades were hurried up from the left and thrown across the gorge. Mott's Division was to have supported Upton on the left, but upon forming for the advance, found itself the target of Hardaway's and Nelson's batteries on Ewell's right, and were compelled to abandon the task assigned it. In fact, Mott's brigades were broken by the Confederate Artillery, and driven back in confusion to the cover of their works at the base of the hill in Ewell's front. Assailed on three sides at once and unsupported, Upton's men were first forced back into the angle, in turn seeking cover behind the traverses, and then over the works, retiring in disorder to their own lines, after a loss of 1,000 men, or 20 per cent of the number engaged in the assault, while Ewell lost 650 men, 350 of whom were captured.

In the *mêlée* following upon the irruption of the Federals into Ewell's works, Smith's Richmond Howitzer Battery at the angle was seized by the enemy, but later recovered, the battery commander maintaining his fire until he with a number of his cannoneers was actually snatched from among the guns by the assailants. In the subsequent repulse of the Federals, Hardaway's remaining batteries were alone engaged. Thrown into position on the right of the salient, these four batteries had relentlessly poured canister into Upton's huddled troops and pursued them with their fire until they left the works. Two of Cutshaw's batteries which had been held in reserve near the Court-house were rushed to the gorge, but were too late to assist in the repulse. As the Federals withdrew, some of the men of Garber's Battery of Cutshaw's Battalion, under their captain, entered the works and turned two of Smith's guns, for which no cannoneers remained, upon the fleeing masses. Both Lieut-Col. Hardaway, and his field-officer, Maj. David Watson, were wounded, the former slightly, the latter mortally, but in spite of a painful wound, Hardaway with his clothes riddled with bullets remained at his post and directed the fire of

his batteries. The loss of Maj. David Watson was a serious one. In the words of the Chief of Artillery, this veteran artilleryman who had served from the very first of the war as a lieutenant at Yorktown with Magruder, then as captain of the 2d Company of Richmond Howitzers until his recent promotion, was "an accomplished gentleman, a faithful, patriot, and gallant soldier."*

Grant attributed the failure of Upton's attempt of the 10th to Mott's inability to advance, and on the 11th planned a much more powerful attack to be made by the whole of the 2d and 9th Corps. The angle was again selected for the focus of the assault.

A much exaggerated report of Federal activity on the Confederate left led Lee to believe that Meade would attempt to move in that direction during the night, so the chiefs of artillery were ordered to withdraw all their guns from the front line, in order that the Confederates might move under cover of darkness without being heard. Mahone's Division on the extreme left was ordered to march during the night and occupy Shady Grove before daylight. Gen. Long had in the morning placed Cutshaw's and Page's battalions in position along Johnson's front, the weakest part of Ewell's line, relieving some of Hardaway's batteries. Late in the afternoon the orders came to him to have "all of his batteries which were difficult of access" prepared to be removed before dark and was informed that the projected movement required him to be ready to take up the march at a minute's notice. He immediately ordered all the artillery on Johnson's front, except two of Cutshaw's batteries, to be withdrawn, as it had to pass through a wood by a narrow and difficult road, and the night bid fair to be very dark. Alexander showed more foresight on this occasion than Long, for he ventured to accomplish the intent of the order without

*For full and accurate account of his life and military career, see *The University Memorial*, p. 570. He was the devoted friend and companion of Col. Brown, who fell but four days before him. The sad coincidence of their deaths and the similar features of their characters and careers lead us to paraphrase what Tacitus wrote of Agricola, "*Similes non vitæ tantum claritate, sed etiam opportunitate mortis.*"

literal compliance with it. Thus while Long withdrew twenty-two guns of Page's and Cutshaw's battalions from the salient, Alexander visited every one of his batteries in person, had their ammunition chests placed on the limbers (they were usually dismounted and placed beside the guns in the pits), and the carriages so placed and the roads leading from the works so marked and prepared that they could easily withdraw without making the slightest noise. All of Longstreet's guns, therefore, remained in position.

About 8 A. M., Lee discovered that Meade was massing for an assault upon Ewell instead of withdrawing from his lines, and the orders to the Artillery were at once countermanded. But already Ewell's line, which had been caused to conform to the terrain for the sole purpose of affording the Artillery good positions, was practically stripped of its guns and now remained a dangerously weak projection, with a very poor field for musketry fire. Naturally defective, yet with artillery so posted as to sweep its faces, many of the objections to the salient line had been overcome. Now the line was totally lacking in defensive qualities, with the exception that a hasty line of intrenchment had been partially completed across the gorge.

All night Meade was engaged in massing Barlow's, Birney's, Mott's, and Gibbon's divisions in front of Johnson. The charge was ordered for 4 A. M., but owing to a fog Hancock, who was to direct the attack, delayed until 4:35. The distance to the Confederate works was about 1,200 yards. The Federal masses were very compactly arranged, too much so for freedom of action over the ground to be traversed. Moving off quietly and slowly, it was not until the Confederate pickets gave the alarm that the Federals broke into a run and commenced to cheer.

Johnson's men had heard the enemy's column forming, and repeated calls had been sent for the Artillery. Long had already received orders to return the guns to the works, and Cutshaw and Page were hastening back by separate routes.

The Federals came on, to use Gen. Johnson's words, "in great disorder, with a narrow front, but extending back as far as I could see." But there was hardly a gun to fire upon the seething, confused mass of Federals. Truly a great opportunity had been sacrificed, for it is dreadful to contemplate what the effect of Long's twenty-two guns would have been had they opened a concentrated fire on the Federal column. It is not difficult to picture the result, however, for that dense, overcrowded column would never have reached the Confederate works. What an opportunity was this for the artillery! Never since Pope uncovered Porter's flank at Second Manassas to Reilly's guns had the breast of the Federal Infantry been so bared. "Nowhere else in the whole history of the war was such a target presented to so large a force of artillery. Ranks had already been lost in the crowd, and officers could neither show example nor exercise authority. A few discharges would have made of it a mob, which could not have been rallied. There was a thick abattis of felled trees in front, and 'chevaux de frise,' which, Barlow says, 'would have been difficult to get through under a cool fire.' For the mob, which his division would have soon formed, there would have been no escape but flight, with phenomenal loss for the time exposed to fire."*

"Had the Artillery been in position the result might have been different, or had the weather been favorable, the disaster might have been avoided; but the morning was so dark and foggy that it was with difficulty that we could distinguish friend from foe." These are the comments and explanations of Gen. Long, himself, but his guns were not there and he had lost his great chance. And here it may be said that nothing so well illustrates the difference between Alexander and Long as the manner in which they both complied with their orders on this occasion. We sometimes hear that great soldiers have often been the product of opportunity. But this is not generally true. The casual observer fails to de-

**Military Memoirs of a Confederate, Alexander*, p. 520.

tect the fact that it is preparedness to profit by opportunity, and not merely the favor of fortune that enables soldiers to win great reputations. Take for instance the case just considered. Alexander sized up the situation at a glance, and stood prepared to grasp what he foresaw as a great opportunity, should it be presented to him. Long failed utterly to realize what might be in store for him, and neglecting to prearrange therefor, the greatest opportunity of his military career passed him by. True he obeyed his orders and cannot be censured. The point made is not one of blame, nor does opportunity weigh orders.

The two leading guns of Page's Battalion only arrived in time to unlimber and fire three rounds between them into the Federal masses before they were surrounded and seized. Twelve of Page's, and eight of Cutshaw's guns were then captured along with two-thirds of Johnson's Division, including the division commander and Brig.-Gen. Steuart. Only the two rearmost guns of Montgomery's Louisa Battery of Page's Battalion escaped.

The Confederate Infantry in the salient, deprived of their artillery, had done all it could to check the onward rush of the Federals. The whole thing happened so quickly that neither Hancock nor Ewell at first realized the extent of the disaster to the Confederates. After their first success, the disordered Federals paused in the advance to reform; as the fugitives from the salient streamed to the rear, they met reinforcements from the brigades of Johnston and Gordon on the right, and from those of Daniel and Ramseur on the left, who promptly checked the disorganized pursuers. The situation was indeed a critical one for the Confederates, and Gordon's (Early's) Division had only arrived in the nick of time to establish the new line. Again Gen. Lee had placed himself at the head of his troops to lead them forward, and again the men had insisted on his retiring before they charged the enemy and pressed them back to the head of the salient.

Upon learning that Hancock's advance was being checked, Grant ordered eight brigades of the 6th Corps to reinforce him, and about 8 A. M. these additional troops increased the confusion and crowding in the limited space within the salient. Burnside had also been ordered to assault the Confederate lines and about 5 A. M. fell upon A. P. Hill on the right. On Hill's left center, Burnside met with no success whatever, Nelson's, Poague's, and Pegram's battalions simply tearing the dense attacking columns to pieces as they appeared in the open, but on the extreme right Potter's Division swept Lane's Brigade from its trenches and seized two guns of Cutts' Battalion. But Lane reformed his men some distance to the rear and recovered both his works and the guns, driving Potter off. Failing in his attack, Burnside was then ordered to move to his right and connect with Hancock's line, which he did by 9:15 A. M. Meanwhile both sides had moved up artillery to bear on the salient space, across the gorge of which the Confederates had formed behind the uncompleted breastworks. About this time a most gallant act occurred. Unable to draw off two guns of the Staunton Battery, which they had seized, the Federals had left them between the lines. Cutshaw and Garber, the latter the battery commander, now saw these guns standing idle in the lead-swept space. Not a moment did they hesitate, but, followed by those men of the battery who had escaped capture, rushed to the pieces, turned them upon the enemy and maintained their fire until the Federal line again swept forward. There between the struggling lines they plied the guns with many thousand eyes upon them, and not a cannoneer faltered at his post. But if this exploit was superb what of that of the gallant Capt. Charles R. Montgomery, who had saved two of his pieces when the other guns of Page's Battalion were captured? Appreciating the seriousness of the situation he had moved without a word of direction one of his guns with great labor down a small ravine on the right of the Harris house to a point within two hundred yards

of the enemy, and from that position maintained his fire against all odds until three full caissons had been exhausted.

The conspicuous gallantry of Cutshaw, Garber, and Montgomery on this occasion won the plaudits of two armies, but alone they could not resist the increasing pressure on their front. Braxton's, Nelson's, and a part of Hardaway's Battalion had been promptly posted by Col. Carter under the direction of Gen. Long on a second line in rear of them at the gorge, and to the left of the Courthouse. From this group, therefore, Capt. Dance with Hardaway's batteries now moved forward to the gorge, but by noon Long was compelled to call for artillery reinforcements from the other corps. Accordingly Col. Cabell with the 1st Company of Richmond Howitzers was ordered to Ewell's line from the left and went into action at the left base of the salient just to the left of Dance's batteries while McIntosh, with two batteries, also arrived, going into position at the Harris house, and posting two guns above the McCool house.

A tremendous infantry combat had been raging for some time before the artillery reinforcements arrived. Lee had brought up Perrin's, Harris' and McGowan's brigades from his left, and Grant had assembled twenty-four brigades in and about the angle of the salient. He had also posted field batteries to rake its faces, while eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars from the reserve were placed so as to drop shells behind the work at the gorge and behind the traverses along the western face. Before 10 o'clock, Gen. Lee had brought up every man and gun to the salient that could be spared for the defense of his broken center. From then on, it was but a question of endurance, for all day long the struggle continued, neither side being able to make a successful advance. During the day diversions were made on both sides in favor of the center, the most serious fighting being that between Warren and Anderson west of the salient.

At dawn, Warren had opened all his guns and sent forward skirmishers to prevent Anderson from detaching troops to Ewell's support. Alexander's guns, all in position, replied slowly to those of Warren, their presence seeming to deter him in his attack. Finally, at 9:15 A. M., Grant ordered him to attack at once, and about 10 A. M. his men appeared in the open. By common consent, Anderson's Infantry and the Artillery in the trenches both held their fire until the Federal lines were within 100 yards, then opened, while the guns which Alexander held in his second line engaged the enemy's batteries and diverted their fire from the works. No sooner did the blizzard of Confederate fire burst upon them than Warren's men turned and fled in such utter consternation that it would seem two of his divisions lost their bearings in retiring, and engaged in a fire fight with each other for some time, in which both lost heavily, while the amazed Confederates merely listened as at Chancellorsville during Sickles' attack. The havoc worked with Warren's assaulting columns, not half so dense as those of Hancock, gives some indication of what would have happened to the latter had Long's Artillery, like Alexander's, been in position.

Soon after Warren's failure, his corps, with the exception of four brigades, was transferred to the angle, adding eight more brigades to the twenty-four already massed there for a fresh attack, but Grant abandoned his determination when it was discovered that Lee had greatly strengthened the gorge line and brought many batteries to bear on the space in front, in addition to having reinforced his infantry. The Federals for the rest of the day simply contented themselves by keeping up a heavy infantry and artillery fire to which the Confederate Infantry replied, while the Artillery maintained only a desultory fire in order to save ammunition.

When night fell, Grant had lost in his great assault, 6,820 men; Lee 9,000, of which 4,000 were prisoners, and twenty guns. Hancock's attack had failed by reason of the excessive number of men required to maneu-

ver over so limited a space, and nothing of importance had been accomplished but the compelling of Lee to correct a faulty line, and a certain advance in the relentless process of attrition, which comprised the major part of the Federal strategy.

During the night, the remnant of Ewell's Corps abandoned the faces of the salient, the rear portions of which it held throughout the day, and established itself behind and improved the works at the gorge. Before morning, Long's Artillery, with the batteries sent to its assistance, was well intrenched in strong positions, completely dominating the space within the abandoned faces of the salient. The 13th, therefore, proved a day of rest since Grant wisely gave up his efforts to break Lee's new line. In fact, his troops themselves rendered the verdict, for while as brave as any that ever lived, they were after all human, and conscious of the futility of further assaults.

On this day, Maj. Cutshaw was assigned to the command of Hardaway's Battalion, Hardaway having at last been compelled by his wounds to relinquish active command. The remnants of Cutshaw's and Page's battalions were united under Maj. Page.

The losses in the 2d Corps Artillery had been unusually heavy, but in the other corps little damage had been received. First Lieut. Dent Burroughs, commanding Moody's Battery, Huger's Battalion, had been killed by a shot which penetrated the works. He was said by Alexander to have been a superb young officer. Several of the 1st Corps guns in the infantry trenches had been struck and disabled in the repulse of Warren's assault.

While the Light Artillery was engaged at Spotsylvania, the Horse Artillery was winning laurels on other fields. Pelham's and Breathed's old battery, now under Capt. P. P. Johnston, had again distinguished itself while operating with Fitz Lee on the 8th. On that occasion, the battery was near the Courthouse, and well to the front of a portion of Anderson's

Corps. A strong line of the enemy suddenly advanced against Johnston's unsupported guns, which he held in position, firing rapidly, while the led horses and dismounted men were retired. The Federals were so numerous that four guns were unequal to the task of holding them back, and on they pressed, bent on seizing the battery. Maj. Breathed, who was present, finally ordered Johnston to retire his left section, leaving the other with him to cover the withdrawal, but the captain declined to leave any of his guns while in action, and undertook to withdraw them piece by piece. When the enemy had begun to cry for their surrender, and while he was preparing to move off the last piece, Johnston was shot through the shoulder, and before the gun could be limbered the drivers and horses of the lead and swing teams were struck down, and the arm of the driver of the wheel team was shattered. As if unconscious of the presence of the enemy, Maj. Breathed sprang from his horse, cut loose the disabled teams that were struggling on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and brought off the gun almost as if by a miracle, while the surging enemy mingled their cheers with those of Anderson's men, who now crossed the crest in rear of the battery, and stopped the pursuit. Breathed, Breathed, what a name is thine! How justly are thy praises sung by comrades and the erstwhile foe alike. It was you of whom Wade Hampton wrote, "A braver and more gallant soldier never lived"; whom Fitz Lee characterized as "one of the bravest and best soldiers the Confederacy produced"; of whom Wickman said, "Capt. Breathed is the best man for the management of a battery of horse artillery that I have ever known"; whom Rosser declared to be "one of the most noted officers in the Confederacy for fighting qualities," and whom Munford claimed to be "as brave an officer and as hard a fighter as appeared in the war." Of him Fitzhugh Lee, years after the war, also wrote, "Should I, for any reason, go to the field again, and get in the saddle once more, no one would I rather have by my side, were he living, than the gallant

Breathed." Stuart's opinion of Breathed is amply testified to by the following letter from him to Lee concerning him: "I will never consent for Capt. Breathed to quit the Horse Artillery, with which he has rendered such distinguished service, except for certain promotion, which he has well earned."

But, see what the Commander-in-Chief, himself, is said to have written of this young officer—"With an army of Breathed's, I could have conquered the world."

During the 8th, Sheridan concentrated his cavalry in rear of the Federal Army, and moved to the vicinity of Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 9th, with about 12,000 troops and a large body of horse artillery, he struck the Telegraph Road, *via* Hamilton's Crossing, and advanced upon Richmond. At Mitchell's Station, he was resisted by Wickham, who was then reinforced by Stuart with Fitz Lee's and Gordon's brigades, Johnston's, Griffin's, and a section of Hart's batteries. Again the Confederate Cavalry sought to check Sheridan's column at Beaver Dam, but failed. After resting his exhausted men for a few hours, Stuart moved rapidly to Yellow Tavern, which he reached at 10 A. M., on the 10th, in advance of Sheridan, and there posted Wickham on his right and Lomax on the left. The latter's line followed the Telegraph Road a short distance, then crossed it to a hill on which Breathed had placed a single piece of Hart's Battery, a section of which also occupied the road, while Johnston's Battery was posted on an elevation in rear of the line.

About 4 P. M., the enemy suddenly attacked, capturing most of the men and horses of Griffin's Battery on the left, but no guns, and driving back Lomax's line. Stuart assembled a handful of men on the road where Hart with two guns remained undaunted, firing into the flank of the enemy as they swept by. The Federals were soon checked by a charge of the 1st Virginia Cavalry and driven past the guns, which continued to fire upon the surging masses. As the enemy's line retired, a dismounted trooper turned as he passed and dis-

charged his pistol at Stuart. Thus was the fatal wound inflicted upon the great cavalry leader while he stood mounted among his guns, seeking by his example to rally his cavalry. He died two days later in Richmond.

The Confederate Cavalry was now badly broken up, and Hart almost alone remained between the fallen chieftain and the enemy. On this occasion, Hart's conduct was as heroic as Poague's had been at the Wilderness. The result of the battle is known. The Confederate Cavalry certainly met with defeat, but Sheridan had been delayed and failed to enter Richmond. We search in vain, however, for reference to the leading part which the Horse Artillery took in this delaying action, notwithstanding the fact that it bore the brunt of the Federal attack, saved the Cavalry from a complete rout, and remained alone in action long enough for the bulk of the Cavalry to rally and retire in order. One cavalry regiment, the 1st Virginia, kept its organization and supported the batteries after the enemy was checked.

Meanwhile, Shoemaker's Battery remained with W. H. F. Lee, near the Army, while Thomson's and McGregor's under Chew were operating with Hampton and Rosser on the left.

No account of the Artillery at Spotsylvania would be complete without a brief mention, at least, of Maj. Joseph McGraw of Pegram's Battalion.

This remarkable soldier had been discovered by Pegram, who rapidly caused his advancement from a teamster, through the lower grades. He was a man of enormous stature and unusual ability, possessing those rare qualities which distinguish the born commander. His courage was proverbial; the character of the man is well illustrated by the following anecdotes related to the writer by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, Adjutant of Pegram's Battalion.

While sitting on his horse at Spotsylvania a solid shot tore Maj. McGraw's left arm from his body, leaving only a stump in the shoulder socket. For an instant

his officers and men hesitated in their work to proffer aid to their much beloved field-officer. "Don't mind me, men," he cried, "I'm all right—give it to 'em," and with such words on his lips he fell forward from the saddle without a cry of pain.

Upon regaining consciousness, McGraw refused to receive the usual anæsthetic, and exercising the prerogative of his authority as senior officer to the surgeon in attendance, commanded the latter to remove the shattered remains of his arm, which was done without eliciting a groan from the patient or a blink from his marvelous blue eyes.

One of his officers undertook to commiserate with the Major over his wound. "Pretty bad," replied McGraw, "I reckon I'll be off duty thirty days."

Sometime after McGraw's wounding, Col. Pegram and his adjutant, who like Damon and Pythias were inseparable, were sitting in their tents in the lines at Petersburg. Orders had been given that no one should approach the lines mounted, as the danger from Federal sharpshooters was very great. The hoof falls of a horse were heard approaching, and running to the tent door to see who the reckless equestrian might be Col. Pegram was confronted by McGraw, who calmly and in the most soldierly manner saluted with his right hand and reported, "Sir, Maj. Joseph McGraw returns to duty."

Just before the withdrawal of the Army from the Petersburg lines McGraw was promoted lieutenant-colonel and placed in charge of 24 guns with their horses. A few days later on the retreat he jocularly declared that he held an unparalleled military record in that he had lost 28 guns in 24 days! McGraw knew that the man did not live who could justly criticize the rectitude of his conduct in battle.

CHAPTER XXXIX


THE NORTH ANNA

IN the interval between the 12th and 18th of May, Lee gradually moved his army eastward to meet corresponding movements of the enemy. The first Corps was shifted on the night of the 15th, from the extreme left to the extreme right beyond the Fredericksburg Road and extending to the Po. Huger's and Haskell's battalions were placed in position along the new line, while Cabell's was held in reserve. On the morning of the 18th, Meade again attempted to break Lee's line at the salient where Ewell remained in position with thirty pieces of artillery well posted. Long withheld his fire until the dense attacking column came within short range, when Col. Carter in command of Page's re-organized battalion gave the word to fire. The murderous fire of canister and spherical case at once arrested the advance, threw the enemy into confusion, and hurled them back in disorder, and this before they entered the zone of effective musketry fire. Indeed before emerging from the woods, the attacking infantry was much shaken; some of the enemy's brigades were almost at once eliminated by the furious fire of the hostile artillery. Only a few of the assailants reached the abattis, none penetrated it, and the attack over the identical ground, which had formed the battlefield of the 12th, was not renewed. Few of the Confederate infantrymen discharged their muskets, and practically no loss was sustained either by the Confederate Artillery or Infantry. The Federal medical returns state that "five hundred and fifty-two wounded was the result, and the character of the wounds were unusually severe, a large portion being caused by shell and canister." Thus did the twenty-nine guns actually engaged by Carter overthrow 12,000 picked infantry. One pauses to contemplate what might have been the result on the 12th had Long been prepared

to meet Hancock's attack. When we consider the effect of Alexander's Artillery on that same day, and of Carter's guns on the 18th, the contention that Hancock's crowded masses would never have reached the Bloody Angle on the 12th, had the artillery been in position, seems well supported.

During the afternoon, and after the failure of the Federal assault, Ewell determined to make a flank movement around Meade's right. Braxton, with six guns of select caliber, was ordered to accompany the column, but the roads proving impassable, due to the heavy rains of the past week, he was soon compelled to return to the lines. Simultaneously with his attack on Ewell, Meade had assailed Hill's line in front of the Courthouse. Placing a number of batteries in a position from which they could partially enfilade the works of the 3d Corps, Meade attempted to advance a large number of guns under cover of their fire, and with them prepare the way for a large infantry assault in force. Pegram's and Cutts' batteries bore the brunt of the furious cannonade, which ensued during the next hour, and succeeded in silencing the more advanced batteries of the enemy, which caused the attack to be abandoned. In the artillery duel Maj. Joseph McGraw, of Pegram's Battalion, was severely wounded, as were several other officers. Richardson's Battalion further to the right and Alexander's Artillery beyond were not engaged.

Unsupported by artillery, Ewell had lost 900 men, but he learned on the 19th that the enemy had not only moved from Anderson's front, leaving his dead and wounded on the ground, but was also preparing to move from his own front. Early on the 21st he discovered that he was unopposed, so the 2d Corps, with all its artillery, was moved to the right, passing by the other corps to the Telegraph Road south of the Po, and then by that road toward Hanover Junction. Later in the day, the 1st Corps, with its artillery and some of Walker's battalions, followed Ewell. That night the



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILFRED E. CUTSHAW

8d Corps with its remaining artillery brought up the rear after a collision with Warren's troops, in which sharp skirmishing occurred. A. P. Hill then moved upon Hanover Junction by a road slightly west of and almost parallel to the Telegraph Road. About noon on the 22d, after a march of thirty miles, the head of Lee's column reached the North Anna, and before night the whole army was in position on the south bank, having moved over the chord of the arc which Grant had been compelled to follow.

In the new position near Hanover Junction, the 1st Corps occupied the center at the Telegraph Road bridge, the 2d extending down and the 8d up the river on the right and left, respectively. The small works at the crossing, which had been prepared in advance, were now greatly strengthened and every available gun was placed in position, the Artillery with an extensive and unrestricted field of fire completely commanding every approach.

Breckinridge's Division from the Valley joined the Army here with two battalions of artillery under Maj. William McLaughlin; these troops were held in reserve at Hanover Junction.

The reinforcement which Breckinridge brought to Lee did not number over 8,500 men, but they were seasoned troops and the additional artillery more than made up for the loss in guns at Spotsylvania. Breckinridge had fought one of the most brilliant small engagements of the war on the 15th at New Market in the Valley, where with about 4,500 men of all arms, he had defeated Sigel with not less than 6,000 men and 28 guns, thus preventing him from seizing the upper Valley and moving around Lee's flank. It was in this interesting battle, of far more importance than the numbers engaged would seem to indicate, that the Corps of Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute with four companies under its commandant and a section of artillery under Cadet Capt. C. H. Minge, aggregating about 250, saved the

Confederates from defeat by a brilliant charge at the crisis of the combat, losing 9 killed and 48 wounded, or over twenty per cent of the Corps.* But the charge of the cadets was not the only brilliant incident of the battle, for Maj. William McLaughlin, formerly captain of the 1st Rockbridge Battery, in command of Breckinridge's Artillery, there won fresh laurels for his arm of the service. His command consisted of Chapman's, Jackson's, and McClannahan's batteries, with six, four, and six guns, respectively, and a total personnel of about 250 men, to which was added in the battle, the cadet section of two rifles and thirty men. This battalion of artillery was one of those which Breckinridge now brought to the Army. The most careful research fails to disclose with certainty the composition of the other battalion at this time under McLaughlin's command. It will be recalled, however, that Pendleton had urged Alexander to endeavor to secure two batteries of Col. J. Floyd King's Battalion for the 1st Corps, but before January this battalion was transferred from the south, where it had been operating, to Gen. Samuel Jones' command in the Department of Western Virginia with the following organization:

Capt. George L. Davidson

Davidson's Lynchburg Battery,	Lieut. John T. Johnson.
Lowry's Wise Legion Battery,	Lieut. J. H. Pence.
Richmond Otey Battery,	Capt. David N. Walker.
Danville Ringgold Battery,	Capt. Crispen Dickenson.

But on May 1, the return of Breckinridge's Division shows the following batteries:

Monroe Virginia Battery,	Capt. George B. Chapman.
Lewisburg Battery,	Capt. Thomas A. Bryan.
Roanoke Battery,	Capt. Warren S. Lurty.
Botetourt Battery.	Capt. Henry C. Douthat.
Rhett (Tenn.) Battery,	Capt. William H. Burroughs.
Tennessee Battery,	Capt. Hugh L. W. McClung.
Charlottesville Battery,	Capt. Thomas E. Jackson.

*For full account of this heroic incident, see *The Military History of the V. M. I.*, J. C. Wise, and *The Battle of New Market*, John B. Wise.

The effective personnel of these seven batteries numbered 80 officers and 597 men. Before Breckinridge joined Lee, he himself was joined by Imboden with McClannahan's Battery, which as we have seen with Chapman's and Jackson's batteries comprised McLaughlin's Battalion. On May 5th, Breckinridge was ordered to send Col. King with two of his four batteries to the Army of Northern Virginia for assignment to the 1st Corps, and the other two were to remain with Breckinridge. According to statements in the history of the Washington Artillery, by Maj. Wm. M. Owen, pp. 828, 847, the 13th Virginia Battalion which he had commanded in East Tennessee was in the trenches with Breckinridge at Cold Harbor on June 6, and was commanded by Lieut.-Col. King, himself, and when he was reassigned to its command July 31 it consisted of Davidson's, Dickenson's and Walker's batteries.

Exclusive of these two battalions, Lee's Artillery personnel now numbered:

1st Corps, 465; 2d Corps, 1,977; and 3d Corps, 2,682; total 4,074, with an aggregate present and absent of 6,568.* The twenty pieces lost at Spotsylvania and the casualties in personnel, were more than compensated for by the reinforcement with Breckinridge, so that at the North Anna, Lee had in the strongest position he had yet occupied in this campaign, and by far the most favorable one for artillery, not less than 225 guns manned by the most numerous artillery personnel ever brought by him into action.

At this time, the Federal Army, with the reinforcements it had received, numbered about 100,000 men with an undiminished force of artillery, while the entire Confederate force, including an additional reinforcement which soon arrived under Pickett, did not exceed 40,000 men, or about 35,000 infantry and 5,000 artillery. According to Col. Taylor's estimate, the reinforcement received by the Confederates from the Wilderness to Cold

*See *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXXIII, p. 1186.

Horse Artillery, 478 present for duty. Aggregate present and absent, 674.

Harbor, was about 14,400 men, while during the same time Grant brought up 50,000 fresh troops. Thus it is seen that the proportion of artillery to infantry continued to increase as the infantry failed in numbers, being now nearly seven guns per thousand infantry, with the artillery personnel comprising about one-seventh of the field army. Truly were the precedents of Frederick and Napoleon being followed.

The Confederates had hardly commenced intrenching on the 23d, when the enemy appeared on the north bank in the forenoon, and opened fire with artillery upon the bridge-head works at the north ends of the railroad and Telegraph Road bridges, which had been constructed the year before. Eight guns of Huger's and a like number of Haskell's Battalion were quickly placed in position near the river by Alexander for the defense of these works, while the Chief of Artillery reconnoitered the defensive line above and below them. The fords on the right were soon protected by the Artillery of the 2d Corps, Braxton's Battalion being posted well in advance near the Doswell house. About 4:30 p. m. Warren's Corps crossed the river without opposition at Jericho Ford, four miles above the Chesterfield bridge on the Telegraph Road, while Hancock advanced along the Telegraph Road, and Burnside on his right moved towards Ox Ford Crossing. Burnside was unable to cross and Hancock was held back in reserve. From the 8d Corps, Heth's Division with Poague's Battalion, and Wilcox's Division with Pegram's Battalion, were now sent to oppose Warren, while McIntosh's Battalion was placed in position to cover Anderson's Ford on Hill's right, and below him near the center of the position Maj. Lane with six rifles of Cutts' Battalion was posted on a bluff back of the Montgomery house, which commanded both the Chesterfield bridge and Anderson's Ford above.

Warren had formed line of battle in a very favorable position with his front concealed within the edge of a wood. His left rested on the river, which made a large concave bend in his rear, and again drew near his right.

The open ground in front of his right flank was commanded by his artillery. But, while his position was a strong one, his situation in relation to the rest of Meade's Army was precarious, for a river lay between him and his supports. As Hill's two divisions formed for attack, Poague and Pegram advanced under cover of rising ground behind the right of the line, until within good supporting distance of the infantry, and as the Confederates moved out to attack, their batteries, hitherto unseen, galloped to the crest in their front and opened with destructive effect upon the enemy's reserves at the ford. Cutler's Division on the Federal right was broken and pursued by Hill's troops, but the Federal artillery on that flank first checked the Confederates and then engaged in a duel with Pegram and Poague, who had meanwhile thrown the Federal reserves massed near the left into great disorder. In the Federal center, Griffin's Division in the woods maintained itself with great resolution, and Hill was compelled to forego the attack. In the artillery duel which ensued, Maj. Ward, a most valuable officer of Poague's Battalion, was killed by a cannon shot. Meanwhile, McIntosh had also become engaged with the enemy's artillery, losing Lieutenant Pearce, in command of Clutter's Battery, and a limber by explosion. In the center, Haskell and Huger had held the bridges in their front, but the small infantry line in the works on the north bank had either been captured or forced to retire, leaving the works in the hands of the enemy, who had approached under cover of the ravines leading to the river and which the Confederate batteries were unable to search effectively. At nightfall, the south end of the railroad bridge was burned, and soon the Confederate center and right was moved back to a line further from the river and on more advantageous ground. This line, according to Gen. Alexander, was too good, for its apparent strength defeated Lee's object, which was to induce the enemy, by withdrawing, to attack him. Its center rested on the river half a mile above the Ox Ford bridge, and thence, leaving the

North Anna, it ran across the narrow peninsula formed by the bend in the river, one and a half miles to Little River, where its left rested. From the center on the river the line ran southeast across another bend of the river and rested three miles below near Morris' Bridge. Along the center and right, the batteries of the 1st and 2d Corps were posted with their infantry while the 8d Corps held the left.

On the morning of the 24th, the enemy's 5th and 6th Corps formed in front of Lee's left wing, while the 2d and part of the 9th crossed to the south bank and appeared in front of his right. Occasional skirmishing and artillery firing broke out during the morning, but while Meade's troops were massing nothing serious occurred. Demonstrations on the Confederate left caused Poague's Battalion to be sent to the extreme flank at Little River, Pegram's, McIntosh's, and Lane's battalions retaining their positions of the previous day, while Richardson's with Mahone's Division occupied a second line near the Anderson house. Gordon's Division, with Braxton's Battalion, soon joined Mahone, and Breckinridge's Division with its two artillery battalions was moved up to take Gordon's place on the right.

One need only look at the map to appreciate the peculiar situation of Meade's Army. To say the least, it was a dangerous one, affording a tactical opportunity to the Confederates, which eluded them by reason of the illness of Gen. Lee. The point cannot here be discussed further. The possibilities of the situation belong to the realm of speculation, for the only activity was on the part of the Federals. Burnside was first ordered to attack and carry Ox Ford, which, if done, would at once unite the Federal wings and correct the evils of Meade's position. If successful, the attack would also divide Lee's wings. But Burnside pronounced the task assigned to him impossible, and did not even attempt it. Hancock, on his left and Warren, on his right, each advanced skirmishers and felt Lee's lines, but both reported against a serious attack, for they had acquired

from their recent experiences the utmost respect for the defensive abilities of the Confederates. Furthermore, they now saw the Confederate Artillery well intrenched and bearing upon every portion of the field over which they would have to advance, and well knew the power of its guns in such a position. The lesson of Fredericksburg had not been forgotten to say nothing of recent events at Spotsylvania, where artillery alone had hurled their splendid columns back on several occasions, almost without the aid of infantry. They saw here these same guns in the most favorable position they had yet occupied, with a clear field of fire unbroken by covered approaches of any kind, and they knew that to pass through the zone of artillery fire was but the first stage of the attack, for those guns could not be silenced and would remain in the front line to add their canister to the musketry effect of an infantry, never yet driven from its works. Thus Lee, who, in spite of his physical condition, was seeking to impress his army with the necessity of striking the enemy a crushing blow when the opportunity arrived, was deprived of his chance by the forbidding aspect of his position. Nor was Lee capable at the psychological moment of supplying his army with the necessary energy to enable it to assume the offensive. His subordinates assigned the same objections to an attack on the Federals that the latter had advanced against the plan to assault Lee's position. The country occupied by the Federals on both flanks, and especially on their left, was flat and open, allowing the most effective use of their artillery and infantry behind well prepared intrenchments, and the Confederates knew full well that Hunt was in command of Meade's Artillery. Others might blunder, but they were satisfied that Hunt would make the most of any natural or artificial aid afforded by the terrain, and that as at Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg, and Gettysburg, the Federal Artillery would prove a bulk-head, which could not be battered in, even after the infantry had been driven to cover. If the Federals had learned to respect Lee's

Artillery, none the less had the Confederates learned to respect Hunt. They never entertained the least misgiving as to their ability to drive the enemy's infantry, nor were they especially mindful of the Federal guns in other hands, but there was not a man in Lee's Army who had not been impressed by the splendid abilities of Hunt as an artillerist, and they never counted on his making a mistake. A close study of the struggle between the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac will satisfy the student that no officer in the Federal Army, from first to last, commanded the same respect from his enemy that Henry J. Hunt did.

Had Lee been entirely invalided and absent from his army, as it lay in position on the North Anna, with the Federals in a dilemma before it, it is possible something might have been attempted by the Confederates. Some strong will might have improved the opportunity which Meade's position afforded. But, with Lee present, neither the collective nor any individual will was capable of asserting itself. It was impossible for the Army to realize that he was really incapacitated, and the most natural inertia of his subordinates under the circumstances was heightened by a confidence in his genius, almost sublime. Such is the effect of a master mind upon mediocrity. It may be frequently noted in the history of war. Who would have dared take the lead in Italy with Hannibal present? And in the whole list of Napoleon's marshals, however brilliant as fighting lieutenants they may have been, we fail to detect a single captain. The one man beside Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia, who may be classed as a captain, had fallen at Chancellorsville. Had he been present, even Lee no doubt would have temporarily surrendered the reins of control with a confidence born of experience, impossible in the case of Ewell, A. P. Hill, or Anderson, his corps commanders. This is an assertion which must not be taken as a reflection upon any of the three gallant lieutenants then leading the Confederate Corps, for we are not discussing their potentialities as

captains, but conditions as they actually were. We are projecting our view deep into the human side of the situation, which is the only way a true understanding of many military problems may be had, and the more the historian cultivates this habit, the more correctly will history be written. When Napoleon declared that history was essentially false, he did so in the full knowledge that the historian commonly reasoned from effect to cause, and not from cause to effect. Conscious of the motives which guided his own career and the circumstances which dictated his military maneuvers, his faith in the history of his time based, as it was, upon the imperfect perceptions of his critics, was entirely destroyed, and he realized that what was true in his own case was true in the case of others. With what scorn must he have viewed historians who insisted upon logic for the satisfaction of their formulæ! "Here is a result," said the military critic; "give us that orderly process of reasoning and events which led to it, and in such a way that the science of war as propounded in our manuals will be exemplified." And, so to meet their demands and to discourage his opponents, who invariably sought to observe every rule of war, failing of course in the attempt, he caused Berthier to manufacture what they required. Thus was the world misled, and yet it still continues in the attempt to formulate the operations of one who was neither guided by, nor observed, any rule. All this is true of every great soldier, and never until this fact is grasped will the world appreciate the loss it suffered when Lee died without writing the history of his military career. In that work, had it been written, the mist which enshrouds the science of war, especially the leading of an army, would have been dissipated, for free as he was of all vanity, deceit, and personal interest, he would have set forth no false formulæ as the guiding principles of Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness, and he would have acknowledged many blunders which proved both successful and unsuccessful, and for the commis-

sion of which science has been called upon to supply the reasons. An account of his military operations would have set forth the human side of war as never before or since disclosed, and the full truth of Moltke's definition of war as "the practical adaptation of the means at hand to the accomplishment of the end in view" would have dawned upon every reader. The usual manual of military field engineering prescribes in detail the kind of intrenchments suited to a given position, and even declares how many men are required, and how long it will take them, to erect these works. But suppose the first blow of the mattock uncovers stone instead of sinking the tool in unresisting earth? What then of position and time? Shall the troops lay exposed on the rugged slope simply because the position is the correct one according to formulæ and Kriegspiel? Will the enemy lie dormant, while dynamite is brought forward to supply the place of pick and spade? How better, than by these queries, can the real meaning of the science of war be illustrated, or the tactics of Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness be explained? The leader of troops is but a military engineer by whom every expedient must be employed. In the solution of the problem, if the human, the psychological element, is ignored, the troops will be exposed on the prescribed position.

The foregoing digression may appear at first sight to have little bearing upon the situation at Hanover Junction. In truth it has all to do with it, for in the problem the human element is the unknown factor to the ordinary critic, which, when introduced into the equation, solves it.

Before Lee recovered his motive power sufficiently to take advantage of his opportunity at the North Anna, Grant removed the temptation by withdrawing his troops across the river and setting them in motion for the Pamunkey. During the last two days of his presence before the Confederates, Lee's Artillery had been little engaged. But two incidents in connection with the use

of the guns should be preserved. On the 24th, Lane's Battalion had been actively employed in harassing the enemy near the Telegraph Road bridge, and in doing so had drawn upon itself a heavy fire from the hostile batteries across the river, which caused some loss. Bursting in one of Lane's pits, where several detachments of men were under cover, a shell ignited the tow in a dismounted ammunition chest, which it shattered. The explosion of the ammunition, which was momentarily expected, would probably have killed every man in the pit. Seeing the danger, Capt. John R. Wingfield and private Hemington, without thought for their own safety, sprang to the chest and extinguished the blaze with their hands. The other incident also concerns a battery of this (Cutts' or Lane's) battalion. Battery "A," in command of Lieut. Lucius G. Rees, had been left with McGowan's Brigade as the rear guard of the 3d Corps in the movement from Spotsylvania to the North Anna. It was, therefore, at the very rear of the whole army. When Hill collided with the enemy, Rees with his four guns was cut off by a large force of infantry, and with unusual presence of mind dashed past them to prevent the capture of his battery. This brought him in the enemy's rear, but he unlimbered and, firing a piece at a time, while the others withdrew, he managed to elude his pursuers with the loss of but one man mortally wounded. Moving by a long circuit to the west and south, he then passed around the enemy's right at Little River, and rejoined his battalion on the 24th, after two days of separation, most of which time he was in the enemy's rear.

Pickett's Division of about 8,800 men rejoined from Petersburg about this time.

CHAPTER XL

COLD HARBOR

AT noon on the 26th, Grant sent Sheridan, who had rejoined the Army with the cavalry after a raid to the James River, with the pontoon train to Hanover Town on the Pamunkey River, under orders to prepare the crossing, and after dark the infantry followed. Screened by cavalry pickets, the withdrawal of the enemy was not discovered by the Confederates until the morning of the 27th, when Lee again took up the race. Moving by the Telegraph and parallel roads, towards Ashland, thence towards Atlee's Station, the Army bivouacked for the night after an exhausting march of about fifteen miles near Half Sink and Hughes' Shop. While the Army was covering the remaining thirteen miles to the Totopotomoy on the 28th, Hampton and Fitz Lee, with all the Horse Artillery, were opposing Sheridan's advance at Hawe's Shop on the road from Hanover Town to Atlee's Station. This affair was one of the severest cavalry engagements of the war, and was only broken off by both armies arriving and taking up positions confronting each other. As the Confederates arrived, Breckinridge's Division with McLaughlin's Battalion of artillery occupied the southwest bank of Totopotomoy Creek on the left of Lee's line, at the Hanover Town Road. Next came the 1st Corps, Alexander promptly placing every available gun in position on Anderson's right, then the 2d Corps now under Early, with Long's batteries well placed. The right of the line near and beyond Pole Green Church was occupied by the 8d Corps, while Walker's battalions were parked in reserve behind Breckinridge's Division on the left. Again had Lee won the race, in which at one time the Federals were eight miles nearer Richmond than the Confederates.

The next morning, Walker posted McIntosh's Battalion on the left of the Hanover Town Road to support Breckinridge, before whom the enemy had appeared in force, and the following day some of Lane's batteries were placed in position between McIntosh and McLaughlin. Alexander had skillfully placed batteries from Cabell's and Huger's battalions on Breckinridge's right, so as to secure for them an enfilade fire down his front and a cross-fire with Walker's batteries, and during the 30th and 31st all these guns were constantly and most effectively engaged against the enemy's infantry and artillery. While the enemy demonstrated throughout these two days against Lee's left, active efforts were also directed upon the 2d Corps, the Artillery of which now under Carter, Gen. Long having been incapacitated by a severe illness, proved most effective. Nelson's Battalion on the evening of the 30th accompanied Rodes' Division on the Old Church Road and took a prominent part in the attack which drove the enemy's left from Johnson's farm to Bethesda Church. In this affair, First Lieut. Ancell, of the Fluvanna Battery, a meritorious officer, was killed. Returning to the lines that night with the infantry division, Nelson's Battalion resumed its old position, while Hardaway who had recovered from his wound and rejoined his battalion on the 21st, posted his guns on Nelson's left. Braxton, Cutshaw, and Page held their battalions in reserve.

Though maintaining the greatest activity in Lee's front along the Totopotomoy, Meade could not bring himself to the point of a real assault on the Confederate lines. Again he found Lee well intrenched; the activity of the Confederate artillery alone sufficed to give the warning, for here as before the Confederate batteries held the Federals at arm's length, while the infantry for the most part rested in the trenches. With the exception of Rodes' brilliant attack on the Federal left, the infantry was not called upon to exert itself. On the left where the threat was the most serious, the front was

so thoroughly dominated by McIntosh, McLaughlin, Lane, Cabell and Huger, with upwards of fifty guns, that the Federal Infantry hardly disturbed the men in the trenches. Verily was the Artillery doing its part by its sister arm in this campaign. Shoulder to shoulder it stood with the Infantry and watched and fought while the latter conserved its strength.

On May 30, Hoke's Division with Dearing's old battalion, now commanded by Maj. J. P. W. Read, was ordered to march from Drewry's Bluff and join the Army. The battalion still consisted of Blount's, Caskie's, Macon's, and Marshall's (Stribling's) batteries, with a personnel of 17 officers and 855 men present for duty, and 16 guns.* But one battalion remained absent from the 1st Corps, and that, the Washington Artillery now under Maj. Owen, was stationed near Drewry's Bluff, having rendered distinguished service in the operations against Butler, south of the James.

Before resuming the narrative, it seems proper to give a brief account of the operations of Read's or Dearing's old battalion while detached from the Army with Pickett, especially as no history of the Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia would be complete without reference to the heroic service rendered by one of the batteries in particular.

On the 1st of February, Pickett with Hoke's, Clingman's, and a part of Corse's Brigade, and Read's Battalion, had moved from Kinston, N. C., to threaten Newberne, while Dearing in command of the cavalry covered the front. Barton's three brigades and a naval force on the Neuse were to coöperate with Pickett.

Dearings movement towards the north was successful in diverting the attention of the Federals from Pickett's columns, and Col. R. Taylor Wood, with his small flotilla, effected a complete surprise, capturing a gunboat under the very walls of the fort at Newberne. By 2 o'clock in the morning Pickett reached Bache-

*Now designated 38th Battalion Virginia Artillery.

lor's Creek, seven miles distant, where he struck the enemy's troops whose pickets were captured, but being reinforced the Federal force checked the Confederate advance, after the outer defenses had been lost. Pickett now impatiently awaited the result of Barton's flank movement, which was to open his way to Newberne, but Barton failed to coöperate as planned and after remaining in position all the next day, Pickett was compelled to retire to Kinston after inflicting some damage upon the enemy, including the capture of a section of artillery and a large number of horses, wagons, etc. In Pickett's assault upon the enemy, in front of Newberne, Capt. William H. Caskie in command of the Richmond Hampden Battery, with his teams in a gallop actually led the charge of the infantry. Almost instantly his horse was wounded, but the gallant young officer seized a musket and continued on foot at the head of his battery. Seeing that he was dismounted, Gen. Pickett sent him a fresh horse, upon which he continued in the fight, not halting to unlimber his guns until within a stone's throw of the enemy's infantry. For his superb conduct on this occasion, he was soon promoted, Capt. J. E. Sullivan succeeding to the command of his battery.

The oldest of Read's batteries was the Richmond Fayette, named as we have seen in honor of LaFayette, who was visiting Richmond when it was formed, May 27, 1824. In acknowledgement of the compliment, the distinguished Frenchman presented the battery with two brass 6-pounders, which he had brought to this country during the Revolution. Col. John Rutherford was its first commander, Col. Henry Coalter Cabell commanding it in April, 1861, when it volunteered for duty, soon being assigned to Magruder at Yorktown, from which time it had served in every great battle of Lee's Army.

The Fauquier, or Stribling's original battery, had also served with great distinction from the first, having been specially mentioned in the Federal reports of the

fighting at Turkey Island just after Malvern Hill, where without support it repulsed a cavalry charge. It was one of the few batteries to pursue the enemy on their retreat from Second Manassas. Later it accompanied Longstreet on the Suffolk campaign, in which it was surrounded by an overwhelming force and lost its guns and officers. After the latter were exchanged the battery was reorganized and rearmed with six Napoleons at Richmond, and took part in the Gettysburg campaign as we have seen. Stribling was soon thereafter promoted and succeeded by Lieut. William C. Marshall, who in command of the battery escaped with it from Appomattox, disbanded his men and destroyed his guns at Lynchburg.

The remaining or the Latham-Dearing-Blount Battery was organized in Lynchburg in April, 1861, and served under its first commander at First Manassas. It is said by some to have fired the first Confederate gun on that day. Serving throughout the war with great distinction, it also escaped the Surrender and disbanded at Lynchburg, after destroying its guns. After Latham transferred to the Branch, N. C., Battery, Dearing established his brilliant reputation as an artillerist with this Lynchburg battery.

Such was the record of this battalion, which more than any other had served apart from the army to which it belonged. The foregoing facts have been given lest its detached service on other fields might be thought to have injured its record.

On the 31st, Sheridan took possession of Cold Harbor, to which point Meade at once sent the 6th Corps. The sidling movement was again met by Lee, who dispatched the 1st Corps, a part of the 8d, and Breckinridge's and Hoke's divisions, the last having just arrived from Petersburg, with Read's Battalion of artillery, to his right with a view towards turning and attacking Meade's left. Cabell's, Huger's, Haskell's, and Read's battalions were to coöperate with Kershaw's,

Pickett's, Field's, and Hoke's divisions, respectively, while McLaughlin operated with Breckinridge.

Grant had also ordered Gen. W. F. Smith with the 18th Corps, just landed at the White House with 10,000 men and 16 guns, to Cold Harbor. With but fifteen miles to march, Smith lost his way and it was 4 P. M. of the 1st when the 18th united with the 6th Corps, which arrived about 10 A. M., after a distressing night march.

Kershaw had arrived and attacked Sheridan about 6 A. M., but putting in only two brigades, they were repulsed by the Federal troopers with their magazine carbines. Hoke, on Kershaw's right, who had not been placed under Anderson's command, failed to attack, and the remainder of the long column with practically all the Artillery remained halted in rear on the roads, while the 6th Corps was arriving in support of Sheridan. The whole movement was a distinct failure, and through lack of leadership and clear orders a brilliant opportunity to strike the 6th Corps en route, which was well assembled by 1 P. M., was lost. Meantime, the Confederate column had been ordered to intrench as it stood, and the guns were ordered up and placed along the line. The works were no more than kneeling intrenchments, however, when Grant about 5 P. M. ordered the 6th and 18th corps to assault the Confederate line over an intervening space of about 1,400 yards. Between Kershaw's and Hoke's divisions was an interval of about 50 yards occupied by a strip of marshy ground. The Confederates had given up all ideas of an attack that evening, when a sudden increase of fire along the picket line 300 yards in front of the main line and the opening of the enemy's guns interrupted their digging. It was soon learned that the enemy had been successfully resisted by Hoke, Kershaw, and Pickett, upon whose divisions the attack had fallen, except at the gap, from which a thicket extended well forward, allowing the Federals as at Second Manassas and Fredericksburg to approach the line unobserved. A large Fed-

eral force had worked through this interval to the rear of the Confederate line, and soon compelled Kershaw and Hoke to refuse their adjacent brigades and extend across the gap in its rear. This action, which should have been taken long before, checked the enemy after they had taken several hundred prisoners. Hinton's and Gregg's brigades of the 1st Corps were now hurried to the spot and driving back the enemy reestablished the line, while the Federals intrenched themselves about 800 yards in its front. Darkness put an end to the fight. The Artillery had hardly fired a shot, for so dense were the woods that no position was available for its use. During the night a Napoleon gun of Cabell's Battalion, under Lieut. Falligant, was posted in the rear of the gap in a position much exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters, and not more than 50 yards distant from them. The other pieces of Cabell's Battalion were now posted along Kershaw's, while Huger's and Haskell's batteries occupied Pickett's and Field's line extending to the left.

Meade had also made a serious attempt against the 8d Corps on Anderson's left, but the assault fell upon Heth's position, where Hardaway's Battalion had by merest good fortune been posted near the Mander house. Under cover of a skirt of woods, the Federals advanced to within 50 yards of the Confederate intrenchments, but at that point were overwhelmed by Hardaway's canister fire. Having very little protection, Hardaway's batteries suffered severely and were relieved during the night by Poague's Battalion.

By the morning of the 2d of June, the opposing lines had settled down in their intrenchments closer to each other than ever before, the hostile troops so close that every exposed movement was plainly discernible. Three Federal corps now confronted Lee's right at Cold Harbor, while the other two lay opposite Early's or the 2d Corps, at Bethesda Church. The fighting opened with a renewed effort on the part of the Federals to force the gap in Anderson's line, but Falligant's single piece was

kept constantly in action, and by the expenditure of an enormous amount of canister passed along the line by hand to it for several hundred yards, kept the swampy space clear of the enemy while his gallant detachment was relieved from time to time from the batteries nearby.

In the afternoon, Gen. Early, perceiving a movement that indicated a withdrawal of the enemy from his front, advanced against Burnside's right flank, making a half wheel with the Johnson house position as his pivot. Gen. Long, though still ill, had returned to duty the day before. Cutshaw moved his battalion out of its works and posted it in line with Garber's Battery on the right just beyond the old Church Road.

This was a most fortunate disposition, and one which enabled Garber with canister to check the pursuit of one of Gordon's brigades, which pursuit was repulsed and driven back by the guns. But Early's movement was as a whole most successful. Striking Burnside's Corps while in motion and sweeping down on Warren's right, he not only took a number of prisoners with small loss to himself, but prevented two entire corps from taking part in the attack at Cold Harbor, which had been planned by Grant. Long's Artillery had been greatly assisted by Haskell's Battalion on Field's front, which Alexander had moved out in front of the works in order to get an enfilade fire. This battalion kept up a constant fire upon Warren's line and prevented it from changing front. All day the sharpshooting and artillery practice were incessant. During this day a number of Alexander's gun carriages in Pickett's and Kershaw's front were actually disabled by bullets which passed through the embrasures and cut the spokes of the wheels. The terrain behind the intrenchments was so flat that it was fully exposed to even the frontal fire of the enemy, which prevented all movements of men and horses.

During the day, Grant received a fresh reinforcement of 5,000 troops, who were to take part with Wilson's

Cavalry in a flank attack on Early in the morning, while Burnside and Warren made a frontal assault. Meanwhile, Lee had by marching Breckinridge's, Wilcox's, and Mahone's divisions across his rear, extended Hoke's line to the Chickahominy, picketing the south bank of the river with Fitz Lee's Cavalry and Johnston's and Shoemaker's batteries. During the night, Cutshaw was relieved by Hardaway, and the position of Kershaw's left at the gap was slightly changed and greatly strengthened by placing there four guns of Cabell's Battalion, behind good epaulments, to one of which Falligant's gun was noiselessly withdrawn after the old works were levelled to the ground. Law's Brigade was also moved up as a support and intrenched in rear of the line at this point, for the massing of the enemy's columns opposite had been plainly heard.

The Confederates in the best of spirits and utmost confidence were waiting under arms for the attack, when at the first blush of dawn the fire of the pickets in the gap announced the appearance of the enemy. As the Federals burst from the thickets, not over 100 yards away, wildly cheering and with bands playing in their rear, the Confederates, who for several hours had been fearful lest the attack would not come off, set their teeth and took a firmer hold of their muskets. Pushing forward to the point where the Confederate works stood in the gap the night before, for a moment it seemed to the Federals as if they had succeeded, but not so. Cabell's four pieces under Lieut. Callaway, concealed in their individual works, two on either flank of the infantry trench, which traversed the gap somewhat in rear of the old line, burst forth as if but one gun with doubled charges of canister, partially enfilading the enemy and crossing their fire at the deserted line. Of course, the repulse of the enemy at this point was immediate and bloody, and though Callaway's men suffered from musketry fire at the closest range, alone he would have been able to clear his front. For his superb conduct on this occasion, he was specially mentioned in orders.

Read's guns along Hoke's and those of Cabell on Kershaw's line were equally active, the approach of the Federals generally being arrested about 50 yards from the works. From Kershaw's right, Huger's Battalion delivered a withering enfilade fire upon the space over which the assault was rendered, while Pickett sent forward a line of skirmishers to fire upon the flank of the attacking column. Haskell also opened to aid the troops on his left.

On Early's front, Hardaway secured a most effective oblique fire on the enemy and Cutshaw from his position in reserve moved rapidly to the front of the line and to the left of Hardaway, when the attack developed and from a most exposed point opened a terrific enfilade fire upon the column which assaulted Rodes' works. Heth's Division held the extreme left of Early's advanced line, and to it Poague's Battalion had been assigned. The division commander directed Col. Poague to post two batteries, Wyatt's and Richards', on the left, but after a rapid reconnaissance, Col. Poague reported in favor of a better position, as the one indicated was plainly untenable. Heth, however, reiterated his orders, and nothing was left the gallant Poague but to obey them. As the batteries galloped forward, the heavy line of skirmishers, with artillery in support, which Poague had discovered not over 250 yards away, simply riddled the teams and shot down many of the cannoneers. After firing but a few rounds, the two batteries were so badly crippled that they were no longer able to remain in action. Poague was struck by a fragment of a shell, narrowly escaping death. Capt. Wyatt and Lieut. Rives were killed, many men and horses were killed or disabled, and nothing but the most heroic efforts of the survivors saved the guns from capture. Thus did an infantry commander usurp the function of his artillery leader, and by disregarding the advice and experience of one of the most competent and daring artillerymen in the Army, uselessly sacrifice two superb batteries, which might have rendered valuable service under the di-

rection of their proper leader. It was such ignorance that had long since caused the Artillery to be given a more independent organization, for the experiences of the first year of the war had taught that division and brigade commanders as a rule neither understood nor were capable of handling artillery in camp, on the march, or in action. The employment of the artillery as a whole at Cold Harbor, and in the entire campaign, was marked by a degree of independence of the infantry hitherto unknown. Frequently we have found a battalion of one corps in the line of another corps. It was a fatal mistake to turn Poague over to Heth's mercies, but the error had its good effects, as it simply emphasized the impracticability of the repetition of such a practice, for Col. Walker's protest was prompt and forceful.

On the right, Breckinridge's Division and the 8d Corps, minus Heth's Division and Poague's Battalion, had taken position about Gaines' farm, with the flank of their line resting on the Chickahominy. Pegram's Battalion, to which Dement's and Chew's Maryland batteries from Richmond had now been added, occupied a fine position on Turkey Ridge, with McIntosh's, Richardson's, and Lane's battalions in order on its left. In the rear of his batteries, McIntosh posted a 24-pounder howitzer, which he had adjusted for high angle fire over the ridge, and which he successfully employed with indirect fire against the enemy's working parties in his front. On this part of the field the Federals were generally held at arm's length by the Artillery which was most actively employed. The action proper lasted but about one hour, though at isolated points small attacks reoccurred, and long-range artillery fire was kept up by the enemy until noon. At one point only was the Confederate parapet carried, and this on the right by Barlow's Division, which approaching under cover to within 75 yards of the works swept over them and seized three pieces of artillery. But here Finnegan's Brigade succeeded in driving out the enemy and recovering the guns.

By 7 A. M., Grant had authorized Meade to discontinue his efforts, and gradually the futility of further attack became apparent even to Meade, who had lost over 7,000 men during the morning, while the Confederate casualties did not exceed 1,500, including several hundred captured.

The bulk of the Federal casualties was due to the Artillery which had been superbly handled throughout the day, as testified to by the complaints in the reports of every Federal corps. At many points the enemy had either been enfiladed, as by Cutshaw and Huger, or had met with destructive oblique and cross fires, which, according to Gen. Humphreys, swept through the ranks "from the right of Smith to the left of Hancock." Again he states, "The assault on the 2d Corps could not be renewed unless the enemy's enfilade artillery fire could be silenced," and of the 6th Corps he writes: "During all this time, besides the direct fire, there was an enfilade artillery fire that swept though the ranks from right to left." Here he undoubtedly refers to the effect of Hardaway's, Cabell's, Haskell's, and Huger's guns, which literally tore the assaulting column to pieces. In writing of Smith's attack, he also says: "The fire from the right came from a part of the enemy's works against which no part of our attack was directed, and Gen. Smith was unable to keep it down with his artillery," which is but another reference to the 24 guns which Huger pushed out in front of Pickett and Field. After reading such statements, is it any wonder that when Meade attempted to renew the assault his troops laid down? The order for this fresh effort did not come from Grant, who as we have seen had had enough early in the morning. Meade's was the unconquerable will. He desired to try conclusions again, and would have done so had he been able, but "His immobile lines pronounced a verdict against further slaughter," declared Swinton. Gen. Alexander denies this. He asserts that no such mute protest on the part of Meade's men occurred, and that they lay down merely pending the

organization of a fresh attack, in order to find cover while the arrangements which necessarily consumed much time were being made. This may be true, and as it is more in consonance with the conduct of the Federal Infantry on many other occasions, it probably is. Swinton did not like Grant. He had been caught, it is said, eavesdropping about Grant's headquarters, and re-proved by the stern soldier in no gentle terms. Besides he was writing for home consumption, for already deputations were calling upon Lincoln for the removal of "that butcher Grant." Just as he erred in imputing the order for the renewal of the assault to Grant, so may Swinton have been mistaken in other respects. A good authority declares that Meade's troops, as if by general agreement, after their bloody repulse in the early morning, pinned white badges on their breasts bearing their names and addresses, in order that they might be identified by the enemy since they felt certain that they could not successfully cross the Confederate fire zone. This circumstance, if true, does not indicate that the troops were unwilling and did not intend to renew their efforts, for in no way can that badge be likened to a white feather. On the contrary, it showed that the men who wore it were resolved to do or die, and rather expected to die. That many of his officers and men criticised Grant for what they ignorantly styled the merciless slaughter of his troops cannot be denied. They failed to see that in no other way could he defeat Lee except by fighting, and that to attack the Army of Northern Virginia behind breastworks, under the most favorable conditions, meant heavy losses. If their lack of faith in Grant, coupled with the devotion of the Confederates in Lee, enhanced the chances of Federal losses, that was not Grant's fault, as a general. His was not the character, however, which could make a veteran on the battlefield cry out: "God bless Marse Robert. I wish you were Emperor of this country, and I were your carriage driver."

After all criticism has been passed upon Grant and Meade, the latter a soldier whose great ability was unfortunately overshadowed by the presence of Grant, and who grows in stature with the passing of time, Cold Harbor was but the exemplification of Jackson's statement two years before: "We sometimes fail to drive the Federals from their intrenchments, but they always fail to drive the Confederates out." Let it be asked then, who had succeeded before Grant failed?

To return to our narrative. On June 3 and 4, the Chief of Artillery made a thorough reconnaissance of the Chickahominy fords below Hill's right. On the 2d, Maj. Owen with the 2d, 3d, and 4th companies of Washington Artillery, had been ordered to report to Gen. Ransom at Bolton's Bridge, and to leave the 1st Company at Drewry's Bluff where the battalion had been engaged on the 21st of May with Butler's troops and the Federal gunboats. At 10 A. M. on the 3d the batteries reached Bolton's Bridge, during the fighting at Cold Harbor, and were the next day posted at the fords as far down as the York River railroad bridge by Pendleton. Col. Eshleman now arrived and assumed command. In the meantime, Lieut.-Col. Pemberton, of Vicksburg fame, arrived with the Richmond Defense Battalion, in command of Lieut.-Col. C. E. Lightfoot. This battalion, with Fitz Lee's Division and Shoemaker's and Johnston's batteries, were held in Bottom's Ford to guard Lee's right flank. During the 4th, the enemy appeared, and made strong demonstrations as if to cross the river, but the fire of the Artillery prevented their near approach to the ford.

After several days of inactivity, Lee assumed the offensive. On the 6th, he endeavored to turn Meade's right flank by sending Early to the north of Matadequin Creek, and again on the 7th by a movement south of that stream, but the swampy and impassable character of the terrain prevented any success on both occasions.

When it was discovered on the 7th that the enemy had withdrawn from Field's front, Haskell's Battalion was

transferred to the south bank of the Chickahominy, and posted at the Grape Vine and Federal bridges. During the better part of the next week, skirmishing at short range all along the lines from Pickett's front to the river was incessant, and the Artillery was constantly engaged, though in a desultory way. So close were the lines that the guns had to be thoroughly covered, in spite of which many casualties were incurred, especially in Cabell's Battalion, which lost the veteran battery commander of the 1st Richmond howitzers. No officer in the Artillery had seen more service than Capt. Edward S. McCarthy, who was shot in the head and killed on the 4th.

One matter of particular interest in connection with this random fighting was the employment and development of McIntosh's high angle fire with howitzers adjusted as mortars, a practice which was the outgrowth of the conditions. This indirect method of fire, extensively employed here for the first time, offered many advantages inasmuch as it could be delivered without the exposure of the cannoneers to the vigilant sharpshooters of the enemy. Exceptionally good effect seems to have been obtained by McIntosh with his first howitzer, which led to the use of others, and this is the only instance of indirect fire met with so far, except Alexander's cannonade of Bank's Ford the preceding year. It was subsequently used quite extensively at Petersburg, where it was also necessary to screen the guns and detachments, but never fully appreciated, nor did it attract the attention it warranted. It was to be many years before Gen. Langlois was to give to the world indirect fire in its modern stage of perfection.

It was in connection with McIntosh's experiments with his howitzers that Pendleton sought the assistance of the Chief of Ordnance in the preparation of "stink-shells." In other words he desired to secure a projectile from the bursting of which in the enemy's works a suffocating effect would be obtained. "It seems at least worth a trial," he wrote. He also urged that hand

grenades be provided the Confederate troops to be used by them in assaulting the enemy's works.* The grenades were reported to be available for issue, but no "stink-shells" were made and nothing seems to have come of the proposal.

On June 5th, Hunter, who had succeeded Milroy, defeated Jones, who had succeeded Breckinridge, and on the 12th Breckinridge was ordered to return to the Valley with his division, and McLaughlin's Battalion of artillery, to the command of which Lieut.-Col. King was now assigned, while Maj. Gibbes was transferred from Cabell's to the command of King's Battalion. Three days later, when it was discovered that Meade had again moved towards the Confederate right, Lee also detached Early's Corps with Nelson's and Braxton's battalions under Gen. Long, and dispatched the force *via* Charlottesville to the Valley. Early's instructions were to attack Hunter in the rear, and after uniting with Breckinridge to move down the Valley, cross the Potomac, and threaten Washington. These orders were given in the hope that the movement might result in Grant's recall for the defense of the Capital.

While the main army was engaged with Meade, the Horse Artillery had been actively employed with the cavalry divisions. McGregor's Battery, after being sharply engaged at Stanard's Mill on the Po, from the 16th of May to the 19th, accompanied W. H. F. Lee's Division as rear guard of the Army to Hanover Junction, and from there to Hanover Courthouse, where on the 31st it had again been heavily engaged. In this last action, Lieut. Ford, conspicuous for his gallantry, was killed. Hart's Battery participated in a small affair at Ashland on the 1st, and on the same day Shoemaker's and Johnston's batteries under Breckinridge were warmly engaged at Bottom's Bridge, and Cold Harbor, where three years before Pelham had won such undying laurels. The story of the service of these batteries is one in itself, and at the time of which we write perhaps no

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXXVI. Part III, pp. 888-889.

organization in the Army commanded the admiration and appealed to the pride of the Army as a whole as did Chew's Battalion of Horse Artillery.* Its record in marching and fighting is not excelled by that of any artillery battalion that ever took the field.

During the fighting of the first few days of June, Sheridan had drawn off around Meade's rear and attempted another raid on Lynchburg, *via* Gordonsville, in coöperation with Hunter's movement up the Valley. Accordingly on the 8th, Col. Chew and Maj. Breathed with Hart's, Thomson's, Johnston's, McGregor's, and Shoemaker's batteries, moved with Hampton's and Fitz Lee's divisions to intercept the Federal Cavalry, which they did at Trevillian Depot, on the Virginia Central Railroad. In this affair, Hart's, Thomson's, and Johnston's batteries only were engaged, and ably maintained themselves against Pennington's four horse batteries. Next to Brandy Station, this was the largest purely cavalry combat fought in Virginia, and Chew's handling of the horse batteries on this occasion was especially brilliant.

It may prove interesting to note the condition of the Horse Artillery at this time. The report of Capt. John Esten Cooke, Assistant Inspector General of Artillery on Pendleton's staff, dated May 25, fully sets forth the facts.

Johnston's Battery had lost 38 horses since the first of the month, most of them in action, and many others were badly broken down. Two guns had teams of but five and two of but four horses. Shoemaker's Battery, while it had lost fewer horses in action, was in a worse plight than Johnston's as to the condition of its teams. These batteries each required a minimum of 80 horses to make them fully effective. The five batteries had lost in all 99 animals and many of the cannoneers had been relegated to Battery "Q," in order to supply draught teams.

*Let us hope for the promised history of his battalion, by its commander, before referred to.

Requisition was immediately made by Pendleton on the receipt of the report for 100 fresh horses, and he endorsed Col. Chew's request that McClannahan's and Jackson's horse batteries of McLaughlin's Battalion be assigned to his command. Capt. Cooke reported that every care was being taken of the animals, which were being grazed whenever possible, in addition to receiving eight pounds of corn daily.* On the 8th of June, Cooke inspected Thomson's and Hart's batteries under the immediate command of Chew, in camp with Hampton's Division on the Brooke Turnpike above Meadow Bridge. Their condition he reported as exceptionally good under the circumstances, especially Thomson's, as a result of that officer's efficiency and ceaseless care. At this time, Thomson had 98 and Hart 112 men. The limbers and caissons were full and the ordnance wagons well supplied, except with Blakely ammunition, but mules were needed by the train. The requisition for horses for the battalion had been filled. So that in spite of its service and an enormous loss of horses and casualties aggregating about 100 men for the past month, the Horse Artillery was in fine fettle, when it encountered Sheridan at Trevillian's a few days later.†

Griffin's Horse Battery with Chew's and Dement's 4th and 1st Maryland batteries had been detached from the cavalry in the field and attached to the Maryland Line, stationed at Richmond under command of Gen. Bradley T. Johnston.

Notwithstanding the demands upon him incident to the field operations of the campaign, the Chief of Artillery had not only hastened forward the refitting of the Horse Artillery, but he had also found time to urge legislation upon the President for the more complete organization of the entire artillery arm. In conference with Long, Alexander, and Walker, on the 3d of May, he had accepted certain radical proposals drawn up by Long and at once forwarded them to Gen. Lee. But hearing nothing from them, he addressed the President

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part III, pp. 831-847.

†*Ibid.*, pp. 838, 884, and Part I, p. 1058.

direct concerning them on June 8, urging that a more just rule be adopted by Congress with respect to the authorized quota of artillery officers. The abstract of the proposed bill follows:

"A battery of field artillery to consist of 4 guns. For such a battery 100 to 125 effective privates, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 2 buglers, 2 artificers, 1 guidon, 1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, and one second lieutenant. Six gun batteries now existing may so remain till their number of men is reduced to the above standard. The batteries shall be organized into battalions of 3 or 4 batteries, and whenever it can be done without detriment to the service, batteries from the same state shall be thrown together. To each battalion of 4 batteries there should be a lieutenant-colonel and major; 1 adjutant, with the rank of first lieutenant; assistant quartermaster, with the rank of captain; a chaplain, surgeon, and assistant surgeon. Battalions of 3 batteries may have officers of each grade, or fewer and of less rank, as commanding generals may recommend. Two or three battalions may constitute a regimental group, to be commanded by a colonel, entitled to 1 adjutant, with the rank of captain, and 1 aide with the rank of first lieutenant. Two regimental groups to form a brigade, to be commanded by a brigadier-general. Staff of a brigade to be 1 adjutant-general, rank of captain; 1 aide-de-camp, rank of first lieutenant; 1 quartermaster, rank of major; 1 commissary, rank of major; and 1 chief surgeon. The artillery of an army, provided it consists of two or more brigades, to constitute a corps of artillery, to be commanded by a general of superior rank to a brigadier-general, with a staff as designated by law for generals of like grade. All appointments above the rank of captain to be made by selection."

These indeed were radical proposals, but certainly very wise ones. The contemplated reorganization would have provided for many promotions in the arm, and relieved a situation which was fraught with many difficulties. It would not only have greatly enhanced the efficiency of the arm, but would have enabled many deserving officers to be awarded well earned promotions. Again, it would have ruled out politics to a large extent, for Congress would have been restricted to the appointment of junior officers only, all others depending upon their military records for preferment.

Pendleton's communication was referred by Mr. Davis to Gen. Bragg, his military adviser, who disap-

proved the proposed method of determining the number of officers in the arm, and declared the gun to be the proper unit upon which to base the strength of the commissioned personnel. But he very justly said that the present proportion of officers to guns was inadequate, and that he saw no valid reason for restricting the senior artillery grade to that of brigadier-general. "The Artillery of an army of three corps like Gen. Lee's is equivalent in importance to either corps of infantry," wrote Bragg. Gen. Lee also declared in favor of the gun as the proper unit. Every battalion should have two field officers, and his army was entitled to a major-general of artillery, while each corps chief, whose command was far more important than that of a brigade of infantry, should bear the rank of brigadier-general, he thought.

The matter was referred in September by the President to the Secretary of War for conference with the Committee of Military Affairs, as to the legislation recommended in his annual message, and in the report of the Secretary of War advocating an increase in the commissioned personnel of the Artillery.

At the end of June, the artillery material of the three corps proper consisted of ninety-four Napoleons, four 24-pounder and six 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 20-pounder and forty-eight 10-pounder Parrotts, and thirty-two 3-inch rifles, or a total of 196 pieces including those of Gibbes', or King's old battalion, which had been assigned to the 1st Corps in lieu of the Washington Artillery, and not including those of Read's Battalion. The 2d Corps also had then but four battalions, Cutshaw having been assigned to the command of the one formed by the consolidation of the remnants of his own, and Page's upon Hardaway's return to duty, Page being relieved from command. If we take King's Battalion as counterbalancing the loss of Page's 20 guns, it will be seen that Lee had 16 more guns, not including McLaughlin's, Eshleman's, Lightfoot's, and Owen's, at Cold Harbor than he started with, and allowing four

pieces for each of the 15 batteries of those four battalions he must have had, exclusive of the Horse Artillery, at Cold Harbor, not less than 275 pieces of artillery, while his infantry had diminished in numbers in spite of reinforcements by at least 10,000 men. His proportion of guns to infantry had therefore risen to nearly nine guns per thousand infantry before he reached Petersburg. In the meantime, Meade had lost near 60,000 men, killed, wounded and missing, but had gained fully 40,000 by reinforcement. His original proportion of artillery had diminished, however, for nearly one hundred guns had been returned to the base.

Little remains to be said concerning the Artillery in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, which included a rapid series of tremendous combats. The narrative has traced the movement of the various commands in detail, and those movements fully expose the tactics of the arm. It can only be added that nothing is so accurate a test of efficiency as results, and even the casual reader must have been impressed by the wonderful results obtained by Alexander, Long, and Walker. It is inconceivable that Lee's Infantry, however superb it was, could have withstood the shock of the blows which Grant and Meade aimed at it, had there not been mingled with its men in the foremost line, and shoulder to shoulder with them, willing toilers at the muzzles and the lanyards of the guns. As has been said before, little opportunity was found to employ artillery in masses, and it was understood by the gunners from the first that their part lay in taking the brunt of the Federal attacks from the shoulders of the Infantry by ceaseless vigilance and instant readiness to stem the tide of assault before it washed up against the Infantry lines. They were called upon to do this over and over again, always, except at North Anna, where no great effort was made by the enemy, under the most adverse circumstances, for they found neither commanding positions nor extensive fields of fire. For the time being, one might say, they simply took the place of the Infantry,

and only once, at the Bloody Angle, did they allow the enemy to cross bayonets with their sister arm. What a record indeed is this!

To one more point must attention be called. From the day of the rapid concentration of the Artillery along the Rapidan on the 5th of May, there was never an hour when every battery of Lee's Army was not either in position, in immediate support, or on the march and actually with the infantry divisions. Not one single instance of delay in the movement of the Artillery, or of a single battery, has been encountered, for the simple reason that the wonderful organization it had been given and the remarkable artillery leaders the war had developed, always enabled the batteries to be in the first line. One may search military history in vain for a parallel. It will not be found in the Napoleonic campaigns, nor will it be found in the French War of 1859, the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, or in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. Read Hohenlohe, who never fails to present the record of the Prussian Artillery in its best garb, and see how great masses of artillery remained idle at the critical moment; how the unwieldy columns blocked the roads in the rear of the armies, and then remember that the beautiful countries of Bohemia and France, with their wide *chausses* and rolling hills afforded ideal artillery terrain as compared to the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, and the almost pathless forests of Hanover, where scarce a clearing a mile wide or a commanding position is to be found. Then pursue the investigation further and study the operations of the Federal Artillery with Grant, and it will be found that near 100 of his guns were returned to Washington because no adequate use could be made of them, nor were those which he retained wholly employed at any one time. As a matter of fact, fewer were engaged in any one battle than remained idle, and this in spite of Hunt with all his skill and ability.

CHAPTER XLI

COLD HARBOR TO PETERSBURG

AFTER dispatching the 2d Corps to the Valley, Gen. Lee moved the 1st and 3d Corps across White Oak Swamp to the neighborhood of Riddles Shop, at which point Wilcox's Division and Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions relieved the Cavalry and pressed back the enemy's advance. In this affair, Pegram with his old battery, now commanded by Capt. Cayce, made a most superb attack upon the enemy's leading troops, displaying all the dash and strength of his character. During the past campaign, he had, though constantly engaged, found little opportunity to exhibit his rarest quality, which was rapidity of action, but nevertheless his services had been distinguished and his reputation as a fighter was unsurpassed by that of any artilleryman in the Army. Very small, slight of figure, and only about twenty-four years old, he had the heart of a lion and, as the men said, "was always itching for a fight." Fortunate indeed is the officer who acquires such a reputation, for it is such men that instill in those under their command the *élan* which carries them on to victory. Illustrative of the feeling of the soldiers who knew him towards this youthful and dashing artilleryman, the following anecdote is recounted. On a certain occasion when it was doubtful if there was to be a fight, Pegram was seen galloping down the line of the infantry from position to position occupied by his batteries, followed by Capt. W. Gordon McCabe, his adjutant, who, like Pegram, was a veritable game-cock. The troops were in the humor for fighting, and as an old veteran spied the pair of artillerymen approaching, he rose from the trenches, waved his hat aloft and cried, "Come on, boys! Here comes that d——n little man with the glasses. We're going to fight 'em now."

On the 12th, Read's Battalion, accompanying Hoke's Division, marched from Cold Harbor to Petersburg, ar-

living there on the 15th, and was immediately thrown into position near the Hare house to repel the threatened attack. During the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the 1st and 8d corps remained in observation of the enemy near Malvern Hill, while part of Lee's Army opposed Butler on the south side of the river. It was from their present position that Lee expected the enemy to attempt an advance against Richmond, but Grant had determined to cross the James at Wilcox's Landing, ten miles below City Point and entirely out of Lee observation, and to move thence directly upon Petersburg with his whole army. This movement had been suggested to him by Halleck some days before, and Grant was also, no doubt, familiar with McClellan's intention to do the same thing just three years before. His proposed line of operations would lead him in the rear of Butler and enable him to fall on the extreme right of the Confederate defensive line, which now rested at Petersburg, for the defense of which only a part of the troops of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia under Gen. Beauregard were immediately available, in addition to Lee's Army, which he hoped to elude and outmarch. This was all but accomplished, for while Lee remained on the north bank of the James, watching what he believed to be the entire Federal force, Grant had performed a feat unheard of before, and with secrecy and celerity transferred nearly his entire army across the river. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, part of his troops were actually arriving at Petersburg and endeavoring to take the city, and were only prevented from doing it, on the 15th, by Wise's Brigade, not more than 1,200 strong, two small regiments of cavalry under Dearing, Moseley's Battalion and Sturdivant's and Martin's batteries with 22 guns, and some old men and boys called Local Reserves, or a total force of less than 8,000 of all arms and conditions. The resistance of these troops was grandly heroic and they have never received the credit their conduct deserved, for they stood between Lee and disaster, against odds perhaps never before

paralleled. It was only upon the most urgent representations that Lee was persuaded by Beauregard to send reinforcements to Petersburg, for the great soldier could not believe that the Federals had crossed the river. He finally sent Hoke's Division and Read's Battalion of artillery from Drewry's Bluff on the morning of the 18th. With 18 miles to go, the head of Hoke's column reached Petersburg at sunset, having traveled partly by rail; the bulk of the division by forced marching, at 9 p. m. All that day, while Wise and Dearing were resisting the ever-increasing pressure at Petersburg, Lee remained near Malvern Hill, his attention occupied by the Federal Cavalry, but when on the morrow he finally concluded that a part of Grant's troops had crossed the James, he set the 1st Corps in motion for the south side of the river.

Early in the morning, Pickett's and Field's divisions with Huger's, Haskell's, and Gibbes' battalions, crossed the pontoon bridge near Drewry's Bluff and advanced towards the Bermuda Hundred lines, from which Beauregard had been compelled to withdraw Bushrod Johnson's Division on the night of the 15th for the support of Wise at Petersburg.

Kershaw's Division was halted near Drewry's Bluff. The next day Pickett and Field, after a skirmish with Butler's troops near Port Walthall, in which Alexander's two battalions were engaged, recovered Beauregard's abandoned lines. On that same day, Kershaw's Division, with Cabell's Battalion, and the 8d Corps with its artillery, which had encamped the previous day near Chaffin's Bluff, also crossed the river upon the bridge near Drewry's Bluff, and was ordered to Bermuda Hundred. On the 18th, Pickett's Division, with Huger's Battalion, established itself on a line fronting Bermuda Hundred from Howlett's on the James River, to the confluence of Swift Creek with the Appomattox.

During the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Beauregard had made a grand fight against the head of Grant's Army,

but at last was compelled to request reinforcements or instructions for his retreat. The fighting at Petersburg had lasted until midnight on the 17th, and he knew that his small force, now consisting of Wise's, Elliott's, and Johnson's brigades of Bushrod Johnson's Division, and Hoke's Division, a total of about 14,000 infantry, could no longer maintain the lines. Already he had been forced to relinquish the outer works of the eastern defenses and fall back upon a new line hastily laid off from the river and running from the Hare house and Blandford Cemetery to the Rives house.

After the receipt of Beauregard's dispatch on the night of the 17th, Kershaw was ordered to march to Petersburg, though Lee was not yet convinced that Beauregard was correctly informed about the enemy. It was not until a third staff officer arrived from Beauregard at 3 A. M. on the 18th, that Lee was convinced that Grant's entire army was massing in front of Petersburg. He now sent orders to Anderson to march with Field's and Pickett's divisions for Petersburg, where Kershaw arrived about 7:30 A. M.

Upon his new line, Beauregard had skillfully posted his artillery under Col. Hilary P. Jones. It consisted of Read's, Moseley's, Coit's, and Boggs' battalions. This large artillery force of sixteen batteries and 53 guns had proved of inestimable value to him in his defense of Petersburg. Without it he could never have maintained the front he did from the 15th to the 17th. As it was now merged into Lee's Army, let us examine its organization. With the organization of Read's Battalion, we are already familiar. That of the other battalions was as follows:

MOSELEY'S BATTALION

Maj. Edgar F. Moseley

Yorktown Battery,
Macon (Ga.) Battery,
Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg't,
Battery "C", 18th N. C. Batt.,

Capt. Edward R. Young.
Capt. C. W. Staten.
Capt. John O. Miller.
Capt. James D. Cumming.

COIT'S BATTALION

Maj. James C. Coit

Halifax Battery,	Capt. Samuel T. Wright.
Petersburg Battery,	Capt. Richard G. Pegram.
S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery,	Capt. James I. Kelly.
Miss. Confederate Guards Battery,	Capt. William D. Bradford.

BOGGS' BATTALION

Maj. Francis J. Boggs

Albemarle Battery,	Capt. N. C. Sturdivant.
Richmond Battery,	Capt. S. Taylor Martin.

Read's Battalion after being engaged at Cold Harbor on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of June, had reached Petersburg on the afternoon of the 17th in time to materially assist in the defense. Moseley's Battalion which had been organized about the time of Butler's advance, had been engaged in the fighting at Drewry's Bluff, and on the Bermuda Hundred lines, when Beauregard bottled up the Army of the James so successfully. Its commander had formerly served as a field officer in the 1st Virginia Regiment of Artillery, after its organization by Col. John Thompson Brown as part of Magruder's Army in 1861. Coit's Battalion had been organized for service in North Carolina in the early spring, later operating with Beauregard against Butler. Both Moseley's and Coit's battalions had rendered excellent service. Boggs' Battalion had only been organized on the 17th as such. Hitherto its two batteries had operated independently in the vicinity of Petersburg, and had been engaged against Butler. On June 5, Capt. Sturdivant and two of his guns had been captured.

The batteries of these battalions averaged about four guns and 90 men, and therefore comprised a valuable addition to Pendleton's command, depleted by the detaching of Long's two battalions, especially since Lee was now called upon to defend so extensive a line.

On the morning of the 18th, before Lee's troops arrived, Bradford's three 20-pounder Parrotts and

Wright's five Napoleons of Coit's Battalion were placed in position on the north bank of the Appomattox to enfilade the approaches to Beauregard's left. The rest of Jones' Artillery was either placed along or in rear of the infantry trenches of the new line, and all of it was most effectively employed during the day.

At 4 A. M., the 18th, Grant made a general advance with the 2d, 5th, and 7th Corps, while the 6th and 18th were held in reserve. He learned during the morning with the utmost surprise that Beauregard's whole force during the preceding days consisted of but two small divisions, and very much chagrined he now urged his corps commanders to press forward with energy and carry the new line before it could be materially strengthened. Meade himself fixed noon as the hour of attack. By that time, Kershaw had relieved Johnson, and Jones' guns had been skillfully disposed. Field's Division had also begun to arrive and occupy the trenches on Kershaw's left, while Hoke and Wise remained in position.

About midday the assault commenced, falling principally on Wise and Hoke next to the river, but was repulsed with loss, Wright and Bradford simply tearing the Federal ranks to shreds with their enfilade fire, while the other batteries of Beauregard's command swept the approaches with a most destructive frontal fire. So successfully did Jones' battalions perform their task that a variance occurs in the reports of the fighting this day, which can only be attributed to the effect of the "long arm." Humphreys states that every Federal Corps assaulted in force and that they were repulsed with loss, while on the Confederate side the day was not considered as one of general battle by the infantry, but as one of artillery fighting alone.

"It was necessary to wait until night before Beauregard's artillery could receive its plaudit of 'Well done, good and faithful servant,' and be relieved by fresh battalions of Longstreet's Corps. Of all the moonlight nights I can remember, I recall that Saturday night as perhaps the most brilliant and beautiful. The weather was exceedingly dry, the air perfectly calm, with an exhilarating

electrical quality in it. The dust rose with every movement and hung in the air. The whole landscape was bathed and saturated in silver, and sounds were unusually distinct and seemed to be alive and to travel everywhere. It was not a night for sleep in the trenches. There was a great deal to be done at all points to strengthen and improve them, and every man was personally interested in working at his immediate location.

"In spite of all pains, the drawing out of old guns and approach of new was attended with sounds which wandered far, and with luminous clouds of dust gradually rising in the air. Then the enemy would know we were moving, and there would come crashes of musketry at random and volleys of artillery from their lines. Then our infantry would imagine themselves attacked, and would respond in like fashion, and the fire would run along the parapet to right and left, and gradually subside for a while, to break out presently somewhere else."

Such is Gen. Alexander's graphic description of the night of the 18th of June, when with his accustomed energy and bravery he was engaged with Lieut.-Col. Branch of Beauregard's Artillery in replacing the latter's guns with his own. All through this work, his exposure was constant and to the verge of recklessness, but there was work to be done, and in spite of the protests of his men he galloped back and forth, ordering here, suggesting there, and utterly regardless of his own safety until all was done that the exigencies of the situation required. As the 1st Corps arrived, it had taken position on Beauregard's right. After substituting Huger's guns for Jones' along Hoke's and Wise's front, Alexander then placed two batteries of Haskell's and Gibbes' Battalion in the trenches between the Baxter Road and the Rives house. Haskell's remaining batteries were then posted on elevated positions in the second line.

Beginning at the salient formed by the junction of the new with the old works, known as the Rives salient, where he posted Richardson's Battalion, Col. Walker, to whose command the Washington Artillery had now been assigned, occupied the line with the batteries of the 3d Corps on Alexander's right, and extending around to the south and west as far as the Weldon Railroad.

The works comprising the line of defense at Petersburg were by far the most pretentious which the Confederates had yet occupied. With the exception of the portion of the line recently established by Beauregard when forced back on the 17th, they had been laid out by engineer officers and constructed in advance by slave labor. Every advantage of terrain had been taken and a broad field of fire for artillery cleared in front of the line. Of course there were defects, but to a large extent these were corrected as they developed, and the works throughout were rapidly extended and improved. The trenches at Cold Harbor had barely afforded cover for the infantry, and the epaulments for the guns were there of the crudest kind, but now the artillery was to fight behind real cover and placed to the best advantage after careful reconnaissance of the approaches.

The morning after Pendleton's Artillery arrived, the Chief of Artillery accompanied by Gen. Beauregard visited the north bank of the river and, after a rapid inspection of the terrain, ordered Lane's Battalion and Penick's Battery of Richardson's to move over and fortify the commanding eminence at the Archer House, while Chew's and Clutter's batteries of McIntosh's Battalion, under Maj. Marmaduke Johnson, were ordered to be intrenched on a lower elevation half a mile higher up the river. Poague's Battalion under Capt. Utterback joined Bradford's and Wright's batteries immediately opposite the point where the main line rested on the south bank of the river. There were now, therefore, about fifty guns placed to enfilade the approaches to the Confederate left. But Grant did not renew his assaults on the 19th, and his troops occupied themselves intrenching where they had bivouacked during the night in close proximity to the Confederate works. The opposing lines thus established by accident in a measure remained substantially unchanged until Lee's evacuation ten months later.*

*For a detailed account of the Richmond Artillery defenses at this time, see *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part III, pp. 808-11. There were 38 pieces of position on the lines, with a force of Heavy Artillery aggregating 2,893 present for duty, and the 1st, 2d, and 4th Maryland field batteries with 232 men and 10 guns. *Ibid.*, p. 861.

CHAPTER XLII

PETERSBURG—THE SIEGE COMMENCES

FROM the day the two armies confronted each other, sharpshooting and artillery practice were incessant, while both sides labored constantly, improving their works. The great enfilading group of guns north of the river to the command of which Col. Cutts had been assigned, and to which several 30-pounder Parrotts and 12-pounder Whitworths were added and placed in position at the Archer house, at once attracted the attention of the Federal Artillery. When Cutts opened on the enemy's line on the 20th, the effect of his fire, enfilade, and on some points of the opposing line reverse, was so overwhelming as to cause great confusion among the Federals, and lead to an almost immediate change of position. A great effort was now made by Hunt to silence the Confederate group. During the next few days, Abbott's reserve artillery regiment of 1,700 men with 60 mortars, ranging from 24-pounder Coehorns to 10-inch sea coast pieces, was brought up and undertook to subdue Cutts' fire, but all in vain. His men toiled all the harder at their fortifications and soon protected themselves and their guns with bomb proofs and works of the most substantial character. In the meantime, however, they had suffered many casualties from Abbott's terrific mortar fire, including Lieut. Lucius G. Rees, of Cutts' Battalion, who had so distinguished himself on the North Anna, killed, and Lieut. James of the same battery, wounded.

The effect of the Federal mortar fire was also felt at other points of the line, and steps were now taken by Gen. Alexander to counteract it. Fortunately, he had ordered some 12-pounder mortars constructed in Richmond several weeks before, and these began to arrive on the 24th. They were light and convenient to handle, and with characteristic energy and skill Alex-

ander placed them at points where they could best assist in the defense of the weaker salients of the line, up against which the enemy had pressed to short range. The number of these mortars was gradually increased until twenty-seven 12-pounder, 24-pounder, and 8-inch mortars were in position along Beauregard's line, and thirteen of like caliber beyond the Rives salient. Interior lines were now constructed at the gorges of the salients, a number of heavy pieces of position from Richmond placed therein to reply to six 100-pounder and forty 80-pounder Parrotts, which Abbott had drawn from his seige train and mounted in the permanent works along Beauregard's abandoned line. These redoubts, with the infantry trenches which connected them, formed a veritable citadel, behind which a small force of defenders were secure against assault, and enabled Grant to constantly extend his lines to the west, while a system of redans and infantry trenches in their front and pushed close up to the Confederate works made detachment of the Confederate troops from their front extremely risky. But the weakest part of the Confederate line was Elliott's salient, named from the brigade assigned to its defense. Here the edge of the deep valley of Poor Creek, which ran nearly parallel to the Confederate line of works, was but 138 yards distant, while the depression afforded ample space and perfect cover for the massing of a large body of infantry. Along the rear edge of this valley, the Federals threw up strong rifle pits with elaborate head-logs and loop-holes from which an incessant fire was kept up upon the Confederates. At this point, Col. Walker posted Cayce's Battery of Pegram's Battalion, and under cover of night the men managed to place obstructions in front of the parapet.

On the 20th, Thomson's, Hart's, Shoemaker's and Johnston's batteries were engaged the entire day at the White House with Fitz Lee and Hampton, who had returned from Trevillian's, and underwent the unusual experience of horse artillery fighting both field artillery

and gunboats at the same time.* Two days later, McGregor's Battery was engaged with W. H. F. Lee in an affair with Wilson's and Kautz's Cavalry at the Davis house on the Weldon Railroad. The Federal Cavalry was followed by W. H. F. Lee to the Staunton River, where its progress was barred by local militia and a force of artillery at the bridge. Attacked in rear by the Confederate Cavalry, with an impassable stream in their front, Wilson and Kautz decided after having done much damage to the railroads to return to Petersburg, and in doing so were assailed by Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, two brigades of infantry under Mahone, Cayce's Battery under Pegram and the entire Horse Battalion under Chew and Breathed at Reams Station, where they were completely routed, losing 1,500 men, two horse batteries complete with twelve guns, and their wagon trains. In this affair, Pegram, Chew, and Breathed were in their glory, and in no engagement of the war did the Horse Artillery display greater dash, notwithstanding the preceding weeks of constant marching and fighting.

Another affair in which the Artillery shone with particular brilliance had, meantime, occurred at Petersburg, in which McIntosh was the bright star.

Advised on the 22d of a movement by the 2d and 6th Federal Corps from their works opposite Hill, against the railroads on his right, Lee sent Hill with Wilcox's and Mahone's divisions, supported by Johnson's, to meet it. McIntosh with the 1st Maryland Battery under Lieut. Gale was to move out with the infantry. Hill's orders were to strike the enemy while stretched out to the left, while Col. Walker's Artillery coöperated with him from the lines. When all was ready, McIntosh with Gale's section of Clutter's Battery galloped forward to within a few hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments and opened upon their columns, instantly causing confusion among them, while the infantry

*It will be recalled that the artillery had engaged gunboats on the Rappahannock in 1862. Forrest also attacked gunboats on the Tennessee River with Morton's horse batteries.

rushed forward under cover of his fire and carried the Federal line. Lieut. Wilkes' section of Capt. Valentine J. Clutter's Richmond Battery, recently added to McIntosh's Battalion, now moved out and supported Gale. While Wilcox obstructed the advance of the 6th Corps, Mahone and Johnson passed through a gap between it and the 2d Corps, and struck Barlow's Division, which was moving around the 6th Corps, in the rear, capturing 1,700 prisoners and four guns, which were successfully brought off during the night by Hill after also routing Mott's Division. The conduct of McIntosh, Gale, and Wilkes on this occasion elicited the highest praise from all arms, and gives us a rare instance of light batteries actually maneuvering between intrenchments. One is almost compelled to inquire if there were any limitation upon what the artillerymen would attempt.

Lee now planned an attack on Meade's right to be preceded by a great artillery preparation. It was hoped that the infantry under cover of Cutts' enfilading and Alexander's frontal fire might reach the Federal mortar batteries and recover the outer line. Promptly on the morning of the 24th, the Artillery opened the greatest cannonade which the siege had yet seen, but for some reason no infantry assault occurred. The cannonade was not without its effect, however, for the enemy was impressed with the futility of making subsequent attempts in that quarter, by the tremendous power which the Artillery developed.

During the next few days, Gen. Alexander's attention was especially attracted by the enemy's activity in front of the Elliott salient. Having been an engineer officer of some experience, he detected signs, which convinced him that underground work was going on. He had confidently expected each morning to see a "Flying Dutchman" in that quarter, or some other evidence of the opening of approaches across the narrow space in front of the salient, but instead he had noted an increase of musketry fire from the Federal works there, and a diminishment of alertness among the enemy's sharp-

shooters on either side. Each day he visited the salient and carefully watched what was going on. On his way back to his headquarters on the 80th, he was slightly wounded by a sharpshooter, and before leaving the Army the next day, for six weeks, to visit his home in Georgia, he called at Gen. Lee's headquarters in person and reported his views about the mine. Mr. Lawley, an English war correspondent of the *London Times*, was present and inquired how far it would be necessary for the Federals to mine, and when told by Alexander the distance was 500 feet, he replied that the tunnel at the Siege of Delhi, the longest ever dug, was but 400 feet, and that it was found impossible to ventilate a longer gallery. Alexander replied that there were many Pennsylvania miners in Meade's Army, and that military precedents would not deter them from making the attempt. It so happened that upon the advice of Lieut.-Col. Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, a coal miner, against the advice of every engineer in Meade's Army, the Federals had opened a gallery on the 27th of June, just two days before Alexander called Lee's attention to the danger.

Alexander did not return to the Army until August 18, Cabell commanding the Artillery of the 1st Corps in his absence, but upon his advice Huger was assigned to the command of the guns and mortars near the salient. The day after his departure Gen. Lee directed his engineers to open countermines. Shafts with listening galleries were promptly sunk, unfortunately, on the flanks of the salient, for the Federals were tunneling straight for its apex and their operations were not heard. Had Alexander been present, it is safe to say the battle of the Crater would never have been fought, for having devoted so much attention to the salient, he would most certainly have been placed in charge of the countermines and would have caused the first one to be opened at the apex. From that point the enemy's mining 20 feet below the surface would readily have been detected and their gallery destroyed by the explosion of a *camouflet*, or smothered mine.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE TRENCHES IN JULY

THE strength of the Artillery about Richmond and Petersburg had been greatly enhanced during the past month while the Infantry composed of Johnson's and Hoke's divisions of Beauregard's Army, Pickett's, Field's, and Kershaw's divisions of the 1st Corps, Anderson's, Heth's, and Wilcox's divisions of the 8d Corps, showed a marked diminishment. In fact, recruiting for the Infantry had almost come to a standstill, and on July 10, while the paper strength of the foregoing commands aggregated 103,178 men, there were but 51,867 present for duty. In the Cavalry Corps composed of Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's divisions, with 28,180 men on the rolls, there were but 10,498 effectives in the field. In marked contrast to these figures are those of the Artillery which, not including Long's command in the Valley, numbered 6,472 present for duty, with an aggregate present and absent of 9,485. In other words, while Lee was able to muster but half his infantry and cavalry in the field, but one-third of his artillery personnel was absent, a fact which seems to testify to a comparatively high state of discipline in the artillery arm.

To the work of maintaining his corps, Pendleton constantly addressed himself. Furthermore, he now sought to bring order in his arm out of the chaos into which the recent campaign, with its heavy losses, had necessarily thrown the Army.

It will be recalled that when Longstreet moved to Petersburg *en route* to Tennessee, he had started from the Rapidan with Alexander's, Walton's, and Dearing's battalions, but that the first only through a change of plans accompanied him to the West, the Washington Artillery and Dearing's Battalion remaining throughout the winter in the Department of North Carolina

and Southern Virginia with Pickett. Since that time, these two battalions had considered themselves no longer an integral part of the 1st Corps to which they had been assigned by *G. O. No. 19, June 4, 1863*. True, they had rejoined the Army at Cold Harbor in June, but they had not fallen under Alexander's immediate control. In fact, Dearing's old command under Read had again been detached to Petersburg with Hoke's Division, and the Washington Artillery, to the command of which Lieut.-Col. Eshleman had been assigned, after his provisional battalion had been broken up, later accompanied the 3d Corps to Petersburg.

Since the battle of Gettysburg, where Walton was so rudely displaced by his junior, the Washington Artillery had not been well disposed towards Alexander. These troops were serving in a foreign land and were naturally sensitive to anything in the nature of a slight to their old commander, so they had welcomed their separation from the 1st Corps Artillery to the command of which Alexander had been assigned, March 1, 1864, with advanced rank from February 26. And so, when on June 18, Lee commenced his movement from Cold Harbor, the Washington Artillery applied direct to the President to be allowed to attach itself to the 3d Corps. * This was of course a violation of army regulations, but it must be remembered that state politics entered into the affairs of the Army of Northern Virginia, as in the case of all other armies that have ever taken the field. Dissatisfaction on the part of these troops with the persistent disregard of Walton's claims was now open, and as his case was undoubtedly the principal matter in the politics of the Artillery Corps, the facts should be cited.

On coming into the field in May, 1861, Maj. Walton was the senior artillery officer in the Army and commanded the largest artillery organization. After First Manassas, an act of Congress was passed at the instance of Beauregard to authorize the promotion of artillery

**In Camp and Battle With the Washington Artillery Battalion*, Owen, p. 329.

officers, Walton's case being especially mentioned as a deserving one. Under this provision, Walton was promoted Colonel and assigned to duty as Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, retaining immediate command of the Louisiana Battalion. Soon after this, Pendleton, who had been advanced from the grade of captain, subsequent to Walton's arrival in Virginia, was promoted to the grade of colonel with temporary rank, under the law authorizing the President to confer such rank. Though still Walton's junior, he was again promoted and made brigadier-general and chief of artillery, when the reorganization in the winter occurred, and Col. Walton was assigned to duty as chief of artillery of the 1st Corps. In the meantime, Beauregard and Longstreet repeatedly recommended the promotion of Walton, who was by service the senior artillery officer in the Confederate armies, but it was announced that no more brigadier-generals of artillery would be appointed. All this, and his displacement at Gettysburg was taken by Walton with commendable grace, though naturally he was much chagrined. Beauregard had, just after the reorganization, written him as follows: "I regret to hear that you have not been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of artillery, which in the estimation of your friends you have won by your efficient services on so many glorious battlefields, commencing with Bull Run. If my testimony to your efficiency, zeal and capacity, whilst commanding the Battalion of Washington Artillery in the Army of the Potomac and acting as chief of artillery of the First Corps of that Army, can be of any service to you I will willingly give it to you, not as a favor, but as a right to which you are entitled." And Longstreet, before the reorganization, wrote him: "I have on three occasions and several times in conversation expressed my opinion and wishes in favor of having you promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. I still think your services give you the best claim to the promotion of any officer in the service, and I am quite

satisfied you are as well qualified to fill the office. I still hope your promotion may soon come." But it will be recalled that these letters were written early in the war and before experience showed the necessity of trained artillery leaders. Beauregard was from Louisiana himself, and Longstreet from Georgia, and it is a fact that before the tremendous campaigns of 1862 welded the Army of Northern Virginia into a thoroughly organized and disciplined fighting machine, state prejudices were rife and entered into every appointment. In fact, Longstreet, above all others, persisted to the end in harping on the favoritism he imagined was shown Virginians. But it must be recalled that Pendleton owed his preferment over Walton largely to Mr. Davis' influence, with whom he had been a cadet at West Point, and besides the day was one when graduates of the United States Military Academy were in the ascendant.

Though a veteran of the Mexican War, Walton was not a West Pointer. To soothe his disappointment, he was now offered the command of a Louisiana Brigade with advanced rank in the infantry, but this he refused, as he could not see how assignment to the command of an infantry brigade of 1,000 men, in lieu of that over 80 guns, was really a promotion. The next affronts to Walton were the appointment of Long as brigadier-general September 21, 1863, Shoup during the winter in the Western Army, and Alexander, his second ranking battalion commander, March 1, 1864, with rank from February 26. In the meantime, Col. Stephen D. Lee, of the Artillery, had been promoted and assigned to the command of an infantry brigade in the West, November 6, 1862, soon to be again promoted August 8, 1863. Whatever Longstreet's early views about Walton may have been, it would not seem that he had long retained them, for he supplanted him, as we have seen, at Gettysburg by Alexander and intentionally left him behind when he made his expedition to Tennessee. One thing seems certain. If Longstreet still, in

1863, professed the advocacy of Walton's promotion, he was not acting in good faith or was doing so to secure his transfer from the 1st Corps.

In the meantime, Walton was not the only artillery officer sidetracked. Col. Cabell had been persistently overslaughed because of his age. His own adjutant has recorded that this distinguished member of a proud and historic family "lacked self-assertion and aggression; to some extent, too, he lacked the manner and bearing of a soldier, and he never maneuvered for position for himself or his battalion."* "His essential characteristics were a pure and unselfish nature, tender and affectionate heart, gentle and unfailing courtesy, single-hearted and devoted patriotism, quiet but indomitable courage." "He was a man of intellect and culture, as well as character." But all these virtues together did not spell fitness for high command in the Artillery and their very enumeration points to the fact that his military *confidante* knew he lacked the dash and ability requisite for successful leadership and confirms the estimate of him entertained at headquarters which has been previously stated. A serious effort, it will be recalled, was made to sidetrack Cabell by transferring him to the defenses of Richmond, and there was even the suggestion that he be given advanced rank in order that it might be accomplished. Upon learning from his friends of this suggested promotion, the gallant old soldier was much gratified, until by accident he discovered the motive, when he flamed into an ungovernable rage and demanded to know if he was taken for a "damned sneak and coward and fool." He surrendered his old battalion, it is true, but not until Appomattox.

We have seen how Col. Brown was overslaughed in the interest of Long, not by reason of lack of ability, for he was an exceptionally fine officer, competent and successful, but because Long's claims were more acceptable at headquarters. Cabell and Brown, like Walton, were not West Pointers. From the foregoing

**Four Years Under Marse Robert*, Stiles, p. 155.

facts, it does not appear that Walton was the only one who was overslaughed, whether justly or not, or that state politics alone controlled in his case. Indeed, we can go still further in tracing the effort to hand the tactical reins of the Artillery over to young and trained soldiers, for was not Pendleton himself, at first seized upon with such avidity as the senior artilleryman, gradually displaced from tactical command? The effort to dispose of him on the battlefield has been clearly perceptible in every reorganization of the arm. In fact, except with regard to his actual rank, his case was not dissimilar to that of Walton's, and an unprejudiced student of the Army of Northern Virginia will be compelled to admit that all these unfortunate maneuvers, disappointing as they were to certain faithful soldiers and their friends, were in the interest of artillery efficiency. Of course Walton and Cabell could not appreciate this. Soon after Alexander's promotion, Walton had applied to be relieved from duty with the Army of Northern Virginia, and at his own suggestion was assigned to duty as Inspector of Field Artillery at Large. During his absence, a strong effort developed in the Artillery arm to declare all positions not actually filled in the mobile army vacant, in order that adequate promotion might be given officers present in the field. In pursuance of this hard plan, concerning which much is to be said on both sides, Maj. S. F. Pierson, who had not served with the Army in the field for several years, but who still held his commission therein, was transferred to the Virginia Reserves on July 21, and Lieut.-Col. John S. Saunders was transferred to the Inspector Generals Department.* But Walton had a friend at court in Gen. Bragg, who had him ordered back to the Army to prevent his elimination. Returning to the Army after an arduous tour of duty in the South, Walton now found it necessary to accept service under those formerly his juniors, or resign. While he did not disparage the ability of Long and Alexander, yet he did

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XL, Part III, pp. 790, 797.

not feel that such a course was consistent with his dignity. Furthermore, he was forced to the conclusion upon a review of events than his services were no longer valued. Accordingly on July 18, he tendered his resignation and addressed a remarkable and pathetic communication to his gallant command, in which much of the foregoing matter is included. "It is with reluctance," wrote he, "that I have been forced from the service, with grief that I find myself separated from you, with whom, I had hoped, should Providence permit, to return to the city of our home. Circumstances have denied me this privilege; but harsh as may be their decree, they cannot rob me of the consolatory conviction that while with you I tried to deserve your affection and esteem, nor of the hope that while absent I may retain them."

In the diary of the Washington Artillery as an entry of July 20, the following is found: "The resignation of our gallant old chief, Col. Walton, has been accepted. We shall never cease to regret the circumstances that have induced this action. All our hearts are so attached to him, that no one, no matter how capable he may prove himself, can command the Washington Artillery as he has done, in peace as well as in war." Such were the sentiments which animated the men of that splendid command, whose services in Virginia were so heroic and so unselfish from first to last. But it is not difficult to see in the pages of the diary quoted from that the circumstances which entailed the resignation of Walton were appreciated in their proper light, as well as lamented. The devotion of his officers and men to Walton could not blind them to the fact that his age (54 years) and physical strength had rendered him unsuited to further activity in the field.

On the day of Walton's resignation, the Washington Artillery was ordered to rejoin the 1st Corps, and regularly report through its chief. This order of Gen. Pendleton's no doubt precipitated Walton's final action. But special authority was obtained from the President

overruling Pendleton's order, and the battalion was assigned to Col. Walker's 3d Corps Artillery, although desirous of being attached to Beauregard's command. This transfer met with Pendleton's approval, provided another battalion were assigned to the 1st Corps in its place. On July 31, however, Maj. Owen was again assigned to the command of the 18th Virginia Battalion, which he had previously commanded in Tennessee, relieving Maj. Gibbes and reporting to Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger, Acting Chief of Artillery 1st Corps, in the absence of Alexander. The 18th Virginia Battalion then consisted of Davidson's, Walker's "Otey," and Dickenson's batteries, with 12 guns and 450 men.

Another matter affecting the artillery organization now came up for final adjustment. During the month of July, Maj. Edgar F. Moseley, who, though holding his commission in the 1st Virginia Regiment of Artillery, had for some time commanded a battalion under Beauregard, was promoted lieutenant-colonel and reassigned to the same battalion. From the first it had appeared an incongruity to allow officers of a single independent regiment to be promoted without reference to other commands and to command battalions while holding a commission in this regiment. Before Col. Brown's death, he had sought to have Maj. Moseley promoted in the 1st Regiment vice Lieut.-Col. Coleman, but met with Pendleton's opposition on the ground that there could be no such independent regimental promotion. But at last Moseley was promoted without reference to Pendleton's views, whereupon the Chief of Artillery strenuously protested against the disregard of the claims of other officers in the arm, senior in rank, and with infinitely more service than Moseley had to his credit. Furthermore, Pendleton now sought to have the old regimental organization of the 1st Virginia Artillery abolished as inconsistent with the general scheme of artillery organization.

This regiment was organized under state authority in 1861, in the Army of the Peninsula under Magruder,

and turned over to the Confederacy as such by Virginia. Magruder, it will be recalled, was an artilleryman himself, and had with Alexander, from the first urged the organization of artillery in large groups, and this he proceeded to do in his own army. The original officers elected in the regiment were Col. George W. Randolph, afterwards Brigadier-General and Secretary of War, Lieut.-Col. Henry Coalter Cabell, and Maj. John Thompson Brown. When Randolph was promoted, Cabell became colonel and Brown lieutenant-colonel, but the majority remained vacant for some time. The companies associated to form the regiment were the Richmond Fayette, originally commanded by Randolph, then Cabell; the 2d Richmond Howitzers, originally commanded by Brown; the 3d Richmond Howitzers, originally commanded by Robert Stanard; Sands' or Ritter's Henrico; Southall's or Wyatt's Albemarle; and Allen's Hampton; Cosnahan's Peninsula; Coke's Williamsburg; Young's Yorktown; and Richardson's James City, batteries. Of these Allen's was soon detached from the Army of Northern Virginia, being brigaded with another to form Allen's Battalion, while Cosnahan's and Coke's were merged in the spring of 1862 under Capt. John Coke. In October, Coke's and Ritter's batteries were broken up and the men and guns distributed among other batteries, so that but six of its original batteries remained in the Army after the reorganization, the Fayette being sooner or later assigned to Dearing's, then Read's, the 2d and 3d Howitzers to the 1st Virginia Regiment under Brown, and Wyatt's to Poague's Battalion, while Young's and Richardson's only remained with Moseley when elected major of the regiment in the summer of 1862.

In July, 1864, Young's Battery alone remained in Moseley's Battalion, Richardson's being on detached duty at Chaffin's Bluff, so that the original regiment was virtually defunct and was entitled to no field-officers.

Pendleton's recommendation for the official disbandment of the regiment was forwarded approved by Gen. Lee and referred to Gen. Bragg by the Secretary of War, who endorsed the views of the Chief of Artillery. The upshot of the whole matter was the official disbandment of the regiment on August 29, 1864, and its recognition as a battalion of six companies to which no extraordinary rule of promotion should apply.

Having taken steps to accomplish this end, though failing in having the Washington Artillery reassigned to the 1st Corps, Pendleton now called on Col. Jones for the return of Read's Battalion to Pickett's Division, from which it had been detached to operate with Hoke.

When Lee crossed the James on June 17 and 18, he had left behind near Malvern Hill Cutshaw's and Hardaway's battalions of the 2d Corps under Col. Carter to patrol the river and resist the approach of transports and gunboats. On the 18th of July, Col. Carter, with Cutshaw's Battalion, had moved to Walker's farm, while a small Confederate cavalry force advanced towards Rowland's Mill and a regiment to the vicinity of Charles City Court House. Carter's scouts along the river reported that no vessels of any kind had passed down the river since the 11th, but about 4 P. M. he discerned two vessels, one a passenger and the other a freight steamer, moving up stream. Throwing Cutshaw's guns into action on the bank, among them a Whitworth rifle, Carter opened fire on these vessels, injuring the freighter to some extent and striking the transport, which caused it to turn back to Fort Powhatan before reaching the channel nearest the guns. That night the battalion withdrew to Phillip's Farm, six miles back from the river, and went into camp. On the 14th, Carter reappeared at Malvern Hill and with the Whitworth drove off a picket gunboat opposite Turkey Island House. Two days later the Whitworth successfully drove back down the river three small gunboats which had steamed up stream to clear the river of the Confederate artillery, while Graham's Battery of

Hardaway's Battalion, with four 20-pounder Parrotts opened from Tilghman's Gate upon the pontoon bridge, a gunboat, and the Federal camp at Deep Bottom. The gunboat was struck several times and finally retired to the cover of the river bank and the camp was thrown into such a commotion that an entire brigade left the woods near Four-Mile Creek at a double-quick and took shelter in the trenches. Carter also employed his cannoneers in these expeditions as sharpshooters, having armed them with captured cavalry carbines, and proposed thereafter to operate with a single battery fully mounted. Again it may be said, this was remarkable service for field artillery, but it showed the ready adaptability of that arm to meet the exigencies of any situation.

Carter's activity along the James shelling the Federal transports, gunboats, and landings, kept Butler in such a constant state of alarm, that soon Grant's attention was directed to this quarter. On the 26th, Hancock with 20,000 infantry and 22 pieces of artillery, and Sheridan with 6,000 cavalry, were started for Deep Bottom to coöperate with Butler in surprising the Confederates, and making a dash upon Richmond. Wilcox's Division was already at Drewry's Bluff, for noting a movement among the enemy towards the James, Lee had sent it and Kershaw's Division on the 24th to reinforce Conner's Brigade and Carter's artillery force on the north bank of the river. During the night of the 26th, Hancock and Sheridan crossed the river and at dawn advanced. Kershaw's Infantry almost at once fell back, leaving Graham's 1st Rockbridge Battery without supports in an advanced position, where after defending itself with superb coolness for some time its four large Parrotts were captured. On hearing of Hancock's crossing, Lee immediately sent over W. H. F. Lee's Division of cavalry with McGregor's Battery, and Heth's Division of the 2d Corps, while on the night of the 28th, Poague's Battalion and Penick's Battery were ordered from their positions north of the Appomat-

tox to join Col. Carter. When Grant found that his movement had been anticipated, he ordered Hancock to recross the river on the night of the 29th. Col. Poague was now directed to take position on the left of Pickett's line, and guard that flank against the approach of the enemy from Dutch Gap, where he remained throughout the winter shelling Butler's working parties along the canal with guns and mortars.

On the north side of the river, the Confederate line extended from New Market toward White Oak Swamp, the right resting near the Chaffin farm. When Hancock first appeared before this line, Gen. Ewell, who commanded the Richmond defenses, had urged the turning out of the Local Defense troops, but to this the Secretary of War had objected on account of the inconvenience and interruption it caused the government departments, from which the men were mostly drawn. The dispatch of Anderson to the James by Gen. Lee, with Wilcox's and Kershaw's divisions, had rendered the step unnecessary, but Lieut.-Col. Pemberton, in charge of the Artillery defenses of the city, had on the 27th posted two batteries of Lightfoot's Battalion at the intersection of the Mill and Varina Roads, behind Conner's right, and the other battery near the New Market Road, all on the exterior line of works, while Maj. Stark's Battalion, composed of the Mathews and Giles batteries under Capts. Andrew D. Armistead and David A. French, respectively, were posted near the Barton house. Pemberton's two battalions numbered 700 men with 22 guns, or about 100 men per battery. Soon the Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. Charles A. Green, Jr., which had been on duty in Richmond since its misfortune on the Rapidan, joined Stark's Battalion.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE CRATER

WE have seen that Gen. Alexander had detected signs of the enemy's mining operations, and that on July 1 the Confederate engineers had opened countermines. By July 10, the Confederates had done enough work, had it been done at the salient, to have heard the enemy, who would have been directly beneath them. Besides those on the flanks of the salient, two other shafts farther to the left near Colquitt's and Gracie's salients were opened on the 10th and 19th, respectively, and were being vigorously pushed. A perfect mania for tunneling seemed to have broken out among the Confederates. On the 11th, Bushrod Johnson urged that listening galleries be constructed along his lines, all of which goes to show that no one but Alexander had really perceived the enemy's objective. On the 12th, the enemy opened upon Wise's Brigade an unusually heavy mortar fire, which not only necessitated night work on the bomb-proofs, but caused Johnson to order greater efforts on Maj. Moseley's part to subdue this fire.

Before leaving the Army, Alexander had placed about half a dozen Coehorn mortars in the ravines immediately in rear of Elliott's salient, and on June 20 he had posted the 16 guns of Haskell's Battalion in the sunken Jerusalem Road, 600 yards in its rear, all under Col. Haskell. Though somewhat exposed to the enemy's fire, which overshot the works in their front, Haskell's batteries were not permitted to break ground or show any sign of their presence. This disposition of these guns was a foresight for which the entire Army, as we shall see, should have been grateful to Alexander.

On the 27th, Alexander, before being ordered to the north of the James River, carefully inspected his lines and was by no means satisfied with the protection Col.

Huger had provided for the 1st Corps guns. The works of Huger's and Cabell's battalions were in his opinion entirely too slight to withstand the fire of the heavy pieces, which he expected the enemy to bring to bear on them. Accordingly Huger was directed to employ his cannoneers in strengthening these works, as no infantry or other labor was available.

The next day, Col. Walker, who still had Pegram's, McIntosh's, and Richardson's battalions less Penick's Battery, in position on Huger's right, reported that the enemy were strengthening their works in his front, and increasing the number of their guns to such an extent that he was working his cannoneers in reliefs of from 40 to 100 men day and night, while Mahone's Division of the 8d Corps alone remained in the trenches in support of his guns. On the night of the 28th, Colquitt's Brigade of Hoke's Division, and Wise's of Johnson's Division were secretly transferred to the portion of the line which had been held by Field's Division before it was moved across the James River with Anderson to oppose Hancock, while Gracie's Division was placed in the works on Johnson's left. The utmost caution and silence was enjoined upon the troops. Capt. Richard G. Pegram's Petersburg Battery, of Coit's Battalion, still occupied Elliott's salient.

Having practically completed his mine, Grant had sought, as we have seen, to draw off a large portion of the Confederates to the north side of the river, before springing it. A gallery 511 feet long, with two branch galleries at the end, to the right and left, each 87 feet long, had been successfully dug. Col. Pleasants' method of ventilation was a simple one. "When the tunnel had penetrated the hill far enough to need it, a close partition was built across it near the entrance with a close-fitting door. Through the partition on the side of this door was passed the open end of a large square box, or closed trough, which was built along on the floor of the tunnel, conveying the fresh outside air to the far end of the tunnel, where the men extending it were at work.

"To create a draught through the air box, a fireplace was excavated in the side of the tunnel, within the partition, and a chimney was pierced through the hill above it. A small fire in this chimney place, and the outside air would pass through the air-box to the far end of the tunnel, whence it would return and escape up the chimney, taking with it the foul air of the tunnel." This gallery was finished July 17th, the flank galleries on the 23d, and on the 28th, the very day Lee was moving his troops from his line to oppose Grant's feint to the north, each gallery was charged with 4,000 pounds of gunpowder.

The Federals knew that Lee had detected their operations, for they themselves could hear the Confederates at work in the countermines. Nevertheless, they determined to delay the explosion until preparations for a grand charge to succeed it could be completed. For the assault a large force of infantry was to be employed, which was to rush forward under cover of the concentrated fire of many batteries. From their signal towers, the Federal lookouts had located the position of nearly every gun in the Confederate lines, and 81 heavy guns and mortars, and about as many field pieces were brought up and placed in position to bear on them. But Haskell's Battalion was overlooked, thanks to Alexander.

Having failed in his effort against Ewell's outer line, Grant at Deep Bottom on the 28th gave orders for the explosion of the mine on the morning of the 30th. "The explosion might have been arranged for the afternoon of the 29th, but the morning of the 30th was chosen, as it permitted the placing of more heavy guns and mortars for the bombardment, which would follow the explosion as well as preliminary arrangements, such as massing the troops, removing parapets and abattis to make passages for the assaulting columns, and posting of pioneers to remove our abattis and open passages for artillery through our lines. Depots of intrenching tools, with sand bags, gabions, fascines, etc., were established,

that lodgments might be more quickly made, though the pioneers of all regiments were already supplied with tools." Engineer officers were detailed to accompany each corps, and the Chief Engineer was directed to park his pontoon trains at a convenient point, ready to move at a moment's warning, for Meade having assured himself that the Confederates had no second line on Cemetery Hill, as he had formerly supposed, and as had been positively reported to him, was now sanguine of success, and made these preparations to meet the contingency of the meagre Confederate force retiring beyond the Appomattox and burning the bridges. In such an event, he proposed to push immediately across the river and Swift Creek and open up communications with Butler at Bermuda Hundred, before Lee could send any reinforcements from his five divisions north of the James.

On the afternoon of the 29th, when Meade issued his orders for the attack, Lee had but three small divisions, Johnson's, Hoke's, and Mahone's behind his works, and Alexander's, Jones', and three battalions of Walker's Artillery. As soon as it was dark, Burnside was to mass his troops in the valley opposite Elliott's salient and remove the abattis in his front, so that the columns of assault might debouch rapidly. He was to spring the mine at about 8:30 A. M., and, moving rapidly through the breach, seize the crest of Cemetery Hill, a ridge four hundred yards in rear of the Confederate lines.

Ord was to mass the 18th Corps in rear of the 9th, and to follow and support Burnside's right.

Warren was to reduce the number of men holding his front to the minimum, concentrate heavily on the right of his corps, and support Burnside's left. Hancock was to mass the 2d Corps in rear of Ord's trenches, and be prepared to support the assault as developments might dictate, while Hunt was to concentrate his artillery on the hostile guns in, and commanding the salient. Thus did Grant mass 60,000 men to fall upon

a single point of Lee's ten miles of line, behind the whole of which there was hardly one man for every six in the assaulting column. Now let another describe what occurred:*

"Long before dawn of the 30th the troops were in position, and at half past three, punctually to the minute, the mine was fired. Then the news passed swiftly down the lines, and the dark columns, standing in serried masses, waited in dread suspense the signal, knowing that death awaited many of them on yonder crest, yet not animated by the stern joy of coming fight, nor yet resolved that though death stalked forth with horrid mien from the dreadful breach, it should be but to greet victory.

"Minute followed minute of anxious waiting,—a trial to even the most determined veterans,—and now the east was streaked with gray, yet the tender beauty of the dim tranquillity remained unvexed of any sound of war, save one might hear a low hum amid the darkling swarm as grew the wonder at delay. Nor was the cause of hindrance easy to ascertain, for should it prove that the fuse was still alight, burning but slowly, to enter the mine was certain death. Thus time dragged slowly on, telegram upon telegram of inquiry meanwhile pouring in from Meade, who, unmindful of the dictum of Napoleon, that 'in assaults a general should be with his troops,' had fixed his headquarters full a mile away. But these were all unheeded, for Burnside knew not what to answer.

"Then it was that two brave men, whose names should be mentioned with respect whenever courage is honored, Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, both of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, volunteered for the peculiar service and entered the mine. Crawling on their hands and knees, groping in utter darkness, they found that the fuse had gone out about 50 feet from the mouth of the main gallery, relighted it and retired.

"'In eleven minutes now the mine will explode,' Pleasants reports to Burnside at thirty-three minutes past four, and a small group of officers of the Forty-eighth, standing upon the slope of the main parapet, anxiously await the result.

"'It lacks a minute yet,' says Pleasants, looking at his watch.

"'Not a second,' cried Douty, 'for there she goes.'

"A slight tremor of the earth for a second, then the rocking as of an earthquake, and with a tremendous burst which rent the sleeping hills beyond, a vast column of earth and smoke shoots upward to a great height, its dark sides flashing out sparks of

*The following narrative of events from the pen of Capt. William Gordon McCabe is the best account of the battle of the Crater ever written, and so recognised both North, South, and abroad. It has stood the severest tests of both time and criticism. Capt. McCabe was the gallant adjutant of Col. William J. Pegram's Artillery Battalion, and reflected all the dash and courage of his celebrated young commander.

fire, hangs poised for a moment in mid-air, and then hurtling downward with a roaring sound, showers of stones, broken timbers, and blackened human limbs, subsides—the gloomy pall of darkening smoke flushing to an angry crimson as it floats away to meet the morning sun. Pleasants has done his work with terrible completeness, for now the site of the Elliott Salient is marked by a horrid chasm, 185 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 80 feet deep, and its brave garrison all asleep, save the guards, when thus surprised by sudden death, lie buried beneath the jagged blocks of blackened clay—in all, 256 officers and men of the 18th and 22d South Carolina,—2 officers and 20 men of Pegram's Petersburg Battery."

Two of Pegram's guns were hurled through the air to a great distance. Of the two Confederate galleries on the flanks of the mine, one, which was unoccupied, was destroyed by the explosion, while the miners at work in the other were badly shaken up but climbed out and escaped as the gallery was not crushed in.

"The dread upheaval has rent in twain Elliott's Brigade, and the men to the right and left of the large abyss recoil in terror and dismay. Nor shall we censure them, for so terrible was the explosion that even the assaulting column sunk back aghast, and nearly ten minutes elapsed before it could be reformed.

"Now a storm of fire bursts in red fury from the Federal front, and in an instant all the valley between the hostile lines lies shrouded in bellowing smoke. Then Marshall, putting himself at the head of the stormers, sword in hand, bids his men to follow.

"But there comes no response befitting the stern grandeur of the scene—no trampling charge—no rolling drums of austerity—no fierce shouts of warlike joy as burst from men of the 'Light Division' when they mounted the breach of Badajos, or from Frazier's Royals, as they crowned the crimson slopes of Saint Sebastian.

"No, none of this there. But a straggling line of men of the Second Brigade, First Division, uttering a mechanical cheer, slowly mounts the crest, passes unmolested across the intervening space, and true to the instinct, fostered by long service in the trenches, plunges into the Crater, courting the friendly shelter of its crumbling sides.

"Yonder lies Cemetery Hill in plain view, naked of men, and hard beyond the brave old town, nestling whitely in its wealth of green.

"Silence still reigned along the Confederate lines, yet Ledlie's men did not advance, and now the supporting brigade of the same division running forward over the same crest, and with an incredible



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN CHIVES HASKELL

folly crowding in upon their comrades, already huddled together in the shelving pit, all regimental and company organization was lost, and the men speedily passed from the control of their officers.

"If we except Elliott, who with the remnant of his brigade was occupying the ravine to the left and rear of the Crater, no officer of rank was present on the Confederate side to assume immediate direction of affairs, and a considerable time elapsed before Beauregard and Lee,—both beyond the Appomattox,—were informed by Col. Paul, of Beauregard's staff, of the nature and locality of the disaster.

"But almost on the moment, John Haskell, of South Carolina, a glorious young battalion commander, whose name will be forever associated with the Artillery Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, galloped to the front, followed by two light batteries, and having disposed these pieces along the Plank Road, and opened Flanner's light guns from the Gee house, passed to his left to speak a word of cheery commendation to Lamkin of his battalion, who was already annoying the swarming masses of the enemy with his Virginia Battery of eight-inch mortars. Passing through the covered way, Haskell sought Elliott, and, pointing out to him the defenseless position of the guns on the Plank Road, urged him to make such dispositions as would afford them protection. Essaying this, Elliott sprang forward, followed by a mere handful of brave fellows, but, almost on the instant, fell stricken by a grievous hurt and was borne from his last field of battle.

"The fire of the enemy's artillery was now very severe, owing to their superior weight of metal, and the guns of the Plank Road, exposed in addition to the fire of the sharpshooters, were suffering such loss that it was determined to retire all but six pieces, and, as the situation seemed rather hopeless, to call for volunteers to man these. To Haskell's proud delight every gun detachment volunteered to remain.

"Nor did the artillery to the right and left fail to bear themselves with the resolution of men conscious that, for the time, the hope of the Army was centered in their steadiness, and that their guns alone barred the road to Petersburg; for, let me repeat, Cemetery Hill was naked of men."

With the superb Haskell encouraging them to every effort, his cannoneers labored at their pieces like fiends. He actually moved two detachments with their mortars forward to the trenches within fifty yards of the Crater, into which they burst their shell at a surprising rate. No less active was Maj. Hampton Gibbes, whose battalion, on the right of the Crater, opened as soon as the pieces could be brought to bear on the

enemy's massed troops. At first the left gun of Davidson's Battery alone had an effective command of the Crater, and it was left for a time unserved through the misbehavior of the acting battery commander, Lieut. James C. Otey, who, owing to a combination of circumstances, was the only officer at the time present with the battery. This unfortunate young officer, the first and the last in the whole career of Lee's Artillery Corps to abandon his guns in cowardice, seems to have been entirely unmanned by the awfulness of the cataclysm, in which he and his men had all but been engulfed. Let us not be too harsh in our judgment of him. Let us imagine ourselves in his position and ask if the mere thought of such an experience as that through which he had passed does not shake our resolution. If poor Otey were at fault, then he has long since atoned for his misdoing. To the writer he is more to be pitied, and demands more of charity than any other soldier in that grand artillery corps of Lee's Army. Would that his name might not be mentioned, but there it is in black and white in the record for all time. The hand of mortal cannot obliterate it, the stain is indelible. The incident is not recounted here to hold Otey up to scorn, but to show that misconduct before the enemy was so rare, so unheard of in Lee's Artillery, that even on the part of a miserable, insignificant youth, it attracted the attention of an army.

If Otey allowed his guns to remain inactive, it was not to be for long, for Gibbes and Maj. Samuel Preston, of Wise's Brigade, personally manned one of the pieces and worked them with excellent effect, until they both fell desperately wounded, thus making glorious the spot of Otey's defection. Again the guns became silent, and again a number of artillery officers, heedless of all personal danger, rushed to the position to man the pieces. This time it was Lieut.-Col. Huger, Acting Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps, with Capts. Winthrop, Mason, and Haskell, of Gen. Alexander's staff, that reopened the fire, soon joined by Private L. T.

Covington, of Pegram's destroyed battery. "Frank Huger, who like Edward Freer of the Forty-third had seen more combats than he could count years, was, as always, to the fore, working as a simple cannoneer at his heated Napoleons, cheering and encouraging his men by joyful voice and valiant example." Thus did Gibbes, Preston, Huger, and the other gallant artillerymen maintain their fire at the critical moment in spite of the concentration of the enemy's guns upon them until, spurring hard from the hospital, with the fever still upon him, came Lieut. John Hampden Chamberlayne, of the 8d Corps Artillery, who with volunteers from other batteries and Wise's infantrymen, so handled the guns which had been abandoned by their men and until then only manned by a few officers, that from that day the battery bore his name, and he wore another bar upon his collar.

The left gun of Davidson's Battery in the next salient on the right of the Crater, which in the hands of those we have mentioned did such fearful execution, was so well protected that it could never be kept silent by Hunt's concentrated fire. Whenever the Federals showed themselves it reopened. Gibbes alone fired forty or more rounds, at a range of less than 400 yards, with it, before he was wounded. Five hundred yards to the left was Wright's Halifax Battery of Coit's Battalion. These guns, which had a flanking fire on the left of the destroyed salient and across all the approaches thereto, were posted in the depression behind the infantry line and thoroughly masked from the hostile artillery fire not only by the ground in their front, but by a heavy fringe of pines in advance of the Federal line, which the enemy had carelessly neglected to level. Wright's fire was rapid, incessant, and accurate, causing great loss. The Federal Artillery made vain efforts to locate him with their mortar shells, which tore up the ground all around, but could never hit him or silence his four guns. Besides these, a half dozen or more of Haskell's 8-inch Coehorn mortars, from two or three ra-

vines in the rear, threw shell aimed at the Crater, and Langhorne's 10-inch mortars along the Baxter Road also took part in the work of destruction. It was now, too, that Alexander's foresight was to yield such fine results, for Haskell's sixteen guns which he had so long kept concealed in the sunken Jerusalem Plank Road were in position 600 yards directly in rear of the Crater. The group simply swept the front from first to last.

As soon as the Federal attack developed, Cutts' great group of guns north of the Appomattox opposite the enemy's right, and Jones' batteries along Beauregard's front near the river, opened upon the hostile artillery and kept up a furious cannonade to prevent Hunt from concentrating his fire upon the point to be assaulted, and on the Confederate right Walker's batteries also sought to divert the enemy's fire.*

"On the Federal side, Griffin of Potter's Division, not waiting for Wilcox, pushed forward his brigade, and gained ground to the north of the Crater, and Bliss's Brigade of the same division, coming to his support, still further ground was gained in that direction. But his leading regiments, deflected by the hostile fire, bore to their left, and, mingling with Ledlie's men swarming along the sides of the great pit, added to the confusion. Wilcox now threw forward a portion of his division and succeeded in occupying about one hundred and fifty yards of the works south of the Crater, but stopped by the fire of Chamberlayne's guns, and, whenever occasion offered, by the fire of the infantry, his men on the exposed flank gave ground, and, pushing the right regiment into the Crater, the confusion grew worse confounded. Some of the men, indeed, from fear of suffocation, had already emerged from the pit and spread themselves to the right and left, but this was a matter of danger and difficulty, for the ground was scored with covered ways and traverses, honeycombed with bomb-proofs, and swept by the artillery. Others of them pressed forward and got into the ditch of the unfinished gorge lines, while not a few creeping along the glacis of the exterior line, made their way over the parapet into the main trench. In all this there was much hand-to-hand fighting, for many men belonging to the dismembered brigades still found shelter behind the traverses and bomb-proofs and did not easily yield.

*As regards the execution of Chamberlayne's guns, see especially statement of Gen. Warren, *Report of Conduct of the War* (1865), Vol. I, p. 166; Gen. Hunt, pp. 98, 184; Duane, p. 100.

For the efficiency of the Confederate artillery fire, see Meade's report, *Ibid.*, p. 81; Col. Loring's statement, p. 95; Gen. Potter, pp. 87, 177.

"Meanwhile, Gen. Meade, 'groping in the dark,' to use his own phrase, sent telegram upon telegram to Burnside to know how fared the day, but received answer to none. At fifteen minutes to six, however, one hour after Ledlie's men had occupied the breach, an orderly delivered him a note in pencil, written from the Crater by Gen. Loring, Inspector General of the 9th Corps, and addressed to Gen. Burnside. This was Meade's first information from the front and was little cheer, for Loring stated briefly that Ledlie's men were in confusion and would not go forward.

"Ord was now directed to push forward the 18th Corps, and the following dispatch was sent to Richmond:

" 'HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

" 'July 30, 1864, 6 A. M.

" 'MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE—Prisoners taken say that there is no line in their rear, and that their men were falling back when ours advanced, that none of their troops have returned from the James. Our chance is now. Push your men forward at all hazards, white and black, and don't lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.

" 'GEORGE G. MEADE,

" '*Major-General, Commanding.*'

"But Ord could not advance, for the narrow debouches were still choked up by the men of the 9th Corps and by the wounded borne from the front, and although Burnside promptly transmitted the order to his subordinates, the troops in rear moved with reluctant step, while no general of division was present with those in front to urge them forward.

"Again did Meade telegraph to Burnside: 'Every moment is most precious; the enemy are undoubtedly concentrating to meet you on the crest.' But not until 20 minutes past seven did he receive a reply to the effect that Burnside 'hoped to carry the crest, but it was hard work.'

"Then Meade's patience seems fairly to have broken down. 'What do you mean by hard work to take the crest?' he asks. 'I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy's line, which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an immediate answer.

" 'GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major-General.*'

"To which Burnside, in hot wrath, straightway replied:

" 'HEADQUARTERS, NINTH CORPS,

" '7:35 A. M.

" 'GEN. MEADE—Your dispatch by Capt. Jay received. The main body of Gen. Potter's Division is beyond the Crater.

"I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was unofficerlike and ungentlemanly.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Major-General.*"

"Griffin, it is true, in obedience to orders to advance straight for Cemetery Hill, had during this time attempted several charges from his position north of the Crater, but his men displayed little spirit, and, breaking speedily under the fire of the artillery, sought their old shelter behind the traverses and covered ways. The rest of Potter's Division moved out slowly and it was fully eight o'clock, more than three hours after the explosion, when Ferrero's negro division, the men beyond question inflamed with drink, burst from the advance line, cheering vehemently, passed at a double quick over the crest under a heavy fire, and, rushing with scarce a check over the heads of the white troops in the Crater, spread to their right, capturing more than two hundred prisoners, and one stand of colors."

The negroes, however, could not traverse the space which Haskell's guns dominated. No troops with their formation could have done so. As the dense mass came in sight, partly emerging from the Crater, the sixteen guns concentrated upon it and drove the assailants to cover without the aid of a hundred muskets. A single negro private, with his musket at support arms, charged home to the guns and was felled with a rammer staff, as he sprang into the sunken road among the pieces.

At the same time that Ferrero made his effort, Turner, of the 10th Corps, pushed forward a brigade over the 9th Corps parapets, seized the Confederate line further to the north, and quickly disposed the remaining brigades of his division to confirm his success.

"Now was the crisis of the day, and fortunate was it for maiden and matron of Petersburg, that even at this moment there was filing into the ravine, between Cemetery Hill and the drunken battalions of Ferrero, a stern array of silent men, clad in faded gray, resolved with grim resolve to avert from the mother town a fate as dreadful as that which marked the three days' sack of Badajos.

"Lee, informed of the disaster at 6:10 A. M., had bidden his aide, Col. Charles Venable, to ride quickly to the right of the army and bring up two brigades of Anderson's old division, commanded by Mahone, for time was too precious to observe military etiquette, and send the orders through Hill. Shortly after the General in Chief reached the front in person, and all men took heart when they descried the grave and gracious face, and 'Traveller' stepping proudly, as if conscious that he bore upon his back the weight of a nation. Beauregard was already at the Gee house, a commanding position five hundred yards in rear of the Crater, and Hill had galloped to the right to organize an attacking column, and had ordered down Pegram, and even now the light batteries of Brander and Ellett were rattling through the town at a sharp trot, with cannoneers mounted, the sweet, serene face of their boy-colonel lit up with that glow which to his men meant hotly impending fight.

"Venable had sped upon his mission and found Mahone's men already standing to their arms; but the Federals from their lofty lookouts were busily interchanging signals, and to uncover such a length of front without exciting observation demanded the nicest precaution. Yet was the difficulty overcome by a single device, for the men being ordered to drop back one by one, as if going for water, obeyed with such intelligence that Warren continued to report to Meade that not a man had left his front.

"Then forming in the ravine in rear, the men of the Virginia and Georgia brigades came pressing down the Valley with swift, swinging stride,—not with the discontented bearing of soldiers whose discipline alone carries them to what they feel to be a scene of fruitless sacrifice, but with the glad alacrity and aggressive ardor of men impatient for battle, and who, from long knowledge of war, are conscious that Fortune has placed within their grasp an opportunity which, by the magic touch of veteran steel, may be transformed to 'swift-winged' victory.

"Halting for a moment in rear of the 'Ragland House,' Mahone bade his men strip off blankets and knapsacks, and prepare for battle.

"Then riding quickly to the front, while the troops marched in single file along the covered way, he drew rein at Bushrod Johnson's headquarters and reported in person to Beauregard. Informed that Johnson would assist in the attack with the outlying troops about the Crater, he rode still further to the front, dismounted, and, pushing along the covered way from the Plank Road, came out into the ravine in which he formed his men. Mounting the embankment at the head of the covered way, he descried within one hundred and sixty yards a forest of glittering bayonets, and beyond, floating proudly from the captured works, eleven Union flags. Estimating rapidly from the hostile colors the probable force in his front, he at once despatched his courier to bring up the

Alabama Brigade from the right, assuming thereby a grave responsibility, yet was the wisdom of the decision vindicated by the event.*

"Scarcely had the order been given when the head of the Virginia Brigade began to debouch from the covered way. Directing Col. Weisiger, its commanding officer, to file to the right and form line of battle, Mahone stood at the angle, speaking quietly and cheerily to the men. Silently and quickly they moved out and formed with that precision dear to every soldier's eyes—the sharpshooters leading, followed by the 6th, 16th, 61st, 41st, and 12th Virginia—the men of Second Manassas and Crampton Gap!

"But one caution was given,—to reserve their fire until they reached the brink of the ditch; but one exhortation, that they were counted on to do this work, and do it quickly.

"Now the leading regiment of the Georgia Brigade began to move out, when suddenly a brave Federal officer, seizing the colors, called on his men to charge. Descrying this hostile movement on the instant, Weisiger, a veteran of stern countenance, which did not belie the personal intrepidity of the man, uttered to the Virginians the single word, 'Forward.'

"Then the sharpshooters and the men of the 6th on the right, running swiftly forward, for theirs was the greater distance to traverse, the whole line sprang along the crest and there burst from more than eight hundred warlike voices that fierce yell, which no man ever yet heard unmoved on field of battle. Storms of case shot from the right mingled with the tempest of bullets which smote upon them from the front, yet was there no answering volley, for these were veterans, whose fiery enthusiasm had been wrought to a finer temper by the stern code of discipline, and even in the tumult the men did not forget their orders. Still pressing forward with steady fury, while the enemy, appalled by the inexorable advance, gave ground, they reached the ditch of the inner works—then one volley crashed from the whole line, and the 6th and 16th, with the sharpshooters clutching their empty guns and redoubling their fierce cries, leaped over the retrenched cavalier, and all down the line the dreadful work of the bayonet began.

"How long it lasted none may say with certainty, for in those fierce moments no man heeded time, no man asked, no man gave quarter; but in an incredibly brief space, as seemed to those who looked on, the whole of the advanced line north of the Crater was taken, the enemy in headlong flight, while the tattered battle flags planted along the parapets from left to right told Lee, at the Gee house, that from this nettle danger, valor had plucked the flower, safety for an army.

*The young courier by whom this order was transmitted was Jimmy Blakemore, an ex-cadet of the Virginia Military Institute, to whom Mahone constantly entrusted the most important missions. Mahone, it will be recalled, was himself an old cadet.

"Redoubling the sharpshooters on his right, Mahone kept down all fire from the Crater, the vast rim of which frowned down upon the lower line occupied by his troops.

"And now the scene within the horrid pit was as might be fitly portrayed only by the pencil of Dante, after he had trod 'nine-circle Hell.' From the great mortars to the right and left, huge missiles, describing graceful curves, fell at regular intervals with dreadful accuracy and burst among the helpless masses huddled together, and every explosion was followed by piteous cries, and oftentimes the very air seemed darkened by flying human limbs. Haskell, too, had moved up his Eprouvette mortars among the men of the 16th Virginia, so close, indeed, that his powder charge was but one ounce and a half—and, without intermission, the storm of fire beat upon the hapless mass imprisoned within.

"Mahone's men watched with great interest this easy method of reaching troops behind cover, and then, with the initiative ingenuity of soldiers, gleefully gathered up the countless muskets with bayonets fixed, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and propelled them with such nice skill that they came down upon Ledlie's men like the rain of the Norman arrows at Hastings.

"At half past ten the Georgia Brigade advanced and attempted to dislodge Wilcox's men, who still held a portion of the line south of the Crater, but so closely was every inch of the ground searched by artillery, so biting was the fire of musketry, that obliquing to their left, they sought cover behind the cavalier trench won by the Virginia Brigade,—many officers and men testifying by their blood how gallantly the venture had been essayed.

"Half an hour later the Alabamians under Saunders arrived, but further attack was postponed until after 1 P. M., in order to arrange for coöperation from Colquitt on the right. Sharply to the minute agreed upon, the assaulting line moved forward, and with such astonishing rapidity did these glorious soldiers rush across the intervening space that ere their first wild cries subsided their battle flags had crowned the works. The Confederate batteries were now ordered to cease firing, and forty volunteers were called for to assault the Crater, but so many of the Alabamians offered themselves for the service that the ordinary system of detail was necessary. Happily, before the assaulting party could be formed, a white handkerchief, made fast to a ramrod, was projected above the edge of the Crater, and, after a brief pause, a motley mass of prisoners poured over the side and ran for their lives to the rear.

"In this grand assault on Lee's line for which Meade had massed 65,000 troops, the enemy suffered a loss of above 5,000 men, including 1,101 prisoners, among whom were two brigade commanders, while vast quantities of small arms and twenty-one standards fell into the hands of the victors.

"Yet many brave men perished on the Confederate side. Elliott's Brigade lost severely in killed and prisoners. The Virginia Brigade, too, paid the price which glory ever exacts. The 6th carried in 98 men and lost 88, one company 'the dandies,' of course,—'Old Company F' of Norfolk, losing every man killed or wounded. Scarcely less was the loss in other regiments.

"Such was the battle of the Crater, which excited the liveliest satisfaction throughout the Army and the country. Mahone was created major-general from that date; Weisiger, who was wounded, brigadier-general; Capt. Girardey, of Mahone's staff, also brigadier, the latter an extraordinary but just promotion, for he was a young officer whose talents and decisive vigor qualified him to conduct enterprises of the highest movement. Yet, fate willed that his career should be brief, for within a fortnight he fell in battle north of the James, his death dimming the joy of victory."

We search in vain for any such recognition of those dauntless gunners, who alone stood between the enemy and Petersburg after the explosion of the mine. "Ham" Chamberlayne became a captain, but glory was the only reward Gibbes and Haskell and Huger, and the others received. Such was the lot of the artillerymen. Indeed no one seemed to think promotion, in an arm whose officers distinguished themselves on every occasion, was necessary. It would seem that the Army had come to regard deeds of heroism and feats of extraordinary valor as matters to be expected and not rewarded, in the Artillery.

"On the Federal side, crimination and recrimination followed what Gen. Grant styled 'this miserable failure.' There was a Court of Inquiry, and a vast array of dismal testimony, which disclosed the fact that of four generals of division belonging to the assaulting Corps, *not one had followed his men into the Confederate lines.* Nay, that the very commander of the storming division, finding, like honest Nym, 'the humor of the breach too hot,' was at the crisis of the fight palpitating in a bomb-proof, beguiling a Michigan surgeon into giving him a drink of rum, on the plea that 'he had malaria, and that he had been struck by a spent ball,'—

legends of a hoary antiquity, whereof, let us humbly confess, we ourselves have heard."

Although few promotions in the arm resulted from the conduct of the Artillery in the Crater fight, the Army, Petersburg, and the whole South knew that the gunners had saved the day. They knew that the batteries had stood their ground without infantry supports, and hurled back the enemy in their front. They knew how Haskell, and Pegram, and Coit, from rear, from right, and from left had formed a circle of fire about the threatened point and, unaided, denied the enemy's advance to the town, while Mahone was bringing his men up from the right just in time to prevent Ayres' Division of Warren's Corps from charging Chamberlayne's "one-gun battery," as the enemy called the piece which Gibbes and Huger and the other gallant officers had heroically kept in action. The deeds of the artillerymen were upon every tongue. Indeed, even in the Federal accounts of the affair, a large part of every report is devoted to the overwhelming and destructive effect of the Confederate Artillery and never once did the enemy thereafter forget the power of the guns which occupied the works in their front.

CHAPTER XLV

THE SECOND CORPS IN THE VALLEY

WHILE the Federals were mining, and the Confederates countermining, many things of interest to the Artillery were occurring besides the gathering of unexploded Federal shells from in front of the lines by night, and the incessant artillery practice by day.

Between July 6 and 9, Grant had detached three divisions of the 6th Corps to Washington to oppose Early and Breckinridge, who had reached Lynchburg ahead of Hunter and without a fight sent him whirling back through West Virginia, after he had devastated the Valley and destroyed much private property usually exempt from destruction, against both Lincoln's and Grant's orders. Perhaps the greatest feat of Hunter's ruthless campaign was the demolition of the Virginia Military Institute. As a measure of military necessity, this was of course justified, in so far as the burning of its buildings and military equipment was concerned, but the wanton burning of its valuable library, its scientific apparatus, and the private houses and property of its professors, over the protest of his officers, was an act for which Hunter's government will yet have to pay.*

Nelson's and Braxton's battalions of artillery which under Gen. Long were alone detached from the Army with the 2d Corps, though marching continuously and with great speed, failed to reach Lynchburg before Hunter decamped. On June 22, however, these two battalions were united with Breckinridge's Artillery near Salem. Thence the Army of the Valley moved by the direct route to Staunton. During the halt of two days at that point, Gen. Long organized his entire force

*At the time this is written, a bill is pending in the United States Senate, providing for an indemnity to the Institution for \$214,000, which includes no interest. This bill was drawn and introduced by Senator Henry A. Du Pont, of Delaware, who like William McKinley was an officer in Hunter's army, and both of whom protested against the destruction of the school. Senator Du Pont was Hunter's Chief of Artillery and commanded the 5th United States Battery, solid shot from the guns of which still remain in the walls of the barrack.

of artillery. The least efficient batteries of Breckinridge's Division were to be left in a reserve artillery camp at Staunton, in command of Maj. Leyden, while Nelson's, Braxton's, and McLaughlin's battalions were fully horsed, armed, and equipped. The three battalions thus organized, with forty pieces, were placed under the immediate command of Col. J. Floyd King, while Jackson's, Lurty's, and McClannahan's horse batteries with ten guns were organized into another battalion to operate with McCausland's force of 1,500 cavalry. The 2d Corps and Breckinridge's Division together numbered 8,000 infantry.

Hunter's retreat to the Ohio, or flight, it might be more properly styled, left the Valley open to Early, who promptly moved down it, and after encountering little resistance crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown July 5 and 6. On the 9th, he advanced upon Frederickstown, whereupon Gen. Wallace withdrew his force of about 5,000 men and placed them in line of battle along the Monocacy a mile or two east of the town.

When Early determined to attack that portion of the line opposite the railroad bridge, the ford, and across the Georgetown Road, Gen. Long skillfully posted a number of guns on the west bank which soon effectively prepared the way for McCausland and Gordon to cross the stream. These troops were soon assailed by the enemy, whose line of battle was formed at right angles to the river, presenting an opportunity to Long, of which he immediately availed himself. Gordon hardly became engaged before the supporting artillery raked the Federal line from flank and in reverse, immediately crushing it and driving the enemy in a route from the ford and bridge. Never was victory more complete, and seldom has one of equal magnitude been attained with so little effort and cost to the assailants. The result was due entirely to the skillful employment by Long of his artillery in the operations of which the most thorough coöperation between Nelson, Braxton, and McLaughlin was obtained. On this occasion a

few batteries only were used to clear the crossings, the others being held in readiness under cover while the infantry and cavalry tempted Wallace to assail them. The plan worked to perfection, and no sooner had the Federal line advanced and exposed its flank, than Long and King threw every gun into action with decisive effect, with the loss of but a score of men and two officers. Lieut. Hobson, of the Amherst Battery, fell mortally, and Lieut. Southall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General on Long's staff, severely wounded.

The conduct of the brave old Col. Nelson on this occasion and throughout the succeeding campaign, as well as that of McLaughlin and Braxton, was highly commendable. William Nelson, closely connected by blood with Lee, Pendleton, Page, Braxton, Carter, and many other officers of the Artillery, was a picturesque character. Among the first to raise a battery in the spring of 1861, he had gradually risen to high rank. Like Cabell, he was not noted for dash, nor was he by training a soldier. But he possessed an unblemished character, was sternly courageous, as dependable as any officer in the Army, and was adored by his men who regarded him as a father. The young farmer boys of Hanover, and Louisa counties, flocked by hundreds to his standard, and followed him from first to last with a devotion which military prowess alone could not have commanded. In appearance, the "Old Colonel," as his men affectionately styled him, was truly a remarkable figure. Gen. Bushrod Johnson commonly wore a linen duster and straw hat, Gen. William Smith, ex-Governor of Virginia and known as "Extra Billy," usually carried an umbrella on the march, Gen. Mahone a cow in his headquarters train, but Col. Nelson alone adorned himself with a high silk hat! On many occasions as he rode past strange troops, the men with shouts of merriment cried after him, "Old man, come out of that hat!" and similar humorous gibes. This eccentricity of dress, however, was not abandoned by him in spite of the derisive comments of the soldiery. His own men knew

and loved him, for after all it was the head and heart and not the helmet of their leader that mattered.

On the 10th, Early advanced rapidly against Washington, which beside its garrison of near 20,000 troops was now defended by the two divisions of the 6th Corps detached from Petersburg, and 6,000 men of the 19th just arrived from New Orleans. After creating great alarm in the north, Early withdrew from before the Capital on the night of the 12th, conscious of his inability to carry the strong Federal works by storm, recrossed the Potomac at White's Ford on the 14th, encamped for a few days at Leesburg, and then moved through Snicker's Gap to Berryville, picketing the adjacent fords of the Shenandoah River with his artillery.

McLaughlin at Castleman's Ferry was soon heavily engaged in repelling an attempt of the enemy's advance guard to cross, but as the main column began to arrive Early retired from Berryville *via* White Post to Newtown. Col. Nelson with two batteries then accompanied Ramseur's Division to Winchester where they made an unsuccessful attack upon the enemy, losing the guns of Kirkpatrick's Amherst Battery. Nelson had advanced his guns so close to the Federal line that when Ramseur's troops met with a severe reverse and fell back in confusion, the battalion commander, whose conduct was heroic on this occasion, was unable to save Kirkpatrick's guns. The battery was rearmed, however, August 20.

After retiring to Strasburg and allowing the enemy to occupy Winchester and push their advance to Newtown, Early turned upon them a few days later and drove them in great haste through Winchester toward Martinsburg. The Federal retreat was so rapid that although it was followed across the Potomac at Williamsport, no punishment could be inflicted upon the enemy, and Early resumed his position at Strasburg. During these operations the Artillery, while little engaged, was called upon for the most tremendous exertions in marching and countermarching.

At this juncture, Sheridan assumed command of a large Federal force in the Valley, and Early fell back before him to Fisher's Hill. Before the end of July, Early's command had marched by road over 400 miles, losing less than 3,000 men, and dispersing two armies of an aggregate strength of double his own. During this period, the Artillery was constantly with the infantry column and with the exception of the physical breakdown of Gen. Long, was in as good order as when it left Cold Harbor. As a record of field artillery marching this campaign is worthy of the most careful study, for in that respect it excelled all others of the war and shows to what a high degree of mobility field batteries may be brought. Horses now are just as capable of performing such work as they were in 1864, and yet it is doubtful if a single battery in our army could march 400 miles on short provender, in less than 60 days, and engage in a pitched battle with any degree of effect.*

Meanwhile Anderson with Kershaw's Division and Cutshaw's Battalion of artillery had joined Early, and on the 14th of August, Fitz Lee's Division of cavalry with Johnston's and Shoemakers's horse batteries arrived at Front Royal. Early again drove the enemy out of Winchester. On the 19th, Gen. Long was compelled to relinquish his command, placing Col. Nelson in charge of the Artillery, while Capt. Kirkpatrick assumed command of Nelson's Battalion.

After much marching and skirmishing, in all of which the Artillery was constantly engaged, the enemy retired to Harper's Ferry on the 21st. Early remained in the neighborhood of Charles Town until the 25th, moving thence to Shepherdstown, and then into camp at Bunker Hill. On the 31st, Milledge's and Massie's batteries accompanied Rodes' Division to Martinsburg, where the latter battery was heavily engaged. Early then concentrated his army near Stephenson's Depot.

Col. Carter had been relieved from his more or less amphibious duties along the James on August 2, and

*Early made enforced requisition upon the Maryland farmers for horses, but only a few were assigned to the artillery. See his *Memoirs*, p. 395.

ordered to join Early as Chief of Artillery. He reported for duty September 9. His selection to fill Gen. Long's place was as wise as it was merited. In all that great army, there was not a more gallant artilleryman than Tom Carter, of Pampatyke, devoted friend and near kinsman of Lee. Graduating from the Virginia Military Institute in the Class of 1849, he studied medicine at the University of Virginia. He soon forsook his profession, however, and settled upon his fine estate in King William County. There during the years immediately preceding the war, he reigned in lordly state among his kinsmen and people, as his father had done before him. Noted for the purity and strength of his character, beloved and respected by all, dispensing hospitality to his friends and charity to the poor and needy of the country-side, he peacefully awaited the call to arms, ready to repay with blood and valor his State for the education it had given him. No sooner was the summons issued than he called together his slaves, admonished them to be faithful in his absence, and committing them to the care of a young and beautiful wife, saddled his thoroughbred charger and rode proudly to the Court House where the guidon of his battery was planted, and assumed command as if by inherited right. A few days, nay hours, saw the King William Artillery ready to receive its guns, for a hundred feminine hands had toiled ceaselessly with needle and thread upon the uniforms for his men. With a score of young kinsmen of the country-side, consumed with martial ardor, there was no lack of material for the officers and noncommissioned officers of the battery, mounted as they were upon the best blooded animals which Virginia could boast. There was no need to teach these men horsemanship, and the influence a century of association among their progenitors and a lifetime spent with their captain supplied the discipline of regular troops. A cousin of Robert E. Lee, Tom Carter combined more of the modesty, simplicity, and valor of his great kinsman than any other man in Virginia. It is recounted

that at Seven Pines, while he sat with one foot in his stirrup and the other thrown across the pommel of his saddle, coolly directing under a hail of fire the remaining fragment of his battery, up rode D. H. Hill, of iron nerve, and in the midst of the carnage about him, rose in his stirrups and after saluting Carter declared that he would rather be the captain of the King William Artillery than President of the Confederate States.

From that day when Carter first fought under the eye of Lee, his name was the very synonym of valor. Promotion meant nothing to him. It came it is true, and was well earned, but his sole desire was to serve Lee and Virginia faithfully and well. On several occasions he was not rewarded by increased rank when it should have been given him, but he was the kinsman of Lee and knew that in spite of his merit his claims must not be pressed. So it was that when Shoup was promoted in the Western Army, Carter preferred to remain in Virginia, to the soil of which every tie of blood and duty bound him. It was in Virginia that he belonged and there he remained. As the great invading host swept around Lee's Army, trampling Carter's crops, driving off his horses and cattle, demolishing his barns and fences, it was there on the very lawns of his ancestral estate that he planted his guns while a devoted wife, with the sublime courage of womanhood, ministered tenderly to the victims of his fire. Soon the crash of the guns ceased to disturb the peace of Pampatyke, but not until it lay a rent and bleeding wreck in the path of the great armies. But still at her post its mistress remained, surrounded only by a score of faithful blacks, who looked upon the tragic scenes of war, and bewildered could not understand. Hardly a week that the cavalry patrols of one army or the other did not pass and repass, or that the heroic wife of the absent artilleryman did not like a sainted creature beckon some ambulance with its woeful burden through the gates of Pampatyke. Friend and foe alike there found relief, for while the lips of Sue Roy bade her soldier husband struggle on to

the last, her angelic hands and heart were animated only by the spirit of Christ in the alleviation of the suffering about her. Her deeds were known to all—to both armies,—and so when her gallant husband returned from Appomattox, he was able to receive into his home, wrecked but not wholly destroyed, the weary chieftain whom he had followed on a hundred battlefields. Ah! who can say what were the emotions of Robert E. Lee, and Tom Carter, and Sue Roy during those bitter days after Appomattox. Let us not profane the sanctity of their haven of retreat. Let us avert our eyes after seeing the great master of war dismount at the doorway, and grasp in silence the outstretched hand of the kinsman whose blood had proved his devotion. More of the sacred scene is not for us. Let us leave them, as an ancient negro respectfully slips the martial trappings from the back of old Traveller, and turns him out to rest and graze beneath the patriarchal oaks of Pampatyke, where no longer the manger is full, where no longer the grain bins are laden with the golden freight of yore, where no longer the fields are flooded by a sea of tasseled wheat. But leaving them, how can it be otherwise than with regret that ours is not the brush to place on canvas this scene, so sweetly pathetic, and yet so fraught with lessons of fortitude and courage that no man might look thereon without seeing through his tears a flash of the unconquerable spirit of Lee and Virginia.

Such as we have described him, was Col. Thomas H. Carter, the man who now succeeded Gen. Long in command of Early's Artillery. He came to this important post just as he did to the county courthouse in the spring of 1861, received by all not only with respect, but with affectionate regard. He did not come to displace Nelson. He merely received his long deferred due.*

At daylight on the 19th of September, the Confederate cavalry pickets at the crossing of the Opequon and Berryville Road, were driven in, and information

*After the war Col. Carter became Rector of the University of Virginia.

having been received by Early of the fact, he immediately ordered all the troops at Stephenson's Depot to be in readiness to move, while Gordon, who had arrived from Bunker Hill, was directed to move at once. By some mistake, Gordon failed to receive his orders. Ramseur was already in position across the Berryville Road skirmishing with the enemy, when Early reached him and learned that Gordon was not moving up. He at once directed Breckinridge and Rodes to hasten forward as rapidly as possible. The position occupied by Ramseur was about one mile and a half out from Winchester on an elevated plateau between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run, in the angle formed by the Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In his right front the country was open, while to his left the ground sloped off to Red Bud Run along which there were some patches of woods which afforded cover for troops. In his front and towards the Opequon ran the Berryville Road with hills and woods on both sides, which also afforded admirable cover for the approach of the enemy.

Nelson's Battalion was posted on Ramseur's line, covering the approaches as far as practicable, and Lomax with Jackson's Cavalry and part of Johnson's was on the right, watching the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal Road beyond, while Fitz Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with his cavalry and Johnston's Horse Battery.

Gordon's Division reached the field a little after 10 A. M. and was placed under cover in rear of a wood behind the interval between Ramseur and the Red Bud. Knowing that it would not do to await the shock of the heavy assaulting columns, which were being formed, Early ordered Gordon to examine the ground on his left with a view to making an attack himself, and placed Rodes' three brigades as they came up on Gordon's right, also in some woods. The enemy was now discovered moving in great force both against Ramseur's front and left. Already Ramseur's men were falling

back behind Nelson's batteries, which remained steadfast, however, and single-handed checked the advance while Early made his dispositions to hurl Gordon and Rodes on the right of the Federal column. Meanwhile, Nelson's batteries were being severely punished, but gallantly continued to pour a most destructive fire into the enemy's ranks, while Braxton's Battalion galloped into position in front of Gordon and also opened fire upon the Federal flank. Evans' Brigade of Gordon's Division, passing beyond the guns, was soon overcome and followed by the enemy, who rolled back the Confederate left wing until it rested at right angles to Ramseur's line with seven of Braxton's guns at the salient. The onrushing enemy actually approached to within musket range of these pieces, which were totally unsupported, but could not drive the gunners from their position. Of the situation at this juncture Early wrote: "This caused a pause in our advance and the position was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this force was driven back the day was lost. Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their ground, and under the personal superintendence of Lieut.-Col. Braxton, and Col. T. H. Carter, my then Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy. This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy, staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle flag on the ground whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot. Just then, Battle's Brigade of Rodes' Division, which had arrived and had been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans' Brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge."

Ramseur's Division, which with Nelson's batteries always in front bore the brunt of the attack, was at first forced back a little, but rallying behind the guns soon recovered itself. Lomax on the right had greatly assisted Ramseur by making a gallant charge against the

left flank of the attacking infantry, and Breckinridge's batteries with Fitz Lee managed to secure a destructive flank fire across the Red Bud on the left, while in the words of Early, "Nelson's and Braxton's battalions had performed wonders."

Although the Confederates had before noon won a splendid victory, it was not without paying a high price, for the superb Rodes had been killed at the very moment of success. Thus one by one were Jackson's veterans falling, and who should take their places was already becoming a problem.

The attack so far had been rendered by the Federal 6th and 19th Corps, but another remained. Early's lines were now formed from Abraham's Creek across to the Red Bud and were much attenuated.

About 2 o'clock, Breckinridge's and Wharton's divisions, and McLaughlin's Battalion reached the field after a heavy engagement during the morning with the enemy's cavalry on the Charles Town Road. Patton's Brigade of Wharton's Division was then sent to re-enforce Fitz Lee, while Col. King placed his batteries on a hill in rear of Breckinridge's line, which now faced to the left. Later in the afternoon two divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the pickets north of the Rose Bud and Crook's infantry corps, which had not been engaged, forced back Patton and Fitz Lee. The Federal Cavalry then swept around Early's left flank to oppose which Wharton's other two brigades, King's Artillery, and one of Braxton's guns were double-timed to the rear. Breckinridge, after driving back the enemy, formed his division in line in rear of Early's left and at right angles to the Martinsburg Road, again repulsing the enemy. But many of the men on Early's front line hearing Breckinridge's fire in their rear, and thinking they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced falling back, thus producing great confusion. At the same time, Crook advanced against Gordon and struck his line while in confusion. The whole front line now gave way, but a large number of the men were rallied

behind a line of breastworks, which had been thrown up just outside of Winchester during the first year of the war. At this point, the Artillery was gradually massed and checked all pursuit. Of this movement of the Artillery, Col. Carter wrote in his report: "Fortunately the Artillery was under perfect control to the last, and maneuvered and fought with untiring courage. The guns retired from point to point, halting, unlimbering, and firing, while efforts were made by general officers to rally the infantry."

Wharton's Division maintained its organization on the left, and Ramseur fell back in good order on the right. But, again, the Federal Cavalry got around Early's left and he was compelled to retire through the town under cover of Wickham's Brigade of cavalry, and Breathed's guns on Fort Hill. A new line was formed east of the town, which was maintained until nightfall, when Early retired without serious molestation to Newtown.

Near the close of the day, Col. Carter received a painful wound from a fragment of shell, which compelled him to turn over the command of the Artillery to Nelson, but he was not permanently disabled.

While many recriminations followed upon this affair, the whole army testified to the stout resistance made by the Artillery in the long and exhausting struggle which lasted from dawn to dark. The ultimate loss of the battle was due to the Federal superiority in cavalry, which was free to encircle the left flank, gradually compelling Early's line to fall back before the infantry in its front. Had Carter had sufficient artillery to crown the heights northwest of the town, he might have prevented the movement of the enemy's cavalry in that direction. Unfortunately Cutshaw was off with Kershaw's Division on an expedition east of the Blue Ridge.

Three guns of King's Battalion were lost in this battle, two of which were loaned the cavalry, and one of which was abandoned on the retreat, after its teams were shot down.

After Early's reverse at Winchester, he retreated during the night with all his trains secure to Fisher's Hill, and formed line of battle on the morning of the 20th, with McLaughlin's Battalion on the right, Braxton's in the center, and Nelson's on the left. The afternoon of the 20th, Sheridan appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill, and for the greater part of the next two days was engaged in reconnoitering Early's line. After some sharp skirmishing the enemy began to fortify in Early's front, but it was soon discovered that an attack was intended on the Confederate left. Early now gave orders to retire, but just before sunset Crook's infantry drove back Lomax's dismounted cavalry and involved Ramseur's left before the withdrawal could be effected. Ramseur made an attempt to meet this movement by throwing his brigades successively into line to the left, and Wharton's Division was sent for from the right, but it did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line in the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement resulted in confusion in both divisions and as soon as this was noticed by the enemy, a general advance along the whole Federal line was ordered. After very little resistance the Confederate Infantry made for the rear in confusion, leaving the Artillery in the lurch, as it had never done before. Of this incident Early wrote, "The men and officers of the Artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and order them to withdraw their guns, before they would move. In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads leading from their positions into the pike were so rugged, that eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy."*

Early is in error as to the number of guns. There were fourteen lost, four of Nelson's, two of Lomax's Horse Artillery, seven of Braxton's and one of King's taken by the enemy on this occasion. Again Col. Nelson's conduct was conspicuously gallant as he withdrew

*Gen. Jubal A. Early, etc., p. 480.

his pieces in small groups, alternately unlimbering and firing and entirely without infantry support.

From near Fisher's Hill, Early fell back on the 26th, in line of battle beyond New Market, Nelson, Braxton, and McLaughlin in the rear guard occupying every practicable position from which to retard the pursuers. In this retreat in which Nelson led the Artillery with consummate skill, Capt. John L. Massie, of the Fluvanna Battery, fell mortally, and Lieut. N. B. Cooke, of Braxton's Battalion severely, wounded. Early then moved toward Port Republic, arriving at Brown's Gap on the 25th, where he was rejoined by Kershaw's Division, and Cutshaw's Battalion. On the same day, Col. Carter resumed command of the Artillery, of which Carpenter's and Hardwicke's batteries were engaged on the 26th and 27th.

On the 28th, Early again put his army in motion down the Valley, marching *via* Waynesborough to Mount Sidney, and thence by slow stages to Hupp's Hill below Strasburg, which position he reached October 18th. Here an affair occurred in which Fry's Richmond Orange Battery participated with great credit and in which Lieut. S. S. French, adjutant on Carter's staff, was severely wounded.

The Cavalry had meanwhile been moving by the back road, and on the morning of the 8th had encountered the enemy. In this affair the Cavalry broke badly, leaving Thomson's and Johnston's batteries entirely isolated, but the gunners managed to cut their way to the rear, not, however, without the loss of six pieces. The very next day Shoemaker's Battery and the remaining section of Thomson's, which were serving with Lomax's Cavalry as a guard to Early's wagon trains near Woodstock, were again deserted by the Cavalry, which fled precipitately to the rear. With the exception of one of Thomson's, all the guns were saved by the extraordinary heroism of the horse artillerymen. On this occasion Capt. Carpenter of the Alleghany Battery, a classmate and devoted friend of

Jimmie Thomson's at the Institute, particularly distinguished himself. Observing the danger to which his comrades were exposed, he quickly rallied a number of the fugitive troopers and again and again formed them across the Valley Pike to check the pursuers. In this way he contributed materially towards saving the guns and trains, losing an arm as a result of his reckless exposure. But what was an arm to Carpenter, if by losing it he could save the gallant Jimmie Thomson!

The following extract from the diary of a horse artilleryman of Thomson's Battery throws some light on the affair of October 9th: "The shameful way that our Cavalry, especially that portion that tried to operate on the North Mountain Road, fought, bled, and died, a running rearward, was enough to make its old commander, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, weep in his grave. Ring down the curtain on that scene, for the Cavalry played a regular exeunt act."

This was the famous battle of Tom's Brook, sometimes called by the Federals in a spirit of derision, "The Woodstock Races." At any rate, like the one the preceding day, it was a disgraceful affair on the part of the Confederate Cavalry. Soon after a Washington paper contained a card signed by Gen. Custer to the effect that he had captured all the guns of the Stuart Horse Artillery but one, and offering a reward of \$1,000.00 for that. The reward was never claimed.

On October 19, at a very early hour, Early moved forward to attack the enemy beyond Cedar Creek, and by 10 A. M. not only had he routed two Federal Corps, seized their camps with twenty-four pieces of artillery, but Carter's battalions almost unaided by the Infantry had dislodged the 6th Corps near Middletown. It was here that a fatal halt by Early occurred in spite of Gordon's and Carter's urgent requests to be allowed to follow up the success of the morning. Carter even went so far as to declare that with his guns alone he could crush out all resistance of the enemy and begged that he be allowed to follow the Federals up, but Early de-

layed to reform the disordered troops which he found in the captured trains, and gave Sheridan time to stay the route of his army and lead part of it back to the field of battle. Early then formed his line across the pike north of Middletown and at right angles thereto with Wofford's Brigade on the right, then Wharton's Division, then Pegram's Division across the road, then Ramseur considerably in advance, with Kershaw and Gordon in order to the left. Between Gordon and Rosser's Cavalry, with Thomson's Battery on the extreme Confederate left, was an interval of about a mile in which about 3 P. M. Carter, of his own accord, placed six of Cutshaw's and two of Jones' guns. Shortly after, about 3:30 P. M., the enemy assailed Gordon in force and again the Infantry gave way while the guns were retired only upon Gordon's order. Nelson's, Braxton's and McLaughlin's battalions and the other batteries of Cutshaw's, posted from right to left along the infantry line, resolutely held their positions until the left began to roll up, whereupon Carter withdrew them to a commanding elevation several hundred yards in rear of the infantry line. Soon the Infantry began to break and move to the rear, but the Artillery maintained its fire, holding the Federals for over an hour, and not until its ammunition was exhausted was the order to retire given. Meantime, Carter had placed a small group of guns on the heights south of Cedar Creek to cover the withdrawal of the Infantry and Artillery.

Again Early's Infantry had failed him after winning a splendid victory, the Artillery as at Winchester alone saving the retreat from becoming a rout. Night at last came and under cover of darkness and the fire of Carter's rearmost guns, the Army was falling back in apparent safety. While the main body of the Artillery was marching in column towards Hupp's Hill, a small body of Federal cavalry burst into the fields on the right of the turnpike and charged the column and trains in rear. The bugle blasts, cheers, the rush of horses' feet, and pistol shots in the darkness, at once created a panic

in the infantry support, already much disorganized. The artillery officers and men appealed in vain to the panic-stricken infantrymen for muskets to defend the trains, but could not secure them, and as the cannoneers were totally unarmed they were compelled to abandon a large number of guns and wagons. Not only did the enemy recover all the guns captured from them in the morning, but twenty-three others besides. "One hundred men in an organized state, with muskets, could have saved the train," wrote Col. Carter.

This incident was as disgraceful to the Confederates as it was pleasing to Sheridan. It was not, however, the fault of the Artillery. The attack, in the nature of an ambush, occurred at a very narrow passage south of Strasburg, between the precipitous bank of the river on the one side and bluffs for the most part on the other. A bridge on the turnpike had failed and caused the road to become congested with ordnance and medical trains, and a long column of over 1,400 prisoners. There was absolutely no chance, therefore, for escape, and the cannoneers could not be expected to engage with fence rails or stones, even had they been available, in a night conflict with armed troopers. That their conduct was in every way commendable is attested by Col. Carter, who declared that throughout the night, with confusion and disorder all about them, the artillerymen remained cool and thoroughly under control, and as a guarantee against the repetition of such occurrences, he took occasion to recommend at once that a certain proportion of artillerymen be armed with carbines.

After this misfortune, Early retreated to New Market, in the neighborhood of which he remained until the last of November, when the Army proceeded to Harrisonburg, the Artillery going into winter quarters near Staunton. Thus did Early's Valley Campaign of 1864 come to a close, brilliant in many respects yet, in the main, ill-fated. With the exception of the Artillery it hardly seemed possible that the troops which broke so badly at Winchester, at Fisher's Hill, at Wood-

stock, and on several other occasions were the men which had fought under Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, and Lee himself. It has been attempted to explain the poor conduct of Early's troops by saying that these men were simply fought out, that they had reached the limit of physical endurance, and that with a failure of physical stamina came their demoralization as a natural consequence. This explanation is on a par with that which makes of Jackson a religious fanatic at Gaines' Mill and White Oak Swamp. Neither are satisfactory. Why, if Early's Infantry was exhausted, was the Artillery still capable of performing deeds of unsurpassed valor on the field of battle, as well as the same marches which fell to the Infantry? No. Some other explanation is necessary and the correct one would seem to concern the discipline of the several arms. Is it too much to suggest a comparison of the field-officers and battery commanders of the Artillery with the officers of equal rank in the Infantry and Cavalry? Is it too much to say that in the comparatively long service and training of the junior officers of the Artillery, many of whom had served in the lower grades of their arm since the beginning of the war, lies the explanation? Is it too much to say that in the artillery enlisted personnel, there may be found a further cause for the superior conduct of the gunners over that of the other troops, large numbers of whose best men had fallen in battle, while an ever-increasing number of conscripts, and inferior material filled their places? Some such explanation seems reasonable, for certain it is that there was a marked difference which Early fully recognized. It is well known that he made some harsh criticisms of his troops, and in this connection an incident concerning the Artillery should be recorded.

On a certain occasion it was reported that Early, in his natural disappointment over the result of his campaign, had impugned the fighting qualities of his army. Whereupon, Col. Carter, politely but firmly, demanded a retraction in favor of the Artillery and got it. It is

not difficult in reading Early's memoirs to see that such a discrimination was sincere on his part. Again and again he bears tribute to the Artillery of his command, when only veiled reproaches are found for the others.

The principal artillery lessons to be drawn from Early's operations in the Valley are as to the endurance of artillery, and what may be exacted of it in rear guard actions, in the face of a superior force—superior not only in point of numbers, but moral as well. Carter's Artillery formed the very backbone of Early's Army from Winchester to the end of the campaign. Without it, on more than one occasion, withdrawals from before the enemy would have been decisive defeats, and retreats would have become disgraceful routs. It was always at hand, as we have shown, in the forefront of the advance, and on every hilltop on the retreat, either to open the battle with encouragement to the Infantry, or to deny Sheridan's superb and overwhelming force of cavalry the full fruits of victory.

CHAPTER XLVI

PETERSBURG—THE WINTER OF 1864

GRANT had learned a lesson, and for three weeks after the Crater fight comparative quiet reigned at Petersburg, though many brave men perished in the trenches. Picket firing and artillery practice was continuous, "while the fiery curves of mortar-shell by night, told that the portentous game of war still went on."

About August 10th, Fitz Lee's Division of cavalry, with Johnston's and Shoemaker's batteries under Capt. Johnston, received orders to join Early in the Valley. Maj. Breathed had been wounded in a skirmish on June 29. This force reached Front Royal on August 14, and thenceforth participated in all of Early's operations in the Valley.

Upon Alexander's return to the Army August 18, he at once examined the Artillery defenses with the Chief of Artillery, and steps were instantly taken by the latter to have the works in rear of the Crater greatly strengthened. A number of Blakelys, Columbiads, and 80-pounder Parrotts were issued to the 8d Corps and caused to be mounted and manned by the cannoneers of Penick's Battery, while more careful instructions were drawn up for the Artillery in general, in order to secure the most systematic routine of duty possible and guard against all surprises. In connection with this work, Gen. Pendleton was constantly in the works and trenches.

About this time Lieut.-Col. Pemberton renewed Carter's proposal to organize a special body of horse artillery for the purpose of harassing the enemy along the river, a duty which required great mobility, but nothing was accomplished in that direction. Towards the end of the month, Col. Hilary P. Jones was ordered to Wilmington to organize the Artillery of the 8d Military District on the same basis as that of the Army in

Virginia, leaving Lieut.-Col. Moseley in command of Beauregard's Artillery.

Grant's next move after the Crater was an attempt to seize the Weldon Railroad by gradually extending his left. To meet this threat, Heth's Division and Brander's Battery of Pegram's Battalion moved out on the 18th and attacked the enemy at the Davis house on the railroad, the affair resulting successfully for the Confederates. The next day, Mahone's Division and Pegram, with the rest of his battalion, joined Heth and Brander and renewed the attack. In this engagement in which the Federals lost nearly 3,000 prisoners, Pegram greatly distinguished himself, and together with a part of Heth's Division bore the brunt of the battle. Again on the 21st, Pegram with twelve guns was heavily engaged at Poplar Spring Church, where Mahone, attacking with six small brigades, failed to dislodge the enemy. On this occasion instead of encountering a small force as expected, he found an army corps well entrenched with every approach to the hostile works swept by a powerful array of artillery. On the 24th, Pegram was directed, with Brander's and Cayce's batteries of his own battalion, Ross's of Lane's, and sections of Hurt's and Clutter's of McIntosh's, to accompany Heth's column in its attack upon the enemy at Reams Station. The following day Heth made a splendid effort capturing twelve stands of colors, nine pieces of artillery, ten caissons, 2,150 prisoners, and 3,100 muskets, losing himself but 720 men. In this brilliant affair Pegram, with characteristic dash and skill, prepared the way to victory. While the conduct of the North Carolina troops was superb and won fresh laurels for the old North State, Heth himself declared that he did not believe any troops could have carried the works of the enemy without such assistance as Pegram rendered the North Carolinians, by first shaking the hostile line with the fire of his guns.

By the end of August, however, Grant was firmly established across the Weldon Road and had thus taken

another important line of communication from Lee. To seize it had cost him in the four engagements of August not less than 8,500 men, as opposed to a loss of one-fourth that number to his adversary, but the advantage was worth the cost. He knew that similar successes, even at such disproportionate losses, would soon enable him to accomplish his purpose.

In the severe fighting of August on the right, Hampton had also won fresh laurels for the Cavalry, eliciting high praise for his regiments and Hart's and McGregor's batteries from Lee himself. From September 14 to 30, these two batteries with Edward Graham's Petersburg Battery of Beauregard's Artillery, now converted from light to horse artillery, rendered service of the most brilliant character, in coöperation with the Cavalry.

On the 29th of September, the enemy succeeded in carrying by surprise, a commanding salient of the Confederate works, known as Fort Harrison, near Chaffin's Bluff. To meet this threat against Richmond, Gen. Alexander, who had rejoined his command in August, accompanied Field's Division that night with Clutter's Battery of McIntosh's Battalion, and Marye's Battery of Pegram's Battalion, both under Maj. Marmaduke Johnson. The next morning Haskell's Battalion joined Alexander north of the James, and Lieut.-Col. Hardaway, who had been placed in command of the Artillery on the James when Carter was ordered to join Early, September 2, reported to Alexander with his own and Stark's Battalion.

Immediately an effort was made to recover Fort Harrison. Hardaway's and Stark's battalions co-operated as far as practicable with Johnson's and Haskell's in the unsuccessful effort of the 30th to recover the fort from Butler, but the nature of the terrain and the advantageous position of the enemy placed Alexander at a great disadvantage. When the attack was resumed October 1, Haskell's Battalion was united with Hardaway's and Stark's on the right near the

river, and Lamkin's Battery, which had gained much experience with high angle fire in the trenches at Petersburg, was assigned the task of shelling the hostile works with a number of mortars. But again the attempt to drive Butler out of Fort Harrison proved unsuccessful, and the Artillery was withdrawn to the defensive lines with the exception of Lamkin's Battery, which remained in the advanced position with the mortars.

While the Confederates were thus opposing Butler on their extreme left, heavy fighting was also taking place on the right, brought on by the continuous extension of the enemy in that direction. In the affairs of September 30 and October 1, known as the "Battles of the Jones House," Pegram with Brander's and Ellett's batteries on the first day operated with Heth in his attack on the Federal left, and on the second day with Brander's and Cayce's batteries in the combined attack of Heth and Wilcox. On the 2d, Pegram with Ellett's, Cayce's under command of Lieut. Hollis, who greatly distinguished himself the preceding day, and Gregg's batteries, took a prominent part in repulsing the Federal assault on Heth's position. In these affairs, the Federals again lost heavily and again the reports teem with references to the extraordinary effectiveness of the Confederate Artillery.

Repeatedly during the siege was Pegram praised by the generals of the divisions with which he served, as well as by his corps commander. In the action of September 30, when Heth's and Wilcox's divisions were assigned the task of recovering the extension of the line of rifle-pits to the right of Petersburg, he shone with especial brilliance. On this occasion McGowan's Brigade after a gallant resistance was borne back by sheer weight of opposing numbers. Seeing that the South Carolinians were giving ground, Pegram, who had gone forward with them in their initial advance, rode through the line of battle, snatched the colors from the ensign and rode with them straight toward the enemy. "When forty or fifty yards in advance of the whole line, placing the

color-staff on his stirrup and turning halfway round in his saddle, he dropped the reins on his horse's neck, raised his hat and shouted out in tones sweet and clear as a bugle, 'Follow me, men!' It was a scene never to be forgotten—the glorious sunset, the lithe, boyish form, now sharply cut against the crimson western sky, then hid for a moment by the smoke of battle, the tattered colors, the cheering lines of men. With a rousing yell, the sturdy brigade closed up, and never after gave back a single inch. The color-bearer ran out to him, the tears standing in his eyes, and cried out: 'Give me back my colors, Colonel! I'll carry them wherever you say!' 'Oh! I'm sure of that,' he answered cheerily, 'it was necessary to let the whole line see the colors; that's the only reason I took them.' ”*

On the 7th, Haskell's and Johnson's battalions shared in the repulse of the enemy by Field's Division, along the New Market and Darbytown roads north of the James and were particularly effective, the gallant Haskell being struck in the head by a bullet and Lieut. McQueen of Garden's Battery also falling severely wounded. Haskell's Battalion was again engaged on the 18th under Capt. Garden, in an affair memorable in the Artillery for the heroic conduct of Corporal Fulcher, of Flanner's Battery. A Federal shell bursting among the ammunition, wounded six men and ignited the fuses of a number of shell, which had been improperly exposed. Though himself wounded, Fulcher seized the shells and carrying them under fire to a nearby pool extinguished the burning fuses.

The Presidential election in the North was now near at hand, and before settling down into winter quarters, Gen. Grant determined to make one more vigorous effort to turn Lee's right, seize the southside road, and compel the evacuation of Petersburg. For this purpose, he concentrated on his left the greater portion of three army corps, at the same time directing pressure to be exerted all along the line, and especially north of the

*See W. Gordon McCabe's sketch of Pegram in *The University Memorial*.

James. On the 27th, a simultaneous attack was made on the lines below Richmond, and on Lee's right flank, resulting in the latter quarter in the battle of Hatcher's Run.

The Federal advance below Richmond, though general and in considerable force, was easily repelled. While the enemy delivered a frontal attack upon the Confederates in position, with Hardaway's and Stark's battalions between the Darbytown Road and Fort Harrison, Haskell's and Johnson's battalions moved out around the extreme left of Field's Division and secured a most destructive flank fire upon the attacking columns, literally sweeping the approaches along the Williamsburg, and Nine Mile Roads, and even as far as the Charles City Road. The entire shock of the assault was in this way diverted from the Infantry and the attack was abandoned before it developed serious proportions. Lieut. Wilkes, commanding Clutter's Battery, a young officer of distinction, fell mortally wounded.

In connection with this affair it is to be noted what might have been accomplished with artillery in June, 1861, on the same ground had it been in the same hands. But at that time, there were no Alexanders, Haskells, and Hardaways, but only a great mass of disintegrated artillery, without organization and operating solely as individual batteries. It was the experience of four years of constant fighting that now enabled the Artillery to maneuver in large groups over country which had formerly precluded the movement of a single battery. The time had come when the modern belief that artillery can go with the infantry was everywhere entertained, and it seems surprising that so soon as Lee's Artillery surrendered its guns, or buried them, that the world should have ignored the lessons which it had been taught by Alexander, Long, and Walker, only after nearly half a century to be retaught by Langlois, the father of modern field artillery.

On the extreme right, the Federal attack was no more successful than below Richmond. Advancing through

the most densely wooded region, confusion added to the resolute resistance of the Confederates, brought failure to the movement. At first the enemy advanced, gradually forcing Hampton back to and across the Boydton Plank Road. While rendering splendid service with the advanced line, Capt. Hart fell at the head of his battery with a severe wound.

After the enemy had crossed Hatcher's Run and pressed forward to Burgess's Mill, Lee hurled a part of Hill's Corps upon Hancock's isolated column, determined to recover the Boydton Road which was now of so much importance to him, since the Weldon Railroad had been lost. Here Pegram, with Ellett's Battery under Lieut. Hollis, and Gregg's Battery, again fought his guns with the most desperate courage. In action the mild appearing youth seemed to have become a fiend incarnate, and innumerable tales of his reckless daring and total disregard of danger to himself and his men might be recounted. In the fighting around Petersburg he had become one of the foremost figures in the Artillery and such a reputation had he acquired for valor that in all that splendid artillery corps, no name was more prominently before the Army.

At the same time that Hill's troops and Pegram hurled themselves upon the head of Hancock's column, Hampton's cavalry division which with Hart's, McGregor's, and Graham's batteries had worked its way around to the right, fell upon the Federal left and rear, with the result that Hancock was compelled to withdraw in confusion after losing about 1,500 men.

After these signal reverses Grant refrained for some time from further attempts on Lee's flanks, contenting himself with a ceaseless cannonade and redoubling the activity of the sharpshooters. And so the inexorable process of attrition wore on, every loss of life in the trenches placing the Federals that much nearer the inevitable issue.

On the 12th of October, orders were received to arm all cannoneers that could be spared from the guns with

muskets for the defense of the trenches. In this way only could the rapidly failing infantry lines be reinforced. In the Washington Artillery Battalion alone one-half of the drivers were thus armed and organized as an infantry garrison for Fort Gregg. After six months of service in the trenches, exposed day and night to hostile fire, this battalion was at last relieved by that of Lieut.-Col. Moseley, and ordered to the extreme right to serve thereafter with the 8d Corps. It would seem certain that Longstreet's recent return to the command of his corps had something to do with the transfer. Not only was Eshleman's Battalion transferred, but Gibbes' old battalion, now commanded by Maj. Owen, formerly of the Washington Artillery, was transferred November 3, from the 1st to Beauregard's old command, or Anderson's Corps. But on the 15th, Owen's Battalion was again transferred, this time to the 3d Corps.

On November 4, an order was published permanently assigning assistant adjutant-generals in the Artillery Corps, as follows:

STAFF OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY

Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton

1st Corps, Capt. S. Winthrow, and Capt. J. C. Haskell.

2d Corps, Capt. W. A. Percy.

3d Corps, Capt. William W. Chamberlaine and Capt. Richard Walke.

Pendleton now again sought to have the measure proposed in May, in the form of a bill for the increase of the commissioned personnel, adopted. With this end in view he addressed the Secretary of War, November 8, but soon received a reply from Mr. Sedden, in which it was apparent that with the exception of allowing increased rank to general officers in the Artillery Corps, no help from the War Department need be expected.* This was not what Pendleton wanted. His efforts were not in the interest of himself but for the welfare of the Corps, and he promptly pointed out to the Secretary the injustice being done artillery officers by the Government

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part III, pp. 1205, 1211.

continuing the old system. In arguing the case of his corps, Pendleton wrote on the 15th to the Secretary of War as follows:

"DEAR SIR—Permit me, in acknowledging your kind favor of the 12th instant, to submit additional considerations in reply to your objections to our proposed bill.

"*First.* You regard such legislation as objectionable, because in the main unnecessary, since the organization asked for virtually exists in this army by regulation and can be similarly introduced in any other.

"*Second.* It will prove, you apprehend, embarrassing in several respects: First, a system fixed by law allows to the commanding general less freedom in adapting his resources to emergencies; second, a plan suitable for a large army may not be adapted to smaller commands; third, officers attached under law cannot be as freely transferred as the commanding general may desire.

"The considerations in reply to both of these objections seem to me to be really decisive. First, as to the necessity of the case; although we have artillery battalions formed under orders of the commanding general, sanctioned by the Department, and although this organization has proved one of the most efficient instrumentalities in our great struggle, the result is attained at the cost of very serious injustice to a large class of most deserving officers; is attended by inconveniences which experience satisfied us ought to be obviated, and is liable to depreciate in the future, if remedial measures be not adopted. The injustice of which I speak results partly from the fact that the status of artillery officers as now determined by number of guns, 80 for a brigadier, 40 for a colonel, 24 for a lieutenant-colonel, and 16 for a major, is entirely disproportioned to their merit and services. A single case may illustrate: The Chief of Artillery of one of our Army Corps, although his command in extent, importance, and responsibility greatly exceeds that of any infantry brigadier, must remain a colonel, as our roll already has 8 brigadiers of artillery, and we have not four times 80 guns.* In like manner, battalion commanders, whose commands, admirably managed, in difficulty and importance far surpass ordinary infantry regiments, must remain lieutenant-colonels, or majors, because we have not a sufficient number of times 40 or 24 guns to allow of their being rewarded with another grade. In truth, my dear sir, there ought to be more scope for promotion in this arm. Officers painfully feel that they are not fairly estimated, that in spite of noblest service they are often needlessly far behind their brethren of other arms. This might, indeed, be remedied in part by reducing the number of guns required for the several

*Pendleton here, of course, refers to Col. Walker of the 3d Corps.

grades. But this is not the whole case,—our artillery field officers feel that in the present plan they occupy rather a false position; it seems to regard them somewhat as exceptional and almost superfluous, instead of as an essential element of the structure and efficiency of the army. Their arm they know to be of eminent value. Their power they are equally satisfied is greatly enhanced by combination, the significance of its extensive organisation they have seen fully proved, and to leave them nearly unrecognized by legal sanction, appears to them something like a degradation of their branch of the service. There are, besides, others on whom the present plan operates hardly. Every regiment of infantry or cavalry has its own non-commissioned staff provided by law; our artillery battalion as now existing, though imperatively needing such officers, are not allowed them except by temporary detail, without recognized authority. The service cannot but suffer from these things, and especially from the insufficient number of field officers. It not unfrequently now occurs that instead of two field officers to a battalion, we cannot under the casualties of service get one; and if, as is sometimes the case, the eldest captain be not efficient for larger command, hazard may ensue, which ought not to be permitted.

“These, my dear sir, are not matters of speculation, or fancy; they are realities seriously felt by some of the best men we have in service, and they seem conclusively to show that some such legislation as that proposed is really called for in justice to our arm, and with a view to the best interests of the service. With regard, in the second place, to embarrassments involved in applying law to this organization, first that the general cannot arrange detachments as readily as he may wish, the breaking of batteries has rarely been found necessary during the past two years, nor could there be difficulty in doing it if necessary, were batteries fully legalized. The same great principle of military control under which commanding generals can send infantry or cavalry companies, regiments, brigades, etc., where he deems it necessary, must, of course, apply to artillery organisations of whatever kind, and, besides, as you observe, we expressly guard that point in our bill. Gen. Lee would undoubtedly have commented unfavorably on this feature of the plan had it constituted in his judgment a real objection. Second, that which may suit a large army may not be adapted to smaller commands. This the bill also provides for; it is not mandatory, only permissive, each case can be arranged according to its own conditions. Third, officers assigned under the law become inconvenient fixtures. There is undoubtedly an evil here; though we guard against it by a clause in the bill, and besides, whatever be the evil, it pertains equally to the infantry and cavalry regiments, brigades, etc., yet the advantages of a definite legal

system for these have been found greatly to overbear the disadvantages suggested; and so it would prove for similar reasons in the artillery.

"These views, my dear sir, I submit with kind candor, yet with sincere deference. Impartial observers like yourself, surveying processes from a position allowing wide range of view, can often detect errors which escape the notice of those more occupied with details; but in a case of this nature, where all the chief officers of an arm, under frequent appeals from those of highest authority associated with them, concur in recommending a specific as well tested by experience and approved in their judgment; and when that recommendation is enforced by the deliberate approval of so rigidly careful a judge as Gen. Lee, I feel that there can be little danger of mistake in asking for the legislation in question, as really needed and likely to promote the best interests of the service."

The foregoing communication from the Chief of Artillery is given in full, for to the careful reader, it is a history of the conditions in the Artillery arm as they existed at the time of its writing. Not only did Pendleton decline to be brushed aside, but he made bold to put the matter squarely up to the Department, in such a way that to disapprove meant to accept full responsibility for further neglect of the claims of artillery officers.

December 7, the enemy's cavalry set out in force upon a raid toward Belfield and beyond, which movement called forth Hampton's Division and his horse batteries. At Hicksford, Hampton met the raiding column and repelled it. An infantry column accompanied by Pegram's Battalion and the Washington Artillery was unable to overtake the main body of the enemy, and after seven arduous days of marching and some skirmishing with the rear guards, returned to the lines worn out by the incessant toil over frozen and all but impassable roads.

Both armies now settled down for the winter, but with ever-watchful eyes upon each other. The Confederate Artillery had indeed borne its share of the struggle. The weeks which followed witnessed privations undreamed of before. The awful monotony of life in the trenches was occasionally broken, however, by the ex-

citement of Hill's activities during January and February on the right. On several occasions the Washington Artillery was called upon to march and countermarch in that quarter, finally going into cantonments near Burgess's Mill.

Again did the spirit of revival sweep over the Army, and serve in a great measure to hold the weary troops steadfast. In the diary of the Washington Artillery is found the following significant passage: "January 29—The men have built a chapel just behind my tent, and have prayer-meetings nightly. The whole army has taken to praying, and if prayer accomplish anything, we should whip the fight yet. Peace commissioners started for Washington yesterday. No good is expected from the mission. We will certainly have a campaign in the spring of some sort or other." The men who were now "praying nightly" were the gay Louisianians, who but a short while before enlivened the camps with their music and dancing. Thus had time, adversity, and starvation wrought a change in the spirit of the troops. But with the love and fear of God had come an unconquerable resolve to die at their posts, a resolve unknown in the earlier stages of the war. Then it was the joy of victory which inspirited the troops to deeds of valor. Now it was a sacred devotion to duty, to a cause, to God, that animated the Confederate soldier and enabled him to bear the travail of war and slow death in the trenches, without even the hope of eventual success. Before it was the innate bravery of the race; in the winter of 1864-65, as at Fredericksburg, it was a sterner God-given courage which held the men to their colors.

To foster the spirit of sacrifice among the men of his command Gen. Pendleton was constantly at work. His love for them was great, and he watched over them with the spirit of one personally responsible for their future state. Of his command at this time he wrote: "In the whole of the eventful campaign of 1864, the Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia bore a distinguished

part, and in every portion of the widely-extended field of operation rendered signal service. It was everywhere and at all times proved reliable, howsoever great the emergency. In the wildest fury of battle and ceaseless harassment and exposure from sharpshooters and shelling on the lines, on the toilsome march, amid all the hardships of the trenches, through summer, fall, and winter, and when steadily breasting the tide of reverse against friends unnerved or overpowered, and foe flushed with triumph, the brave officers and men of this branch of our army have almost without exception exemplified the very highest virtues of Christian soldiers battling for their faith, their honor, and their homes."

At this time the staff of the Chief of Artillery was as follows: Capt. Dudley D. Pendleton, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieut. George W. Peterkin, and Acting Lieut. Charles Hatcher, aides-de-camp; Capt. John Esten Cooke, and Lieut. E. P. Dandridge, Assistant Inspector Generals; Maj. John C. Barnwell, Ordnance Officer; Dr. John Graham, Surgeon; Maj. John Page, Quartermaster; and of them their chief reported, "It is but just that I should say they have uniformly discharged their duties with faithful alacrity and to my entire satisfaction."

Artillery headquarters were located during the winter near the railroad cut on the extension of Halifax Street, and about this center the most ceaseless activity reigned. The labors of the Chief and his staff and of the artillery corps commanders were incessant in the effort to secure and care for the horses and maintain the material in serviceable condition. Then, too, there were many vacancies to fill and where so many were deserving of reward the problem of promotion imposed no light task.

The difficulty of securing needed supplies at this time can be illustrated in no better way than by giving the following extract from the record of purchases, with

Confederate money, by an artillery officer traveling from Augusta, Ga., to Petersburg, in the early days of 1865.

1 curry comb.....	\$ 10.00
Mending pants.....	20.00
Hair cutting and shave.....	10.00
Meal on road.....	20.00
Cigars and bitters.....	60.00
Pair of eyeglasses.....	185.00
Candles.....	50.00
Coat, vest, and pants.....	2,700.00
1 gallon whiskey.....	400.00
1 pair pants.....	700.00
6-yd. linen, 2¾ ft. wide.....	1,200.00
1 oz. sulphate quinine.....	1,700.00
2 weeks' board.....	700.00
1 doz. Catawba wine.....	900.00
Shad and sundries.....	75.00
Matches.....	25.00
Penknife.....	125.00
1 package brown Windsor soap.....	50.00

Army boots were selling in Richmond at this time for from \$500.00 to \$600.00 a pair, and artillery officers commonly paid \$175.00 for the leather and \$75.00 for the fabrication of the coarsest kind of military boots. One may easily imagine the difficulty encountered in replacing and repairing artillery harness, equipments, etc., the price of leather being \$5.80 per pound. The matter of securing draught animals was even more serious. The schedule of prices established by the War Department in August, 1864, which provided for the impressment of animals, fixed the value of first-class artillery horses and mules at \$500.00.* The price was bad enough. The main difficulty was to find the animals and to feed those already on hand. The schedule prices for feed at this time were as follows:

Corn, per bu. 56 lbs.....	\$4.00
Unshelled corn.....	3.95
Cleaned oats, per bu. 52 lbs.....	2.50

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1153.

Wheat bran, per bu. 17 lbs.....	\$.50
Hay, unbaled, per 100 lbs.....	3.00
Sheaf oats, baled.....	4.40
Sheaf oats, unbaled.....	3.50
Blade fodder, baled.....	3.90
Shucks, baled.....	2.60
Wheat straw, baled, per 100 lbs.....	2.20

We have followed its trials and tribulations in some detail, but nothing can so impress one with the severity of the ordeal through which the Artillery had passed since the first of May, as a summary of its losses, which itemized by corps and battalions were as follows:

Huger's Battalion.....	87
Cabell's Battalion.....	47
Haskell's Battalion.....	68
Hardaway's Battalion.....	4
Stark's Battalion.....	2
Gibbes' Battalion.....	20
Johnson's Battalion.....	19

Total 1st Corps.....	197
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Field and Staff.....	3
Page's Battalion.....	177
Cutshaw's Battalion.....	191
Hardaway's Battalion.....	74
Nelson's Battalion.....	116
Braxton's Battalion.....	128
McLaughlin's Battalion.....	103

Total 2d Corps.....	788
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Pegram's Battalion.....	78
Poague's Battalion.....	82
McIntosh's Battalion.....	84
Richardson's Battalion.....	51
Lane's Battalion.....	64
Owen's Battalion.....	38
Washington Artillery.....	18

Total 3d Corps.....	370
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Stribling's Battalion.....	132
12th Virginia Battalion.....	41

Moseley's Battalion.....	87
Coit's Battalion	58
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Total Anderson's Corps (Beauregard).....	318
Horse Artillery.....	79

RECAPITULATION

1st Army Corps.....	197
2d Army Corps.....	788
3d Army Corps.....	870
Anderson's Corps.....	318
Horse Artillery.....	79
<hr/>	
Aggregate	1,752

Of this number, exactly 500 were reported as missing, principally in the 2d Corps, due to captures at Spotsylvania, where 7 officers and 187 men of Page's, and 4 officers and 128 men of Cutshaw's Battalion were taken by the enemy. Deducting 17 officers and 488 men missing from the aggregate loss and the casualties in battle are found to be 1,252, of which number 72 were officers. In the 3d Corps alone 7 officers were killed and 25 wounded, Poague's Battalion losing 12 of the number, Lane's 8, McIntosh's 6, and Pegram's 4. In the 2d Corps there were 9 officers killed, 18 wounded, and 16 missing.

If we take the aggregate loss at 1,752, we find the loss of the Artillery Corps to have been over thirty per cent of its original strength, with a total loss in killed and wounded of over twenty-eight per cent! It is small wonder that Lee's Artillery was so highly regarded by both friend and foe. The writer knows of no such figures as these as applicable to any other artillery.*

In spite of the great drain on the personnel incident to such a list of casualties, never was the Artillery Corps allowed to become depleted to the point of ineffectiveness. The total artillery personnel of the 1st, 3d, and Anderson's Corps, as stated in the returns of October 20, 31, November 10, and December 10, being 5,839,

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 1052.

6,167, 6,277, and 6,179, respectively. It was not until after the opening of spring that disintegration began to set in.

On December 28, 1864, the distribution and armament of the Artillery was as follows:

1ST CORPS

Brig.-Gen. Edward Porter Alexander

CABELL'S BATTALION

Col. Henry Coalter Cabell

1st Co. Richmond Howitzers, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Robert M. Anderson.
Troup (Ga.) Battery, 4 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. Henry H. Carlton.
Battery "A", 1st N. C. Reg't, 2 Napoleons, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Basil C. Manly.
Pulaski (Ga.) Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Lieut. Morgan Callaway.

HUGER'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Frank Huger

Maj. Tyler C. Jordan

Brooks' (S. C.) Battery, 14 12-pounder howitzers.	Capt. William W. Fickling.
Madison (La.) Battery, 2 12-pounder, 4 24-pounder howitzers.	Lieut. Jordan C. Parkinson.
Richmond Battery, 4 8-inch rifles.	Capt. William W. Parker.
Bedford Battery, 4 8-inch rifles.	Capt. John D. Smith.
Bath Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Esmond B. Taylor.
Ashland Battery, 2 Napoleons, 2 20-pounder Parrotts.	Lieut. James Woolfolk.

HASKELL'S BATTALION

Maj. John C. Haskell

Branch (N. C.) Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Henry G. Flanner.
Palmetto (S. C.) Battery, 8 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott.	Capt. Hugh R. Garden.

Nelson Battery, Capt. James N. Lamkin.
26 mortars.

Rowan (N. C.) Battery, Capt. John A. Ramsey.
1 12-pounder Whitworth, 2 8-pounder Armstrongs.

HARDAWAY'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Richard A. Hardaway

Powhatan Battery, Capt. Willis J. Dance.
4 8-inch rifles.

3d Co. Richmond Howitzers, Capt. Benj. H. Smith, Jr.
4 Napoleons.

1st Rockbridge Battery, Capt. Archibald Graham.
2 8-inch rifles, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.

Salem Battery, Capt. Charles B. Griffin.
4 Napoleons.

STARK'S BATTALION

Maj. Alexander W. Stark

Mathews Battery, Capt. Andrew D. Armistead.
4 Napoleons.

Louisiana Guard Battery, Capt. Charles A. Green.
4 Napoleons.

Giles Battery, Capt. David A. French.
4 Napoleons.

JOHNSON'S BATTALION (Improvised)

Maj. Marmaduke Johnson

Clutter's Richmond Battery, Lieut. Lucas McIntosh.
2 Napoleons, 2 8-inch rifles.

Fredericksburg Battery, Lieut. John G. Pollock.
4 Napoleons.

2D CORPS

Col. Thomas Hill Carter

NELSON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William Nelson

Amherst Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
2 Napoleons, 1 8-inch rifle.

Georgia Regular Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr.
8 8-inch rifles.

Fluvanna Battery, Capt. Charles G. Snead.
2 12-pounder howitzers.

BRAXTON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton

Maj. Marcellus N. Moorman

Alleghany Battery, 2 Napoleons.	Capt. John C. Carpenter.
Stafford Battery, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. R. L. Cooper.
Lee Battery, 2 Napoleons.	Capt. William W. Hardwicke.

CUTSHAW'S BATTALION

Maj. Wilfred Emmet Cutshaw

Richmond Orange Battery, 2 12-pounder howitzers.	Capt. Chas. W. Fry.
Staunton Battery, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Asher W. Garber.
2d Co. Richmond Howitzers, 2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. Lorraine F. Jones.

KING'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. J. Floyd King

Maj. William McLaughlin

Lewisburg (W. Va.) Battery, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Thomas A. Bryan.
Monroe Battery, 2 Napoleons.	Capt. George B. Chapman.
Wise Legion Battery, 2 Napoleons.	Capt. William M. Lowry.

8D CORPS

Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker

McINTOSH'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. David Gregg McIntosh

Maj. Marmaduke Johnson

1st Maryland Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. William F. Dement.
4th Maryland Battery, 1 10-pounder Parrott, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Walter S. Chew.
2d Rockbridge Battery, 8 24-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. William K. Donald.
Hardaway's Alabama Battery, 2 8-inch rifles, 1 12-pounder Whitworth.	Capt. William B. Hurt.
Danville Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Berryman Z. Price.

PEGRAM'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William J. Pegram

Maj. Joseph McGraw

Richmond Letcher Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Thomas A. Brander.
Richmond Crenshaw Battery, 4 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Thomas Ellett.
Richmond Purcell Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. George M. Cayce.
Fredericksburg Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Lieut. John G. Pollock.
Battery "B", 1st N. C. Reg't, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Thomas E. Gregg.

POAGUE'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. William T. Poague

Albemarle Battery, 1 Napoleon, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. Charles F. Johnston.
Madison (Miss.) Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick.
Pittsylvania Battery, 2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Nathan Penick.
Warrenton Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Addison W. Utterback.
Graham's N. C. Battery, 2 Napoleons, 1 8-inch rifle.	Capt. Arthur B. Williams.

RICHARDSON'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Charles Richardson

Maj. Victor Maurin

Norfolk Blues Battery, 2 Napoleons, 2 8-inch rifles.	Capt. Charles R. Grandy.
Donaldsonville (La.) Battery, 2 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. R. Prosper Landry.
Norfolk Battery, 4 Napoleons.	Capt. Jos. D. Moore.

CUTTS' BATTALION

Col. Allen S. Cutts

Maj. John Lane

Battery "A", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., 4 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts.	Capt. Hugh M. Ross.
Battery "B", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., 6 Napoleons.	Capt. George M. Patterson.

Battery "C", Sumter (Ga.) Batt., Capt. John T. Wingfield.
4 Napoleons, 2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles.

ESHLEMAN'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Benj. F. Eshleman

Maj. M. B. Miller

1st Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Edward Owen.
1 10-pounder Parrott, 3 3-inch rifles.

2d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. J. B. Richardson.
4 Napoleons.

3d Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Andrew Hero, Jr.
4 Napoleons.

4th Co. Washington Artillery, Capt. Joe Norcom.
3 Napoleons, 1 10-pounder Parrott.

GIBBES' BATTALION

Maj. William W. Owen

Lynchburg Battery, Capt. John Hampden Chamberlayne.
4 Napoleons.

Ringgold Battery, Capt. Crispen Dickenson.
4 Napoleons.

Richmond Otey Battery, Capt. David N. Walker.
4 Napoleons.

ANDERSON'S CORPS

Col. Hilary P. Jones

MOSELEY'S BATTALION

Maj. William H. Caskie

Battery "C", 18th N. C. Battalion, Capt. James D. Cumming.
2 Napoleons.

Battery "E", 1st N. C. Reg't, Capt. John O. Miller.
4 10-pounder Parrotts.

Macon (Ga.) Battery, Capt. C. W. Staten.
4 Napoleons.

Yorktown Battery, Capt. Edward R. Young.
4 Napoleons.

BRANCH'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. James R. Branch

Maj. James C. Coit

Confederate Guards, Miss. Battery, Capt. William D. Bradford.
2 12-pounder, 3 20-pounder Parrotts.

Petersburg Battery, Capt. Richard G. Pegram.
4 Napoleons.

Halifax Battery,	Capt. Samuel T. Wright.
4 Napoleons.	
S. C. "Chesterfield" Battery,	Capt. James I. Kelly.
2 Napoleons.	

STRIBLING'S BATTALION

Maj. Robert M. Stribling
Maj. Joseph G. Blount

Lynchburg Battery,	Capt. James M. Dickerson.
4 Napoleons.	
Fauquier Battery,	Capt. William C. Marshall.
4 Napoleons.	
Richmond Fayette Battery,	Capt. Miles C. Macon.
2 10-pounder Parrotts, 2 3-inch rifles.	
Richmond Hampden Battery,	Capt. J. E. Sullivan.
4 Napoleons.	

BOGGS' BATTALION

Maj. Francis J. Boggs

Martin's Richmond Battery,	Lieut. Samuel H. Pulliam.
8 Napoleons, 1 12-pounder howitzer.	
Albemarle Battery,	Lieut. William H. Weisiger.
4 Napoleons.	

HORSE ARTILLERY

Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew

CHEW'S BATTALION

Lieut.-Col. Robert Preston Chew

Petersburg Battery,	Capt. Edward Graham.
2 3-inch rifles, 2 12-pounder howitzers.	
Washington (S. C.) Battery,	Lieut. E. Lindsay Halsey.
4 3-inch rifles.	
2d Stuart H. A. Battery,	Capt. William M. McGregor.
4 3-inch rifles.	

BREATHED'S BATTALION

Maj. James Breathed

1st Stuart H. A. Battery,	Capt. Philipp P. Johnston.
Lynchburg Battery,	Capt. John J. Shoemaker.
Ashby Battery,	Capt. James W. Thomson.
Roanoke Battery,	Capt. Warren S. Lurty.

HORSE ARTILLERY BATTALION OF LOMAX'S DIVISION

2d Maryland Battery,	Capt. William H. Griffin.
Charlottesville Battery,	Capt. Thomas E. Jackson.
Staunton Battery,	Capt. John H. McClannahan.

Chew's own battalion was serving with Hampton near Petersburg and Breathed's with Rosser and Fitz Lee in the Valley. The Horse Artillery had gradually been increased to ten batteries.

At the beginning of the New Year, Haskell's, Hardaway's, Johnson's and Stark's battalions under Gen. Alexander were still north of the James and had been recently joined by Poague's Battalion. Cutts' and Richardson's battalions remained in position north of the Appomattox, with the exception of Penick's Battery, which had been attached to Poague's Battalion. The 2d Corps Artillery was in the Valley, while Cabell's and Huger's battalions of the 1st Corps, Jones' battalions of Anderson's, and Pegram's, McIntosh's and Gibbes' remained in the trenches, and Eshleman's near Burgess's Mill.

In addition to the twenty-six mortars manned by Lamkin's Battery, Poague manned four, McIntosh two 8-inch howitzers and two 8-inch mortars, Pegram two 8-inch and two 24-pounder mortars, Cutts one 8-inch columbiad and seven 24-pounder mortars. In Anderson's Corps, Coit, Blount, and Caskie manned four 30-pounder Parrotts, one 8-inch Columbiad, four 8-inch, twelve 24-pounder, nine 12-pounder mortars, and about 25 howitzers of various calibers. Exclusive of the heavy guns and pieces of position, and the guns of the Horse Artillery there were in the four corps of Lee's Army, January 1, 1865, 282 field guns, including 192 Napoleons and howitzers, and 90 rifled pieces.*

Of the field-officers, Col. Moseley had been killed December 16, Gibbes had been wounded on July 30, Caskie was absent on indefinite sick leave, Boggs was on duty in Richmond, Maurin at High Bridge, and Branch was absent on leave. Maj. Miller was therefore assigned to duty with Richardson's Battalion in the absence of Maurin, while Maj. Blount had succeeded to the command of Dearing's, or Read's, and Maj. Owen

*For tabular report showing heavy artillery in position and manned by field artillery at Richmond and Petersburg, see *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part III, p. 1854.

to Gibbes' Battalion. Dement's Battery, leaving its guns in the trenches at Petersburg, was on duty at Drewry's Bluff.

Notwithstanding the strenuous service which it had rendered and losses which almost seem to have been annihilating, the condition of the Artillery at the close of the year 1864 was actually better than when it left winter quarters the preceding spring. On this point, Pendleton, in his report, wrote February 28, 1865: "In conclusion I am able to report that our artillery remains at the close of this arduous campaign in a condition of most encouraging efficiency, and that with reasonable effort toward supplying it with a few guns to replace some lost in unfortunate affairs that have been described (here he refers to loss in the Valley), and with horses to reestablish a number of teams disabled in action or worn down by hard service, it will be in full strength for the campaign of the ensuing spring. It may be confidently relied upon to accomplish, by the Divine blessing during the next season, as it has so well done through the last, its entire share in the defense of our country."*

*For condition of Walker's Artillery of the 3d Corps, September 30, 1864, see *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part II, p. 1309.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE BEGINNING OF THE END—1865

WHEN Longstreet rejoined the Army and was assigned to the command of the troops north of the James, he found the outer artillery defenses in a state not altogether satisfactory, and, it would seem, held Lieut.-Col. J. C. Pemberton responsible for the condition of affairs. But in this Longstreet was in error, for whatever may have been Pemberton's shortcomings at Vicksburg, he had labored incessantly upon the works below Richmond, and had with little encouragement greatly improved them. Longstreet's criticisms, however, soon led to dissatisfaction, and on January 7, Pemberton was relieved from his former duties and assigned to duty as Inspector General of Artillery and Ordnance with Capt. L. S. Marye as his assistant. Alexander was now placed in entire charge of the artillery defenses north of the river, while Col. Stapleton Crutchfield, still quite unfit to perform active field service, was assigned to the command of the garrison at Chaffin's Bluff, where Hardaway had for some time been stationed with his battalion. On January 16, Alexander was again compelled to rest from his duties for a brief space, leaving Col. Cabell in control as Acting Chief of Artillery of the 1st Corps.

At the close of January, the entire effective strength of Carter's four battalions of artillery in the Valley was but 35 officers and 538 men present for duty, with an aggregate present and absent of 2,082. Of the latter number, 16 officers and 383 men were carried as prisoners of war. The rolls showed 32 guns in service.

The condition of Early's command in camp near Staunton was most unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to the artillery horses, for which on account of Sheridan's activities and long droughts during the past summer sufficient forage could not be secured.

After sending Fitz Lee's Cavalry Division to Petersburg, Lomax's Brigade to the pasture lands in the Alleghanies, and temporarily disbanding Rosser's Brigade, the men of which were allowed to return to their homes with their horses, the situation was still serious. Accordingly the men and horses of King's or McLaughlin's artillery battalion were sent to southwestern Virginia to be wintered, while the officers and men of Braxton's and Cutshaw's battalions under Col. Carter were ordered to report to Gen. Lee to man the works about Richmond. Col. Nelson with six pieces of his battalion remained with Early. About this time Gen. Long again reported to Early for duty, and caused the guns of the 2d Corps, from which the men and horses had been taken, to be shipped by rail to Lynchburg. This was a deplorable state of affairs, but it could not be avoided, as the horses of the Cavalry and Artillery would have perished had they been kept in the Valley.

Two very small brigades of Wharton's Division, and Nelson's artillery command now comprised Early's whole force, which was placed in camp near Fishersville between Staunton and Waynesborough.

At the time Braxton and Cutshaw were ordered to Richmond, there were Lieut.-Col. Atkinson's four battalions of heavy artillery under Maj. Hensley, Hardin, Cary, and Robertson, respectively, and Lightfoot's Local Defense Battalion and Leyden's 9th Georgia Battalion of light artillery manning the lines, with a total of 68 officers and 1,517 men present for duty. Other forces of heavy artillery were assigned to the defenses of Petersburg, and the Richmond and Danville Railroad under Lieut.-Col. Howard and Maj. Boggs, respectively.*

Genls. Lee and Pendleton were now making every effort to secure horses for the artillery in order that it might be placed in condition before spring to take the field. On the 1st of February, it was estimated that

*For detailed distribution of this force and that at Petersburg along the Richmond and Danville Railroad, see *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, pp. 1196-97-98 and 1185.

6,000 horses and 4,000 mules were needed for the armies of the Confederacy, and that the number which could possibly be secured before spring was 5,000; 3,000 from Mississippi and 2,000 in Virginia. The Inspector General of Transportation estimated that with ample funds 15,000 animals might sooner or later be secured in Mexico and Texas, at \$70.00 gold per head, but these animals were totally unsuited to artillery service. In Mississippi the animals would have to be purchased from within the enemy's lines at a vastly greater cost, while in Virginia the available supply would only be forthcoming for cash payments in gold.* Such was the condition of affairs and well might Pendleton have despaired of remounting his batteries.

A suggestion was now made by Col. Carter to drive the unserviceable animals of the Artillery west to the counties of Augusta and Rockbridge, where they could be exchanged with the farmers for fresh ones, should authority to that effect be granted. He reported that a fairly large supply of horses could be had in this section, calling attention to the fact that Sheridan had but recently taken therefrom over 1,700 animals in spite of the drain of the war. This plan was promptly proposed to the Inspector General of Transportation, and again Pendleton protested against the practice of herding the condemned artillery horses in great droves only to perish from neglect, and consume forage, when they might be distributed among the farmers for purposes both of recuperation and aid to agriculture.

In a report dated February 14, Maj. Cole states that 2,482 horses and 1,370 mules were immediately required by the Army at Petersburg, and a grand total of 3,270 horses and 2,409 mules for all the forces in Virginia. Having been provided with \$100,000 in gold and \$3,000,000 in treasury notes, he was hopeful of securing 2,500 animals in Virginia and North Carolina, provided he was allowed to impress and pay for them at

*Letter of Inspector General of Transportation, February 2, 1865, *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1190.

local appraisements. In addition to this number, he reported that 700 artillery horses would be returned from the infirmaries before April 1.*

The horse depots which had been established at Pendleton's suggestion had proved of great benefit to the service, for by means of them large numbers of exhausted animals had been rendered serviceable and re-issued. But the losses in the field continued to be greater than the supply, especially in the tidewater section of Virginia. Many of the animals were bred and raised in the mountainous regions of the west, and were not acclimated to the lowlands about Petersburg, nor could they be made to flourish, in spite of every effort, when taken from their accustomed pastures and placed on army forage. Glanders and farcy, the most dreaded equine diseases, became prevalent in the corrals at Petersburg, and Owen's 18th Virginia Battalion was almost dismounted before the close of the winter from these maladies of the horses.†

So vehemently had Braxton and Cutshaw protested against the unhorsing of their commands, that early in March it was decided to issue horses and new guns to the former, and it was ordered to relieve Poague's Battalion on duty under Alexander. But after issuing the horses, and before the guns arrived from Richmond, the issue of forage became so scarce that many of the animals perished. About this time Cutshaw applied to have his battalion converted into cavalry for more active service than that which he was performing as heavy artillery. Both the officers and men of his command, he declared, were desirous of this change and were willing to repair to the Valley, where in small groups they would secure their own mounts.

Conditions were indeed becoming desperate. Even the Horse Artillery which Pendleton was endeavoring to reorganize and place upon a more efficient footing for the anticipated campaign, was in urgent need of guns

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 1282.

†*Ibid.*, p. 1805.

and equipment, necessitating a call upon Alexander for rifles for its armament. But to this Alexander objected, urging that howitzers be issued the horse batteries, instead of his much-needed rifle pieces, of which he already had too few. He was even now compelled to strengthen the line he was defending by planting sensitive shell among the abattis in his front, illuminating his field of fire by night with fire balls, etc., and to take from him his best ordnance was an act of folly, which he strenuously opposed.

As spring approached conditions in the Army in general grew worse and worse. From the trials of the late winter, "history would fain avert her eyes." They were such as can never be forgotten by those who watched and waited; such as can never be credited by those who read the story in peace and plenty. To guard the long line of intrenchments from the Chickahominy to Hatcher's Run, there was now left but a gaunt remnant of that valiant host which had hurled back nearly thrice its number at Cold Harbor, and wrought humiliation to the Army of the Potomac on a score of fields in this vigorous campaign.

"Living on one-sixth of a ration of cornmeal and rancid pork, thinly clad, their bodies indeed shivered under the freezing blasts of heaven, but their dauntless spirits cowered not under the fiery blasts of war. But there was to be added a pang deeper than the pang of hunger; sharper than the rigor of the elements or hurt of shot and steel. For now from the cotton lands of Georgia and the rice fields of Carolina, came borne on every blast the despairing cry, which wives with little ones raised to wintry skies, lit by the glare of burning homes, and the men of the 'Old North State' bethought them of the happy homesteads which lay in the path of the ruthless conqueror, who was waging war with an audacious cruelty, capable of destroying a whole nation. A subtle enemy, till then well-nigh unknown, attacked in rear the Army which still haughtily held its front,

and men, with bated breath and cheeks flushing through their bronze, whispered the dread word 'desertion.' "

On the 28th of February, Gen. Lee reported to the Secretary of War a total of 1,094 desertions between the 15th and 25th of the month! Of this number, 586 were in Hill's and 217 in Anderson's Corps. During the ten days ending March 8, 779 men abandoned their colors, 450 from these same corps.

"The historian, far removed from the passions of the time, may coldly measure out his censure; but we, comrades, bound to these men by countless proud traditions, can only cry with the old Hebrew prophet, 'Alas! my brother!' and remember that these were valiant souls, too sorely tried."*

In response to a circular of March 7, calling for suggestions as to how to cure the dread malady which now unabated threatened to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Alexander promptly proposed the classification of offenses with appropriate punishments and an increase of the authority of regimental courts, to be employed in lieu of the cumbersome system of Corps Courts hitherto in use. The proceedings under the proposed system were to be more summary and the death penalty more frequent.† But it is exceedingly doubtful if desertion could have been checked by more drastic punishment, or in any way. The Army of Northern Virginia was doomed—the Confederacy had long since shown the hectic flush upon its check.

Gen. Lee had already disclosed his plans to Gen. Pendleton and given him confidential instructions regarding the proposed withdrawal of the Army. In accordance with these plans Pendleton redoubled his efforts to place the Artillery on the most efficient footing possible, and at last, with the support of Gen. Lee, he succeeded in securing the many needed promotions in his corps, for which he had so long struggled, and authority

*Address of W. Gordon McCabe on the Siege of Petersburg, *Army of Northern Virginia Memorial*, p. 169.

†A careful study of Gen. Alexander's plan will repay the student, *Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part II, pp. 1800, 1801.

to reorganize his battalions. On March 1, the following promotions were announced, with rank from February 18.

To be Brigadier-General—Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker.

To be Colonels—Lieut.-Col. William Nelson, D. G. McIntosh, Frank Huger, and W. J. Pegram.

To be Lieutenant-Colonels—Majs. John C. Haskell, W. M. Owen, John Lane, R. P. Chew, W. E. Cutshaw, Marmaduke Johnson, and R. M. Stribling.

To be Majors—Capts. H. W. Ross, T. J. Kirkpatrick, W. J. Dance, B. C. Manly, T. O. Brander, S. T. Wright, N. V. Sturdivant, J. F. Hart, P. P. Johnston, J. A. Thomson, and W. G. McGregor.

Never in its history was the Artillery Corps so well provided with field-officers as now. It seems too bad that Pendleton's insistence could not have been rewarded before. He now set about the task of reorganization with renewed energy, and everywhere found the greatest encouragement reigning among his officers. But there had as usual been some oversights. Hardaway, who well deserved promotion, was left out and Alexander, calling attention to his merits, suggested the consolidation of Johnson's Battalion with Leyden's in order that the necessary vacancy in the grade of colonel might be created. He also recommended Garden, Parker, Lamkin, Woolfolk, and Moody to be promoted majors, and Leyden a lieutenant-colonel.

Pendleton himself was not promoted, but it is probable he would have been had time permitted. From a confidential communication from Gen. Pendleton written some years after the war the following extract is taken.

"On the ground, probably, that this arm of the service, all essential as it is, can never be independent, but always only coöperative with others, Confederate law allowed in it no grade above that of Brigadier-General. Only such, therefore, was I to the last, though having under me three other Brigadier-Generals, and, consequently serving in fact as a Major-General. But no exaltation of name was, so far as I know myself, a ruling motive with me, the incongruity never disturbed me. It was about to be corrected on Gen. Lee's recommendation when irremediable reverse befell our army and cause."

Instead of consenting to the conversion of Cutshaw's Battalion, Pendleton at once addressed himself to the task of reorganizing the entire Artillery of the 2d Corps. Sending Col. Carter to Gen. Long, he proposed through him to fully remount Nelson's, Braxton's, and Cutshaw's battalions, and place them on the most effective basis. For this purpose, McLaughlin's Battalion was to be ordered East, dismounted, placed in the stationary batteries, and its horses, guns, and equipment used for the other battalions. Gen. Long promptly assented to the plan, and at once Cutshaw was withdrawn from Fort Clifton, Braxton from Chaffin's Bluff, Nelson ordered to Lynchburg and the work undertaken. Cutshaw's Battalion at this time consisted of Fry's, Montgomery's, Reese's, Carter's, Garber's, Carrington's, Tanner's, and Jones' batteries, with 674 officers and men present for duty and 1,047 on the rolls. It, therefore, afforded a surplus which was to be used in completing the personnel of Nelson's and Braxton's battalions. Accordingly, on March 17, McLaughlin was ordered to report to Col. Carter at Lynchburg, turn over his horses and material to Nelson, and proceed by the canal with his men to Richmond.

Other changes in the Artillery were also now necessary. In the 3d Corps, Chew's 1st Maryland Battery, in which there were but 86 men present for duty, was recommended to be consolidated with Griffin's horse, or the 2d Maryland Battery, of Breathed's Battalion.

Martin's and Dickenson's batteries of Sturdivant's and Owen's battalions, respectively, were relieved of their guns and formed into a battalion with Douthat's Battery, which was brought from the southwest with McLaughlin's Battalion. This new battalion under command of King was assigned to duty in the stationary batteries of Alexander's line. Walker's Battery of Owen's Battalion was assigned to Sturdivant's Battalion, in place of Martin's, and Chamberlayne's to McIntosh's Battalion in place of Chew's, while Maj. Owen was assigned to duty under McIntosh. Thus was the

18th Virginia Battalion disbanded and sufficient material from Martin's, Dickenson's, and Chew's batteries secured in addition to that of McLaughlin's Battalion to fully rearm and equip Nelson's, Cutshaw's, and Braxton's veteran battalions.* These changes were officially promulgated March 20, and on that same day the Horse Artillery, with Chew as Chief, was reorganized, as follows:

Maj. Hart's Battalion:

Hart's Battery and Graham's Battery, to serve with Gen. Butler's Division.

Maj. McGregor's Battalion:

McGregor's Battery and McClannahan's Battery, to serve with Gen. W. H. C. Lee's Division.

Maj. Breathed's Battalion:

Shoemaker's Battery and Griffin's Battery, to serve with Gen. Fitz Lee's Division.

Maj. Johnston's Battalion:

Johnston's Battery and Jackson's Battery, to serve with Gen. Lomax's Division.

Maj. Thomson's Battalion:

Thomson's Battery and Lurty's Battery, to serve with Gen. Rosser's Division.

Col. Chew, like all the other artillery commanders, was now admonished to be prepared for active operations, however early or unexpectedly the call might come.

**Rebellion Records*, Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part III, pp. 1816-17-19-21-22-23-27-28 and 1333.

CHAPTER XLVIII

"LE DEBACLE"

WELL might Pendleton caution his subordinates that their measures should be prompt, for already the evacuation had been too long deferred. How Lee was overruled and compelled to remain in the Petersburg lines against his will cannot be discussed here. Nor how, when the object of the peace conference failed, the Army, although bitterly disappointed, set its teeth, once more resolved to struggle on to the end, whatever that might be. We must content ourselves solely with tracing the events which concerned the Artillery.

Sheridan's cavalry divisions were circling about Lee's Army like great vultures impatient for their prey. One of his columns was marching upon Lynchburg, and to meet the danger Pendleton was directed to send enough of his men there to man the field guns which Early had turned in during the winter. Accordingly, Garber's, Jones', and Carrington's batteries were dispatched to Col. Carter, who with his usual energy and skill prepared to meet the raiders.

On the morning of March 25, the Chief of Artillery was summoned to meet the commanding general at the headquarters of Gen. Gordon at 5 A. M. Gen. Lee had decided to make a daring attempt to break Grant's line near the center by an attack upon Fort Steadman, which, it was believed, could be carried by surprise. How Gordon's sudden blow was at first crowned with success; how his guides ran away and left his storming columns groping in ignorance; how his supports failed to reach him, must be read elsewhere. Suffice it here to say that what bid fair to be a brilliant success through unwonted misfortune, dereliction, or what not, resulted in miserable failure.

This unsuccessful effort, in which, however, the Artillery fully performed its allotted task, was quickly fol-



MAJOR DAVID WATSON
Killed at Second Cold Harbor, 1864

lowed by a vigorous advance on the part of Grant. Early on the morning of the 29th, the corps of Warren and Humphreys moved toward Lee's intrenchments on the extreme right, while the inexorable Sheridan swept around the flank and occupied Dinwiddie Courthouse, six miles southwest of the infantry column. Lee, quickly divining the intention of the enemy, moved out along the White Oak Road with 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, leaving Longstreet north of the James and Gordon alone in front of Petersburg. On the 31st, he attacked the Federals in flank, but after pursuing as far as the nature of the country permitted, was compelled to return to his works. On the same day, Sheridan advanced to Five Forks, driving Fitz Lee and part of Pickett's command before him. The following morning, Sheridan was reinforced by Warren and Humphreys, and in the evening defeated the 8d Corps. Perceiving that his forces were too weak to combat successfully with the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet on the evening of the 1st to move rapidly across the river to Petersburg.

In the battle of Five Forks, the Artillery suffered a loss indeed irreparable, a loss directly due to Gen. Pickett's orders. On this occasion Gen. Pickett assumed to designate the position for Pegram's guns—a position with every defect known to artillerymen. But Pegram with that spirit of blind obedience which constituted his sole fault did not question his orders and died like a rat in the trap to which he was assigned.

No finer tribute to Pegram can be penned than that which his gallant adjutant and comrade has already given to the world, and so those eloquent lines are quoted here: "Of him I almost fear to speak, lest I should do hurt to that memory which I would honor. For to those who knew him not, the simplest outline of a character so finely tempered by stern and gentle virtues would seem but an ideal picture touched with the tender exaggeration of retrospective grief; while to so many of you who knew him, as he was, the gentle comrade and the

brilliant fighter, any portrait must prove, at best, but a blurred semblance of the young soldier, whose simple, heroic, godly life rejects, as it were, all human panegyric. Yet even the coldest must allow that it was a life which afforded a notable example of how great a career may be crowded within the compass of a few years. In the spring of '61, a youth of modest demeanor, he entered the military service as a private soldier; in the spring of '65, still a mere lad, he fell in action, Colonel of Artillery, mourned by an Army.

"More than once in desperate and critical events were grave trusts confided to his prudence, skill and courage; more than once did he win emphatic praise from Hill, from Jackson and from Lee. Thus it was his lot to be tried in great events, and his fortune to be equal to the trial, and having filled the measure of perfect knight-hood, 'chaste in his thoughts, modest in his words, liberal and valiant in deeds,' there was at last awarded him on field of battle the death counted 'sweet and honorable.'

"Such was William Johnson Pegram, of the Third Corps, who at the early age of twenty-two died, sword in hand, at the head of his men, with all his 'honor owing wounds' in front 'to make a soldier's passage for his soul.'" And may the author add, such was the soldier who was sacrificed by the ignorance of his division commander—an infantry officer who undertook to direct the placing of his artillery without discretion on the part of his artillery commander.

Had Col. Pegram lived and the war continued he would have attained to high command. Already Gen. Lee had expressed his intention to give the young soldier a brigade at the first opportunity which presented, but it is doubtful if the gallant artilleryman would have exchanged his sixteen guns for such a command.

Early on the morning of the 2d, the Federals renewed the attack, breaking the lines of the Confederates and forcing them from their position covering the Boyd-

ton Plank Road, and Gibbon's Division of Ord's Corps boldly essayed to break through into the town. The morning of the 1st, Pendleton had ordered seven guns of Poague's command, which had been held in reserve near Howlett's, to march for Petersburg, and that night the whole battalion was directed to follow. When the first two batteries arrived they were ordered to proceed to the right and conceal themselves before dawn near the Turnbull house.

After capturing all the works to the south and west, Grant found a more difficult task before him at the town, for Ord's way was barred by two open profiles, known as Battery Gregg and Fort Whitworth, the latter from the character of a gun mounted therein. These works were about 200 yards apart and 1,000 in front of the main line of intrenchments. The gorge of Battery Gregg was closed by a palisade and its ditch was generally impassable. On the right flank, however, a line to connect with Whitworth had been started, and here the unfinished ditch and parapet gave a narrow access to the parapet of Gregg. It was by this route that the enemy finally reached it. It was defended by two guns of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut. McElroy, and the 12th and 16th Mississippi, 214 men in all. Fort Whitworth was open at the gorge and was held by three guns of the Washington Artillery, under Lieut. Battles, and two Mississippi regiments.

Thrice Gibbon's columns, above 5,000 strong, surged against Gregg and each time were repulsed by the devoted garrison, McElroy fighting his guns with great valor while his drivers armed with muskets aided the infantry. The day was an eventful one for the Washington Artillery, for early in the morning when Battles was ordered to withdraw from the outer line, before his horses could be brought up the enemy rushed to the works and seized his guns. But, McElroy in the fort, seeing Battles surrounded and cut off led a charge of his pseudo-infantry, and recovered the pieces.

Shortly before noon, Gibbon, reinforced by two brigades of Turner's Division, while the third advanced against Whitworth, again assailed Gregg, and this time his men swarmed over the parapet and captured McElroy's guns. Of the garrison 55 were killed, 129 were wounded, and only 30 were found uninjured, while Gibbon lost 122 killed and 592 wounded in the four assaults.

McElroy had again performed a splendid feat of arms. Surely he felt no shame over the loss of those two guns, which "taught prudence to the enemy for the rest of the day." It was the unflinching character of Lee's artillerymen as exemplified by McElroy that prompted Meade in July to telegraph Grant, "I cannot advise an assault. . . . It is not the number of the enemy, which oppose our taking Petersburg; it is their artillery and their works, which can be held by reduced numbers against direct assault."*

The seven guns of Poague's Battalion from near the Turnbull house assisted Eshleman's other batteries on the Boydton Road in checking the enemy's pursuit, and while heavily engaged had been joined by Poague with the remainder of his command. Maj. Brander had also posted three guns on the north bank of the Appomattox, from whence they were able to enfilade the Federal left as it swung towards the river, while Chew threw four pieces into action on the right of the Cox Road. But by noon the Federals had seized Gregg and Whitworth, and fully established their line from these works to the river. Nevertheless, McElroy, Poague, Brander, and Chew had checked the enemy and given Field's Division time to reach Petersburg before the outer line fell. Kershaw now alone remained north of the James to confront Weitzel. A. P. Hill, veteran of many fields, a knight *sans peur et sans reproche*, had fallen. But all was not yet lost.

During the day, the artillery fire on the east of the city had been unusually severe. Beginning the previous

*Written July 26.

night, the enemy's mortars and guns had been kept incessantly at work.

Lee and Longstreet had watched the defense of Fort Gregg, with the utmost admiration, fully expecting the compact Federal masses to assail the inner works, behind which Field had been placed. Early in the morning, Lee had advised the President that he must abandon the lines that night, and having noted Grant's pause, about 3 P. M., issued the formal orders for the evacuation in time to begin the move by dark, and the troops north of the James were directed to march through Richmond and join the Army on the roads leading westward. While Alexander stood at the north end of the pontoon bridge, near Drewry's Bluff, watching his batteries file by, Walker and Jones withdrew their battalions from the Petersburg lines. Pendleton had ordered all the guns to move out at 8 P. M. This was accomplished with great success in spite of the enemy's ceaseless cannonade. But ten pieces had to be abandoned and these by Jones for lack of teams, all being disabled. Even a number of mortars were saved, and by 2 A. M. all the field artillery had crossed the Appomattox and commenced the march westward along the Hickory Road. Thus did Lee evacuate the forty miles of intrenchments which for nine months had been "clothed in thunder," and for the defense of which the line of defenders had at last been overstretched.

Along the north bank of the Appomattox moved the long lines of artillery and dark silent columns of infantry through the gloom of the night towards Amelia Courthouse, where rations had been ordered to be collected for the Army. "As the troops moved noiselessly onward in the darkness that just precedes the dawn, a bright light like a broad flash of lightning illumined the heavens for an instant, then followed a tremendous explosion. 'The magazine at Ft. Drewry is blown up,' ran whispers through the ranks, and again silence reigned." All knew now that Alexander and Kershaw had spiked their heavy guns and were on the way

to join the main column. Passing through Manchester at daybreak, Alexander's column marched 24 miles on the 3d, going into camp that night near Tomahawk Church, while the main column halted about nine miles from Goode's Bridge after a distressing night and day of toil, broken only by a brief halt at Chesterfield Courthouse, about dawn that morning.

At 8:15 A. M. Richmond in flames had been surrendered to Weitzel, and the sun was hardly up before Meade's troops entered the works about Petersburg.

Alexander's command had just gone into bivouac when he was ordered to accompany some engineer officers to prepare a wagon route for the Artillery and trains to an overhead railroad bridge across the Appomattox River. Marching all night in the mud, the entire column was safely gotten across during the 4th and went into camp near sundown about three miles from Amelia Courthouse. During the day, Pendleton was busily engaged making arrangements for the reduction of the Artillery to a basis proportionate to the other troops, and to dispose of the surplus. Only the best equipped battalions were to remain with the Army, while all the rest were to be taken by Gen. Walker to Lynchburg.

The morning of the 5th, Walker set out by a road to the right and west of the main column after destroying ninety-five caissons with a great quantity of ammunition, which had early in the winter been sent to Amelia from Petersburg.

As soon as Grant learned of Lee's line of retreat, he pushed forward his whole available force, numbering near 80,000 men, in order to intercept him on the Richmond and Danville Railroad. The Federal pursuit was as rapid as the progress of Lee's Army was slow. The heavy rains, bottomless roads, and utter lack of forage soon reduced the artillery teams and transport to a most distressing state of exhaustion, and hundreds of men were forced to leave the ranks from hunger. The long wagon trains with their broken-down teams

encumbered the roads at every turn, the men cheered on at first by the promise of food at Amelia Courthouse. But, disappointment there awaited them, for Lee's orders had miscarried and the rations and forage intended for the Army lay in the storehouses in Richmond. Nothing remained but the wide dispersion of the troops for foraging purposes, and dissolution under these conditions was inevitable. The delay at Amelia entailed by the necessity of collecting food was fatal, for already Sheridan's troopers were harassing the flank and even the head of the column, while Grant's whole force well fed and carried forward by the stimulating hope of early victory was marching on nearly parallel roads.

In the words of one of Pendleton's staff officers, "It was a period in which no note was taken of day or night; one long, confused, dreadful day. There seemed to be no front, no rear, for firing might be heard ahead and behind, and on both sides at once. There were no headquarters, except where the ambulance happened to be." Small wonder that the brave men and their horses fell by the roadside exhausted by want and weariness.

Such was the condition when it was learned that Sheridan was across Lee's path at Jetersville, whereupon the Army was formed into line of battle to attack him. But it was now reported that the 2d and 6th Corps were in front of the Army, and in order to pass them the column was countermarched a short distance, turned off to the right through Amelia Springs, and after marching all night reached Rice's Station six miles west of Burkeville at daylight.

During the night a serious panic was started by a large black stallion carrying a fence rail swinging to his bridle, and running through the column. In the long continued firing which broke out, many officers and men were killed, among them Maj. Smith, who was in command of the detachment of heavy artillerymen from Drewry's Bluff.

At Rice's Station, Alexander was directed to select a line of battle upon which Lee soon formed his army, now reduced to about 10,000 men, while Pendleton placed his battalions in positions commanding the Burkeville Road and from which they could sweep the approaches on the left.

All day the 2d Corps had closely pressed Lee's rear, while the cavalry and the 6th Corps struck Ewell's column at Sailor's Creek. The latter force of about 8,000 men consisted of Kershaw's Division, a number of departmental employees under Gen. Custis Lee, the marines and sailors of the fleet under Admiral Tucker, and the heavy artillery from Drewry's and Chaffin's bluffs, under Col. Crutchfield and Maj. Stiles. After a most desperate conflict in which Ewell's nondescript force first repulsed, then charged the enemy, it was overborne by numbers and captured. Gen. Lee had gone in person to try to save Ewell's command, but now returned to the other troops, and told Gen. Pendleton on coming up with him, "General, half of our army is destroyed."

Toward noon, the enemy began to appear in Lee's front at Rice's Station, but were easily held off by Pendleton and Alexander with the Artillery. During the day Dearing's and Rosser's cavalry had met and captured a small mixed force of the enemy which had been sent forward to destroy the High Bridge on the Lynchburg Road. In this affair, both Gen. Dearing and Maj. James W. Thomson were killed. Thus two more officers, whose names will be remembered as long as any others in Lee's Artillery, laid down their lives.

The combat was short and bloody, the Confederate victory complete, and Dearing and the gallant Col. Boston of the Cavalry both fell in the first flush of victory. Opposite the Confederate center and left, the enemy sent up the white flag. But on the extreme right, Thomson, in ignorance of the surrender, pressed forward with his mounted cannoneers. As he did so, he caught sight of the white flag away down the line and

gave a shout of joy. At that very moment he was struck with two balls, either of which would have proved fatal. With a deep groan he reeled from his saddle and fell dead. A moment later not a shot was to be heard. About the stricken body of the youthful major, his gunners grouped themselves in silence, among them his devoted friend and comrade, Maj. James Breathed, who, as he sighed and turned away, said, "With ten thousand such men as Jimmie Thomson, I could whip Grant's Army."

So died this martial youth, who from the day he entered the Virginia Military Institute in September, 1860, until the hour of his death, personified all that was valiant, all that was noble. No space here to tell of the many fields upon which he had won fame. But a lad of eighteen when as a lieutenant he helped Chew organize Ashby's Horse Battery, but twenty when captain of that battery, and but twenty-one when he became a battalion commander in the Horse Artillery, yet he was a veteran when he died, and was able to boast continuous service from the very beginning to the very end of the war. With Ashby, Jackson, and Stuart, he had fought upon every field made famous by their names, and on many an unknown field he had followed Chew who fought while others rested.

There beside Dearing and Boston he lay, all of them covered by their rubber blankets, suggestive of the curtain which had fallen upon these heroic lives. But another scene in the tragedy remained. An officer quickly searches the field. It is Jimmie Thomson's roommate at the Institute, the son of Admiral Smith Lee, who has heard of his death and is looking for his body, and more,—for the letter and the picture which he knows will be found in the breast pocket of that stained gray jacket. And on another portion of the field is found by a Confederate officer, in the haversack of a Federal soldier, a slip of paper containing a description of Thomson's death, and on it is written the following verse:

"His life burned not to ashes, white with doubt,
But flaring up in battles' breath went out,
His young blood pulsing years in a wild route,
Then halting at high tide.

"In the loud trumpet blast, in the grand rush of lifted banners met,
With his cheeks flushing and his saber wet,
His young eyes flashing and his young lips set;
So his rich spirit passed.

"Just when the field was won,
When the clouds broke from off the hard-won fight,
And the pierced flag leaped out upon our sight,
In victory upspringing from the right,
His brave young soul went out."*

During the afternoon Lee received information of an attack by the Federal Cavalry on his wagon train two miles in rear, whereupon he requested Gen. Pendleton to go back and see what could be done to save further loss. Meeting the remnants of Harris' Brigade, Pendleton gathered together about twenty volunteers and soon joined by a regiment of Cooke's Cavalry moved back to the train on which the enemy had fired. Pendleton and Cooke attacked the hostile cavalry, but were soon compelled to fall back, unable to save the wagons, and pursued for some distance by the enemy.

About sundown the Federals began massing in front of the line at Rice's Station for an attack in force, and Lee gave orders to resume the retreat. The Army, now cut off from Danville, marched towards Lynchburg, reaching Farmville at sunrise, after great hardships. During the entire night but six miles were covered. At Farmville, the weary column crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, and received a small supply of rations. As the Artillery began crossing the bridges at Farmville, the enemy pressed closely upon the rear guard, whereupon Pendleton placed several batteries in position on the heights on the north bank to cover the crossing.

*The finder of this paper was the Hon. W. L. Wilson, Member United States Congress from West Virginia, and later President of Washington and Lee University.

For a beautiful and most interesting account of Maj. Thomson's career, see "A Modern Greek," by John S. Wise, *Bob Taylor's Magazine*, December, 1906.

Gen. Lee now sent for Alexander, and with his map explained to him that the enemy had taken a highway bridge across the Appomattox near the High Bridge, were crossing on it and would come in upon his road about three miles ahead of him. Directing Alexander to send artillery to cover this passage, he placed the two bridges at Farmville under the latter's personal charge with orders to destroy them after the troops had all crossed. After pointing out on the map a shorter route to Lynchburg than that which Lee was following, and producing a resident of the section to confirm the map, Gen. Alexander retired and immediately set fire to the railroad bridge as the enemy was already in sight.

Poague's Battalion of artillery had been sent ahead to the point indicated by Lee, and Mahone's Division supported by Poague's guns took up a good position and began to intrench. Persistently assailed by Miles' Division throughout the day, Mahone held his own, while Poague fought his guns with desperate determination, losing then recovering one of his pieces. The service which the stern and indomitable Poague here rendered fully satisfied the confidence reposed in him by Pendleton, who selected the gallant little hero of the Wilderness in preference to all others for the delicate task of opening the way for the Army.

At midnight, the main column moved on the road toward Buckingham Courthouse, with Mahone and Poague forming the rear guard. During a truce, after sundown on the 7th, which Mahone secured for the removal of his wounded, a letter from Grant was transmitted to Lee through him, in which Grant first suggested the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, to which Lee promptly replied, inquiring what terms would be offered.

In spite of the roads, a long march was made during the night, and the morning of the 8th found the head of the Confederate column near Appomattox Courthouse.

During the march on the 8th, as Pendleton and Alexander rode together, the Chief of Artillery mentioned

the fact that a number of the senior officers of the Army had conferred together and concluded it should be represented to Lee that in their opinion further resistance was futile, in order that he might surrender without incurring the odium of first proposing the step.

According to Alexander, Pendleton's contemporary account was about as follows:

It being the consensus of opinion among certain officers that Longstreet should approach the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, he, Pendleton, had suggested such action to Longstreet, but his proposal had been indignantly rejected, with the emphatic remark that it was his duty to support and not hamper his superior in the execution of his trust; that his, the 1st Corps, could still whip twice its number, and that as long as that was so, he would never suggest surrender. Failing to enlist Longstreet's services for the purpose proposed, he, Pendleton, had himself made bold to suggest a surrender to Gen. Lee, but was snubbed by the Commander-in-Chief, who coldly declared that "There are too many men here to talk of laying down their arms without fighting."

Gen. Alexander further asserted that in recounting these events, Pendleton was plainly embarrassed by the reception he had been given by Gen. Lee, which he, Alexander, at the time inferred to have been much in the nature of a rebuke. Concerning this whole incident, however, there are many recorded discrepancies.

In later years, Pendleton, always loth to discuss the sad circumstances connected with the retreat and surrender of the Army, gave the following account of his discharge of the mission upon which he was deputed by his fellow officers.

"Fighting was going on, but not very severely, so that conversation was practicable. Gen. Gordon had an interview with me; told me of discouraging intelligence from the South, and of a conference which had been held between other responsible officers and himself, and announced their joint wish that, if my views agreed with theirs, I should convey to Gen. Longstreet, as second

in command, and then, if he agreed, to Gen. Lee, our united judgment that the cause had become hopeless, so we thought it wrong longer to have men killed on either side, and not right, moreover, that our beloved commander should be left to bear the entire trial of initiating the idea of terms with the enemy. My judgment not conflicting with those expressed, it seemed to me to be my duty to convey them to Gen. Lee. At first, Gen. Longstreet dissented, but on second thought preferred that he himself should be represented with the rest. Gen. Lee was lying alone, resting, at the base of a large pine tree. I approached and sat by him. To a statement of the case he quietly listened, and then, courteously expressing thanks for the consideration of his subordinates in desiring to relieve him in part of existing burdens, spoke in about these words: 'I trust it has not come to that. We certainly have too many brave men to think of laying down our arms. They still fight with great spirit, whereas the enemy do not. And, besides, if I were to intimate to Gen. Grant that I would listen to terms, he would at once regard it as such an evidence of weakness that he would demand unconditional surrender, and sooner than that I am resolved to die. Indeed, we must all determine to die at our posts.' My reply could only be that every man would no doubt cheerfully meet death with him in the discharge of duty, and that we were perfectly willing that he should decide the question."

This account differs widely from Alexander's. It may be that as time wore on, Gen. Pendleton saw matters in a softer light, and felt that what had at first appeared as a rebuke to him, was in fact the result of overwrought nerves.

After Pendleton's conversation on the march with Gen. Alexander, he pushed on to communicate in person with Gen. Walker, whose column he found about two miles beyond the Courthouse on the road to Appomattox Station. While he was conversing with Walker, whose batteries were parked and who himself was engaged in the duty of shaving, a large force of Federal cavalry burst upon the camp and began firing upon the defenseless men and their horses. The situation was desperate, but with great coolness, and the utmost presence of mind, Gen. Walker remained master of the situation. Almost instantly Walker's and Dickenson's batteries, which had been relieved of their guns and armed as a guard with muskets, formed line in a

fringe of pines, and held the enemy at bay until a number of guns could be thrown into action, while the train was withdrawn. Thus did Walker's Artillery, entirely unsupported, maintain itself against the enemy. There was no panic whatever among these brave gunners. The following interesting account of this affair is taken from the diary of the Washington Artillery, written by Maj. W. M. Owen.

"After we went into bivouac this evening, the artillery firing we had heard in front late in the afternoon seemed to be approaching nearer. It was not a great while before long trains of wagons came tearing down the road from the front, the drivers whipping up their mules and shouting lustily. I mounted my horse and rode forward to see what was the matter. I had not gone far before I came up to a force of infantry that were being aligned across the road and preparing for defense.* Here I met some officers and men of the Washington Artillery, from whom I learned that Gen. Walker's column of artillery (about sixty pieces) had been marching in front of the Army all day, and at about 4 P. M. had halted in a grove just before reaching Appomattox station, on the Lynchburg railroad. Everything had been so quiet that they concluded to have a good rest, the officers and men taking advantage of the time to wash up and refresh themselves. It was not thought necessary to put out pickets, as the enemy was supposed to be pushing only our rear. While enjoying this supposed security, all of a sudden a bugle call rang out upon the air, and a squadron of Federal cavalry was seen preparing to charge. Men rushed to their guns in a hurry, horses were hitched up, and as the enemy advanced they were met by a raking fire of canister, which repulsed them. But again and again the enemy, reinforced, charged. They were Sheridan's cavalry.† The guns that could be gotten off fired retiring, and fell back to Appomattox Courthouse, where in the streets of the town they met infantry coming to their support, who in turn drove the enemy's cavalry back with loss. But the Washington Artillery, fighting to the last and evading capture with difficulty, destroyed their gun carriages, buried their guns in the woods, and nearly all the officers and men went to the mountains. They fired their last shot to-day, after three years and nine months of service in the field, since Bull Run, July, 1861."

This account explains the fact that some of the Artillery known to have been with Walker's column surrendered the following day with Pendleton's command.

*These were Walker's dismounted cannoneers.—Author's note.

†Custer's command.—Author's note.

While with Walker, and after the repulse of the enemy's cavalry, Pendleton received a summons from Gen. Lee, and setting out to rejoin the main column narrowly eluded a hostile force of cavalry, which was sweeping through the village, by leaping his horse over a fence and skirting the fields. When he reported to the Commander-in-Chief about 1 A. M. of the 9th, he found him "dressed in his neatest style, new uniform, snowy linen, etc." To Gen. Pendleton's expression of surprise, Gen. Lee explained, "I have probably to be Gen. Grant's prisoner, and thought I must make my best appearance."

Here the question suggests itself, was Lee really preparing to meet his victorious adversary, or was he, prompted by that spirit, the flash of which Pendleton has described, resolved to die at the head of his army in the event Grant failed to grant him honorable terms? He had placed himself on several occasions at the head of his troops, with the evident determination to die at their head if need be. It would almost seem that he was now clothing himself for the final sacrament in the cause which he held to be holy.

Grant was now hurrying forward his troops and massing a large force in Lee's front, having despatched a column by the short route pointed out to Lee by Gen. Alexander. Almost before Pendleton rejoined Lee, he heard the firing of artillery beyond the Courthouse, which could only mean the capture of Walker's Artillery column. Against cavalry alone, the sturdy gunners could contend, but not against the infantry, which was soon brought up by the defeated troopers.

Late in the afternoon of the 8th, Lee had received Grant's reply to his note of the evening before, and again he addressed the Federal commander, proposing a meeting between them at 10 A. M. the next day, this communication being delivered to Grant about midnight. But as the terms of Lee's note rather suggested a discussion of political character, Grant in a third note declined the interview.

At daylight, it was discovered that the enemy was in great force astride the Confederate line of retreat, and that Walker's command had been captured. A collision was unavoidable. Indeed Gordon, now in command of the 2d Corps, and leading the column, had been directed to clear the road at dawn.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 9th of April, the Confederates moved silently forward. Reaching the heights a little beyond the Courthouse Gordon found the enemy disposed to dispute his way, and at once deployed the 2,000 men of his corps, while Gen. Long brought forward the thirty pieces of artillery which were all that were left of Carter's, Poague's, Johnson's, and Stark's battalions. A well directed fire from the Artillery and an attack by Fitz Lee quickly dislodged the force immediately in Gordon's front, but beyond he could already discover the dark masses of the enemy's infantry, and knew further effort unaided was useless. In this affair Fitz Lee actually took a number of prisoners, and two 12-pounder Napoleons, but it was apparent to all that the sacrifice of life incident to further fighting would be as useless as it would be culpable.

Though Gordon, Long, and Fitz Lee fought with great spirit, still at noon the main column had not advanced beyond the Courthouse. When Lee early in the morning inquired of Gordon how he was progressing, the answer was that nothing could be accomplished without heavy reinforcements from Longstreet. Whereupon Lee took immediate steps to bring the fighting to an end and reopened negotiations with Grant. This was the only thing left, for Field's and Mahone's divisions and Alexander's Artillery were holding Meade back in the rear and could not be spared for an attack in the front.

Meanwhile, the march of the Army had been brought to a halt by Gordon's inability to advance, and the rear was closing up. Longstreet directed Alexander to form a line of battle, on which Mahone's and Field's divisions were to be rallied for a last stand. Alexander at once

placed all his artillery and all the organized infantry in position behind the North Fork of the Appomattox. While the enemy were extending their lines to the left the battery commanders begged to be allowed to open upon them, but this Alexander would not permit.

A flag of truce was now sent Grant, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for surrender, and an order to Gordon's troops to suspend their fire. This order, when received by Gen. Long, was sent by him through Majs. Southall, Parker, and other members of his staff to the different batteries, while he, himself, proceeded to the Courthouse. On reaching that point he discovered that the order had not carried to Clutter's Battery under Lieut. McIntosh, a brother of the battalion commander. This battery occupied a hill immediately above the village, and continued to fire rapidly upon an advancing line of the enemy's infantry. Gen. Long at once rode in person to the battery, and ordered the captain to cease firing and to withdraw his battery to a small valley east of the village, where the Artillery was being parked.

According to Gen. Long, the shots which Lieut. Wright's section of Clutter's Battery fired were the last fired in battle by the Army of Northern Virginia.

Some time before the order to cease firing was given, as Alexander came upon Lee and his staff by the roadside at the top of the hill, the General called him aside and again laid the map before him saying that the Army had come to the junction and inquired, "What have we got to do to-day?"

After talking with Gen. Pendleton, Alexander had formulated a plan in his own mind and now proceeded to present it. His own words are here quoted:

"My command having been north of the James had had no share in the fighting about Petersburg, and but little in the retreat. They had now begun to hear of a surrender, and would hint their sentiments in loud voices when I rode by.

"We don't want to surrender any ammunition. We've been saving ammunition all this war. Hope we are not saving it for a surrender."

"I told the general of this, and said that if he saw fit to try to cut our way out, my command would do as well as they had ever done.

"He answered:

" 'I have left only two divisions, Field's and Mahone's, sufficiently organized to be relied upon. All the rest have been broken and routed and can do little good. Those divisions are now scarcely 4,000 apiece, and that is far too little to meet the force now in front of us.'

"This was just the opportunity I wished, and I hastened to lay my plans before him. I said:

" 'Then we have only choice of two courses. Either to surrender, or take to the woods and bush, with orders either to rally on Johnston, or perhaps, better, on the Governors of the respective States. If we surrender this army, it is the end of the Confederacy. I think our best course would be to order each man to go to the Governor of his own State with his arms.'

" 'What would you hope to accomplish by that?' said he.

" 'In the first place,' said I, 'to stand the chances. If we surrender this army every other army will have to follow suit. All will go like a row of bricks, and if the rumors of help from France have any foundation the news of our surrender will put an end to them.

" 'But the only thing which may be possible in our present situation is to get some kind of terms. None of our armies are likely to be able to get them, and that is why we should try with the different States. Already it has been said that Vance can make terms with North Carolina, and Jo Brown with Georgia. Let the Governor of each State make some sort of a show of force and then surrender on terms, which may save us from trial for treason and confiscation.'

"As I talked it all looked to me so reasonable that I hoped he was convinced, for he listened in silence. So I went on more confidently:

" 'But, General, apart from all that—if all fails and there is no hope—the men who have fought under you for four years have got the right this morning to ask one favor of you. We know that you do not care for military glory. But we are proud of the record of this army. We want to leave it untarnished to our children. It is a clear record so far, and now is about to be closed. A little blood more or less now makes no difference, and we have the right to ask of you to spare us the mortification of having you ask Grant for terms, and have him answer that he has no terms to offer. That it is "U. S.—Unconditional Surrender." That was his reply to Buckner at Fort Donelson, and to Pemberton at

Vicksburg, and that is what threatens us. General, spare us the mortification of asking terms and getting that reply.'

"He heard it all so quietly and it was all so true, it seemed to me, and so undeniable, that I felt sure that I had him convinced. His first words were:

" 'If I should take your advice, how many men do you suppose would get away?'

" 'Two-thirds of us,' I answered. 'We would be like rabbits and partridges in the bushes, and they could not scatter to follow us.'

"He said: 'I have only 15,000 muskets left. Two-thirds of them divided among the States, even if all could be collected, would be too small a force to accomplish anything. All could not be collected. Their homes have been overrun, and many would go to look after their families.

" 'Then, General, you and I as Christian men have no right to consider only how this would affect us. We must consider the effect on the country as a whole. Already it is demoralized by four years of war. If I took your advice, the men would be without rations and under no control of officers. They would be compelled to rob and steal in order to live. They would become mere bands of marauders, and the enemy's cavalry would pursue them and overrun many wide sections they may never have occasion to visit. We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from.

" 'And as for myself, you young fellows might go to bush-whacking, but the only dignified course for me would be to go to Gen. Grant and surrender myself and take the consequences of my acts.'

"He paused for only a moment and then went on.

" 'But I can tell you one thing for your comfort. Grant will not demand an unconditional surrender. He will give us as good terms as this army has a right to demand, and I am going to meet him in the rear at 10 A. M. and surrender the army on condition of not fighting again until exchanged.'

"I had not a single word to say in reply. He had answered my suggestion from a plane so far above it that I was ashamed of having made it. With several friends I had planned to make an escape on seeing a flag of truce, but that idea was at once abandoned by all of them on hearing my report."

Thus did the plan upon which the bold young Alexander had cogitated during the preceding days come to naught, dissipated like thin smoke in the air of Lee's nobility of soul. In maturer years, Gen. Alexander came to see the folly of his proposals, and magnanimously ac-

knowledgeed the error of his hot youth, accepting the inevitable in the same spirit it was received by Lee. Let us not censure him if in the enthusiasm of his youth he failed to perceive that in defeat there was a greater courage than prolonged resistance with the useless sacrifice of brave lives. Such an end to a struggle for liberty may have been suited to Cronge and de Wett, but it was beneath a Lee, from whose view that higher duty to God was not obscured by any false sense of obligation to his army and his people.

About 8:30 A. M., Gen. Lee, in his full new uniform, begirt with sword and sash, rode to the rear to meet Grant, and soon received the communication from the latter before mentioned. He at once wrote the Federal chieftain, again requesting an interview, but in terms which suggested fuller compliance with the original proposal. While this last message was being prepared, a messenger riding like the wind dashed around a curve and, seeing Lee, brought his superb charger to a halt. It was the gallant, one-armed John Haskell of artillery fame at Petersburg, nay, more, of world fame. All recognized the rider, who with his good arm only succeeded in drawing up his lathered steed one hundred yards or more beyond the group. Gen. Lee went to meet him, exclaiming: "What is it? What is it?" and then seeing the sad plight of Col. Haskell's magnificent animal so well known to the Army, without waiting for a reply, sorrowfully said: "Oh, why did you do it? You have killed your beautiful horse!"*

Col. Haskell explained that Fitz Lee had sent in a report that he had found a road by which the Army could escape, and that Longstreet had ordered him to overtake Lee, before he could send a note to Grant, and to kill his horse if necessary to do it.

Lee, however, did not credit the report, which later proved to be a mistake.

*This animal was noted for its beauty and speed. It had been led all the way from Richmond on the retreat, with a view to making an escape in case of surrender. The horse recovered and was sold to a Federal officer for a handsome sum in gold.

What need to describe the sad rites which now ensued? Or to tell of the anguish which showed in the eyes of those heroic men that had for four horror-laden years toiled wearily on to Appomattox, whither the inexorable sign posts of Fate had led them—to which we now know the fickle dame, oftentimes disguising the route with cajoling flatteries, had guided them from the first? Was it another trick of Fate that the very roof which shielded the proud Lee from the gaze of the curious, as he conferred with Grant, was the haven in which its owner had sought refuge from the stricken field of First Manassas? Well may it be said that no home in all that bleeding Southland was free from the merciless intrusions of war?*

After the formal surrender of his army, Gen. Lee appointed Gens. Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton to conduct the transfer of property, and to supervise the paroling of the officers and men. In accordance with the stipulations of the agreement the guns and troops were withdrawn from the lines, and the work was promptly undertaken.

The return of the Chief of Ordnance for the morning of April 9 showed 7,892 organized infantry, with 75 rounds of ammunition each, and 63 field guns with an average of 93 rounds. But 61 guns and 13 caissons, however, remained, for two pieces had been destroyed during the morning.

The infantry were first massed near the Courthouse, and after stacking arms were directed to retire, while the Federal officers took charge. Alexander was directed to form all the guns and caissons in a single column along the road, that the Federal ordnance officers might conduct them into their lines. The animals had been practically without forage of any kind for several days. Alexander writes: "With a heart full of sympathy for the poor brutes, I formed the column on Tuesday, April 11, and left them standing in the road,

*The house in which the articles of surrender were signed was the residence of Maj. McLean, to which he had removed after his home at Manassas was destroyed in the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861.

which they filled for about a mile. The next morning I bade good-bye to Appomattox, and as I rode off from the scene I saw the mournful column of artillery still standing in the road unattended, but with many of its poor horses now down in the mud and unable to rise."

Let us avert our eyes from the sad picture and be thankful that a large number of the artillery horses, including all the mounts, had been claimed by the officers and men.

Many batteries had escaped the surrender, both from Walker's column on the 8th, and from the Army at Appomattox the following day. Some made their way to Lynchburg, where the guns were destroyed, and others buried their guns by the roadside and disbanded. Of all that great corps of near three hundred pieces, little more than half a hundred were surrendered. Many of the artillerymen joined Johnston, among them a large detachment of horse artillery under Col. Chew, who escaped with Rosser's Cavalry Division and reported at Greensboro, N. C., April 30. They were not allowed to engage in hostilities against Sherman, for the view was taken that they were an integral part of Lee's Army, and therefore embraced in the surrender. Later they were paroled with Johnston's troops.

The total number of officers and men of the Army of Northern Virginia paroled by Grant during the 10th and 11th of April was 28,231, for large numbers of stragglers soon joined the organized force which stacked arms on the 9th.

It is difficult to determine with certainty the exact composition of the Artillery present at the Surrender. The parole lists indicate that the remaining organizations were as follows:*

Stark's Battalion-----	{	Giles Battery
		Louisiana Guard Battery
		Richmond Hampden Battery

*See Vol. XV, Southern Historical Papers. In this valuable volume the names of the artillery officers who surrendered, as well as of the enlisted men, are given.

Cutshaw's Battalion-----	{ 2d Richmond Howitzers Staunton Battery King William Battery Richmond Orange Battery Reese's Alabama Battery Louisa Morris Battery
Lightfoot's Battalion-----	{ Caroline Battery Surry Battery
Hardaway's Battalion-----	{ 8d Richmond Howitzers 1st Richmond Howitzers Norfolk Blues Battery Salem Battery 1st Rockbridge Battery Powhatan Battery
Johnson's Battalion-----	{ Fredericksburg Battery Clutter's Battery 1st Maryland Battery Southside Battery
Haskell's Battalion-----	{ Lamkin's Nelson Battery Palmetto (S. C.) Battery Rowan (N. C.) Battery Branch's (N. C.) Battery
Huger's Battalion-----	{ Bedford Battery Madison (La.) Battery Ashland Battery Parker's Richmond Battery Bath Battery
McIntosh's Battalion-----	{ 4th Maryland Battery Danville Battery (Price's) Lynchburg Battery (Chamberlayne's) 2d Rockbridge Battery Ringgold Danville Battery Graham's Petersburg Battery Jeff Davis (Ala.) Battery
Richardson's Battalion-----	Donaldsonville (La.) Battery
Poague's Battalion-----	{ Manly's N. C. Battery Pittsylvania Battery Warrenton Battery Williams' N. C. Battery Albemarle Everett Battery N. C. Battery (?)
Braxton's Battalion-----	Lynchburg Lee Battery

With the Army were fragments of other batteries, including men from the four companies of the Washington Artillery Battalion who attached themselves, after

escaping from Walker's column, to Alexander's and Long's commands. Some of the batteries enumerated as present with the Army at the Surrender numbered but a mere handful of men. The strength of the various battalions may be determined from the following enumeration:

ARTILLERY PAROLE ROLLS, DATED APRIL 9, 1865

	Officers	Enlisted Men	Total
General Headquarters, Brig-Gen. Pendleton and Staff	12	13	25
First Army Corps, Brig-Gen. E. P. Alexander and Staff	11	36	47
Haskell's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Haskell	15	139	154
Huger's Battalion, Maj. Tyler C. Jordan	21	307	328
McIntosh's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. M. Owen	14	268	282
Poague's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wm. T. Poague	17	279	296
13th Virginia Battalion, Capt. D. N. Walker	2	10	12
Richardson's Battalion, Capt. R. Prosper Landry	4	77	81
Total First Army Corps	84	1,116	1,200
Second Army Corps, Brig-Gen. A. L. Long and Staff	8	22	30
Carter's Command, Col. Thomas H. Carter	2	4	6
Braxton's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Carter M. Braxton	7	19	26
Cutshaw's Battalion, Capt. C. W. Fry	12	199	211
Hardaway's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. R. A. Hardaway	19	382	401
Johnson's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Marmaduke Johnson	8	135	143
Lightfoot's Battalion, Asst. Surg. J. B. Coakley	1	29	30
Stark's Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Alex. W. Stark	11	154	165
Total Second Army Corps	68	944	1,012
Anderson's Corps, Col. Hilary P. Jones	2	1	3
Blount's Battalion	3	21	24
Coit's Battalion		37	37
Stribling's Battalion	2	8	10
Total Anderson's Corps	7	67	74
Smith's Battalion, Capt. W. F. Dement	13	252	265
Total Artillery	184	2,392	2,676

The foregoing rolls partially disclose the organization of the Artillery as effected by Pendleton at Amelia Courthouse, when the reduction in the force with the Army became necessary, and at which time parts of Coit's, Eshleman's, Cabell's, King's, Nelson's, Pegram's, and Sturdivant's battalions were placed under Gen. Walker to be taken to Lynchburg. According to Custer, there were over thirty pieces of artillery with Walker, besides a large train, and twenty-four of these guns and many prisoners were captured, but Sheridan places the number of guns captured by Custer from Walker at twenty-five. Custer claims that during the ten days preceding the Surrender his command captured forty-six guns.*

The exact composition of the various artillery commands after leaving Amelia is difficult to determine, but the following order, the last issued by Gen. Walker, and for which the author is indebted to Gen. Walker's Assistant Adjutant-General, Capt. William W. Chamberlayne, throws some light on the subject.

"HD. QRS. RESERVE ARTY, A. N. VIRGINIA,

"April 7, 1865.

"CIRCULAR.

"This command will move at 1 o'clock A. M., in the following order:

"Lightfoot's Battalion,
"Coit's Division,
"Eshleman's Division,
"Cabell's Division,
"Walker's Battalion, } Rear Guard.
"Leyden's Battalion, }

"Col. Cabell will furnish a section of Napoleons to march with the Rear Guard.

"The wagons in rear of their respective Battalions.

"By command of Gen. Walker.

"WM. W. CHAMBERLAYNE,
"A. A.-General."

[Received on the back.]

*It will be recalled that some of Walker's batteries had buried their guns, others joined the main column, and others dispersed before Custer's final attack.

Hd. Qrs. Cabell's Batt.,
Received by WALTER B. CARR,
April 7, '65. *Sergeant Major.*

Hd. Qrs. Reserve Arty 3d Corps,
April 7, '65. B. F. ESHLEMAN,
Lt.-Col. Commanding.

Received by JAS. C. COIT,
Maj. Commanding Batt.

[Other receipts torn off.]

If we allow Walker a force of 500 men, and the various batteries which escaped to Lynchburg and the ten batteries of horse artillery 800, it will be seen that the Artillery personnel numbered not less than 3,800 officers and men April 8, 1865. Thus, whatever may be said of the state of disorganization of the Infantry and Cavalry, there being not more than 2,000 of the latter towards the end of the retreat, it is apparent that the Artillery maintained its organization in a comparatively high state of efficiency to the end, with its personnel only slightly reduced since its departure from Petersburg.* No higher tribute can be paid its commanders than this fact, for the Artillery in the nature of things should have been the first to show signs of dissolution.

Grant's terms were honorable. The arms, artillery, such of it as was left, and all public property were to be turned over to the victors, all officers retaining their side-arms, private horses and baggage. In addition to this and in the interest of the desolate Southern people, every soldier in the Confederate Army who claimed to own a horse or mule was to be permitted to retain it for farming purposes. And so many of the artillery teams, for the preservation and care of which Pendleton had labored so incessantly, were now to exchange the gun and the caisson for the plow and the harrow, the implements in that struggle for existence, which for

*Shoemaker's Horse Battery contained 90 men when it surrendered. There is no reason to suppose the other horse batteries were not as strong, so the foregoing estimate is extremely conservative. Three full batteries of Blount's Battalion with certainly 50 men each escaped to Lynchburg.

the next decade proved to be far more cruel and distressing than the mere war for liberty, through which the South had passed. Who can tell what were the emotions of those gallant gunners when first they struck the plowshare of peace into the poverty-stricken soil of their native fields? Did not the war-stained harness, which still hung from the backs of those weary, worn animals, recall to mind the charger and the martial trappings of a hundred battlefields? Did not the dumb patience of those faithful brutes, bearing like their masters the wounds and scars of battle, hold for Lee's men a lesson of fortitude and admonish them that together the old war horse and the veteran must labor on for the salvation of the land? Ah! it is sweet to believe that these brave gunners, often as at dawn they led their old artillery teams from the leaky shelters that stabled them, recalled the reveille of other days, and perhaps with a manly tear in their eyes gently stroked the muzzles of those faithful steeds. Or perhaps, as they rested together, man and beast, in the heat of noon-tide, 'neath the generous shade of some ancient oak, the sighing of the nearby pines recalled to their minds the rush of the guns, the hastening feet, the roar of battle, of another day, and admonished them to be brave so that when the final Appomattox came upon them they might be released from the plow of life with the same consciousness of duty, well performed, that filled their souls on that April day in 1865—that day when nature with her sweet scented fields and budding trees sought to sweeten the bitterness of defeat, and soothe with her beauties the fevered brow of a vanquished army.

It has been said that the shots fired by Lieut. Wright were the last, but let us accept Page's beautiful story as one of fact. Two weeks before the Surrender an old artillery officer had been sent with a small column and a battery to guard an important pass in the Blue Ridge, through which a Federal column from Southwest Virginia was expected to attempt to move upon Lee's rear.

The "Old Colonel" had seized and held the crossing. The position for his guns had been carefully selected. It was at the highest point of the pass just where the road crawled over the shoulders of the mountain along the limestone cliff, a hundred feet sheer above the deep river, where its waters had cut their way in ages past, and now lay deep and silent as if resting after their arduous toil before they began to boil over the great boulders which filled the bed of the stream. The position was impregnable, and the "Old Colonel" had been ordered to hold it until relieved.

Late on the 10th, the enemy assailed the battery, but all in vain. Numbers counted for little in that wild eyrie, where a single gun could hold out against a host. On the 11th, the Federals attempted under a flag of truce to convince the "Old Colonel" that Lee had surrendered, but still he remained at his post, awaiting some order to withdraw. No order came, but soon undoubted news arrived of the sad event. At last, as the sun set in all its glory, throwing the great western peaks in dark relief against the golden sky, and the shades of night spread through the silent vales, the pickets were called in and the old battery formed as if for parade. Once more the men were to be allowed to make the mountains echo with the crash of their guns.

The embers of the sinking camp-fires threw a faint light on the guns, standing so grim and silent in the embrasures of the little work; nearby stood the caissons with the harness hanging limply from the poles. Not a word was spoken, except that of command. "At the order each detachment went to its piece; the guns were run back, and the men with their own hands ran them upon the edge of the perpendicular bluff above the river, where, sheer below, the waters washed its base. The pieces stood ranged in the order in which they had so often stood in battle, and the gray, thin fog rising slowly and silently from the river deep down between the cliffs, and wreathing the mountain side above, might have been the smoke from some unearthly battle

fought by ghostly guns, posted there in the darkness and manned by phantom cannoneers. At the word the gunners drew their lanyards taut—as if a single piece the six guns belched forth a sheet of flame, roared a last challenge on the misty night, and sent their thunder reverberating through the darkening mountain tops, while startling alike the blue-coated warriors in their camp below, the browsing deer and the prowling fox.”

A deadly silence now fell upon the scene, broken only by the sighing of the tree-tops above and the rushing torrent. Then came another command—“Let them go, and God be our helper. Amen!”

For a few moments there was utter silence; then one prolonged, deep, resounding splash, as the war-worn guns plunged into the pool, spreading over its once-placid surface a spray, as if some titan hand had lain a floral tribute upon the abysmal tomb of Lee’s Artillery. Such was the final sacrament of those men, whose record is enshrined in the names of Pendleton, Long, Alexander, Walker, Walton, Crutchfield, Brown, Pelham, Pegram, Chew, Breathed, Latimer, Thomson, Landry, Cutshaw, McIntosh, Poague, Carter, Braxton, Haskell, Huger, Hardaway, Cabell, Gibbes, Watson, McGregor, McGraw, McCarthy, Nelson, Chamberlayne, Caskie, and a host of their peers too numerous to mention, the like of whom the world has never known before or since their time. Such was the hallowed rite that marked the “Burial of Lee’s Guns” and the end of that strife in which Sumter was the primer that discharged the explosive compounded of political antagonism. An apparent motive only had been needed, both north and south, for the pulling of the lanyard to expand an energy stored up through years of cherished animosity. But now, the end had come and once more the placid waters settled over a cause, buried but not forgotten.

If in its record there is a single incident to inspire other generations to emulate the devotion to duty, the valor, the Christian fortitude, of the men who fought its guns, then the “Long Arm of Lee” did not exist, struggle, and perish in vain.

GENERAL INDEX

Battery and battalion organizations are not included in the General Index, but in the "Battery Index" and the "Battalion Index," which follow. The records of the batteries and battalions are the records of their commanders, who are referred to in the General Index in their individual capacity only. Thus, if it be desired to trace the record of Captain, later Colonel, Thomas H. Carter, the references to Carter's Battery and Carter's Battalion should be consulted, as well as the item, "Carter, Col. T. H.," in the General Index. Statistics, such as numbers engaged, organization, personnel, material, captures, losses, ammunition expenditure, tactical features and dispositions, topography, Confederate and Federal, are not generally indexed, but will readily be found in the appropriate chronological chapter of the text.

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The battery organizations of the Army of Northern Virginia always bore two, and sometimes three names, a fact which leads to much confusion in the study of the Artillery records. The following index is arranged under two heads: "A", according to the locality in which the batteries were recruited; "B", according to the names of the battery commanders. Text references will be found under heading "A" only.

Thus the references to Pegram's Richmond "Purcell" Battery will be found under "A", opposite *Richmond*, while Chew's "Ashby" Battery, and Brown's "Wise" Battery, which were not local organizations, will be found under "A", opposite "*Ashby*" and "*Wise*", respectively. In order to trace the complete record of a particular battery it is essential to know to what battalion it belonged at various periods, as the Artillery was frequently referred to in the records by battalions, especially during the latter years of the War when the battalion was the tactical unit. The record of a battalion embraces the record of the constituent batteries.

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